Carrington vs Guerrero

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
ANTHONY CARRINGTON,
Petitioner,
VS.
§
§
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§
§
§
§
§
§
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:25-CV-00031
ERIC GUERRERO,
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Anthony Carrington is an inmate in the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice and is currently incarcerated at the Garza West Unit in Beeville, Texas. Carrington
filed a pro se habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on January 29, 2025.
(D.E. 1). Carrington challenges his convictions for murder, aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. Carrington contends that
he received ineffective assistance of counsel, his guilty plea was not knowing and
voluntary, and his statement to law enforcement was not voluntarily given. Respondent has
filed an answer that the undersigned construes as a motion to dismiss, to which Carrington
has responded. (D.E.s 23 & 25).
For the reasons discussed more fully below, it is respectfully recommended that
Respondent’s motion to dismiss (D.E. 23) be GRANTED and Carrington’s habeas corpus
petition be DENIED. It is further recommended that a Certificate of Appealability
(“COA”) be DENIED.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
March 31, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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I. JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and venue is appropriate
because Carrington was convicted in Bee County, Texas. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C.
§ 124(b)(6); Wadsworth v. Johnson, 235 F.3d 959, 961 (5th Cir. 2000).
II. BACKGROUND
a. Petition and Claims
In his petition, Carrington contends that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel because his attorney did not properly advise him and relay facts that would have
allowed him to make an informed plea. Specifically, Carrington contends that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney: (1) did not inform him of facts
relevant to his guilty plea, (2) did not inform him about his right to appeal, (3) did not file
unspecified motions on his behalf, (4) did not create a “paper trail” proving the attorney
was effective, (5) failed to tell him of the State’s plea bargain offer of 40 years, and
(6) informed him that the trial judge could sentence him to 60 years absent a plea bargain
agreement. Carrington also states that he was coerced and pressured into taking a plea deal
or taken advantage of by the State because: (1) the State failed to inform him of the 40-
year plea bargain offer, (2) the State told him that he had a chance of getting out if he took
the 45-year plea bargain offer, and (3) his confession was not knowingly and voluntarily
given because he was under the influence of drugs and alcohol. (D.E. 1 at 5-8).
As to timeliness, Carrington states that, except for the claim that his confession was
unlawfully obtained, he exhausted his remedies by filing a state habeas application that
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was denied by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (“TCCA”) without a written order.
(Id. at 2, 6-9).
b. State Court Records
In March 2023, Carrington was charged by indictment in the 148th District Court
of Nueces County, Texas, with murder, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and
unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. (D.E. 20-1 at 6-8). The charges were enhanced
with two prior felony convictions, subjecting Carrington to a punishment range of 25 to 99
years or life in prison on each count. (D.E. 20-1 at 6, 17). In October 2023, Carrington
entered into a plea agreement and was convicted of all three counts in the indictment (Id.
at 12-13, 272-74). On October 24, 2023, the Court sentenced Carrington to forty-five years
imprisonment, adhering to the terms of the plea agreement. (Id. at 272-74). Carrington did
not file a direct appeal. Carrington filed an application for habeas corpus relief in May 2024
raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and challenging the voluntariness of his
guilty plea. (Id. at 275-295). The trial court concluded that the application failed to show
that Carrington’s trial counsel performed deficiently or that he was prejudiced by his trial
counsel’s actions. (D.E. 20-2). The trial court found that Carrington voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently entered his plea and that his trial counsel provided effective
assistance of counsel. (Id.). Accordingly, the trial court recommended that the application
be denied. (Id.). On September 18, 2024, the TCCA denied Carrington’s application
without written order on the findings of the trial court and on the Court’s independent
review of the record. (D.E. 20-3).
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III. DISCUSSION
In the motion to dismiss, Respondent contents that Carrington’s claims are without
merit, unexhausted, and/or procedurally barred. (D.E. 23). Specifically, Respondent argues
that Carrington has failed to exhaust his claims that: (1) his counsel failed to inform him
of unspecified relevant facts or of his right to appeal, (2) his counsel did not leave a paper
trail, and (3) his confession was involuntary due to the influence of drugs and alcohol.
Respondent argues that Carrington did not properly present these claims to the TCCA and
that they are now procedurally barred. (Id.). Secondly, Respondent contends that
Carrington’s remaining claims regarding the ineffective assistance of his counsel and the
actions of the state causing an involuntary guilty plea are meritless. (Id.). Respondent
submits that the TCCA’s determination in his state habeas case should be given deference
by this Court and that Carrington’s voluntariness claims relate to non-jurisdictional defects
in his criminal proceedings that were waived by his plea agreement. (Id. at 15-16). Also,
Respondent argues that Carrington has not met his burden to attack trial counsel’s strategic
decisions and has not shown that the motions he wanted filed would have been meritorious.
(Id.). Respondent goes on to state that Carrington has not met his burden to overcome the
doubly strong presumption in favor of his attorney’s representation. (Id. at 21). Further,
Respondent states that Carrington fails to prove that his attorney did not relay the State’s
40-year offer, that he provides no support for the idea that his attorney’s accurate statement
regarding the possibility that he could be sentenced to 60 years somehow rendered his plea
involuntary, and that he can give no support for the contention that the State has an
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obligation to personally inform a defendant of a plea offer when the defendant is
represented. (Id. at 22-23).
Carrington responds that his due process rights were violated because of his trial
counsel’s conduct. (D.E. 25). He states that his attorney: (1) failed to tell him about the
State’s forty-year plea offer, (2) failed to show a paper or trail of motions showing he was
effective and attempting to help Carrington, (3) only visited him on three occasions while
he was incarcerated more than four-hundred fifty-five days in the county jail, and (4) that
his claims are not unexhausted because he timely filed his state habeas application six
months after he was sentenced. (Id.).
a. Exhaustion and Procedural Bars
Federal habeas corpus petitioners are required to exhaust their available state law
remedies. Deters v. Collins, 985 F.2d 789, 795 (5th Cir. 1993). In order to exhaust state
law remedies, Texas prisoners must fairly present their claims to the highest state court,
the TCCA, TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.45, through a petition for
discretionary review and/or a state application for writ of habeas corpus. TEX.R.APP. P.
68; TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.07, et seq. “‘It is not enough that all the facts
necessary to support the federal claim were before the state courts or that a somewhat
similar state-law claim was made.’” Ex Parte Wilder, 274 F.3d 255, 259–260 (5th Cir.
2001) (quoting Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)). Rather, the petitioner must have
presented the highest state court with the same claim, the same factual basis for the claim,
and the same legal theory in order to meet the exhaustion requirement. Id. “[F]leeting
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reference to the federal constitution,” especially when such reference is not accompanied
by any federal case law authority, generally does not suffice to “alert and afford a state
court the opportunity to address an alleged violation of federal rights,” and “vague
references to such expansive concepts as due process and fair trial” in a state court
proceeding will not satisfy the exhaustion requirement. Id. at 260.
When unexhausted claims are contained in a § 2254 application, and when such
claims, if the petitioner tried to exhaust them in state court, “would be barred by the abuse-
of-the-writ doctrine of Article 11.071 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure,” the claims
should be dismissed with prejudice as procedurally barred. Horsley v. Johnson, 197 F.3d
134, 137 (5th Cir.1999); see also Nobles v. Johnson, 127 F.3d 409, 420 (5th Cir.1997) (“A
procedural default also occurs when a prisoner fails to exhaust available state remedies and
‘the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet
the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred.’”). Claims
should be dismissed without prejudice only when the petitioner makes a colorable showing
that his unexhausted claims would be considered on the merits by the state courts if he
attempted to exhaust them. Horsley, 197 F.3d at 136–137.
Carrington claims that: (1) his counsel failed to inform him of unspecified relevant
facts or of his right to appeal, (2) his counsel did not leave a paper trail, and (3) his
confession was involuntary due to the influence of drugs and alcohol. A review of the
record shows that these claims were not raised with the state courts and these claims are
unexhausted. (D.E. 20-1 at 275-295). In addition, if Carrington were to raise the claims in
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a second state application for writ of habeas corpus, the claims would be subject to
dismissal as abuse of the writ under § 11.071 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure,
which provides:
(a) If a subsequent application for writ of habeas corpus is filed after final
disposition of an initial application challenging the same conviction, a court
may not consider the merits of or grant relief based on the subsequent
application unless the application contains sufficient specific facts
establishing that:
(1) the current claims and issues have not been and could not have been
presented previously in an original application or in a previously
considered application filed under this article because the factual or
legal basis for the claim was unavailable on the date the applicant filed
the previous application; or
(2) by a preponderance of the evidence, but for a violation of the United
States Constitution no rational juror could have found the applicant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Carrington makes no argument that the claims could not have been previously
presented in his original state application for writ of habeas corpus. Accordingly,
Carrington’s claims that (1) his counsel failed to inform him of unspecified relevant facts
or of his right to appeal, (2) his counsel did not leave a paper trail, and (3) his confession
was involuntary due to the influence of drugs and alcohol are unexhausted and procedurally
barred from review in this § 2254 proceeding.
b. Section 2254 Standard
A § 2254 petition raising claims that were adjudicated on the merits in state court
may not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim: (a) resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court; or (b) resulted in a decision that was based on an
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unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented to the state court.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state
court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question
of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Court on a set of materially
indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas court
may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from
the Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s
case. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). Although “unreasonable” is difficult
to define, the Supreme Court noted that it is an objective, rather than subjective, standard
and emphasized that there is a critical difference between an unreasonable application of
federal law and a merely “incorrect” or “erroneous” application of federal law. Neal v.
Puckett, 239 F.3d 683, 687 (5th Cir. 2001).
“A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas
relief so long as fair-minded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s
decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (internal quotation marks
omitted). This is a difficult standard to meet. Id. at 102-03.
“When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has
denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in
the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” Id. at 99.
Where a state court decides a prisoner’s federal claim on the merits in a reasoned opinion,
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the federal court merely “reviews the specific reasons given by the state court and defers
to those reasons if they are reasonable.” Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018).
Even summary rulings by state courts are afforded deference under § 2254(d), and in such
cases, the relevant question is what arguments or theories could have supported the state
court’s decision. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 99, 102.
If a decision by a state court is silent as to the reasons for the refusal, a federal habeas
court can “look through” the decision and evaluate the last reasoned state court decision.
Bledsue v. Johnson, 188 F.3d 250, 256 (5th Cir. 1999). A state court’s factual findings are
presumed to be correct, and a petitioner has the burden of rebutting the presumption with
clear and convincing evidence. Garcia v. Quarterman, 454 F.3d 441, 444 (5th Cir. 2006).
This deference extends not only to express findings of fact, but to the implicit findings of
the state court. Id. In addition, “where a state court’s decision is unaccompanied by an
explanation, the habeas petitioner’s burden still must be met by showing there was no
reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 98.
c. Voluntariness of Guilty Plea
In the motion to dismiss, Respondent argues that Carrington’s claims that his plea
was not knowing and voluntary are contradicted by the record. (D.E. 23 at 19-20).
Respondent contends that Carrington was adequately informed prior to pleading guilty
regarding what he was charged with, what he pled guilty to, and what the possible length
of his sentence could be. (Id at 17-18).
Carrington’s response does not address the voluntariness argument. (D.E. 25).
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“A federal court will uphold a guilty plea challenged in a habeas corpus proceeding
if the plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.” James v. Cain, 56 F.3d 662, 666 (5th
Cir. 1995). A guilty plea is invalid if the defendant does not understand the constitutional
protections that he is giving up or where his understanding of the charges is so incomplete
that his plea cannot signify an admission of guilt. Id. If the record shows that the defendant
understood the charge and consequences, then the guilty plea will be upheld as voluntary
even if the trial court did not explain the offense. Id. If the defendant understands the length
of sentence he might possibly receive, then he understands the consequences of his plea.
Id. He need not be informed of every right that is waived by a guilty plea or all of the
consequences that flow from his conviction and sentence. United States v. Edwards, 911
F.2d 1031, 1035 (5th Cir. 1990). “Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong
presumption of verity. The subsequent presentation of conclusory allegations unsupported
by specifics is subject to summary dismissal, as are contentions that in the face of the record
are wholly incredible.” Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977). Official documents
such as written plea agreements are entitled to a presumption of regularity and are given
great weight. United States v. McDaniels, 907 F.3d 366, 371 (5th Cir. 2018).
Here, Carrington has not established that his guilty plea was not knowing and
voluntary. The record shows that Carrington understood what he was being charged with
and the consequences of pleading guilty. Carrington was informed that he was pleading
guilty to murder, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and unlawful possession of a
firearm by a felon in the written admonishments, the plea agreement, and his judicial
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confession and stipulation. (D.E. 20-1 at 12, 14-22, 24-25). Similarly, he was informed of
the possible punishment range for this charge in each of those documents, and informed
that the state was going to recommend a 45-year sentence. (Id. at 12, 17-18). Carrington
initialed and signed the written admonishments and plea agreement and indicated that he
understood the punishment range. (Id. at 12-13, 19-22). The written documents are entitled
to a presumption of regularity and are given great weight. McDaniels, 907 F.3d at 371.
Carrington’s present claims that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary are merely
conclusory and do not overcome the weight afforded to his written acknowledgments. Id.
d. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Plea Stage
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must meet the
two-prong test set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). He must show
that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors
were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial whose result is reliable. Id. at 687-
88.
Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential, and a court
must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. A court must judge the
reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed
as of the time of counsel’s conduct. A petitioner must identify the acts or omissions of
counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment.
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The court must then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts
or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. Id. at
690.
To show prejudice, a petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome.” Id. at 695.
Federal court review of a state court’s denial of an ineffective-assistance claim is
“doubly deferential” because the court must give deference both to counsel’s performance
and to the state court’s conclusion. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 190 (2011). Federal
habeas courts must guard against the danger of equating unreasonableness under Strickland
with unreasonableness under § 2254(d). “When § 2254(d) applies, the question is not
whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable
argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at
105. A petitioner who pleaded guilty must not only show deficient performance, but also
that he would not have pleaded guilty but for the error. Randle v. Scott, 43 F.3d 221, 225
(5th Cir. 1995).
Here, Carrington has not established that trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance that rendered his guilty plea involuntary. In his affidavit, trial counsel refuted
Carrington’s construction of events, stating that he never promised or advised Carrington
that he could obtain a 10-year plea agreement, that he did not have a legal basis to try to
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quash the indictment against Carrington, and that he did relay the state’s 40-year plea offer
to Carrington, but Carrington refused the offer and would not accept a plea offer of more
than 10 years. (D.E. 20-2 at 14). In denying Carrington’s claims in his Article 11.07
application, the state court made an implicit credibility determination in favor of counsel,
and that finding is presumed to be correct. Garcia, 454 F.3d at 444. Carrington has not
shown by clear and convincing evidence that the state court’s findings were wrong. See id.
As a result, he has not established the first prong of the Strickland test because he has not
shown that counsel’s performance was deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88.
Accordingly, Carrington has not established that trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance at the plea stage that rendered his guilty plea unknowing and involuntary.
e. Waiver of Claims Unrelated to Voluntariness of Plea
Respondent also argues that Carrington’s claims relate to non-jurisdictional defects
in his criminal proceedings and were waived by his plea agreement. (D.E. 23 at 15-16).
When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact
guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent
claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of
the guilty plea. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). Thus, once a guilty plea is
entered, all non-jurisdictional defects in the proceedings against a defendant are waived.
Smith v. Estelle, 711 F.2d 677, 682 (5th Cir. 1983). Where a petitioner pleaded guilty, his
Sixth Amendment challenge on collateral review is “limited to the issues of voluntariness
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and his understanding of the nature of the charges brought against him and the
consequences of the plea.” Haynes v. Butler, 825 F.2d 921, 924 (5th Cir. 1987).
Here, Carrington waived any claims not related to the voluntariness of his plea when
he pleaded guilty. His claim that his attorney did not file unspecified motions on his behalf
is unrelated to the voluntariness of his plea, and such non-jurisdictional defects from before
the plea are waived. Smith, 711 F.2d at 682. Regardless, as with his ineffective-assistance
claims regarding the plea proceedings, the state court made an implicit credibility
determination in favor of counsel’s affidavit when it denied Carrington’s Article 11.07
application, and that finding is presumed to be correct. Garcia, 454 F.3d at 444. Carrington
has not shown by clear and convincing evidence that the state court’s findings were wrong.
See id.
f. Evidentiary Hearing
Finally, Respondent argues that Carrington is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing
because his claims were adjudicated on the merits in state court, and the state court record
is sufficient to resolve his claims. (D.E. 23 at 9-10).
Generally, a federal habeas court is limited to consideration of the evidence that was
before the state habeas court. Cullen, 563 U.S. at 182-83. An evidentiary hearing is not
required prior to the District Court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment. See id. at
181-84 (discussing the circumstances under which a district court may hold an evidentiary
hearing in § 2254 proceedings). Regardless, a district court may refuse an evidentiary
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hearing where there is not a factual dispute that, if resolved in the petitioner’s favor, would
entitle him to relief. Austin v. Davis, 876 F.3d 757, 799 (5th Cir. 2017).
Here, Carrington is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing prior to a ruling on the
motion to dismiss. The state court adjudicated his claims on the merits, and this court is
limited to consideration of the evidence that was before the state court. Cullen, 563 U.S. at
182-83. Moreover, as discussed in more detail above, Carrington has not raised any claims
that would entitle him to relief.
IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
An appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from a final order in a habeas
corpus proceeding “unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability.”
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). Although Carrington has not yet filed a notice of appeal, the
issue of whether he is entitled to a COA will be addressed. See Alexander v. Johnson, 211
F.3d 895, 898 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating that a district court may sua sponte rule on a COA).
A COA “may issue ... only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “The COA determination under
§ 2253(c) requires an overview of the claims in the habeas petition and a general
assessment of their merits.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). Where a
district court rejects the constitutional claims on the merits, the petitioner must show that
reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims
debatable or wrong. Slack v. Daniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “A petitioner satisfies this
standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s
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resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented
are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327.
Here, because reasonable jurists would not find it debatable that Carrington failed
to state a claim for a violation of a constitutional right, it is recommended that a COA be
denied.
V. RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that Respondent’s motion
to dismiss (D.E. 23) be GRANTED and Carrington’s § 2254 petition be DENIED. It is
further recommended that any request for a Certificate of Appealability be DENIED.
Respectfully submitted on March 31, 2026.
____________________________
Julie K. Hampton
United States Magistrate Judge
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NOTICE TO PARTIES
The Clerk will file this Memorandum and Recommendation and transmit a copy to
each party or counsel. Within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy of
the Memorandum and Recommendation, a party may file with the Clerk and serve on the
United States Magistrate Judge and all parties, written objections, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b), 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), General Order No. 2002-13, United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas.
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and
recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within FOURTEEN
(14) DAYS after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of
plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal
conclusions accepted by the district court. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d
1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
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