Schneider v. Collier et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
EDWIN GUS SCHNEIDER,
Plaintiff,
VS.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:25-CV-00156
BRYAN COLLIER, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
TO RETAIN CASE AND DISMISS CERTAIN CLAIMS
Plaintiff Edwin Gus Schneider, appearing pro se and in forma pauperis, has filed
this prisoner civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s case is subject to
screening pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); 28
U.S.C. §§1915(e)(2), 1915A.
Based on his allegations in his complaint (D.E. 1) and More Definite Statement
(D.E. 17), and based also on the undersigned’s liberal construction of his claims, Plaintiff
claims that the named defendants have violated his constitutional rights in several respects.
After screening this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1) and
for the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that certain of Plaintiff’s
Fourteenth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, and retaliation claims be retained, and will
order service of process on those claims. The undersigned further recommends that the
district court:
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
December 05, 2025
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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● DISMISS without prejudice former McConnell Unit Warden Adrian A.
Amonett, former Warden E. Holmer, and John or Jane Doe, former unknown
Regional Director IV;
● DISMISS without prejudice Plaintiff’s claims for money damages against
each named defendant sued in his or her official capacity;
● DISMISS Plaintiff’s Claims 4 (claims against Defendant Sgt. Pedro) and 7
(claims that the mail room policy is unconstitutional) for improper joinder
and without prejudice to raising such claims each in separate lawsuits as
appropriate; and
● DISMISS with prejudice Plaintiff’s remaining claims against the remaining
defendants as frivolous or for failure to state a claim for relief.
I. JURISDICTION
The Court has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This case
has been referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for case management and making
recommendations on dispositive motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural Background
Plaintiff is a prisoner in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Criminal
Institutions Division (TDCJ-CID) and is currently housed at the McConnell Unit in
Beeville, Texas. The majority of Plaintiff’s allegations in this case arise in connection with
his current housing assignment.
On June 13, 2025, the Court received Plaintiff’s original complaint. (D.E. 1).
Plaintiff sues the following defendants:
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● Bryan Collier, TDCJ’s former Executive Director;
● Bobby Lumpkin, TDCJ’s former Director and current Executive Director;
● Larissa S. Wysocki, McConnell Unit’s current head warden;
● Adrian A. Amonett, McConnell Unit’s former head warden;
● Placido Samaniego, Jr., McConnell Unit assistant warden over
administrative segregation;
● Candice F. Flannel, McConnell Unit’s former assistant warden;
● E. Holmer, former head warden of the McConnell Unit;
● James R. Tanner, former major of McConnell Unit’s restrictive housing and
current assistant warden of restrictive housing;
● Victor Quiroga, McConnell unit Kitchen Major;
● Crystal Breaux, McConnell Unit’s clinical manager in the medical
department;
● Mike A. Canfield, McConnell Unit sergeant;
● John or Jane Doe, former unknown Regional Director IV;
● Angela Chevalier, current Regional Director IV;
● Olayinka O. Pedro, Coffield Unit sergeant;
● John/Jane Doe, No. 1 Chairperson on the State Classification Committee
(“SCC”);
● Lt. Barrera, McConnell Unit officer and member on the “SSC”;1
● Ms. Immon, McConnell Unit’s #3 Classification Chief;
1 Plaintiff does not indicate what “SSC” represents. It is likely that Plaintiff meant to write “SCC” instead of “SSC.”
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● M. Bety, SCC representative present at the SCC hearing on October 18,
2023;
● SCC member #2, a John/Jane Doe defendant present at the October 18, 2023
hearing;
● K. Cuellar, the 3rd member of the SCC Committee on October 18, 2023;
● SCC John/Jane Doe Representative at the Security Detention Review hearing
on March 28, 2024;
● James R. Tanner, Jr., McConnell Unit major;
● R. Arrisola, McConnell Unit’s “#3 SCC member at the hearing on March 28,
2024;
● Oscar Mendza, TDCJ’s Deputy Director of Management Operations
overseeing the Security Threat Group Management’s Office;
● Sgt. James Mireles, McConnell Unit’s Security Threat Group Supervisor;
and
● The John or Jane Doe Director of TDCJ’s “Director Review Committee.”
(D.E. 1, pp. 4-8). Plaintiff states in his original complaint that he seeks injunctive and
declaratory relief. Id. at 9.
At the Court’s direction, Plaintiff has filed a More Definite Statement in which he
answered several questions and directives to explain his claims. (D.E. 18). In his More
Definite Statement, Plaintiff seeks to dismiss the following named defendants from this
action: (1) former McConnell Unit Warden Amonett (D.E. 17, p. 24, ¶ 15); (2) former
Warden Holmer (id. at 25, ¶ 18); and (3) John or Jane Doe, former unknown Regional
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Director IV (id. at 28, ¶ 23). Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that these
defendants be dismissed without prejudice.
As set forth in his original complaint, Plaintiff appears to sue two individuals named
“James R. Tanner.” (D.E. 1, pp. 5, 7). While framed in a confusing manner, it is apparent
that Plaintiff seeks to sue one individual named “James R. Tanner” who was promoted at
some point from major to assistant warden. Adding to the confusion, however, is Plaintiff’s
request in his More Definite Statement to substitute: (1) “Major Aaron M. Cavazos” for
one of the Plaintiff’s named “James R. Tanner”; and (2) “Major Eric Guerrero” for the
second “James R. Tanner.” (D.E. 17, pp. 25, 33).
A review of Plaintiff’s More Definite Statement reveals that Plaintiff seeks to raise
claims against TDCJ’s current Director Eric Guerrero rather than any McConnell Unit
official named Major Eric Guerrero. Plaintiff did not name Director Guerrero in his
original complaint. In an effort to hopefully clear up the confusion created by Plaintiff’s
pleadings, the undersigned will issue a separate order directing the Clerk to:
● UPDATE the defendant identified on the docket as “James R. Tanner –
Previously Major of R.H” to be “James R. Tanner, McConnell Unit Assistant
Warden”;
● SUBSTITUTE “Major Aaron M. Cavazos” for the official identified on the
docket as “James R. Tanner, Jr. – Major”; and
● ADD TDCJ’s current Director Eric Guerrero as a party defendant in this case.
In addition, a review of Plaintiff’s More Definite Statement reflects that he now
seeks to raise claims against Richard Garcia and Richard Bledsoe, who are Security Threat
Group supervisors and/or managers. (D.E. 17, p. 3, 12-13, ¶¶ 5(a), 5(c), 6(a)). Plaintiff
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did not name these individuals as defendants in his original complaint. Accordingly, in a
separate order, the undersigned will add Richard Garcia and Richard Bledsoe as defendants
in this case.
B. Plaintiff’s Allegations
(1) General Allegations and prayer for relief
Plaintiff alleges the following in his original complaint (D.E. 1) and More Definite
Statement (D.E. 17). In April 2003, while confined at the Allred Unit in Iowa Park, Texas,
he was placed in restrictive housing due to his “gang validation.” (D.E. 1, p. 9). Plaintiff
explains that:
● he remained in restrictive housing until he was granted parole in April 2009;
● Plaintiff came back into TDCJ custody shortly thereafter and has remained
in TDCJ custody through the present and is serving a life sentence for
aggravated robberies;
● Plaintiff has been in restrictive custody all these years due to his gang
affiliation;
● Plaintiff, who is 64 years old, will become eligible for parole when he
becomes 80 years old; and
● Plaintiff is forced to participate in the “GRAD” program, which is required
for inmates with gang affiliations.
Id.
In his More Definite Statement, Plaintiff states that he has been in TDCJ custody
since August 30, 2011 and has been housed at: (1) the Byrd Unit from August 30, 2011
through mid-September 2011; (2) the Coffield Unit from mid-September 2011 until
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December 28, 2011; (3) an unspecified jail pursuant to a bench warrant from December
29, 2011 through early September 2012; (4) the Coffield Unit from early September 2012
through mid-June 2014; (5) the Byrd Unit from mid-June 2014 through September 2014;
(6) the Coffield Unit from September 2014 until June 10, 2023; and (7) the McConnell
Unit from June 10, 2023 until the present. (D.E. 17, p. 1, ¶¶ 1-4). On June 10, 2023, when
being transported to the McConnell Unit, Plaintiff changed transport vans at the Darrington
Unit. Id. at 1, ¶ 2.
According to Plaintiff, “GRAD” stands for Gang Renouncement and Disassociation
(“GRAD”). Id. at 2, ¶ 5(a). Plaintiff explains that inmates in the GRAD program must
meet basic criteria to complete it, such as: (1) having no offender assaults for at least two
years, no staff assaults for at least two years, no major disciplinary cases for at least one
year, no extortion cases for at least two years, no weapon possession cases for at least two
years, and no aggressive sexual conduct cases for at least two years; (2) achieving level
one status for a minimum of one year; (3) renouncing membership in a “STG”; (4)
completing “Attachment B” at the unit and regional level; (5) signing a “release form”
requesting participation and the GRAD renouncement form; (6) having no involvement in
at “STG act” for a minimum of two years; and (7) having no security precaution designator
of ES for escape, SA for staff assault, or HS for hostage situation. Id.
Plaintiff further describes that the inmate must “participate in the process and
associated activities until successful completion is attained” with the process taking nine
months. Id. Plaintiff alleges that the program’s curriculum includes “cognitive
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intervention, anger management, substance abuse education, and programing addressing
criminal addictive behavior.” Id. While not having information available detailing what
happens when you complete the GRAD program, Plaintiff indicates that a Restrictive
Housing Plan provides for the “release of gang inmates assigned to security detention
custody shall be in accordance with the Security Threat Group Plan.” Id.
Plaintiff originally grouped his allegations into seven, sometimes overlapping,
claims.
They are:
● Claim 1 – Plaintiff asserts that his constitutional rights were violated in
several respects in connection with his long-term confinement in restrictive
housing (D.E. 1, pp. 9-12);
● Claim 2 – Plaintiff asserts that various prison officials failed to investigate
and remedy his various complaints regarding his unconstitutional
confinement, his “erroneous classification” hearings, and reviews associated
with his stay in restrictive housing (id. at 12-13);
● Claim 3 – Plaintiff appears to assert that his rights have been violated in
connection with TDCJ staff shortages and the lack of sufficient beds
available (id. at 13);
● Claim 4 – Plaintiff asserts that he was the victim of retaliation by a Coffield
Unit official for exercising his rights to complain, grieve, appeal, and petition
the conditions of his confinement in restrictive housing (id. at 13-14);
● Claim 5 – Plaintiff asserts that: (1) he was the victim of retaliation for filing
grievances and going on a hunger strike from July 12, 2023 through July 17,
2023 at the McConnell Unit; and (2) he was denied medical treatment during
these days despite submitting multiple sick calls (id. at 14);
● Claim 6 – Plaintiff asserts that his constitutional rights were violated when
he was denied access to his medical records, denied being taken to medical
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appointments, and denied needed medications because they were allowed to
expire (id. at 14-15); and
● Claim 7 – Plaintiff asserts that the application of TDCJ policy BP-03.91 has
resulted in an unconstitutional delay period for sending and receiving mail
(id. at 15).
With respect to his claims, Plaintiff seeks declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief.
(D.E. 1, p. 9; D.E. 17, pp. 36-38.
(2) Claim 1 allegations
In Claim 1 as set forth in his original complaint, Plaintiff asserts that his
constitutional rights were violated in several respects in connection with his long-term
confinement in restrictive housing. (D.E. 1, pp. 9-12). According to Plaintiff, the TDCJ’s
policies related to GRAD forced him to endure inhumane conditions in restrictive housing,
including torture that caused him serious mental harm. (D.E. 17, p. 3, ¶ 5(a). Plaintiff
alleges that the requirement of debriefing caused him to divulge secret information about
his gang which led to him being a target of violence by fellow gang members. Id. Plaintiff
asserts that these policies requiring him to disclose particular actions with the gang violated
his Fifth Amendment right not to give statements that incriminate himself. Id. Plaintiff
further asserts that these policies set forth in the Security Threat Group Operations Manuel
fail to give gang member inmates proper notice. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that Executive Director Collier is responsible with implementing
the policies associated with the GRAD program along with unknown managers of the
Security Threat group. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Director Guerrero is responsible for
enforcing these policies as shared with Richard Garcia and Richard Bledsoe, who are
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Security Threat Group supervisors and/or managers. Id. As a result of the implementation
and enforcement of these policies, Plaintiff states he has suffered with physical and mental
damage and pain over 20 years while living in conditions which are torturous and
inhumane. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that, as a member of the Security Threat Group, he is subject to
review process for restrictive housing once every six months. Id. at 3, ¶ 5(b). This review
process requires him to appear before the SCC, or Multidisciplinary Treatment Team
(“MTT”) as it is now called. Id. Plaintiff describes the role of the SCC in reviewing
Security Threat group members as meaningless and redundant when reviewing restrictive
housing placements. Id. at 4, ¶ 5(b). The only time member inmates are released from
restrictive housing is when they complete the GRAD program which is governed by the
Security Threat Group management. Id.
Plaintiff explains that he was asked if he wished to sign for GRAD. Id. at 3, ¶ 5(b).
When he refused to sign, Plaintiff says, he was told he could give an oral or written
statement which was useless. Id. Plaintiff was denied the right to call witnesses at the
restrictive housing reviews. Id. at 4, ¶ 5(b). Plaintiff explains that he was sometimes asked
if he was able to access medical when needed, whether he got along with staff or other
inmates, and whether he received psychiatric services. Id. According to Plaintiff, the
review process was ended when he refused to sign for GRAD. Id. at 3-4, ¶ 5(b). ` Plaintiff
states that his restrictive housing placement has been reviewed five times during his
assignment to the McConnell Unit. Id. at 4, ¶ 5(b).
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Gang inmates are assigned to security detention or restrictive housing in accordance
with the Security Threat Group Plan. Id. The contents of this plan are not available to
inmates. Id. Plaintiff assumes that the plan governed his initial placement in restrictive
housing and the outcome of all reviews after the initial placement. Id. Plaintiff believes
that the procedures under the plan “fail to consider an individual’s behavior and focuses on
the group as a whole.” Id. Rather than rely on evidence in the last 25 years, the plan
focuses on gang violence from the 1980s and 90s. Id. Plaintiff asserts that the plan violates
his due process rights to notice reviews and the right to appeal or grieve his continued
confinement in inhumane restrictive housing conditions. Id. at 4-5, ¶ 5(b).
Plaintiff explains that, under the Security Threat Group Plan, he was forced to
debrief, go through the GRAD program, sign a release of liability for any future violence
that results from his debriefing and completion of GRAD, and endure the “crushing and
inhumane conditions of restrictive housing.” Id. at 5, ¶ 5(b). Through these actions,
Plaintiff asserts that prison officials have acted with deliberate indifference to his health
and safety and denied him proper due process in connection with his placement in
restrictive housing. Id. According to Plaintiff, he has demonstrated his ability to follow
prison rules by not committing prison misconduct and has not been disciplined for violating
a major prison rule for over seven years. Id. Plaintiff alleges that he has been placed in
restrictive housing due to his status as a Security Threat Group member in the absence of
any evidence he presents a threat of gang-related violence or threat to TDCJ staff. Id.
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Plaintiff references two review hearings where he was allegedly denied due process.
First, at a SCC review hearing conducted on October 13, 2023, Plaintiff alleges:
● one of the SCC members told him he could not call a witness;
● he submitted a statements which he requested to be considered;
● Plaintiff refused when asked whether he wished to attend GRAD;
● Plaintiff answered “yes” when asked if he got along well with offenders and
staff;
● Plaintiff informed the SCC members that he was “S4/1A, the best highest
custody level and line class ‘possible’”;
● when asked if he requested and received medical services, Plaintiff informed
them he has been rescheduled for many months due to lack of escorts for x-
rays, provider appointments, and pain medications which had expired;
● when asked if he had participated in programs available to him, Plaintiff
responded “yes”;
● when asked if he had requested psychological services, Plaintiff responded
“yes”; and
● the last words Plaintiff heard at the hearing were that they would see Plaintiff
in six months, which meant they had already made the decision to deny his
release from restrictive custody.
Id. at 6 ¶ 5(b).
Next, at a review hearing conducted on March 28, 2024, Plaintiff alleges:
● he was cut off when he tried to read his written statement out loud;
● Plaintiff replied “no” when asked if he wished to sign off on GRAD;
● Plaintiff was told to grieve an issue related to his previous October 18, 2023
hearing; and
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● the committee reached its decision to deny Plaintiff release from restrictive
custody before the end of the hearing;
Id.
Plaintiff reiterates that he has “suffered both physical and long term confinement in
restrictive housing as a result of the review policies for release from such housing. Id. at
7, ¶ 5(b). Plaintiff asserts he faces a substantial risk of serious harm due to his long-term
confinement in restrictive housing at the McConnell Unit and the requirements of GRAD.
Id. at 8, ¶ 5(b). Plaintiff further alleges that his psychological and physical injuries are
documented on the medical records. Id. He states that he suffers from a heightened state
of anxiety and nervousness, headaches, serious neck pain, insomnia, hypertension, and
mood swings. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that he has been forced to spend 23 hours a day alone in a cell the
size of a car-parking spot. Id. at 5, ¶ 5(b). Plaintiff further alleges that the conditions of
his restrictive housing consist of being:
● unable to see outside a rusted window;
● denied normal prison activities and privileges;
● served cold food without condiments on uncovered trays;
● denied contact visits as he only is provided visits through glass while he is in
a small cage;
● denied video visits through the tablets; and
● denied the ability to practice his Catholic faith, although he was allowed to
see a priest for the Sacrament of Penance and Reconciliation.
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Id. at 5-6, ¶ 5(b). When he was housed in the McConnell Unit’s restrictive housing, he
describes the conditions of confinement as follows:
● he was denied exercise;
● he received two or three showers per week;
● the cell was not cleaned as he was given inadequate cleaning supplies;
● the toilets were defective and often overflowed with feces getting into the
cells;
● food was served cold and in an unsanitary manner;
● roaches and other pests got into the food served; and
● Plaintiff received nutritionally-deficient meals.
Id. at 8-9, ¶ 5(c).
Plaintiff asserts that policies were in place to prevent these unsanitary occurrences
but that general population inmates were treated much better. Id. at 9, ¶ 5(c). Plaintiff
holds the following individuals responsible for the unsanitary and dangerous conditions of
confinement in the McConnell Unit’s restrictive housing:
● Warden Wysocki and Food Manager Quiroga – Plaintiff seeks to hold these
officials responsible for the serious food issues. Id. at 9, ¶ 5(c). According
to Plaintiff, Major Quiroga oversees the food service. Id. at 12, ¶ 5(c).
● Warden Wysock, Regional Director, the head wardens, Region IV Director
Chevalier, deputy director, Executive Director Collier, and Director
Guerrero2 – Plaintiff holds these issues responsible for having insufficient
exercise outside his cell or exposure to sunlight. According to Plaintiff, the
2 Plaintiff also seek to hold responsible the “CID Director” and “deputy vision director. (D.E. 17, p. 10, ¶ 5(c)).
Plaintiff, however, does not indicate who these officials are or otherwise name them as defendants in this case.
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lack of exercise has caused him to suffer deteriorations in his multiple
vertebrates, rotator cuff issues, and insomnia. Id. at 10, ¶ 5(c).
● Warden Wysock, Assistant Warden Tanner, Assistant Warden Samaniego,
and Major Cavazos – Plaintiff holds these issues responsible for scheduling
insufficient access to showers. According to Plaintiff, he is entitled to have
three showers per day but is lucky to be afforded one shower per day. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that Warden Wysocki instructs the laundry officer that
inmates get one shower towel. Id. at 12, ¶ 5(c).
Plaintiff complains that he faces a serious risk of substantial harm due to his lack of
access to medical health services. Id. at 10, ¶ 5(c). Plaintiff alleges that:
● response time to his sick call or I-60 requests usually take three to five days;
● restrictive housing inmates like Plaintiff’s typically do not receive medical
appointments which are granted 10-14 days out for general population
inmates;
● restrictive housing inmates are usually unaware when their medical
appointments are scheduled;
● Plaintiff has had to wait six to nine months to see a medial provider for a
rotator-cuff injury, four to six months for x-rays, and over a year for an MRI
on his shoulder;
● Plaintiff, in the meantime can only get prescribed two-months of all pain
medications, which often expire before he can get a refill;
● Plaintiff’s has had medications expire due to lack of access to medical for
controlling blood pressure and Vitamin D deficiency;
● Plaintiff’s chronic pain in his neck has gone untreated since arriving at the
McConnell Unit, and he is still waiting for an MRI on his neck; and
● Plaintiff misses 90% of his medical appointments due to lack of security
escorts.
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● Plaintiff was denied a medical-ordered pillow, which was provided to him at
the Coffield unit
Id. at 10-11, ¶ 5(c). Plaintiff alleges that Warden Wysocki, Assistant Warden Samaniego,
Major Cavazos share responsibility for who is provided escort to medical. Id. at 11, ¶ 5(c).
Plaintiff also names: (1) Executive Director Collier who is responsible for transit policies;
and (2) Director Guerrero for failing to supervise serious risk situations when they exist.
Id. Plaintiff alleges that he has written Director Guerrero and Executive Director Collier to
provide them notice of the lack of proper access to care due to his status in restrictive
housing. Id. Furthermore, Plaintiff has written Regional Director Chevalier, who
responded that TDCJ is just doing its best. Id.
Plaintiff further alleges he is being denied access to mental health due to TDCJ’s
lack of escorts. Id. at 12, ¶ 5(c). Plaintiff states that his mental health issues arise from his
continued stay in restrictive housing. Id. Plaintiff indicates that he only receives mental
health treatment in the form of psychiatric medications, which were not helpful. Id.
Plaintiff holds the following officials responsible for his denial of access to medical
and mental health treatment due to being in restrictive custody: Executive Director Collier,
Director Guerrero, the Security Threat Group managers, the unit STGO supervisor, the
members of the SCC, the RHC members, the MIT members, Warden Wysocki, Assistant
Warden Samaniego, Major Quiroga, Jane Doe chairperson, Lt. Barrera, M. Bety, John/Jane
Doe member of the SCC on October 18, 2023, SCC John/Jane Doe representative on March
28, 2024, R. Arrisola, and Oscar Mendza. Id. Plaintiff alleges that he made all of these
individuals aware of his injuries through letters and I-60’s statements provided at this
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McConnell Unit review hearings. Id. Through these letters and statements, Plaintiff says
he provided these officials with notice of his injuries, the length of time his injuries existed,
and details of the injuries. Id.
Plaintiff next alleges that he is denied the following privileges while in restrictive
housing: T.V. access, contact visits, video visits, tablet content, phone access, newsstand
applications, e-message video clips from loved ones, group activities of all kinds, church,
schools, the ability to interact with other humans, commissary limits, smaller food portions,
beverages with lunch or dinner, condiments with meals, health food items, and cleaning
supplies. Id. at 12-13, ¶ 5(d). According to Plaintiff, the denial of these privileges subjects
him to psychological and mental injury for being deprived the basic prison life necessities.
Id. at 13, ¶ 5(d).
(3) Claim 2 allegations
In Claim 2 as set forth in his original complaint, Plaintiff asserts that various prison
officials failed to investigate and remedy his various complaints regarding his
unconstitutional confinement, his “erroneous classification” hearings, and reviews
associated with his stay in restrictive housing. (D.E. 1, pp. 12-13). Plaintiff alleges that
this claim references all of his MIT and RHC hearings held every six months since June
10, 2023. (D.E. 17, p. 13, ¶ 6(a)). Plaintiff complains that the results of these hearings
were the same in that he is directed to remain in restrictive housing as a security threat and
is told he will have another hearing in six months. Id.
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Plaintiff holds responsible Executive Director Collier, Director Guerrero, Security
Threat Group managers Garcia and Bledsoe, and the members conducting each hearing as
responsible for violating his due process rights. Id. According to Plaintiff, the members
conducting the hearings change from hearing to hearing. Id. Plaintiff asserts that: (1)
Executive Director Collier implements and enforces the polices at these hearings; (2)
Security Threat Group managers Garcia and Bledsoe have oversight and authority over the
hearings. Id. Plaintiff has filed numerous grievances challenging these reviews, which
were all denied for the reason he was provided a hearing and review and is properly housed.
Id. at 14, ¶ 6(b).
(4) Claim 3 allegations
In Claim 3 as set forth in his original complaint, Plaintiff appears to assert that his
rights have been violated in connection with TDCJ staff shortages and the lack of sufficient
beds available. (D.E. 1, p. 13). Rather than constitute a separate claim, Plaintiff asserts
that this complaint is part of his Eighth Amendment claim regarding cruel and unusual
treatment. (D.E. 17, p. 14, ¶ 7). Plaintiff alleges that the McConnell Unit has the lowest
number of staff placing him at risk when: (1) seeking emergency medical treatment; (2)
seeking access to chronic care treatments; and (4) attending medical appointments which
are often rescheduled. Id. Plaintiff further alleges that medical records will show that he
missed appointments, treatments, the ability to renew expired medications, and x-rays due
to staff shortage. Id. Plaintiff further alleges that the lack of staff prevented him from
exercising out of the cell and getting sunshine and fresh air. Id.
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Plaintiff holds the following officials responsible for the staff shortage: (1)
Executive Director Collier; (2) Director Guerrero; (3) Regional VI Director Chevalier; (4)
the McConnell Unit wardens and assistant wardens past and present, including Warden
Amonett, Assistant Warden Samaniego, Assistant Warden Flannel, Warden Holmer, and
current Warden Wysocki. Id. While difficult to follow his often rambling complaint and
More Definite Statement, Plaintiff appears to single out Executive Director Collier for
mismanaging the training of staff which leads to a shortage of staff. Id.
(5) Claim 4 allegations
In Claim 4 as set forth in his original complaint, Plaintiff asserts that he was the
victim of retaliation by a Coffield Unit official for exercising his rights to complain, grieve,
appeal, and petition the conditions of his confinement in restrictive housing. (D.E. 1, pp.
13-14). Plaintiff states that the relevant incident took place on June 10, 2023, the day he
was transferred from the Coffield Unit to the McConnell Unit. Plaintiff alleges that:
● at 5:00 a.m. in the morning, while Plaintiff was at the Coffield Unit, Sgt.
Olayinka O. Pedro sent a female guard to wake up Plaintiff for transport;
● the female guard told Plaintiff that he could not take any property with him
for transport;
● the female guard escorted Plaintiff to the cages for transport;
● Sgt. Pedro arrived and asked Plaintiff about his property;
● Plaintiff told Sgt. Pedro what the female guard had said;
● Sgt. Pedro asked Plaintiff about whether his property had been inventoried
the day before, to which Plaintiff said no;
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● Sgt. Pedro escorted Plaintiff back to Plaintiff’s cell and instructed him to grab
one hygiene item, his fan, and to wear his “shower shoes only”;
● Plaintiff told Sgt. Pedro that he needed his “legal materials, books, records
as grievances, legal addresses, [his] typewriter, and [his] bible;
● Sgt. Pedro responded “no” and that Plaintiff could only take with him what
he had instructed before;
● Sgt. Pedro also denied Plaintiff’s request to take his tablet, charger, and ear
buds;
● Sgt. Pedro told Plaintiff that he would first be transported to the Darrington
Unit, where another van would take him to the McConnell Unit;
● TDCJ policy provides that a transit inmate may take his tablet with phone
and e-mail messages along “with law library/Lexis/Nexis”;
● Sgt. Pedro denied Plaintiff access to pending grievances, legal mailings, legal
books, and the indigent legal supplies issued to Plaintiff from the Coffield
Unit law library;
● when Plaintiff arrived at the McConnell Unit law library later that day, “this
law library who[] handles issuing legal indigent supplies, denied [Plaintiff]
supplies, saying that [he] had not used [his] previously issued supplies”; and
● it took Plaintiff weeks, after filing a grievance, to get his legal supplies issued
at the Coffield Unit;
(D.E. 17, p. 15, ¶ 8(a)).
Rather than assert a retaliation claim against Sgt. Pedro, Plaintiff actually asserts
that Sgt. Pedro denied him his right to access the courts because he knew Plaintiff was
seeking administrative remedies and had attorney visits along with giving medical
interviews at the Coffield Unit. Id. According to Plaintiff, Sgt. Pedro impacted his ability
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to access the courts as he was unable to get indigent supplies at the McConnell Unit, which
led to him not meeting the statute of limitations in filing civil rights cases. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that, on September 28, 2023, he received the inventory list of
property taken from him at the Coffield Unit. Id. at 16, ¶ 8(a). According to TDCJ policy,
Plaintiff was required to receive this property before he was transported. Id. Plaintiff
explains that the inventory items consisting of law books, legal documents, legal mailings,
and a bible. Id. Plaintiff states that the inventory list is evidence that Sgt. Pedro was the
transport officer on van transports. Id. Sgt. Pedro, Plaintiff says, was aware that he had
had been named in multiple grievances, that Plaintiff had interviewed with the Texas Civil
Rights Project, that Plaintiff had been denied an interview with “Texas Standrad [sic],” and
that Plaintiff should have had his property for transport since he was not returning from the
McConnell Unit. Id. For these additional reasons, Plaintiff asserts that he was deprived
his right to litigate his civil action in the federal courts. Id.
(6) Claim 5 allegations
In Claim 5, as set forth in his original complaint, Plaintiff asserts that: (1) he was
the victim of retaliation for filing grievances and going on a hunger strike from July 12,
2023 through July 17, 2023 at the McConnell Unit; and (2) he was denied medical
treatment during these days despite submitting multiple sick calls. (D.E. 1, p. 14). Plaintiff
alleges that he had filed grievances at the McConnell Unit complaining about: (1) the
whereabouts of his property taken at the Coffield Unit by Sgt. Pedro; and (2) his lack of
access to the courts due to insufficient supplies. (D.E. 17, p. 16, ¶ 9(a)). Plaintiff states
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that he notified the unspecified McConnell Unit warden of these issues seven days before
going on a hunger strike. Id. Plaintiff further notified the Building 12 major, assistant
warden and head warden of his intentions and why. Id. According to Plaintiff, medical
records show that he notified Assistant Warden Flannel of his intentions to go on a hunger
strike. Id.
Plaintiff’s retaliation claims arise from his belief that Assistant Warden Flannel,
along with head warden, instructed Sgt. Canfield to provide false statements to the medical
department which prevented medical personnel from following hunger strike procedures.
Id. at 17, ¶ 9(b), (c). The procedures required “U.A. testing [daily]” and that Plaintiff’s
vitals be monitored after 72 hours of not eating. Id. Medical records show, Plaintiff says,
that Sgt. Canfield had reported on July 17, 2023 that Plaintiff had missed only six meals
since July 12, 2023. Id. Plaintiff further states that Sgt. Canfield was not assigned to
Plaintiff’s building and was working general population during that time period. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that he was never escorted to medical despite submitting numerous
sick calls one week before going on hunger strike, July 7, 2023, July 13, 2023, and July
15, 2023. Id. at 17, ¶¶ 9(c), (f). Plaintiff states that, after 72 hours of not eating, he
complained to staff about no medical follow ups, no vital taken, abdominal pain, not being
monitored, and his history of kidney failure. Id. at 17-18, ¶ 9(f). By day five of not eating,
Plaintiff reported bad abdominal pains to officers in his pod. Id. at 18, ¶ 9(f). After six
days of not eating, on July 18, 2023, Plaintiff ate breakfast and was escorted to see a
medical provider where his vitals were taken with no “U.S. or lab.” Id. Plaintiff was then
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provided a food substitute for thirty days. Id. Plaintiff holds the following officials
responsible for the denial of medical care: Warden Amonett, Assistant Warden Flannel and
Assistant Warden Tanner. Id. Plaintiff states that Executive Director should be responsible
for having an insufficient amount of staff at the McConnell Unit to work as escorts to
medical care. Id.
Plaintiff asserts that the actions of Sgt. Canfield, at the direction of the head warden
and Assistant Warden Flannel, placed him in danger by depriving him medical care. Id. at
17, ¶ 9(c). According to Plaintiff, he suffered as a result kidney damage, stomach pain,
and no bowel movements. Id. at 17, ¶ 9(d).
(7) Claim 6 allegations
In Claim 6, as set forth in his original complaint, Plaintiff asserts that his
constitutional rights were violated when he was denied access to his medical records,
denied being taken to medical appointments, and denied needed medications because they
were allowed to expire. (D.E. 1, pp. 14-15). Plaintiff seeks medical records to verify
missed appointments and whether or not they have been rescheduled. (D.E. 17, p. 18, ¶
10(a)). Plaintiff holds responsible the head wardens, the assistant wardens, and the Medial
Clinical Manager Breaux. Id. As a result of his missed appointments, Plaintiff has suffered
pain and mental stress for longer periods of time than normal. Id.
According to Plaintiff, he is unaware of how many appointments he missed because
restrictive housing inmates are not given medical lay-in passes for appointments and
because he does not get notices of rescheduled appointments. Id. While not being able to
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provide specific dates, Plaintiff says that he has missed appointments for hunger strike
issues, neck and shoulder issues, abdominal pain, Vitamin D deficiency, diet meals, chronic
care, medications for pain and hypertension, x-ray exams, ordered MRIs, and mental
health. Id. at 19, ¶ 10(b). Plaintiff has suffered the following injuries due to the missed
appointments:
● abdominal pain and kidney issues for missing appointments related to his
hunger strike;
● unnecessary pain due to missing medication appointments; and
● anxiety and insomnia due to missing mental health appointments
Id.
Plaintiff holds the following officials responsible for missing these appointments:
unnamed head wardens, unnamed assistant wardens, Assistant Warden Tanner, Clinical
Manager Breaux, and Executive Director Collier. Plaintiff alleges that each of these
individuals were aware of his medical conditions and need for appointments. Id. Clinical
Manager Breaux, Plaintiff says, was aware of his hunger strike due to her position and the
fact his sick call requests were forwarded to her. Id. In addition, Plaintiff alleges that
Clinical Manager Breaux was responsible for verifying and confirming Plaintiff’s missed
meals. Id.
Plaintiff states that he sent Warden Amonett and Assistant Warden Flannel I-60
forms notifying them of his missed appointments and that Executive Director Collier was
aware “of the seriously dangerous low number of staff during the period and did nothing
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to correct it.” Id. Warden Amonett, Assistant Warden Flannel, and Assistant Warden
Tanner, Plaintiff says, were also aware of the lack of staff leading to no available escorts
for medical appointments. Id. Lastly, Plaintiff alleges that Clinical Manager Breaux, who
was aware of Plaintiff’s sick calls, should have reported the lack of escorts to her
supervisor. Id.
Plaintiff lists one medication prescription as expiring without refills:
● Naproxen 500mg – Plaintiff states that this medication, which was prescribed
for neck and rotator cuff pain, expired for three months and was not refilled
until March 27, 2025.
Id. at 20, ¶ 10(c). Plaintiff holds the following officials responsible for not refilling this
medication in a timely manner: Clinical Manager Breaux, Executive Director Breaux,
Warden Amonett, Assistant Warden Flannel, and Assistant Warden Tanner. Id. Plaintiff
again cites these officials’ knowledge of the unit staff shortages as the reason given for
Plaintiff’s lack of adequate access to medical for appointments to receive his medications.
Plaintiff states that:
● Clinical Manager Breaux was aware because he wrote her sick calls
complaining of this matter and scheduled his medical appointments;
● Executive Director Collier was aware of the McConnell Unit’s staff
shortages during this period;
● Warden Amonett knew what staff was needed to operate the restrictive
housing building and what staff he had available;
● Assistant Warden Flannel was aware because she signed off on his Step 1
grievance where Plaintiff complained about his pain levels, insomnia, and
mental stress; and
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● Assistant Warden Tanner was aware because he investigated Plaintiff’s Step
1 grievance.
Id.
(8) Claim 7 allegations
In Claim 7, as set forth in his original complaint, Plaintiff asserts that that the
application of TDCJ policy BP-03.91 has resulted in an unconstitutional delay period for
sending and receiving mail. (D.E. 1, p. 15). Plaintiff complains generally that, while he is
on tablet restriction as a result of a disciplinary violation, there are delays in him receiving
e-messages on the tablets. (D.E. 17, pp. 20-21, ¶¶ 11(a), (b)). According to Plaintiff, he
has no idea when these incidents took place but estimates that the delay in receiving e-
messages ranged up to 30 days. Id. at 21, ¶¶ 11(b), (c).
He further states that there was one incident involving paper mail since a new
policy on mail delivery was enacted. Id. at 20, ¶ 11(a). Plaintiff grieved this incident
through both steps of the grievance policy. Id. Plaintiff alleges that the delay in receiving
paper mail was 13 days. Id. at 21, ¶ 11(c). All of the incidents involving paper mail and
e-messages involved non-legal mail. Id. at 21, ¶ 11(d).
Plaintiff challenges TDCJ policy BP-03.91as unconstitutional because “[i]t leaves
no bar, limitation, nor any administrative remedy when mail is untimely, unreasonable
delayed.” Id. at 21, ¶ 11(f). Plaintiff holds responsible Executive Director Collier, Director
Guerrero, TDCJ’s Deputy Director of Management Operations, and the Director of the
TDCJ’s Director Review Committee. Id. at 21, ¶ 11(e).
C. Plaintiff’s Construed Legal Claims
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Based on his statements in his complaint and More Definite Statement, and based
also on the Court’s liberal and broad construction of his claims, the undersigned
understands Plaintiff’s claims in this action against each of the named defendants to be the
following:
● Former Executive Director Collier (sued in both his individual and official
capacity):
o Violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment and due process rights by
implementing the policies that oversee the Security Threat Group GRAD
program as well as transit which: (1) places him at a substantial risk of serious
harm; and (2) denies him fair notice and a fair review process (D.E. 17, p.
21, ¶ 12).
o Implemented policies in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights in
connection with the restrictive housing plan through the hiring, training, and
firing of subordinate staff. Plaintiff asserts that these policies lead to the
denial of access to adequate medical services consisting of missed
treatments, examinations, appointments for medical refills, and x-rays. Id. at
17, p. 22, ¶ 12).
o Approved an unconstitutional mailroom policy, BP-03.91, that removes time
limitations in receiving or sending out non-legal mail. According to Plaintiff,
this policy leaves no avenue to appeal, petition, or grieve unreasonably
delayed mail. Id. at 21-22, ¶¶ 11(e), (f), 12
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● Former Director and current Executive Director Lumpkin (sued in both his
individual and official capacity):
o Violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment and due process rights by enforcing
polices (Security Threat Group plan, a Security Threat Group operational
plan, and restrictive housing plan operational plan) which caused him to stay
in punishing conditions of restrictive housing for over 13 years continuously.
Id. at 22, ¶ 13.
o Approved of policies in violation of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment by
approving staff levels at the McConnell Unit that lead to a substantial risk of
serious harm. According to Plaintiff, the lack of adequate staffing levels
resulted in lack of time outside the cell, lack of escorts to medical
appointments and other medical services, lack of security safety check, and
lack of in-cell programming classes. Id. at 23, ¶ 13.
● Director Guerrero (sued in both his individual and official capacity):
o Violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment and due process rights by enforcing
polices (Security Threat Group plan, a Security Threat Group operational
plan, and restrictive housing plan operational plan) which caused him to stay
in punishing conditions of restrictive housing for over 13 years continuously.
Id. at 22, ¶ 13.
o Approved of policies in violation of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment by
approving staff levels at the McConnell Unit that lead to a substantial risk of
serious harm. According to Plaintiff, the lack of adequate staffing levels
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resulted in lack of time outside the cell, lack of escorts to medical
appointments and other medical services, lack of security safety check, and
lack of in-cell programming classes. Id. at 23, ¶ 13.
o Violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights in connection with Plaintiff’s
failure to exercise outside his cell or have exposure to the sunlight. Id. at 10,
¶ 5(c).
o Approved an unconstitutional mailroom policy, BP-03.91, that removes time
limitations in receiving or sending out non-legal mail. According to Plaintiff,
this policy leaves no avenue to appeal, petition, or grieve unreasonably
delayed mail. Id. at 21, ¶¶ 11(e), (f).
● Warden Wysocki (sued in both her individual and official capacity):
o Violated Plaintiff’s due process rights by failing to follow TDCJ’s
classification policies when conducting sham unit classification and
restrictive housing reviews. Id. at 23, ¶ 14.
o Violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights by contributing to the denial
of Plaintiffs basic needs such as adequate and timely access to medical care,
exercise, proper hygiene supplies, showers, cleaning supplies, inadequate
meals service. Id. at 10 ¶ 5(c), 23 ¶ 14.
o Retaliated against Plaintiff by punishing him at disciplinary hearings without
his presence, denying him notice of the decisions and severity of
punishments, denying him the right to appeal and file grievances, denying
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him his Securus tablet, and limiting or denying his ability to file grievances.
Id. at 23, ¶ 14.
o Denied his personal property as a result of a disciplinary hearing held on June
13, 2025. Id. at 24, ¶ 14.
o Retaliated against Plaintiff by limiting or denying his ability to file
grievances. Id. at 23, ¶ 12.
● Assistant Warden Samaniego (sued in both his individual and official capacity):
o Violated Plaintiff’s due process rights by voting as a member of the SCC,
now called the MTT and through his involvement in the RTC. According to
Plaintiff, Assistant Warden Samaniego participated in meaningless SSC,
MTT, and RTC reviews which have kept Plaintiff in restrictive housing for
13 years, including two years at the McConnell Unit. Id. at 24, ¶ 16.
o Violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights by contributing to the denial
of Plaintiffs basic needs such as adequate and timely access to medical care,
exercise, proper hygiene supplies, showers, cleaning supplies, inadequate
meals service. Id.
o Contributed to the retaliation against Plaintiff. Id. at 25, ¶ 16.
● Assistant Warden Flannel (sued in her individual capacity only):
o Violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights in connection with Plaintiff’s
food strike by directing Sgt. Canfield to verify in a false manner how many
meals Plaintiff had missed during his hunger strike. Id. at 25, ¶ 17.
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o Violated Plaintiff’s rights by being aware of Plaintiff’s grievances
concerning the deprivation of his property. Id.
o Contributed to Plaintiff’s classification procedure through the SCC and
RHC. Id.
o Violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights by generally being
deliberately indifferent to his health. Id.
o Retaliated against Plaintiff by directing Sgt. Canfield to provide false
statements to the medical department regarding the status of his hunger
strike. Id. at 17, ¶ 9(c).
● Major Quiroga (sued in both his individual and official capacity):
o Violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights in connection with providing
Plaintiff unhealthy meals by: (1) serving unhealthy and unsanitary meals not
in compliance with food manuals; (2) not providing Plaintiff with beverages
withs his meals; (3) serving cold meals; (4) serving non-nutritious meals that
are Vitamin D deficient; and (5) not serving meals with condiments.
According to Plaintiff, Major Quiroga’s meal service placed his health at a
substantial risk of serious harm. Id. at 26-27, ¶ 20.
● Clinical Manager Breaux (sued in both her individual and official capacity):
o Violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights by denying Plaintiff access to
his medical records and by failing to schedule or reschedule his medical
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appointments in a manner to hinder his ability to access medical care. Id. at
26, ¶ 21.
● Assistant Warden Tanner (sued in both his individual and official capacity):
o Violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights by: (1) contributing to
Plaintiff’s lack of adequate access to the showers while in restrictive custody
(id. at 12, ¶ 5(c)); and (2) causing Plaintiff to miss his medical appointments
and failing to fill his prescriptions in a timely manner despite being aware of
Plaintiff’s medical conditions and need for appointments (id. at 19, ¶¶ 10(b)).
● Major Cavazos (sued in both his individual and official capacity):
o Violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights by: (1) contributing to
Plaintiff’s lack of adequate access to the showers while in restrictive custody
(id. at 12, ¶ 5(c)); and (2) sharing responsibility for not providing Plaintiff
with escorts to necessary medical appointments and other medical services
(id. at 11 ¶ 5(c)).
● Sgt. Canfield (sued in both his individual and official capacity):
o Violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights in connection with Plaintiff’s
food strike by falsely verifying how many meals Plaintiff has missed during
his hunger strike. Rather than the six missed meals reported by Sgt. Canfield,
Plaintiff states he missed 18 meals from July 12 through July 17, 2023
without medical attention. Id. at 27-28, ¶ 22.
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o Retaliated against Plaintiff by providing false statements at Assistant Warden
Flannel’s direction to the medical department regarding the status of his
hunger strike. Id. at 17, ¶ 9(c).
● Current Region IV Director Chevalier:3
o Violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights in connection with her
supervision of Warden Wysocki which either harmed Plaintiff seriously or
placed him at substantial risk of serious harm. According to Plaintiff, Region
IV Director Chevalier worked with Warden Wysocki to ensure he was
subjected to inhumane conditions in restrictive housing. Id. at 28, ¶ 24.
● Sgt. Pedro (sued in both his individual and official capacity):
o Violated his right to access the courts by taking his legal materials and other
personal property when he left the Coffield Unit to be transported to the
McConnell Unit. Id. at 29, ¶ 25.
o Contributed to the harassment and retaliation he faced at the Coffield Unit in
the wake of filing multiple grievances complaining about various conditions
of confinement at that unit. Id.
● John/Jane Doe, the SCC’s No. 1 Chairperson (sued in both his or her individual and
official capacity):
○ Violated Plaintiff’s due process rights in connection with the March 28, 2024
review by denying him a meaningful review when she and the other SCC
3 While Plaintiff did not indicate what capacity he sues this defendant, the Court will assume he intended to sue her
in her individual and official capacity.
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members: (1) failed to discuss matters relating to his file; and (2) follow the
fair classification policies. As a result, Plaintiff asserts, he was remanded to
restrictive custody for another six months. Id. at 29-30, ¶ 26.
o Violated his Eighth Amendment rights by remanding Plaintiff back to
restrictive custody where he suffered mental and physical injuries and a
substantial risk of serious harm due to the long-term confinement. Id.
● Lt. Barrera, another SCC member (sued in both her individual and official capacity):
○ Violated Plaintiff’s due process rights in connection with the March 28, 2024
review by denying him a meaningful review when she and the other SCC
members: (1) failed to discuss matters relating to his file; and (2) follow the
fair classification policies. As a result, Plaintiff asserts, he was remanded to
restrictive custody for another six months. Id. at 30, ¶ 27.
o Violated his Eighth Amendment rights by remanding Plaintiff back to
restrictive custody where he suffered mental and physical injuries and a
substantial risk of serious harm due to the long-term confinement. Id.
● Ms. Immon, McConnell Unit’s #3 Classification Chief (sued in both her individual
and official capacity):
○ Violated Plaintiff’s due process rights as a member of the RHC committee
by not following restrictive housing polices which: (1) required the offender
to be afforded the same due process as afforded during disciplinary hearings;
(2) required all RHC hearings be documented on the appropriate form; (3)
did not require housing offenders to be present at the 30-day reviews unless
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deemed appropriate by the RHC; and (4) requires that the restrictive housing
inmate be notified in writing of any decision made by the RHC within 24
hours of the decision. Id. at 30-31, ¶ 28.
● M. Bety, SCC representative at the October 18, 2023 SCC hearing (sued in both her
individual and official capacity):
○ Violated Plaintiff’s due process rights in connection with the October 18,
2023 review by denying him a meaningful review when she and the other
SCC members: (1) failed to discuss matters relating to his file; and (2) follow
the fair classification policies. As a result, Plaintiff asserts, he was remanded
to restrictive custody for another six months. Id. at 31, ¶ 29.
o Violated his Eighth Amendment rights by remanding Plaintiff back to
restrictive custody where he suffered mental and physical injuries and a
substantial risk of serious harm due to the long-term confinement. Id.
● SCC member #2, a John/Jane Doe present at the October 18, 2023 SCC hearing
(sued in both his or her individual and official capacity):
○ Violated Plaintiff’s due process rights in connection with the October 18,
2023 review by denying him a meaningful review when she and the other
SCC members: (1) failed to discuss matters relating to his file; and (2) follow
the fair classification policies. As a result, Plaintiff asserts, he was remanded
to restrictive custody for another six months. Id. at 32, ¶ 30.
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o Violated his Eighth Amendment rights by remanding Plaintiff back to
restrictive custody where he suffered mental and physical injuries and a
substantial risk of serious harm due to the long-term confinement. Id.
● K. Cuellar, the 3rd member of the SCC Committee on October 18, 2023 (sued in
both his/her individual and official capacity):
○ Violated Plaintiff’s due process rights in connection with the October 18,
2023 review by denying him a meaningful review when she and the other
SCC members: (1) failed to discuss matters relating to his file; and (2) follow
the fair classification policies. As a result, Plaintiff asserts, he was remanded
to restrictive custody for another six months. Id. at 32, ¶ 31.
o Violated his Eighth Amendment rights by remanding Plaintiff back to
restrictive custody where he suffered mental and physical injuries and a
substantial risk of serious harm due to the long-term confinement. Id.
● SCC John/Jane Doe Representative at the Security Detention Review hearing on
March 28, 2024 (sued in both his or her individual and official capacity):
○ Violated Plaintiff’s due process rights in connection with the March 28, 2024
review by denying him a meaningful review when she and the other SCC
members: (1) failed to discuss matters relating to his file; and (2) follow the
fair classification policies. As a result, Plaintiff asserts, he was remanded to
restrictive custody for another six months. Id. at 32, ¶ 32.
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o Violated his Eighth Amendment rights by remanding Plaintiff back to
restrictive custody where he suffered mental and physical injuries and a
substantial risk of serious harm due to the long-term confinement. Id.
● R. Arrisola, McConnell Unit’s “#3 SCC member at the hearing on March 28, 2024
(sued in both his individual and official capacity):
○ Violated Plaintiff’s due process rights in connection with the March 28, 2024
review by denying him a meaningful review when she and the other SCC
members: (1) failed to discuss matters relating to his file; and (2) follow the
fair classification policies. As a result, Plaintiff asserts, he was remanded to
restrictive custody for another six months. Id. at 33, ¶ 34.
o Violated his Eighth Amendment rights by remanding Plaintiff back to
restrictive custody where he suffered mental and physical injuries and a
substantial risk of serious harm due to the long-term confinement. Id.
● Oscar Mendza, TDCJ’s Deputy Director of Management Operations overseeing the
Security Threat Group Management’s Office (sued in both his individual and
official capacity):
○ Violated Plaintiff’s procedural due process rights by denying Plaintiff access
to Security Threat Group policies that govern his release from restrictive
custody and provide him information regarding notice and the review
process. According to Plaintiff, Sgt. Mendza has enforced polices governing
the Security Threat Management Group that prohibit Plaintiff from having
notice, the ability to present evidence, and effective review of his restrictive
housing custody by the SCC, RHC, or MTT. Plaintiff’s due process claims
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further challenge the requirement that he successfully complete the GRAD
program. As a result, Plaintiff says, he has been held in solitary confinement
for over 13 years. Id. at 33-34, ¶ 35.
○ Violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights by causing him to stay in
inhumane conditions, which continue to present a substantial risk of serious
harm in addition to the mental and physical injuries already suffered. Id. at
34-35, ¶ 35.
● Sgt. James Mireles, McConnell Unit’s Security Threat Group Supervisor; and
(sued in both his individual and official capacity):
○ Violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights by enforcing policies that
caused him to suffer in inhumane conditions for over 27 months, which
continue to present a substantial risk of serious harm in addition to the mental
and physical injuries already suffered. Id. at 35, ¶ 36.
● The John or Jane Doe Director of TDCJ’s “Director Review Committee”
(sued in his/her official capacity only):
○ Violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights by implementing and enforcing
an unconstitutional mail room policy, BP-03.91, that provides no reasonable
time limitations for inmates to receive or send out non-legal mail. Id. at 36,
¶ 37.
● Richard Garcia, a Security Threat Group supervisor and/or manager (sued in both
his individual and official capacity):
o Violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment and due process rights by enforcing
polices (Security Threat Group plan, a Security Threat Group operational
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plan, and restrictive housing plan operational plan) which resulted in him
being denied relief at his various review hearings and being left in punishing
conditions in restrictive housing for numerous years. Id. at 3, 13 ¶¶ 5(a),
6(a).
o Violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights based on role in denying
Plaintiff access to medical and mental health treatment while in restrictive
custody. Id. at 13, ¶ 5(c).
● Richard Bledsoe, a Security Threat Group supervisor and/or manager (sued in both
his individual and official capacity):
o Violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment and due process rights by enforcing
polices (Security Threat Group plan, a Security Threat Group operational
plan, and restrictive housing plan operational plan) which resulted in him
being denied relief at his various review hearings and being left in punishing
conditions in restrictive housing for numerous years. Id. at 3, ¶¶ 5(a), 6(a).
o Violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights based on role in denying
Plaintiff access to medical and mental health treatment while in restrictive
custody. Id. at 13, ¶ 5(c).
III. GOVERNING LAW
A. Legal Standard for Screening of Plaintiff’s Action
When a prisoner seeks to proceed in forma pauperis the Court shall evaluate the
complaint and dismiss it without service of process if the Court finds the complaint
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks
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monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (providing that a court shall review an in forma pauperis
complaint as soon as practicable and dismiss it if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from an immune
defendant). A claim is frivolous if it has no arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989). A claim has no arguable basis in law if it is based on an
indisputably meritless legal theory, “such as if the complaint alleges the violation of a legal
interest which clearly does not exist.” Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998).
A claim has no arguable basis in fact if “after providing the plaintiff the opportunity to
present additional facts when necessary, the facts alleged are clearly baseless.” Talib v.
Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 1998).
“In analyzing the complaint, [the Court] will accept all well-pleaded facts as true,
viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d
322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999). “The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but
whether he is entitled to offer evidence to support his claim. Thus, the Court should not
dismiss the claim unless the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts
or any possible theory that he could prove consistent with the allegations in the complaint.”
Id. (citations omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported
by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). Plaintiff must allege sufficient facts in support of its legal conclusions that give
rise to a reasonable inference that Defendant is liable. Id.; Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
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550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). The factual allegations must raise Plaintiff’s claim for relief
above the level of mere speculation. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. As long as the complaint,
taken as a whole, gives rise to a plausible inference of actionable conduct, Plaintiff’s claim
should not be dismissed. Id.
Pleadings filed by pro se litigants like Plaintiff are construed using a less stringent
standard of review. Documents filed by pro se litigants are to be liberally construed, and
pro se complaints, however inartfully drafted they might be, are held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 740
(5th Cir. 2002) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)); see also Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations in the
complaint are to be taken as true for purposes of screening, but such deference does not
extend to conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.
DeMarco v. Davis, 914 F.3d 383, 386-87 (5th Cir. 2019).
B. Relevant law regarding 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Section 1983 provides a vehicle for redressing the violation of federal law by those
acting under color of state law. Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643 (2004). To prevail
on a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff must prove that a person acting under the color of state law
deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). A defendant acts under color of state law
if he misuses or abuses official power and if there is a nexus between the victim, the
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improper conduct, and the defendant’s performance of official duties. Townsend v. Moya,
291 F.3d 859, 861 (5th Cir. 2002).
Several of the defendants sued in their individual capacities in this case are
supervisory officials. “Personal involvement is an essential element of a civil rights cause
of action.” Thompson v. Steele, 709 F.2d 381, 382 (5th Cir. 1983). There is no vicarious
or respondeat superior liability of supervisors under § 1983. Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d
298, 303-04 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Carnaby v. City of Houston, 636 F.3d 183, 189 (5th
Cir. 2011) (the acts of subordinates do not trigger individual § 1983 liability for supervisory
officials).
“Each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or
her own misconduct.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. A plaintiff “must plead that each
Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated
the Constitution.” Id. at 676. A supervisory official may be held liable only if “(1) he
affirmatively participates in the acts that cause the constitutional deprivation, or (2) he
implements unconstitutional policies that causally result in the constitutional injury.”
Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 446 (5th Cir. 2011).
Supervisory liability without overt personal participation in the offensive act thus
can lie only if the supervisory official “implement[s] a policy so deficient that the policy
itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force behind the
constitutional violation.” Thompkins, 828 F.2d at 304 (internal quotations omitted). “A
policy is normally an official statement, ordinance, or regulation, but in certain
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circumstances a persistent, widespread practice that is so commonplace as to constitute a
custom can also be treated as policy.” McNeil v. Caruso, No. 17-01688, 2019 WL 1435831,
at *2 (M.D. La. Mar. 28, 2019) (citing Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 579
(5th Cir. 2001)).
Furthermore, Ex parte Young provides “an equitable exception to Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity ... [that] allows plaintiff to sue a state official, in his
official capacity, in seeking to enjoin enforcement of a state law [or policy] that conflicts
with federal law.” Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. Texas, Dep’t of Ins., Div. of Workers' Comp., 851
F.3d 507, 515 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908)). “In
determining whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young avoids an Eleventh Amendment bar
to suit, a court need only conduct a straightforward inquiry into whether the complaint
alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as
prospective.” Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002)
(internal quotations and modifications omitted).
Under the Ex Parte Young exception, plaintiffs may bring “suits for injunctive or
declaratory relief against individual state officials acting in violation of federal law.” Raj
v. Louisiana State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 328 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. at 155-56). To be a proper defendant, the state official must have “some connection”
to the law’s enforcement. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157. “The required ‘connection’ is
not ‘merely the general duty to see that the laws of the state are implemented,’ but ‘the
particular duty to enforce the [law] in question and a demonstrated willingness to exercise
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that duty.’” Morris v. Livingston, 739 F.3d 740, 746 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Okpalobi v.
Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 416 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc)). Ex parte Young only applies,
therefore, when the state official has “some connection to the state law’s enforcement,
which ensures that the suit is not effectively against the state itself.” Texas Democratic
Party v. Abbott, 961 F.3d 389, 400 (5th Cir. 2020) (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Eleventh amendment immunity and Official Capacity (Money Damages)
A suit against a state officer in his or her official capacity is effectively a suit against
that state official’s office. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
The Eleventh Amendment, however, bars claims for money damages against a state or state
agency. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996); Aguilar v. Texas
Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 160 F.3d 1052, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998). As such, an action for
monetary damages against a state official in his or her official capacity is one against the
state itself, and is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.
159, 166 (1985). The Fifth Circuit has extended the Eleventh Amendment immunity
specifically to TDCJ officers and officials acting in their official capacities. See Oliver v.
Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 742 (5th Cir. 2002) (Eleventh Amendment bars prisoner’s suit for
money damages against prison officials in their official capacities).
To the extent that Plaintiff sues Defendants in their official capacities for money
damages, such claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Thus, the undersigned
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respectfully recommends that Plaintiff’s claims for money damages against each named
defendant sued in his or her official capacity be dismissed without prejudice.4
B. Misjoinder of Unrelated Claims
Rule 18(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only allows a plaintiff to join
“either as independent or as alternate claims, as many claims, legal, equitable, or maritime,
as the party has against an opposing party.” Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, in turn, only allows the joinder of several parties if the claims arose out of a
single transaction (or series of transactions) and contain a question of fact or law common
to all the defendants. In other words, “[u]nrelated claims against different defendants
belong in different suits.” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007).
In his complaint and More Definite Statement, Plaintiff seeks to join in this action
numerous claims. Most of Plaintiff’s claims arise in connection with his claims
challenging his continued placement in restrictive housing at the McConnell Unit and
related claims concerning he conditions of that confinement. Plaintiff, however, seeks to
raise some claims which do not arise out the transaction or series of transactions arising
from his placement and confinement in the McConnell Unit’s restrictive housing.
Specifically, Plaintiff improperly seeks to join the following claims arising from separate
and distinct transactions:
4 Claims implicating the Eleventh Amendment are dismissed without prejudice because the Eleventh Amendment
deprives the Court of subject matter jurisdiction. See Planned Parenthood Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Phillips, 24 F.4th 442,
450 (5th Cir. 2022) (observing that “the Eleventh Amendment generally deprives federal courts of jurisdiction” over
certain suits); United States v. Texas Tech Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 285 n.9 (5th Cir. 1999) (“While the Supreme Court
has left this question open, [the Fifth Circuit] has repeatedly referred to the Eleventh Amendment’s restriction in terms
of subject matter jurisdiction.”).
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● Plaintiff’s Claim 4 violations against Sgt. Pedro for denial of access to the
courts, retaliation and harassment based on allegations: (1) Sgt. Pedro took
Plaintiff’s legal materials and other personal property at the Coffield Unit
before being transported to the McConnell Unit; and (2) related to his
conduct following the filing of multiple grievances complaining about
various conditions of confinement at the Coffield Unit (D.E. 17, pp. 15-16,
29 ¶¶ 8(a), 25);
● Plaintiff’s Claim 7 violations against Executive Director Collier, Director
Guerrero, and the John/Jane Director of the TDCJ’s Director Review
Committee for implementing and enforcing an unconstitutional mail room
policy, BP-03.91, that provides no reasonable time limitations for inmates to
receive or send out non-legal mail (id. at 21, 36-37, ¶¶ 11(e), (f), 37).
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s Claims 4 and 7 be
dismissed from this action for improper joinder and without prejudice to raising such
claims each in separate lawsuits as appropriate.
C. Due Process Claims
1. Governing Law
To state a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim, a plaintiff must show he was
deprived of a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Wilkinson v. Austin,
545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005); Coleman v. Dretke, 395 F.3d 216, 221 (5th Cir. 2004). To
establish a due process violation in connection with the disciplinary process and resulting
punishments, a prisoner must establish a liberty interest which was implicated or infringed
by a prison action. Richardson v. Joslin, 501 F.3d 415, 418 (5th Cir. 2007). Liberty
interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause are generally
limited to: freedom from restraints which impose an atypical and significant hardship on
an inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prisoner life; or those punishments that
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extend the length or duration of confinement. Lopez v. Davis, No. 6:19cv593, 2020 WL
6935560, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 2020), adopted, 2020 WL 6888993 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 24,
2020) (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)).
Generally, an inmate has no protectable liberty interest or property interest in his
custodial classification and, therefore, no constitutionally cognizable liberty interest with
regard to his placement in administrative segregation or other restrictive housing as well
as obtaining or retaining classification in general population. Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d 192,
193 (5th Cir. 1995); Wilson v. Budney, 976 F.2d 957, 958 (5th Cir. 1992); see also
Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 221 (“[T]he Constitution itself does not give rise of a liberty interest
in avoiding transfer to more adverse conditions of confinement.”); Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486
(explaining that a plaintiff’s “discipline in segregated confinement did not present the type
of atypical, significant deprivations in which a State might conceivably create a liberty
interest”). Only when a prisoner demonstrates “extraordinary circumstances” may he
maintain a due process challenge to a change in his custodial classification. Luken, 71 F.3d
at 193.
The Due Process Clause “does not protect every change in the conditions of
confinement having a substantial adverse impact on the prisoner.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 478.
Instead, a prisoner’s liberty interest is “generally limited to freedom from restraint which,
while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection
by the Due Process Clause of its own force, ... nonetheless imposes atypical and significant
hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. “[T]here is
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no dispositive bright line between deprivations resulting from initial custodial
classifications and deprivations resulting from disciplinary measures.” Wilkerson v.
Goodwin, 774 F.3d 945, 852 (5th Cir. 2014).
Courts have recognized, however, that extreme conditions of confinement in some
instances can involve such atypical and extraordinary circumstances that such confinement
can implicate a liberty interest. See, e.g., Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 221 (recognizing that the
use of solitary confinement in Ohio’s Supermax facility crossed the line); Hernandez v.
Velasquez, 522 F.3d 556, 562-63 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that solitary confinement can be
used in a way that “imposes atypical and significant hardship.”); Wilkerson, 774 F.3d at
855-57 (concluding that two prisoners given decades-long closed-cell restrictions similar
to the solitary confinement at issue in Wilkinson had a cognizable due process interest in
Louisiana's classification system). The Fifth Circuit has concluded that restrictive
placements of less than two-and-a-half years do not implicate due process concerns but
that placements of more than five years likely do implicate due process. Wilkerson, 744
F.3d at 855; Bailey v. Fisher, 647 F. App’x 472, 476-77 (5th Cir. 2016). In making this
determination, a court must consider both “the nature of the more restrictive confinement
and its duration in relation to the prison norms and to the terms of the individual’s
sentence.” Wilkerson, 744 F.3d at 853 (quoting Harden-Bey v. Rutter, 524 F.3d 789, 792
(6th Cir. 2008)). “Potentially indefinite placements heighten due process concerns.”
Hernandez v. Abbott, No. 9:17-CV-23, 2020 WL 5539093, at *12 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 24,
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2020), adopted, 2020 WL 5534522 (E.D. Tex. Sep. 15, 2020) (citing Wilkerson, 744 F.3d
at 855).
2. Analysis
With respect to his Fourteenth Amendment due process claim, Plaintiff alleges the
following pertinent facts:
● Since returning into TDCJ custody in 2011, Plaintiff has been held in
restrictive custody due to his gang affiliation. (D.E. 1, p. 9; D.E. 17, p. 1, ¶¶
1-4).
● Plaintiff has been held in restrictive custody in the McConnell Unit at all
times since being transferred there on June 10, 2023. (D.E. 17, p. 1, ¶¶ 1-4).
● Plaintiff is forced to participate in and complete the GRAD program,
required for inmates with gang affiliations, as a perquisite for leaving
indefinite restrictive custody (D.E. 1, p. 9; (D.E.17, p. 2, ¶ 5(a)).
● The GRAD program requires him to participate in debriefing, where Plaintiff
is tasked with divulging secret information about his gang affiliation which
makes him the target of violence by fellow gang members (D.E. 17, p. 3, ¶
5(a)).
● Policies associated with implementing both GRAD and the Security Member
Threat Group plan have subjected Plaintiff to a meaningless and sham review
process through his various SCC, MIT, and RHC hearings in which: (1) he
has no meaningful notice as to how he can obtain release from restrictive
custody; (2) he is told he must sign and complete in the GRAD program
which requires debriefing; (3) he is denied the right to call witnesses on his
behalf; and (4) the review process includes no consideration of an
individual’s behavior and focuses on the group instead. (D.E. 17, pp. 4-5, ¶
5(b).
● The Security Member Threat Group plan provides him with no right to
appeal or grieve his continued confinement in inhumane restrictive housing
conditions. (D.E. 17, pp. 4-5, ¶ 5(b)).
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● Plaintiff is subject to inhumane and harsh conditions in restrictive custody,
which includes: (1) being forced to spend 23 hours a day alone in a cell the
size of a car-parking lot; (2) being denied normal prison activities and
privileges; (3) being served cold, unsanitary, and nutritionally-deficient
meals; (4) being denied contact visits with visitation only permitted through
glass while he is in a small cage; (5) being denied exercise; and (6) having to
live in an unsanitary cell. (D.E. 17, pp. 5-9, ¶¶ 5(b), (c)).
Plaintiff’s allegations, accepted as true, indicate that: (1) he has been forced to
endure extreme conditions of confinement in restrictive confinement for several years,
including over two years at the McConnell Unit; and (2) the policies in effect and the
review process accorded him with regard to his restrictive custody status is meaningless
and a sham. While the GRAD program appears to offer Plaintiff an avenue to escape
restrictive custody, Plaintiff’s allegations suggest that it would cause him potential harm
as a target of violence. Plaintiff’s allegations, as a whole, suggest that his stay in the
inhumane conditions of restrictive custody may not end any time soon. Based on the facts
alleged by Plaintiff, the undersigned finds that he has plead in a sufficient manner atypical
and extraordinary circumstances necessary to implicate a liberty interest. See Sandin, 515
U.S. at 484; Hernandez, 2020 WL 5539093, at *13-14. The undersigned recommends that
the Court should retain Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claims.
3. Proper Defendants
In his complaint and More Definite Statement, Plaintiff describes several defendants
as having key roles with regard to keeping him in indefinite restrictive custody. Plaintiff
alleges that several TDCJ officials implemented and enforced various policies in
connection with the GRAD program and Security Threat Group plan that led the denial of
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his due process rights in connection with the alleged sham review hearings. Specifically,
Plaintiff states that:
● former Executive Director Collier was responsible for implementing policies
overseeing the Security Threat Group GRAD program associated that led to
his continuous custody in restrictive custody (D.E. 17, pp. 3, 21, ¶¶ 5(a), 12
;
● Former Director and current Executive Director Lumpkin and current
Director Guerrero were responsible for enforcing the policies associated with
the GRAD policies which caused him to stay in punishing conditions in
restrictive housing (id. at 3, 22, ¶¶ 5(a), 22);
● Oscar Mendza implemented or enforced policies that: (1) denied Plaintiff
access to Security Threat Group policies which govern his release from
restrictive custody and provide him information regarding notice and the
review process; (2) prohibit Plaintiff from having notice, the ability to
present evidence, and effective review of his restrictive housing custody by
the SCC, RHC, or MTT; and (3) require him to successfully complete the
GRAD program (id. at 33-34, ¶ 35);
● Security Threat Group supervisor and/or managers Garcia and Bledsoe
enforces polices (Security Threat Group plan, a Security Threat Group
operational plan, and restrictive housing plan operational plan) which
resulted in Plaintiff being denied relief at his various review hearings and
being left in punishing conditions in restrictive housing for numerous years
(id. at 3, ¶ 5(a)).
Plaintiff further alleges that the following officials participated at the unit level in
denying Plaintiff’s due process rights in connection with his multiple review hearings
conducted by the SCC, MTT, and RTC where he was denied release from restrictive
custody. These officials include: (1) Warden Wysocki; (2) Assistant Warden Samaniego;
(3) John/Jane Doe (the SCC’s No. 1 Chairperson at the March 28, 2024 review); (4) Lt.
Barrera (an SCC member); (5) Ms. Immon (the McConnell unit’s Classification Chief); (6)
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M. Bety (SCC representative at the October 18, 2023 SCC hearing); (7) John/Jane Doe #2
(SCC member present at the October 18, 2023 hearing); (8) K. Cuellar (the 3rd member of
the SCC Committee on October 18, 2023); (9) SCC John/Jane Doe (Representative at the
Security Detention Review hearing on March 28, 2024); and (10) R. Arrisola (McConnell
Unit’s “#3 SCC member at the hearing on March 28, 2024). (See id. at 6, 23-24, 29-33,
¶¶ 5(b), 14, 16, 26-32, 34).
Accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, he has alleged plausible Fourteenth
Amendment due process claims against each of these TDCJ and McConnell Unit officials
based on their roles either in implementing and enforcing policies or direct participation in
Plaintiff’s review hearings. Further factual and legal development of these claims is
necessary to determine whether Plaintiff can maintain these claims against each particular
defendant in his or her individual capacity, official capacity, or both. Accordingly, the
undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court retain Plaintiff’s Fourteenth
Amendment due process claims against:
● Executive Director Collier in his individual capacity;5
● Former Director (and current Executive Director) Lumpkin in his individual
and official capacity;
● Director Guerrero in his individual and official capacity;
● Oscar Mendza, TDCJ’s Deputy Manager of Management Operations
overseeing the Security Threat Management’s Office, in his individual and
official capacity;
5 Since the filing of this lawsuit, Lumpkin has replaced Collier as TDCJ’s Executive Director. Pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Lumpkin is substituted in place of Collier with respect to claims asserted against
TDCJ’s Executive Director in his official capacity.
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● Security Threat Group supervisor and/or manager Garcia in his individual
and official capacity;
● Security Threat Group supervisor and/or manager Bledsoe in his individual
and official capacity;
● Warden Wysocki in her individual and official capacity;
● Assistant Warden Samaniego in his individual and official capacity;
● John/Jane Doe (the SCC’s No. 1 Chairperson at the March 28, 2024 review)
in his or her individual and official capacity;
● Lt. Barrera (an SCC member) in her individual and official capacity;
● Ms. Immon (the McConnell unit’s Classification Chief) in her individual and
official capacity;
● M. Bety (SCC representative at the October 18, 2023 SCC hearing) in her
individual and official capacity;
● John/Jane Doe #2 (SCC member present at the October 18, 2023 hearing) in
his or her individual and official capacity;
● K. Cuellar (the 3rd member of the SCC Committee on October 18, 2023) in
his individual and official capacity;
● SCC John/Jane Doe (Representative at the Security Detention Review
hearing on March 28, 2024) in his or her individual and official capacity;
● R. Arrisola (McConnell Unit’s “#3 SCC member at the hearing on March 28,
2024) in his individual and official capacity.
Plaintiff also appears to allege a Fourteenth Amendment claims against Assistant
Warden Flannel. However, Plaintiff only alleges in a threadbare and conclusory manner
that Assistant Warden Flannel “contributed to [his] classification procedure.” (D.E. 17, p.
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25, ¶ 17). Plaintiff provides no specific facts to indicate that Assistant Warden Flannel
participated in the decision-making process to keep Plaintiff in restrictive housing or
otherwise violated Plaintiff’s rights in connection with the “classification procedure.” See
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Accordingly, the undersigned
recommends that the Court dismiss with prejudice Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due
process claim against Assistant Warden Flannel as frivolous and/or for failure to state a
claim for relief.
D. Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference Claims
1. Governing Law
The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. Const.
amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. Const.
amend. VIII. “The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons . . . but neither does
it permit inhumane ones, and it is now settled that the treatment a prisoner receives in
prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the
Eighth Amendment.” Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 719 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting
Woods v. Edwards, 51 F.3d 577, 581 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (internal quotations
omitted)). An Eighth Amendment violation occurs when a prison official acts with
deliberate indifference to an inmate’s health and safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
834 (1994).
“Deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard to meet.” Domino v. Tex.
Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 755 (5th Cir. 2001). The test for deliberate
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indifference has both an objective and subjective prong. Id. at 839. Under the objective
prong, the inmate must first prove “an objective exposure to a substantial risk of harm.”
Valentine v. Collier, 993 F.3d 270, 281 (5th Cir. 2021). “[I]nmates need not show that
death or serious injury has already occurred to prove that unconstitutional conditions exist
under the objective element[,] . . . [r]ather, they need only show that there is a substantial
risk of serious harm.” Garrett v. Lumpkin, 96 F.4th 896, 900-01 (5th Cir. 2024) (internal
quotations and citation omitted).
To prove the subjective prong of the deliberate indifference test, the inmate must
establish that the prison official “had subjective knowledge that the inmate faced a
substantial risk of harm [to the inmate’s health and safety] and … [consciously] disregarded
the risk.” Valentine, 993 F.3d at 281; see also Lawson v. Dall. Cnty., 286 F.3d 257, 262
(5th Cir. 2002). In other words, a prison official acts with deliberate indifference if he
knows that an inmate faces a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by
failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. Farmer, 511 at 847.
Deliberate indifference may be exhibited by prison doctors in their response to
prisoners’ needs, but it may also be shown when prison officials have denied an inmate
prescribed treatment or have denied him access to medical personnel capable of evaluating
the need for treatment. Estelle, 429 U.S at 104-05. In the context of medical treatment,
the prisoner must show “that prison officials refused to treat him, ignored his complaints,
intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly
evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.” Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d
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339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
A prison official’s knowledge of substantial risk may be inferred if the risk was
obvious. Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d 459, 463 (5th Cir. 2006). The Fifth Circuit
nevertheless has “consistently recognized . . . that ‘deliberate indifference cannot be
inferred merely from a negligent or even a grossly negligent response to a substantial risk
of serious harm.’” Dyer v. Houston, 964 F.3d 374, 381 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Thompson
v. Upshur Cnty., Tex., 245 F.3d 447, 458-59 (5th Cir. 2001)); see also Aguirre v. City of
San Antonio, 995 F.3d 395, 420 (5th Cir. 2021) (“Negligence or even gross negligence is
not enough, the officials must have actual knowledge of the substantial risk”). The
Supreme Court further explains that “an official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that
he should have perceived but did not” falls short of constituting deliberate indifference.
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838. Deliberate indifference encompasses only unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain repugnant to the conscience of humankind. McCormick v.
Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).
2. Analysis
a. Deliberate Indifference Claims to Retain
The Court will first consider whether Plaintiff can establish the objective component
of his deliberate indifference claims. The Supreme Court has stated that only extreme
deprivations can be characterized as punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1992). The length of time spent in offensive
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conditions also should be considered, because for example a “filthy, overcrowded cell ...
might be tolerable for a few days and intolerably cruel for weeks or months.” Alexander
v. Tippah Cnty., Miss., 351 F.3d 626, 631 (5th Cir. 2003). As noted in Hernandez,
“conditions may not be ‘grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime warranting
imprisonment.’” Hernandez, 2020 WL 5539093, at *14 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). “[A] ‘sufficiently serious’ deprivation under the Eighth
Amendment” is defined “as the denial of ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities.” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834).
Here, Plaintiff’s allegations, accepted as true, indicate that: (1) Plaintiff has been
subjected to years of prolonged segregation in restrictive housing, including the last two
years at the McConnell Unit; (2) his restrictive housing placement requires him to spend
23 hours a day alone in his cell the size of a parking lot; (3) he is denied exercise at the
McConnell Unit; (4) the toilets around his cell are defective and often overflow with feces
getting into his cell; and (6) he is served cold, nutritionally inadequate, and unsanitary food.
(D.E. 17, pp. 5-6, 8-9 26-27, ¶¶ 5(b), (c), 20). Plaintiff’s allegations further indicate that
he is denied or prohibited from timely access to medical and health services, such that
medical appointments are forced to be cancelled due to lack of security escorts and are then
rescheduled, there are often long delays in him receiving x-rays or MRIs for serious injuries
and medical conditions, his prescriptions expire before getting refills. Id. at 10, 14, ¶¶ 5(c),
7).
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With regard to his claim he was denied access to medical appointments, medical
records, and medications, Plaintiff alleges that he has missed appointments for hunger
strike issues, neck and shoulder issues, abdominal pain, Vitamin D deficiency, diet meals,
chronic care, medications for pain and medications, x-ray examinations, ordered MRIs,
and mental health. Id. at 18-20, ¶¶ 10(a), (b), (c). Plaintiff’s allegations also reflect that
he has suffered serious physical injuries and unnecessary pain as a result of the harsh
conditions spent in restrictive custody, including abdominal pain, kidney issues, chronic
neck pain, and hypertension. Id. at 8, 10, 19, ¶¶ 5(b), (c), 10(b). Plaintiff’s allegations
further indicate that the GRAD program is a dangerous one subjecting him to a potential
violence by giving secret information about his gang affiliation. Id. at 3, ¶ 5(a). While it
is not necessary to show he has suffered serious injuries, Plaintiff’s allegations taken as a
whole are sufficient to state he is at substantial risk of serious harm either by participating
in the GRAD program or staying indefinitely in restrictive custody for refusing to
participate.
Plaintiff alleges in his complaint and More Definite Statement that many defendants
acted with deliberate indifference toward him in connection with his long-term and
indefinite placement in restrictive custody. These allegations are summarized as follows:
● Executive Director Collier – He was responsible for: (1) implementing
GRAD policies which led to Plaintiff suffering in restrictive custody (D.E.
17, p. 3, 22, ¶¶ 5(a), 12); (2) implementing policies that caused Plaintiff to
have insufficient exercise and exposure to sunlight while in restrictive
custody (id. at 10, 14, ¶¶ 5(c), 7); and (3) implementing transit and other
policies regarding the hiring, training, and firing of staff that led to a shortage
of escorts for Plaintiff to medical and the denial of medical services
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consisting of missed treatments, examinations, appointments for medical
refills, and x-rays (id. at 11, 14, 22, ¶¶ 5(c), 7, 12).
● Former Director Lumpkin – He was responsible for: (1) enforcing GRAD
policies which led to Plaintiff suffering in restrictive custody (id. at 22, ¶ 13);
and (2) approving policies that led to inadequate staffing levels which caused
Plaintiff to suffer in restrictive custody by having insufficient exercise,
exposure to sunlight, lack of access to medical appointments and services,
lack of safety checks, and lack of in-cell programming classes (id. at 11, 14,
23, ¶¶ 5(c), 7, 13).
● Director Guerrero – He was responsible for: (1) enforcing GRAD policies
which led to Plaintiff suffering in restrictive custody (D.E. 17, p. 3, 22, ¶¶
5(a), 13); (2) implementing policies that caused Plaintiff to have insufficient
exercise and exposure to sunlight while in restrictive custody (id. at 10, 14,
¶¶ 5(c), 7); and (3) approving policies related to staff shortages which, in
turn, led to Plaintiff having insufficient exercise, exposure to sunlight, lack
of access to medical appointments and services, lack of safety checks, and
lack of in-cell programming classes (id. at 11, 14, 23, ¶¶ 5(c), 7, 13).
● Warden Wysocki – She was responsible for: (1) enforcing complaints about
unsanitary and unhealthy food served to plaintiff in restrictive custody (id. at
9, ¶ 5(c); (2) failing to provide Plaintiff with sufficient exercise and exposure
to sunlight while in restrictive custody (id. at 10, ¶ 5(c)); and (3) failing to
ensure that Plaintiff was provided escorts to medical and mental health
treatment for appointments, examinations, and/or prescription refills (id. at
10-11, 23, ¶¶ 5(c), 7, 14).
● Assistant Warden Samaniego – He was responsible for failing to ensure that
Plaintiff was provided escorts to medical and mental health treatment for
appointments, examinations, and/or prescription refills (id. at 10-11, 23, ¶
5(c), 7, 14).
● Assistant Warden Flannel – She was responsible for denying Plaintiff
important medical treatment in connection with his hunger strike during the
period from July 12, 2023 through July 17, 2023 (D.E. 1, p. 14; D.E. 17, pp.
17, 25, ¶¶ 9(b), (c), 17).
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● Major Quiroga – He placed Plaintiff’s health at a substantial risk of serious
harm during his stay in restrictive custody by: (1) serving unhealthy and
unsanitary meals not in compliance with food manuals; (2) not providing
Plaintiff with beverages withs his meals; (3) serving cold meals; (4) serving
non-nutritious meals that are Vitamin D deficient; and (5) not serving meals
with condiments. According to Plaintiff, Major Quiroga’s meal service
placed his health at a substantial risk of serious harm. (D.E. 17, pp. 9, 26-
27, ¶¶ 5(c), 20).
● Clinical Manager Breaux – She is responsible for denying Plaintiff access to
he medical records and by failing to schedule or reschedule his medical
appointments in a manner to hinder his ability to access medical care. (id. at
19, 26, ¶¶ 10(b), 21).
● Assistant Warden Tanner – He is responsible for Plaintiff missing his
medical appointments and failing to fill his prescriptions in a timely manner
despite being aware of Plaintiff’s medical conditions and need for
appointments. (id. at 19, ¶¶ 10(b), (c)).
● Major Cavazos – He is responsible for not providing Plaintiff with escorts to
necessary medical appointments and other medical services (id. at 11, ¶ 5(c)).
● Sgt. Canfield – He was responsible, along with Warden Flannel, for denying
Plaintiff important medical treatment in connection with his hunger strike
during the period from July 12, 2023 through July 17, 2023 (id. at 17, 27-28,
¶¶ 9(b), (c), (f), 22).
● John/Jane Doe, the SCC’s no. 1 Chairperson – In connection with the sham
March 28, 2024 review, he or she shared responsibility for remanding
Plaintiff back to restrictive custody where he was subject to a substantial risk
of serious harm based on the denial of access to medical and mental health
treatment (id. at 6, 12, 29-30, ¶¶ 5(b), 5(c), 26).
● Lt. Barerra – In connection with the sham March 28, 2024 review, she shared
responsibility for remanding Plaintiff back to restrictive custody where he
was subject to a substantial risk of serious harm based on the denial of access
to medical and mental health treatment (id. at 6, 12, 30, ¶¶ 5(b), 5(c), 27).
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● M. Bety, SCC representative at the October 18, 2023 SCC hearing – In
connection with the sham October 18, 2023 review, she shared responsibility
for remanding Plaintiff back to restrictive custody where he was subject to a
substantial risk of serious harm based on the denial of access to medical and
mental health treatment (id. at 6, 12, 31, ¶¶ 5(b), 5(c), 29).
● SCC member #2, a John/Jane Doe – In connection with the sham October
18, 2023 review, he or she shared responsibility for remanding Plaintiff back
to restrictive custody where he was subject to a substantial risk of serious
harm based on the denial of access to medical and mental health treatment
(id. at 6, 12, 32, ¶¶ 5(b), 5(c), 30).
● K. Cuellar, the 3rd member of the SCC Committee on October 18, 2023 – In
connection with the sham October 18, 2023 review, he or she shared
responsibility for remanding Plaintiff back to restrictive custody where he
was subject to a substantial risk of serious harm based on the denial of access
to medical and mental health treatment (id. at 6, 12, 32, ¶¶ 5(b), 5(c), 31).
● SCC John/Jane Doe Representative at the Security Detention Review hearing
on March 28, 2024 – In connection with the sham March 28, 2024 review,
he or she shared responsibility for remanding Plaintiff back to restrictive
custody where he was subject to a substantial risk of serious harm based on
the denial of access to medical and mental health treatment (id. at 6, 12, 32,
¶¶ 5(b), 5(c), 32).
● R. Arrisola, McConnell Unit’s “#3 SCC member at the hearing on March 28,
2024 – In connection with the sham March 28, 2024 review, he shared
responsibility for remanding Plaintiff back to restrictive custody where he
was subject to a substantial risk of serious harm based on the denial of access
to medical and mental health treatment (id. at 6, 12, 33, ¶¶ 5(b), 5(c), 34).
● Oscar Mendza, TDCJ’s Deputy Director of Management Operations
overseeing the Security Threat Group Management’s Office – He was
responsible for enforcing policies that caused Plaintiff to stay in inhumane
conditions, which continue to present a substantial risk of serious harm in
addition to the mental and physical injuries already suffered (id. at 34-35, ¶
35).
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● Sgt. James Mireles, McConnell Unit’s Security Threat Group Supervisor –
He was responsible for enforcing policies that caused him to suffer in
inhumane conditions for over 27 months, which continue to present a
substantial risk of serious harm in addition to the mental and physical injuries
already suffered (id. at 35, ¶ 36).
● Richard Garcia, a Security Threat Group supervisor and/or manager – He
was responsible for enforcing policies that resulted in Plaintiff being denied
relief at the review hearings which resulted in him being left in punishing
conditions in restrictive housing for numerous years (id. at 13, ¶ 5(c)).
● Richard Bledsoe, a Security Threat Group supervisor and/or manager – He
was responsible for enforcing policies that resulted in Plaintiff being denied
relief at the review hearings which resulted in him being left in punishing
conditions in restrictive housing for numerous years (id. at 13, ¶ 5(c)).
Plaintiff alleges that these defendants responsible for his placement in restrictive
housing and onerous conditions in such housing (including his isolation and denial of
access to recreation and medical services) were well aware of the conditions of his
confinement and injuries suffered. (D.E. 17, p. 12, 19 ¶¶ 5(c), 10(b)). A review of
Plaintiff’s allegations in his complaint and more definite statement reflect that these
defendants have done nothing to mitigate or otherwise remedy the serious matters
associated with his indefinite restrictive housing assignment despite being aware of
Plaintiff’s complaints.
Accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, he has alleged plausible Eighth
Amendment deliberate indifference claims against the defendants identified above in
connection with his long-term and indefinite placement in restrictive custody. Further
factual and legal development of these claims is necessary to determine whether Plaintiff
can maintain these claims against each particular defendant in his or her individual
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capacity, official capacity, or both. Accordingly, based on the allegations set forth above
in this section, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court retain Plaintiff’s
Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims against:
● Executive Director Collier in his individual capacity;
● Former Director (and now current Executive Director) Lumpkin in his
individual and official capacity;
● Director Guerrero in his individual and official capacity;
● Warden Wysocki in her individual and official capacity;
● Assistant Warden Samaniego in his individual and official capacity;
● Assistant Warden Flannel in her individual capacity only;
● Major Quiroga in his individual and official capacity;
● Clinical Manager Breaux in her individual and official capacity;
● Assistant Warden Tanner in his individual and official capacity;
● Major Cavazos in his individual and official capacity;
● Sgt. Canfield in his individual and official capacity;
● John/Jane Doe (the SCC’s No. 1 Chairperson at the March 28, 2024 review)
in his or her individual and official capacity;
● Lt. Barrera (an SCC member) in her individual and official capacity;
● M. Bety (SCC representative at the October 18, 2023 SCC hearing) in her
individual and official capacity;
● John/Jane Doe #2 (SCC member present at the October 18, 2023 hearing) in
his or her individual and official capacity;
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● K. Cuellar (the 3rd member of the SCC Committee on October 18, 2023) in
his individual and official capacity;
● SCC John/Jane Doe (Representative at the Security Detention Review
hearing on March 28, 2024) in his or her individual and official capacity;
● R. Arrisola (McConnell Unit’s “#3 SCC member at the hearing on March 28,
2024) in his individual and official capacity;
● Oscar Mendza, TDCJ’s Deputy Manager of Management Operations
overseeing the Security Threat Management’s Office, in his individual and
official capacity;
● Sgt. James Mireles in his individual and official capacity;
● Security Threat Group supervisor and/or manager Garcia in his individual
and official capacity; and
● Security Threat Group supervisor and/or manager Bledsoe in his individual
and official capacity.
b. Deliberate Indifference Claims Subject to Dismissal
i. Denial of Privileges
Plaintiff alleges that he has been denied the following privileges while confined in
restrictive housing at the McConnell Unit: T.V. access, contact visits, video visits, tablet
content, phone access, newsstand applications, e-message video clips from loved ones,
group activities of all kinds, church, schools, the ability to interact with other humans,
commissary limits, and cleaning supplies. (D.E. 17, pp.12-13, ¶ 5(d)). With respect to
these complaints, Plaintiff provides no details regarding the extent of these allegations or
to indicate how the denial of these privileges exposed him to a substantial risk of serious
harm. Plaintiff does not identify which defendants were responsible for denying him these
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privileges or otherwise provide specific allegations detailing how any defendant was aware
that the denial of these privileges exposed Plaintiff to a substantial risk of serious harm.
Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations with respect to the denial of various privileges are
insufficient to state a plausible deliberate indifference claim against any of the named
defendants. See Robert v. Hillhouse, No. 6:20cv121, 2022 WL 6281474, at * 3 (E.D. Tex.
Sep. 6, 2022), adopted, 2022 WL 6201850 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 2022) (citing R.A.M Al-Raid
v. Ingle, 69 F.3d 28, 32 (5th Cir. 1995)). Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully
recommends that Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claims regarding the denial of various
privileges be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous or for failure to state a claim for relief.
ii. Denial of Access to Showers
Plaintiff alleges that he received only two to three showers per week which fell well
short of his entitlement to three showers per day. (D.E. 17, pp. 8-9, 12 ¶ 5(c)). Plaintiff
holds Warden Wysocki, Assistant Warden Tanner, Assistant Warden Samaniego, and
Major Cavazos responsible for scheduling insufficient access to showers. Id.
Plaintiff’s allegations, accepted as true, fail to state a plausible Eighth Amendment
claim with regard to his limited access to showers. See Keller v. Daniels, No. 1:18-CV-
0093-BL, 2019 WL 1560496, at *3, 15 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 14, 2019), adopted, 2019 WL
1557168 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 10, 2019) (finding no Eighth Amendment claims where inmate
claims he was limited access to showering only once a week). Similar to Keller, Plaintiff
provides no specific facts to suggest that he suffered negative health implications or that
he otherwise was exposed to a substantial risk of serious harm due to his limited shower
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access. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment
deliberate indifference claim against Warden Wysocki, Assistant Warden Tanner,
Assistant Warden Samaniego, and Major Cavazos for limiting his access to showers while
in restrictive custody be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous and for failure to state a
claim for relief.
iii. Claim against Region IV Director Chevalier
Plaintiff claims that current Region IV Director Chevalier violated his Eighth
Amendment rights in connection with her supervision of Warden Wysocki, which either
harmed Plaintiff seriously or placed him at substantial risk of serious harm. . (D.E. 17 at
28, ¶ 24). According to Plaintiff, Region IV Director Chevalier worked with Warden
Wysocki to ensure he was subjected to inhumane conditions in restrictive housing.
Plaintiff provides only threadbare and conclusory allegations that Region IV
Director Chevalier had any role in Plaintiff’s placement in restrictive custody or conditions
in such custody. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. His allegations, lacking in any detail, further
fail to indicate that Region IV Director Chevalier, in her supervisory capacity, otherwise
affirmatively participated in the acts that caused an Eighth Amendment deprivation or
implemented unconstitutional policies that causally resulted in any of Plaintiff’s injuries.
See Porter, 659 F.3d at 446. Plaintiff’s allegations, accepted as true, are insufficient to
state a plausible Eighth Amendment claim against Region IV Director Chevalier.
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that this claim be dismissed with prejudice
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against Region IV Director Chevalier in her individual and official capacity as frivolous
and for failure to state a claim for relief.
E. Retaliation Claims
1. Governing Law
“Retaliation” is not expressly referred to in the Constitution; however, it is
nonetheless actionable because retaliatory actions may tend to chill an individual’s exercise
of constitutional rights. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). Retaliation
is actionable “only if the retaliatory act ‘is capable of deterring a person of ordinary
firmness from further exercising his constitutional rights.’” Bibbs v. Early, 541 F.3d 267,
270 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Morris v. Powell, 449 F.3d 682, 684 (5th Cir. 2006)).
“A prison official may not retaliate against or harass an inmate for exercising the
right of access to the courts, or for complaining to a supervisor about a guard’s
misconduct.” Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1164 (5th Cir. 1995). “Filing grievances and
otherwise complaining about the conduct of correctional officers through proper channels
are constitutionally protected activities, and prison officials may not retaliate against
inmates for engaging in such protected inmates.” Reese v. Skinner, 322 F. App’x 381, 383
(5th Cir. 2009) (citing Morris, 449 F.3d at 684).
The Fifth Circuit has emphasized that “prisoners’ claims of retaliation are regarded
with skepticism and are carefully scrutinized by the courts.” Adeleke v. Fleckenstein, 385
F. App’x 386, 387 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Woods, 60 F.3d at 1166). In addition, the Fifth
Circuit has concluded that some acts, even though they may be motivated by retaliatory
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intent, are so de minimis that they would not deter the ordinary person from further exercise
of his rights. Morris, 449 F.3d at 686. Such acts do not rise to the level of constitutional
violations and cannot form the basis of a § 1983 claim. Id.
To state a valid § 1983 claim for retaliation, “a prisoner must allege (1) a specific
constitutional right, (2) the defendant’s intent to retaliate against the prisoner for his or her
exercise of that right, (3) a retaliatory adverse act, and (4) causation.” Jones, 188 F.3d at
324-25 (citing McDonald v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 225, 231 (5th Cir. 1998)). Mere assertions
of an inmate’s personal belief that he is the victim of retaliation or conclusory allegations
do not create a valid claim for relief. Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299, 310 (5th Cir.
1997); Woods, 60 F.3d at 1166. The inmate must produce direct evidence of motivation
or a chronology of events from which retaliation may be inferred. Id. On the element of
causation, a successful claim of retaliation requires a showing that, but for some retaliatory
motive, the complained of adverse incident would not have occurred. Id.
2. Analysis
a. Retaliation Claim against Assistant Warden Flannel and Sgt.
Canfield
Plaintiff claims that he was the victim of retaliation for filing grievances and going
on a hunger strike from July 12, 2023 through July 17, 2023 at the McConnell Unit (D.E.
1, p. 14). Plaintiff alleges that he had filed grievances at the McConnell Unit complaining
about: (1) the whereabouts of his property taken at the Coffield Unit by Sgt. Pedro; and (2)
his lack of access to the courts due to insufficient supplies. (D.E. 17, p. 16, ¶ 9(a)). Plaintiff
states that he notified the unspecified McConnell Unit warden of these issues seven days
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before going on a hunger strike. Id. Plaintiff further notified the Building 12 major,
assistant warden and head warden of his intentions and why. Id. According to Plaintiff,
medical records show that he notified Assistant Warden Flannel of his intentions to go on
a hunger strike. Id.
Plaintiff’s retaliation claims arise from his belief that Assistant Warden Flannel,
along with head warden, instructed Sgt. Canfield to provide false statements to the medical
department which prevented medical personnel from following hunger strike procedures.
Id. at 17, ¶ 9(b), (c). The procedures required “U.A. testing [daily]” and that Plaintiff’s
vitals be monitored after 72 hours of not eating. Id. Medical records show, Plaintiff says,
that Sgt. Canfield had reported on July 17, 2023 that Plaintiff had missed only six meals
since July 12, 2023. Id. Plaintiff alleges that: (1) he was never escorted to medical despite
submitting numerous sick calls one week before going on hunger strike, July 7, 2023, July
13, 2023, and July 15, 2023; and (2) after 72 hours of not eating, he complained to staff
about no medical follow ups, no vital taken, abdominal pain, not being monitored, and his
history of kidney failure. Id. at 17-18, ¶¶ 9(c), (f).
Plaintiff’s allegations, accepted as true, indicate that Assistant Warden Flannel and
Sgt. Canfield plausibly acted with a retaliatory intent in connection with the alleged false
statements provided by Sgt. Canfield that resulted in Plaintiff not receiving adequate
medical attention during his hunger strike. Plaintiff plausibly alleges how: (1) Sgt.
Canfield’s statements regarding Plaintiff’s missing meals were intended as retaliation for
the filing of previous grievances and immediately going on a hunger strike; and (2) such
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actions would not have taken place were it not for his filing of previous grievances and
then going on his hunger strike. Plaintiff’s allegations indeed suggest a plausible timeline
from which such retaliatory intent could be inferred.
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the district court should retain
Plaintiff’s retaliation claim against Assistant Warden Flannel and Sgt. Canfield in their
individual capacities.6
b. Retaliation Claims against Warden Wysocki and Assistant Warden
Samaniego
Plaintiff claims that Warden Wysocki retaliated against Plaintiff by punishing him
at disciplinary hearings without his presence, denying him notice of the decisions and
severity of punishments, denying him the right to appeal and field grievances, denying
him his Securus tablet, and limiting or denying his ability to file grievances. (D.E. 17, p.
23, ¶ 14). Plaintiff further claims that Assistant Warden Samaniego contributed to
unspecified retaliation against Plaintiff. Id. at 25, ¶ 16.
Plaintiff fails to state with any detail how any actions undertaken by Warden
Wysocki or Assistant Warden Samaniego were taken in direct response to any
constitutionally-protected act exercised by Plaintiff such as the filing of a specific
grievance or lawsuit. Plaintiff further offers no direct evidence of either Warden
Wysocki’s or Assistant Warden Samaniego’s purported retaliatory acts and offers at best a
conclusory belief that he was the victim of retaliation. “Conclusory allegations, including
6 Plaintiff states that the head warden also ordered Sgt. Canfield to provide false statements regarding Plaintiff’s
allegedly missed meals. Plaintiff, however, fails to identify the head warden of the McConnell Unit at the time of this
incident.
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a prisoner’s belief that he is the victim of retaliation, are insufficient to support a claim for
retaliation.” Epley v. Lopez, No. 1:18-CV-00115, 2023 WL 2483502, at *14 (N.D. Tex.
Feb. 27, 2023), adopted, 2023 WL 2481607 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2023).
Because he does not offer either direct evidence of retaliatory intent or a plausible
timeline from which such intent could be inferred, Plaintiff fails to lodge a plausible
retaliation claim against either Warden Wysocki or Assistant Warden Samaniego.
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the district court should dismiss these
retaliation claims with prejudice as frivolous and/or for failure to state a claim for relief.
F. Denial of Personal Property Claim (Due Process)
1. Governing Law
The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution provides that no State shall “deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend.
XIV § 1. The Supreme Court has held that a random and unauthorized intentional
deprivation of property does not violate the Due Process Clause if the State provides an
adequate post-deprivation remedy. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 534-35 (1984);
Myers v. Klevenhagen, 97 F.3d 91, 94 (5th Cir. 1996). A claimant must either take
advantage of the available remedies or show the available remedies are inadequate.
Hudson, 468 U.S. at 534-35.
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Texas law allows recovery of monetary damages for the loss of property that has
been taken without authorization. See Murphy v. Collins, 26 F.3d 541, 543 (5th Cir. 1994)
(In Texas, the tort of conversion fulfills this requirement); see also Beam v. Voss, 568
S.W.2d 413, 420-21 (Tex. Civ. App. – San Antonio 1978, no writ) (Conversion is the
unauthorized and unlawful assumption and exercise of dominion and control over the
personal property of another, to the exclusion of, or inconsistent with the owner's rights).
In addition, state law specifically provides that inmates may recover up to $500.00 on a
claim that the TDCJ lost or damaged personal property. Tex. Gov't Code § 501.007.
2. Analysis
Liberally construed, Plaintiff claims his due process rights were violated when he
was denied many items of his personal property as a result of a disciplinary hearing held
on June 13, 2025. (D.E. 17, p. 24, ¶ 14). His allegations, liberally construed, indicate that
these items were taken from him and not returned. Plaintiff holds Warden Wysocki
responsible for the taking of his personal property items.
Because Texas law provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy, Plaintiff’s loss
of his personal property items as a result of the disciplinary hearing does not state a
violation of the Due Process Clause. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 536 (noting that even when
a prisoner's property was intentionally destroyed, such destruction did not violate the
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Fourteenth Amendment because state law provided the prisoner with an adequate post-
deprivation remedy).
A prisoner may bring suit in federal court for property loss only if relief is denied
in state court on grounds other than the merits of his claim. See Thompson, 709 F.2d at
383 n.3. The burden is on the inmate to show the post-deprivation remedy is inadequate.
Myers, 97 F.3d at 94. Plaintiff has provided no allegations to show that he has filed an
appropriate state court action related to the deprivation of his property or that such remedy
was inadequate. As such, Plaintiff’s due process claim against Warden Wysocki for
property loss fails to state a cognizable constitutional claim. Accordingly, the undersigned
recommends that the district court should dismiss with prejudice this due process claim
against Warden Wysocki as frivolous and/or for failure to state a claim for relief.
G. Claims against the Grievance Process
In his original complaint, Plaintiff generally asserts that various prison officials
failed to investigate and remedy his various complaints regarding his unconstitutional
confinement, his “erroneous classification” hearings, and reviews associated with his stay
in restrictive housing. (D.E. 1, pp. 12-13). Plaintiff alleges that he filed numerous
grievances challenging decisions reached in his restrictive custody reviews, which were all
denied for the reason he was provided a hearing and review and is properly housed. (D.E.
17, p. 14, ¶ 6(b)). While not clearly identifying any prison officials responsible for
handling these grievances, the undersigned liberally construes Plaintiff’s action as seeking
to challenge the grievance process as unconstitutional.
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Plaintiff's allegations, accepted as true for purposes of screening, fail to state a
constitutional claim with respect to any prison officials’ alleged failure to respond to
investigate his grievances or rule on them in his favor. Indeed, a prisoner does not have a
constitutional right to a grievance procedure at all. Staples v. Keffer, 419 F. App’x 461,
463 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 373-74 (5th Cir. 2005)). A
prisoner certainly does not have any federally protected liberty interest in having
grievances resolved to his or her satisfaction. See Geiger, 404 F.3d at 374 (because
“[plaintiff] does not have a federally protected liberty interest in having [his] grievances
resolved to his satisfaction ... any alleged due process violation arising from the alleged
failure to investigate his grievances is indisputably meritless.”).
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s constitutional claim
challenging the grievance process be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous and/or failure
to state a claim for relief to the extent he seeks to hold any named McConnell Unit official
responsible.
H. Claims not specifically addressed in this Memorandum and
Recommendation
To ensure justice and access to the courts, courts interpret pleadings of pro se
litigants liberally. See United States v. Robinson, 78 F.3d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing
United States v. Santora, 711 F.2d 41, 42 (5th Cir. 1983)). Pro se actions will not be
dismissed based on technical pleading defects and should be construed to ensure such
claims are given fair and meaningful consideration despite the unrepresented litigant’s
unfamiliarity with the law. See Haines, 404 U.S. at 520-21; see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at
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106 (pro se parties are normally accorded more leniency in the construction of their
pleadings).
The undersigned has liberally construed Plaintiff’s complaint and his More Definite
Statement to give his claims fair and meaningful consideration. The undersigned has
attempted to articulate and analyze Plaintiff’s claims in an impartial manner consistent with
providing appropriate leniency to pro se litigants while at the same time requiring
compliance with applicable pleading and screening standards. To the extent Plaintiff is
attempting to raise any other claim not specifically addressed by the undersigned in this
memorandum and recommendation, the undersigned has concluded that Plaintiff has failed
to state such claim with sufficient factual detail or clarity to allow the claim to be identified
or analyzed by the Court.
As stated previously, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Plaintiff, therefore, must allege sufficient facts in support of its legal conclusions that give
rise to a reasonable inference that any defendant is liable. Id.; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
Further, the factual allegations must raise Plaintiff’s claim for relief above the level of mere
speculation. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Therefore, Plaintiff is advised that any claim not
addressed in this memorandum and recommendation is not currently before this Court
because Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts or state such claims clearly.
I. Leave to Amend
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The undersigned is recommending dismissal of some of Plaintiff’s claims. “When
the dismissal of a pro se complaint is appropriate, it should generally be done without
prejudice in order to allow the plaintiff an opportunity to file an amended complaint.”
Rodriguez v. United States, 66 F.3d 95, 97 (5th Cir. 1995). Leave to amend need not be
granted if the amendment would be futile – for example, if an amended complaint would
still fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S.
178, 182 (1962) (futility of amendment is adequate justification to refuse to grant leave to
amend).
“If the prisoner has filed his complaint and submitted questionnaire responses, then
the court may conclude that he has pleaded his best case such that granting him further
leave to amend would be futile or cause unnecessary delay.” Clark v. Waddell, No. 7:22-
cv-00059-MBP, 2023 WL 8605313, at *18 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 15, 2023) (citing Witherspoon
v. Waybourn, No. 4:20-cv-1150-P, 2021 WL 2635917, at *10 (N.D. Tex. June 25, 2021)
and McLean v. King, No. 3:20-cv-1244-C-BK, 2020 WL 6049297, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Sept.
15, 2020)); see also Mejia v. Monroe, No. H-18-3036, 2021 WL 765726, at *2 (S.D. Tex.
Feb. 26, 2021) (Miller, J.) (finding that inmate had pleaded his best case where he was
afforded an opportunity to plead facts supporting his claim through a more definite
statement).
Here, Plaintiff has had the opportunity to plead his best case against Defendants
with respect to his claims in that: he has filed a complaint and a More Definite Statement
at the Court’s direction in which he has responded to numerous directives and questions.
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Where the undersigned has recommended dismissal of a claim with prejudice, therefore,
that dismissal should be without leave to amend because Plaintiff has already pleaded his
best case.
V. RECOMMENDATION
For purposes of screening and for the reasons discussed above, the undersigned
respectfully recommends that the district court:
● RETAIN Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claims (as set forth
in more detail above in Section IV(C)(2), (3)) against:
○ Executive Director Collier in his individual capacity;
○ Former Director (and current Executive Director) Lumpkin in his
individual and official capacity;
○ Director Guerrero in his individual and official capacity;
○ Oscar Mendza, TDCJ’s Deputy Manager of Management Operations
overseeing the Security Threat Management’s Office, in his
individual and official capacity;
○ Security Threat Group supervisor and/or manager Garcia in his
individual and official capacity;
○ Security Threat Group supervisor and/or manager Bledsoe in his
individual and official capacity;
○ Warden Wysocki in her individual and official capacity;
○ Assistant Warden Samaniego in his individual and official capacity;
○ John/Jane Doe (the SCC’s No. 1 Chairperson at the March 28, 2024
review) in his or her individual and official capacity;
○ Lt. Barrera (an SCC member) in her individual and official capacity;
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○ Ms. Immon (the McConnell unit’s Classification Chief) in her
individual and official capacity;
○ M. Bety (SCC representative at the October 18, 2023 SCC hearing) in
her individual and official capacity;
○ John/Jane Doe #2 (SCC member present at the October 18, 2023
hearing) in his or her individual and official capacity;
○ K. Cuellar (the 3rd member of the SCC Committee on October 18,
2023) in his individual and official capacity);
○ SCC John/Jane Doe (Representative at the Security Detention Review
hearing on March 28, 2024) in his or her individual and official
capacity; and
○ R. Arrisola (McConnell Unit’s “#3 SCC member at the hearing on
March 28, 2024) in his individual and official capacity.
● RETAIN Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims (as
set forth in more detail above in Section IV(D)(2)(a)) against:
○ Executive Director Collier in his individual capacity;
○ Former Director (and current Executive Director) Lumpkin in his
individual and official capacity;
○ Director Guerrero in his individual and official capacity;
○ Warden Wysocki in her individual and official capacity;
○ Assistant Warden Samaniego in his individual and official capacity;
○ Assistant Warden Flannel in her individual capacity only;
○ Major Quiroga in his individual and official capacity;
○ Clinical Manager Breaux in her individual and official capacity;
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○ Assistant Warden Tanner in his individual and official capacity;
○ Major Cavazos in his individual and official capacity;
○ Sgt. Canfield in his individual and official capacity;
○ John/Jane Doe (the SCC’s No. 1 Chairperson at the March 28, 2024
review) in his or her individual and official capacity;
○ Lt. Barrera (an SCC member) in her individual and official capacity;
○ M. Bety (SCC representative at the October 18, 2023 SCC hearing) in
her individual and official capacity;
○ John/Jane Doe #2 (SCC member present at the October 18, 2023
hearing) in his or her individual and official capacity;
○ K. Cuellar (the 3rd member of the SCC Committee on October 18,
2023) in his individual and official capacity;
○ SCC John/Jane Doe (Representative at the Security Detention Review
hearing on March 28, 2024) in his or her individual and official
capacity;
○ R. Arrisola (McConnell Unit’s “#3 SCC member at the hearing on
March 28, 2024) in his individual and official capacity;
○ Oscar Mendza, TDCJ’s Deputy Manager of Management Operations
overseeing the Security Threat Management’s Office, in his
individual and official capacity;
○ Sgt. James Mireles in his individual and official capacity;
○ Security Threat Group supervisor and/or manager Garcia in his
individual and official capacity; and
○ Security Threat Group supervisor and/or manager Bledsoe in his
individual and official capacity.
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● RETAIN Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim (in connection with
Plaintiff’s hunger strike) against Assistant Warden Flannel and Sgt. Canfield
in their individual capacities.
The undersigned will order service separately on these defendants with respect to the
claims retained in this case.
The undersigned respectfully recommends further that the district court:
● DISMISS without prejudice former McConnell Unit Warden Adrian A.
Amonett, former Warden E. Holmer, and John or Jane Doe, former unknown
Regional Director IV;
● DISMISS without prejudice Plaintiff’s claims for money damages against
each named defendant sued in his or her official capacity;
● DISMISS Plaintiff’s Claims 4 (claims against Sgt. Pedro) and 7 (claims that
mail room policy is unconstitutional) for improper joinder and without
prejudice to raising such claims each in separate lawsuits as appropriate; and
● DISMISS with prejudice Plaintiff’s remaining claims against the remaining
defendants as frivolous or for failure to state a claim for relief.
Respectfully submitted on December 5, 2025.
____________________________
Julie K. Hampton
United States Magistrate Judge
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NOTICE TO PARTIES
The Clerk will file this Memorandum and Recommendation and transmit a copy to
each party or counsel. Within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy of
the Memorandum and Recommendation, a party may file with the Clerk and serve on the
United States Magistrate Judge and all parties, written objections, pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b), 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), General Order No. 2002-13, United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas.
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions,
and recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within
FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon
grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual
findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court. Douglass v. United Servs.
Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996)(en banc).
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