Hayes v. Miller et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
GALVESTON DIVISION
LOUIS HAYES,
Plaintiff.
V.
PERCY MILLER, et al.,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:08-cv-00035
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
On June 10, 2026, this case was referred to me for all post-judgment
matters. See Dkt. 98. Pending before me is Judgment Creditor Louis Hayes’
Motion to Permit the Resignation of a Post-Judgment Court Appointed Receiver
and to Appoint a Replacement Receiver for Judgment Debtor Percy Miller Also
Known As Master P. Dkt. 97.
Hayes 	asks 	this 	court 	to 	permit 	the 	current 	post-judgment 	receiver
appointed by this court, Mr. Seth H. Kretzer, to withdraw and to be replaced by
Mr. Brent A. Devere. See Dkt. 97. Not only do I recommend that the court deny
this motion, I also recommend that the court sua sponte reconsider and withdraw
its April 10, 2024 Order on Motion for Post Judgment Relief and Appointment of
a 	Receiver, 	which 	appointed 	Mr. 	Kretzer 	and 	afforded 	him 	extraordinarily
sweeping powers. See Dkt. 82. I make this recommendation because “a trial court
abuses its discretion if the court grants turnover relief and appoints a receiver
under [Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code §] 31.002(b) as to property without
any evidence that the judgment debtor owns that property.” Hamilton Metals, Inc.
v. Glob. Metal Servs., Ltd., 597 S.W.3d 870, 879 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2019, pet. denied).
In 	both 	his 	March 	15, 	2024 	Motion 	for 	Post 	Judgment 	Relief 	and
Appointment of a Receiver, and the instant motion, Hayes contends that Miller
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
June 16, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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owns or has an ownership interest in the following non-exempt property: P. Miller
Enterprises, Inc.; MoneYatti; Broadus Foods, LLC; Big Poppa Burgers; and certain
books, records, and CDs attributed to Miller as Master P. See Dkt. 81 at 5–6;
Dkt. 97 at 5–6. In the instant motion, Hayes also contends that Miller owns or has
an ownership interest in TruTankSoldiers.com, the trademark “Make Em Say
Uhh,” and Louisiana Hemp Extractors, LLC. See Dkt. 97 at 6. I will assume without
deciding that the evidence Hayes submitted in support of these motions is
sufficient to establish Miller’s ownership of the identified businesses and assets.
Even so, that is not the only property to which the court granted relief in its April
10, 2024 order, or to which Hayes asks the court to grant relief now.
The court’s April 10, 2024 order, and the proposed order attached to the
instant motion (Dkt. 97-1), applies to far more property other than Miller’s
ownership interests in the assets identified above. Specifically, the orders vest the
receiver with authority to take possession of:
(1) all documents or records, including financial records, related to
such property that is in the actual or constructive possession or
control of Percy Miller or his agents, servants, employees, all persons
or organizations, whether organized for profit or not, or in active
concert or participation with Percy Miller; (2) all financial accounts
(bank and credit union accounts), certificates of deposit, money-
market accounts, accounts held by any third party; (3) all securities;
(4) 	all 	accounts 	with 	securities 	brokers 	and 	securities 	trading
platforms; (5) all real property, equipment, vehicles, boats and planes;
(6) all safety deposit boxes or vaults; (7) all cash; (8) all negotiable
instruments, including promissory notes, option contracts, drafts,
and checks; (9) causes of action; (10) contract rights, whether present
or future; and (11) accounts receivable; and (12) all documents
representing ownership of any publicly traded or private entity;
(13) all 	ownership 	interests 	of 	any 	publicly 	traded 	or 	private
entity . . . .
Dkt. 82 at 2; see also Dkt. 97-1 at 2–3. It is an abuse of discretion for a trial court
to sign a receivership order that applies to property other than that for which there
is evidence that the judgment debtor has an ownership interest. See Hamilton
Metals, 597 S.W.3d at 883 (collecting cases). Because the court cannot grant relief
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as to property for which Hayes has not submitted evidence that Miller has an
ownership interest, the instant motion should be denied and the court’s April 10,
2024 order should be withdrawn.
Unfortunately, there are other problems with the instant motion and the
court’s April 10, 2024 order. For example, Hayes would have this court give the
receiver power to “direct the delivery of Percy Miller’s mail to the Receiver’s
address and open all mail directed to Percy Miller.” Dkt. 97-1 at 7. Such power
implicates the privacy interests of third parties, yet Hayes has provided no
authority to this court to support such a sweeping power. Similarly, the power to
“assume control of any website or social media site utilized, owned, or over which
Percy Miller has any control” implicates the First Amendment’s prohibition
against compelled speech, yet Hayes has provided no authority to the court to
support the entry of an order giving a receiver such extraordinary power. Id. at 8.
Hayes has not offered this court any authority to support a receiver’s power
“to garnish without separate court action . . . the production or contract payments
owed to Percy Miller” or 	“to open or drill any safe deposit boxes of Percy Miller
and to delivery the contents to the Receiver,” without regard to whose property
may be held in said safe deposit boxes. Id. at 8, 10. Moreover, the notion that a
receiver can take possession of “ownership interests of any publicly traded or
private entity,” id. at 3, runs afoul of the rule that “[a] judgment creditor of a
member of a limited liability company may enforce a judgment against that
member [only] by requesting a charging order against the member’s interest in the
company.” Klinek v. LuxeYard, Inc., 672 S.W.3d 830, 839 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2023, no pet.) (citing Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 101.112). These are but a
few examples of the extraordinary powers that Hayes asks this court to vest in the
receiver without providing any authority supporting the notion that this court
can—or should—vest a receiver with such powers. For these reasons—and because
it is an abuse of discretion to sign a turnover order that applies to property for
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which no evidence is presented that Miller has an ownership interest—the court
should deny the instant motion and withdraw its April 10, 2024 order.1
Finally, the court should withdraw its April 10, 2024 order because Hayes
failed to serve Miller with his March 15, 2024 motion. See S.D. Tex. L.R. 5.3
(“Papers must have at the end a certificate reflecting how and when service has
been made or why service is not required. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b).”).
As for the instant motion, Hayes claims to have served Miller by “posting a
message” on his Facebook account and emailing the motion, Dkt. 97 at 14, yet
Hayes provides no proof of such service.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, I recommend the court deny the instant
motion (Dkt. 97) and withdraw its April 10, 2024 order (Dkt. 82). The court should
require Hayes to provide legal authorities that demonstrate the court’s power to
award each aspect of relief that Hayes requests in any future post-judgment
motions. Additionally, the court should require proof of service of any post-
judgment motions filed by Hayes.
The 	parties 	have 	14 	days 	from 	service 	of 	this 	Memorandum 	and
Recommendation to file written objections. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections will preclude appellate review of
factual findings and legal conclusions, except for plain error.
SIGNED this 	day of June 2026.
______________________________
ANDREW M. EDISON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
1 Should the court ultimately enter an order appointing a receiver, the court should
reconsider whether the receiver is entitled to an outright award of 25% of the balance due
on the judgment. See Dkt. 97-1 at 10. “[A] fee provision in a turnover receivership order
that sets a blanket receiver’s fee is error because the trial court has not yet determined
that a fee in such an amount is warranted by the work done by the receiver or that the fee
is reasonable in light of what work is later done.” Hartwell v. Fundworks, LLC, No. 02-
23-00100-CV, 2024 WL 46053, at *8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 4, 2024, pet. denied).
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