Ybarra v. Dudek

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
GALVESTON DIVISION
L.Y.,1
Plaintiff.
V.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:26-cv-00112
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff L.Y. seeks judicial review of an administrative decision denying her
application for disability and disability insurance benefits under Title II of the
Social Security Act (the “Act”). L.Y. and Defendant Frank J. Bisignano, the
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the “Commissioner”), 2 have
briefed their positions. See Dkts. 8, 10, 11. After reviewing the briefing, the record,
and the applicable law, I affirm the Commissioner’s decision.
BACKGROUND
On July 26, 2021, L.Y. filed a Title II application for a period of disability and
disability insurance benefits, alleging disability beginning June 9, 2021. Her
application was denied and denied again upon reconsideration. Subsequently, an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held a hearing. Following the hearing, the ALJ
1 On May 1, 2023, the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the
Judicial Conference of the United States issued a memorandum recommending that
courts adopt a local practice of using only the first name and last initial of any non-
government party in Social Security opinions. This court has taken that guidance a step
further in the interest of claimant’s privacy and will use only initials in public opinions.
2 Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security on May 7, 2025. Bisignano is
“automatically substituted” as the defendant in this suit. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d); see also 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Any action instituted in accordance with this subsection shall survive
notwithstanding any change in the person occupying the office of Commissioner of Social
Security or any vacancy in such office.”).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
April 16, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
Case 3:26-cv-00112 Document 17 Filed 04/16/26 in TXSD Page 1 of 6

2
issued a written decision finding that L.Y. was not disabled. L.Y. filed an appeal
with the Appeals Council. The Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ’s
decision final and ripe for judicial review.
APPLICABLE LAW
The standard of judicial review for disability appeals is provided in 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g). See Waters v. Barnhart, 276 F.3d 716, 718 (5th Cir. 2002). Courts
reviewing the Commissioner’s denial of social security disability applications limit
their 	analysis 	to 	“(1) whether 	the 	Commissioner 	applied 	the 	proper 	legal
standards; 	and 	(2) whether 	the 	Commissioner’s 	decision 	is 	supported 	by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole.” Est. of Morris v. Shalala, 207 F.3d
744, 745 (5th Cir. 2000). Addressing the evidentiary standard, the Fifth Circuit has
explained:
Substantial evidence is that which is relevant and sufficient for a
reasonable mind to accept as adequate to support a conclusion; it
must be more than a scintilla, but it need not be a preponderance. It
is the role of the Commissioner, and not the courts, to resolve conflicts
in the evidence. As a result, [a] court cannot reweigh the evidence, but
may only scrutinize the record to determine whether it contains
substantial 	evidence 	to 	support 	the 	Commissioner’s 	decision. 	A
finding of no substantial evidence is warranted only where there is a
conspicuous absence of credible choices or no contrary medical
evidence.
Ramirez v. Colvin, 606 F. App’x 775, 777 (5th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). Judicial
review is limited to the reasons relied on as stated in the ALJ’s decision, and post
hoc rationalizations are not to be considered. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S.
194, 196 (1947).
Under the Act, “a claimant is disabled only if she is incapable of engaging in
any substantial gainful activity.” Anthony v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289, 293 (5th Cir.
1992) (quotation omitted). The Commissioner uses a five-step approach to
determine if a claimant is disabled, including:
(1) whether the claimant is presently performing substantial gainful
activity; 	(2) whether 	the 	claimant 	has 	a 	severe 	impairment;
(3) whether the impairment meets or equals a listed impairment;
Case 3:26-cv-00112 Document 17 Filed 04/16/26 in TXSD Page 2 of 6

3
(4) whether the impairment prevents the claimant from doing past
relevant work; and (5) whether the impairment prevents the claimant
from performing any other substantial gainful activity.
Salmond v. Berryhill, 892 F.3d 812, 817 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Kneeland v.
Berryhill, 850 F.3d 749, 753 (5th Cir. 2017)).
The burden of proof lies with the claimant during the first four steps before
shifting to the Commissioner at Step 5. See Salmond, 892 F.3d at 817. Between
Steps 3 and 4, the ALJ considers the claimant’s residual functional capacity
(“RFC”), which serves as an indicator of the claimant’s maximum capabilities given
the physical and mental limitations detailed in the administrative record. See
Kneeland, 850 F.3d at 754. The RFC also helps the ALJ “determine whether the
claimant is able to do her past work or other available work.” Id.
THE ALJ’S DECISION
The ALJ found at Step 1 that L.Y. “has not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since June 9, 2021, the alleged onset date.” Dkt. 5-3 at 43.
The ALJ found at Step 2 that, L.Y. “has the following severe impairments:
degenerative disc disease (DDD) of the lumbar and cervical spine, anxiety
disorder/depressive disorder/bipolar disorder, and gout in right leg.” Id. at 44.
The ALJ found at Step 3 that L.Y. “does not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of
the listed impairments.” Id.
Prior to consideration of Step 4, the ALJ determined L.Y.’s RFC as follows:
[L.Y.] has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as
defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b), except the individual can occasionally
climb ramps and stairs, but should never climb ladders, ropes, or
scaffolds. The claimant can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch,
and crawl. She should avoid concentrated exposure to unprotected
heights, and wet slippery, or uneven surfaces. The claimant can
frequently reach in all directions, including overhead, bilaterally. She
can 	frequently 	handle, 	and 	finger 	bilaterally. 	The 	claimant 	can
occasionally push, pull, and operate foot controls bilaterally. She can
perform the tasks assigned, but not at a production rate pace;
however, she can meet the end of day work goals.
Case 3:26-cv-00112 Document 17 Filed 04/16/26 in TXSD Page 3 of 6

4
Id. at 46.
At Step 4, the ALJ found that L.Y. “is capable of performing past relevant
work as an accounts payable clerk, a dispatcher, and a front desk clerk. This work
does not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by the
claimant’s residual functional capacity.” Id. at 52.
Accordingly, the ALJ found that L.Y. “has not been under a disability, as
defined in the Social Security Act, from June 9, 2021, through the date of [the
ALJ’s] decision.” Id. at 54.
DISCUSSION
This appeal presents only one issue for my consideration: whether the ALJ’s
Step 3 determination is supported by substantial evidence because the evidence
shows that L.Y. fails to satisfy all the criteria for Listing 1.15.
“At step three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s impairment meets
or equals one of the listed impairments set forth in Appendix 1 of the regulations,
see 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, Listing of Impairments (‘Listings’).” Jones
v. O’Malley, 107 F.4th 489, 493 (5th Cir. 2024). “The listed impairments are
physical and mental impairments that are considered disabling regardless of the
claimant's age, education, or work experience.” Id. “[I]f a claimant has one of the
listed impairments, and satisfies the requisite criteria of severity, the claimant is
disabled, and the sequential evaluation ends at step three.” Id.
“Listing 	1.15 	addresses 	disorders 	of 	the 	skeletal 	spine 	resulting 	in
compromise of a nerve root(s).” Id. n.4. Listing 1.15 has four subparts—A, B, C, and
D. A claimant must satisfy all four subparts to be considered disabled. At issue here
is subpart D, which requires, in relevant part:
D. 	Impairment-related 	physical 	limitation 	of 	musculoskeletal
functioning that has lasted, or is expected to last, for a continuous
period of at least 12 months, and medical documentation of at least
one of the following:
1. A documented medical need (see 1.00C6a) for a walker, bilateral
canes, or bilateral crutches (see 1.00C6d) or a wheeled and seated
mobility device involving the use of both hands (see 1.00C6e(i)).
Case 3:26-cv-00112 Document 17 Filed 04/16/26 in TXSD Page 4 of 6

5
Listings § 1.15.
Although the regulations “do not require that [a claimant] have a specific
prescription for the assistive device,” they do require “evidence from a medical
source 	that 	supports 	[the 	claimant’s] 	need 	for 	an 	assistive 	device . . . for 	a
continuous period of at least 12 months.” Id. § 1.00C6a. In finding that L.Y. did not
satisfy subpart D, the ALJ observed “that the use of an assistive device seems not
to be medically necessary. Although the use of a walker was referenced in one
[doctor’s note], there appears to be no documented need for an assistive device in
the medical evidence of record.” Dkt. 5-3 at 47.
L.Y. challenges the ALJ’s conclusion, arguing that the following evidence
satisfies subpart D:
x 	Tr. 466- Manish Rungta, M.D. 06/28/20213 – Using a walker
now . . . poor balance- knees and ankles are not good.
x 	Tr. 474 Dr. Daniel 05/28/2022: Claimant’s gait was slow with a
walker with problems standing from a sitting positions.
x 	Tr. 474 Dr. Daniel 05/28/2022: Claimant uses a walker and at one
time was using a cane until her condition did worsen.
x 	R. 474- Dr. Daniel 05/22/2022:4 Claimant could not walk on toes
and heels, nor squat, with noted support of the examination table.
Dkt. 11 at 8–9. I disagree that this evidence establishes that L.Y. had a medical need
for a walker for a continuous 12-month period.
Dr. Rungta’s note in June 2021 that L.Y. was “using a walker now,” had “poor
balance,” and her “knees and ankles are not good” are simply recorded statements
from L.Y. listing her history of present illnesses. Dkt. 5-8 at 104. The regulations
state that the Commissioner “will not accept a report of your statements about your
symptoms and limitations in place of the medical source’s report of objective
clinical findings.” Listings § 1.00C6a. Such records are not “objective clinical
findings.” Id. Moreover, “mere observations of walker use do not render the
3 L.Y. surely means to refer to a June 24, 2021 encounter with Dr. Rungta, as that is the
date of the visit reflected on page 466 of the transcript. See Dkt. 5-8 at 101–04.
4 L.Y. surely means to refer to the May 28, 2022 report of consultative medical examiner
Dr. Daryl K. Daniel, as there is no May 22, 2022 report in the record.
Case 3:26-cv-00112 Document 17 Filed 04/16/26 in TXSD Page 5 of 6

6
assistance ‘medically necessary.’” Breoade V. v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No.
3:25-cv-254, 2026 WL 673837, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2026). Dr. Rungta “simply
observed [L.Y.]’s walker use without commenting on its medical necessity.” Id.
That is not enough.
Likewise, Dr. Daniel’s report about L.Y.’s use of a walker simply captured
what L.Y. told him and what Dr. Daniel observed during his examination of L.Y.
See Dkt. 5-8 at 110–12. Nowhere in his report does Dr. Daniel “describe . . . the
circumstances for which [L.Y.] need[s] to use the assistive device.” Listings
§ 1.00C6a. Even if Dr. Daniel had described such circumstances, his report is just
one snapshot in time. More evidence would be required to substantiate that L.Y.
had a medical need for a walker for a continuous 12-month period. L.Y. has not
pointed me to any such evidence. “It is [L.Y.’s] burden to establish that [her]
impairments medically equal a listed impairment, and [s]he has not done so. Thus,
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that [L.Y.’s] impairments do
not meet or equal Listing 1.15.” Jones, 107 F.4th at 498.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, I affirm the Commissioner’s decision.
I will issue a final judgment separately.
SIGNED this ____ day of April 2026.
______________________________
ANDREW M. EDISON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case 3:26-cv-00112 Document 17 Filed 04/16/26 in TXSD Page 6 of 6