Toussant v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
GALVESTON DIVISION
M.T.,1
Plaintiff.
V.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-cv-00222
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff M.T. seeks judicial review of an administrative decision denying her
application for disability and disability insurance benefits under Title II of the
Social Security Act (the “Act”). M.T. and Defendant Frank J. Bisignano, the
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the “Commissioner”), have
briefed their positions. See Dkts. 15, 20, 21. After reviewing the briefing, the record,
and the applicable law, I affirm the Commissioner’s decision.
BACKGROUND
On December 14, 2022, M.T. filed a Title II application for a period of
disability and disability insurance benefits, alleging disability beginning December
1, 2022. Her application was denied and denied again upon reconsideration.
Subsequently, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held a hearing. Following the
hearing, the ALJ issued a written decision finding that M.T. was not disabled. M.T.
filed an appeal with the Appeals Council. The Appeals Council denied review,
making the ALJ’s decision final and ripe for judicial review.
1 On May 1, 2023, the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the
Judicial Conference of the United States issued a memorandum recommending that
courts adopt a local practice of using only the first name and last initial of any non-
government party in Social Security opinions. This court has taken that guidance a step
further in the interest of claimant’s privacy and will use only initials in public opinions.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
May 11, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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APPLICABLE LAW
The standard of judicial review for disability appeals is provided in 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g). See Waters v. Barnhart, 276 F.3d 716, 718 (5th Cir. 2002). Courts
reviewing the Commissioner’s denial of social security disability applications limit
their 	analysis 	to 	“(1) whether 	the 	Commissioner 	applied 	the 	proper 	legal
standards; 	and 	(2) whether 	the 	Commissioner’s 	decision 	is 	supported 	by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole.” Est. of Morris v. Shalala, 207 F.3d
744, 745 (5th Cir. 2000). Addressing the evidentiary standard, the Fifth Circuit has
explained:
Substantial evidence is that which is relevant and sufficient for a
reasonable mind to accept as adequate to support a conclusion; it
must be more than a scintilla, but it need not be a preponderance. It
is the role of the Commissioner, and not the courts, to resolve conflicts
in the evidence. As a result, [a] court cannot reweigh the evidence, but
may only scrutinize the record to determine whether it contains
substantial 	evidence 	to 	support 	the 	Commissioner’s 	decision. 	A
finding of no substantial evidence is warranted only where there is a
conspicuous absence of credible choices or no contrary medical
evidence.
Ramirez v. Colvin, 606 F. App’x. 775, 777 (5th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). Judicial
review is limited to the reasons relied on as stated in the ALJ’s decision, and post
hoc rationalizations are not to be considered. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S.
194, 196 (1947).
Under the Act, “a claimant is disabled only if she is incapable of engaging in
any substantial gainful activity.” Anthony v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289, 293 (5th Cir.
1992) (quotation omitted). The Commissioner uses a five-step approach to
determine if a claimant is disabled, including:
(1) whether the claimant is presently performing substantial gainful
activity; 	(2) whether 	the 	claimant 	has 	a 	severe 	impairment;
(3) whether the impairment meets or equals a listed impairment;
(4) whether the impairment prevents the claimant from doing past
relevant work; and (5) whether the impairment prevents the claimant
from performing any other substantial gainful activity.
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Salmond v. Berryhill, 892 F.3d 812, 817 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Kneeland v.
Berryhill, 850 F.3d 749, 753 (5th Cir. 2017)).
The burden of proof lies with the claimant during the first four steps before
shifting to the Commissioner at Step 5. See Salmond, 892 F.3d at 817. Between
Steps 3 and 4, the ALJ considers the claimant’s residual functional capacity
(“RFC”), which serves as an indicator of the claimant’s maximum capabilities given
the physical and mental limitations detailed in the administrative record. See
Kneeland, 850 F.3d at 754. The RFC also helps the ALJ “determine whether the
claimant is able to do her past work or other available work.” Id.
THE ALJ’S DECISION
The ALJ found at Step 1 that M.T. “has not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since December 1, 2022, the alleged onset date.” Dkt. 7-1 at 23.
The ALJ found at Step 2 that, M.T. “has the following severe impairments:
anxiety, depression, osteoarthritis (OA) of bilateral knees, and obesity.” Id. at 24.
The ALJ found at Step 3 that M.T. “does not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of
the listed impairments.” Id. at 25.
Prior to consideration of Step 4, the ALJ determined M.T.’s RFC as follows:
[M.T.] has the residual functional capacity to perform medium work
as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c) except she can occasionally climb
ladders but no climbing ropes or scaffolds. She can frequently climb
stairs and ramps, stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl. She has no balance
limitations. She is limited to no work around dangerous moving
machinery or unprotected heights. She can occasionally work in
extreme heat, cold or humidity. She can understand, remember, and
apply information in order to carry-out detailed but not complex
instructions. She can concentrate, keep pace, and persist for two-hour
periods with customary breaks during an eight-hour workday. She
cannot perform work requiring specific production rate (such as
assembly line work) but can have an end of the day quota. She can
frequently, not constantly, interact with supervisors, coworkers, and
the general public. She can respond appropriately to changes in the
work setting. She can accept instructions and make decisions in a
work setting.
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Id. at 27.
At Step 4, the ALJ found that M.T. “is unable to perform any past relevant
work.” Id. at 33.
At Step 5, the ALJ found that M.T. “has acquired work skills from past
relevant work that are transferable to other occupations with jobs existing in
significant numbers in the national economy.” Id.
Accordingly, the ALJ found that M.T. “has not been under a disability, as
defined in the Social Security Act, from December 1, 2022, through the date of [the
ALJ’s] decision.” Id. at 36.
DISCUSSION
This appeal presents two issues for my consideration: (1) whether the ALJ’s
decision is supported by substantial evidence; and (2) whether the ALJ properly
evaluated the mental health opinion of Nurse Practitioner (“NP”) Feby James
Kanatt. I answer both questions in the affirmative.
A. 	THE ALJ’S O PINION I S S UPPORTED BY S UBSTANTIAL E VIDENCE
M.T. 	contends 	that 	the 	ALJ’s 	decision 	is 	unsupported 	by 	substantial
evidence because the ALJ rejected the State agency opinions as unpersuasive, and
then “failed . . . to obtain an assessment from a medical source with access to all of
the evidence and succumbed to the temptation to play doctor and craft the RFC
from her own attempt to interpret the raw medical data.” Dkt. 15 at 8. In other
words, M.T. believes that the ALJ should have sought out a medical opinion before
crafting the RFC.
To be sure, there are circumstances in which an ALJ should seek out a
medical opinion before ruling. But those are circumstances in which the ALJ
interprets 	“raw 	medical 	evidence” 	herself. 	“Raw 	medical 	evidence 	refers 	to
evidence that does not permit commonsense judgments about functional capacity
and instead requires the ALJ to overstep the bounds of a lay person’s competence
and render a medical judgment. X-ray results are raw medical evidence.” T.M. v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:24-cv-00301, 2025 WL 1424352, at *3 (S.D. Tex. May
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16, 2025) (quotation omitted). In T.M., I held that the ALJ committed harmful
error when he interpreted X-ray results himself and crafted T.M.’s RFC in the
absence of any medical opinion. But T.M. is distinguishable.
In T.M., “the ALJ interpreted raw medical evidence that was not available
to the staff reviewing doctors.” Id. Here, however, the State agency reviewer at the
reconsideration level had the benefit of the only raw medical evidence in the
record: M.T.’s December 2023 and January 2024 x-rays. See Dkt. 7-1 at 82
(“12/19/23 XR Rt knee shows minimal patellofemoral OA changes. Minimal
degenerative narrowing in bilat. femorotibial joints.”); id. (“1/2/24 CE: . . . Xray of
bilat hands and Lt ankle are normal.”). As I have observed before, although the
ALJ found this opinion to be unpersuasive, “the fact that these medical experts
found [M.T.] to be capable of a higher level of work is ultimately supportive of the
ALJ’s RFC determination.” Stanley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 4:22-cv-00527,
2023 WL 2457534, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2023) (cleaned up). “An ALJ may
properly make a disability determination that is not an adoption of any medical
opinion while still basing her decision on substantial evidence.” Golden v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., No. 3:22-cv-00397, 2024 WL 23174, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 2, 2024)
(cleaned up). That is what happened here. Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence.
B. 	THE ALJ D ID NOT E RR IN EVALUATING NP KANATT ’S O PINION
M.T. next argues that the ALJ erred by failing to properly evaluate the
mental health opinion of NP Kanatt. See Dkt. 15 at 12. I disagree.
Because M.T. filed for benefits “on or after March 27, 2017,” the ALJ was
required to apply the new regulations regarding how the Commissioner evaluates
medical 	opinions 	and 	prior 	administrative 	findings. 	20 	C.F.R. 	§ 404.1520c.
Through the new regulations, the Commissioner revised the standards and
procedures for evaluating medical opinions and prior administrative medical
findings, abrogating the treating physician rule. As such, “ALJs are no longer
required to give controlling weight to the opinions of treating physicians.” Pearson
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v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:20-cv-166, 2021 WL 3708047, at *4 (S.D. Miss. Aug.
11, 2021) (quotation omitted). Instead, the ALJ considers the persuasiveness of
medical opinions from different medical sources. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2).
In evaluating persuasiveness, the ALJ considers five factors: (1) supportability;
(2) consistency; (3) the source’s relationship with the patient; (4) the source’s
specialty; and (5) “other factors that tend to support or contradict” the opinion. Id.
§ 404.1520c(c). The most important factors in evaluating persuasiveness are
supportability and consistency. See id. § 404.1520c(b)(2).
With respect to “supportability, the strength of a medical opinion increases
as the relevance of the objective medical evidence and explanations presented by
the medical source increase.” Vellone v. Saul, No. 1:20-cv-261, 2021 WL 319354,
at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2021). “As for consistency, the new rules provide that the
greater the consistency between a particular medical source/opinion and the other
evidence in the medical record, the stronger that medical opinion becomes.” Id.
“Simply put, consistency is an all-encompassing inquiry focused on how well a
medical source is supported, or not supported, by the entire record.” Id.
At a minimum, an ALJ’s persuasiveness explanation should “enable[] the
court to undertake a meaningful review of whether his finding with regard to the
particular medical opinion was supported by substantial evidence, and does not
require the Court to merely speculate about the reasons behind the ALJ’s
persuasiveness finding or lack thereof.” Cooley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 587 F. Supp.
3d 489, 499 (S.D. Miss. 2021) (cleaned up). “Stated differently, there must be a
discernible logic bridge between the evidence and the ALJ’s persuasiveness
finding.” Pearson, 2021 WL 3708047, at *5 (quotation omitted).
On September 24, 2024, NP Kanatt submitted a medical source statement
that opined as follows:
[M.T.’s] ability to understand, remember, or apply information was
extremely 	impaired. 	Her 	ability 	to 	interact 	with 	others 	was
moderately 	impaired. 	[M.T.]’s 	ability 	to 	concentrate, 	persist, 	or
maintain 	pace 	and 	to 	adapt 	or 	manage 	oneself 	were 	markedly
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impaired. [M.T.] was likely to miss work more than four times per
month, and she was not capable of handling funds in her best interest.
Dkt. 7-1 at 32; see also id. at 1328–32. NP Kanatt only began treating M.T. on
February 6, 2024, and last saw M.T. on June 14, 2024, three months prior to NP
Kanatt’s submitting his opinion. In finding NP Kanatt’s opinion unpersuasive, the
ALJ observed that NP Kanatt evaluated M.T.’s mental status to be within normal
limits “during the period that is covered by [M.T.]’s regarding the extreme ratings
Mr. Kanatt gave [M.T.].” Id. at 32 (emphasis added). The ALJ also found NP
Kanatt’s opinion to be at odds with M.T.’s function report, in which M.T. said “she
is able to drive, prepare lights meals, do light cleaning and shop.” Id.
M.T. argues that “[a]n ALJ errs by relying on daily activities that do not
‘reflect [the] ability to perform the required physical acts day in and day out in the
sometimes stressful conditions in which all people work in the real world,’ despite
substantial contrary evidence.” Dkt. 15 at 14 (quoting Williams v. Kijakazi, No.
3:21-cv-0923, 2022 WL 2222403, at *2 (N.D. Tex. June 21, 2022)). That may be
true, but there is not “substantial contrary evidence” here. There is only NP
Kanatt’s opinion. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit has held that an ALJ is free to
“consider evidence of daily activities in conjunction with other evidence.” Reyes v.
Sullivan, 915 F.2d 151, 155 (5th Cir. 1990).
Here, there is logic in the ALJ finding unpersuasive an opinion that M.T. is
extremely impaired in her ability to understand, remember, or apply information
when M.T. is capable of driving and shopping on her own. There is also logic in the
ALJ finding unpersuasive an opinion that imposes extreme limits on M.T.’s mental
functioning when, during the five-month period that NP Kanatt treated M.T., he
found her mental status to be within normal limits. Because I can ascertain a
logical bridge between the evidence and the ALJ’s decision, I find that the ALJ
committed no legal error.
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CONCLUSION
Because I find that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence
and is free of legal error, I affirm the Commissioner’s decision.
I will issue a final judgment separately.
SIGNED this ____ day of May 2026.
______________________________
ANDREW M. EDISON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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