Wood v. Warden FCI Three Rivers

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
CURTIS WOOD,
Petitioner,
VS.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:25-CV-00096
RICHARD LUNA,
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION TO DENY
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT
Petitioner Curtis Wood, a Texas inmate appearing pro se, has filed this habeas
corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s Motion
for Reconsideration pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). (D.E. 16). For the
reasons set forth below, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Petitioner’s motion
be DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
In his petition, Wood alleged that the BOP erroneously calculated his sentencing
credits under the FSA. (D.E.s 1, pg. 1; D.E. 1-1 ). Specifically, he contended that the BOP
unlawfully extended his period of incarceration by not applying FSA credits for
programming he completed while housed at the FCI in Milan, Michigan, between March
10, 2020, and November 2022. The period at issue was before Wood was sentenced on
December 1, 2022. According to Wood, BOP’s miscalculation resulted in a projected
release date of April 25, 2029, instead of June 2026. (D.E. 1-1, pg. 2; D.E. 1-2, pg. 3).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
December 19, 2025
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Wood asked the Court to order BOP to recalculate his FSA credits. (D.E. 1-1, pg. 6). Wood
submitted that if BOP were to include his FSA credits from the programming he completed
between March 2020 and November 2022, it would advance his eligibility for pre-release
custody, including placement in a Residential Reentry Center (“RRC”). (D.E. 1-1, pgs. 1-
3, 6).
In its motion for summary judgment, the government first argued that Wood failed
to properly exhaust his administrative remedies before filing his petition. (D.E. 9). The
government attached the affidavit of BOP Paralegal Bellino as evidence. (D.E. 8, pg. 2- 3).
Bellino stated that Wood had not filed an administrative remedy at any level regarding any
issue. (D.E. 8; D.E. 8-4). The government stated that Wood only attempted to resolve his
issue informally by sending three identical letters dated January 20, 2025, to the case
management coordinator (“CMC”), the warden, and the designation and sentence
computation center (“DSCC”). (D.E. 9, pg. 9; D.E. 1-2, pgs. 2-10). The government
contended that Wood never took steps to initiate the formal administrative remedy process
and had not demonstrated an exception to the exhaustion requirement. Id. Alternatively,
the government submitted that summary judgment was appropriate because Wood’s
petition was facially meritless. The government stated that the credit Wood attempted to
receive was regarding his time before he was in BOP custody. The government argued that
an inmate may not earn FSA credits for a program he successfully completed while in
official detention before his sentence commenced under 18 U.S.C. §3585(a). (D.E. 9, pg.
12). The government further contended that Wood’s FSA credits could not be applied
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towards his sentence until he had earned credits in an amount equal to the remainder of his
imposed term of imprisonment. Id.
Wood filed a response to the motion for summary judgment. (D.E. 10). Wood
argued that the exhaustion requirement should be waived. Specifically, Wood stated that
the requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted is not jurisdictional and may be
waived when pursuing it would be futile. Id. He also submitted that the FSA itself supports
relief in this case because of the purpose of the FSA. Id. Wood contended that BOP’s
categorical exclusion of pre-sentencing programming is inconsistent with the FSA’s plain
language and purpose. Id.
On October 2, 2025, the undersigned entered a Memorandum and Recommendation
(“M&R”) to the District Court recommending that Wood’s petition be dismissed for failure
to exhaust administrative remedies. (D.E. 11). On November 7, 2025, the District Court
adopted the M&R and entered a Final Judgment in this case. (D.E.s 14 & 15). Plaintiff
has now filed a Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. (D.E. 16).
II. DISCUSSION
A Rule 59(e) motion must clearly establish either a manifest error of law or fact or
must present newly discovered evidence. Ross v. Marshall, 426 F.3d 745, 763 (5th Cir.
2005) (internal quotations omitted). A Rule 59(e) motion serves the narrow purpose of
allowing a party to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered
evidence. Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 478-79 (5th Cir. 2004). A Rule 59(e)
motion is not the proper vehicle for rehashing evidence, legal theories, or arguments that
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could have been offered or raised before the entry of judgment. Id. In other words, “a
‘Rule 59(e) motion is not proper to re-litigate matters that have been resolved to the
movant’s dissatisfaction’ and a party cannot attempt to obtain ‘a second bite at the apple’
on issues that were previously addressed by the parties and the Court.” N. Cypress Med.
Ctr. Operating Co. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, No. H-08-2379, 2010 WL 2245075 at * 1
(S.D. Tex. Jun. 2, 2010) (quoting Alvarado v. Texas Rangers, No. 03-CA-0305, 2005 WL
1420846, at *2 (W.D. Tex. June 14, 2005)). Reconsideration of a judgment after its entry
is an extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly. Templet, 367 F.3d at 479.
In his Rule 59(e) motion, Plaintiff argues that: (1) he mailed objections via the
United States Postal Service that were not considered by the Court; and (2) that he
generated an administrative remedy process requesting FTC credits from 2020 to 2023
within the prison system. (D.E. 16). Each of these arguments do not address any of the
substantive rulings or issues presented in this case. Plaintiff does not state what his
objections to the October 2 M&R were and does not address his failure to exhaust
administrative remedies within the prison system prior to filing a federal habeas lawsuit.
The attachment to Plaintiff’s motion shows that he submitted an administrative remedy
request between June 2025 and October 2025, after he initiated this lawsuit. (D.E. 16-1).
Plaintiff cannot seek to rehash these failed arguments in his post-judgment Rule 59(e)
motion. See Templet, 367 F.3d at 478-79. In turn, he offers no newly discovered evidence
that warrant the Court’s reconsideration of whether he has exhausted administrative
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remedies. Plaintiff otherwise presents nothing to demonstrate that a manifest error of law
or fact has occurred.
III. RECOMMENDATION
Because he is not entitled to any relief with respect to the Final Judgment entered
against him, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Plaintiff’s Rule 59(e) Motion
to Alter or Amend Judgment (D.E. 16) be DENIED.
Respectfully submitted on December 18, 2025.
____________________________
Julie K. Hampton
United States Magistrate Judge
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NOTICE TO PARTIES
The Clerk will file this Memorandum and Recommendation and transmit a copy to
each party or counsel. Within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy of
the Memorandum and Recommendation, a party may file with the Clerk and serve on the
United States Magistrate Judge and all parties, written objections, pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b), 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), General Order No. 2002-13, United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas.
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions,
and recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within
FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon
grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual
findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court. Douglass v. United Servs.
Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996)(en banc).
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