Navarrette v. Contract Freighters, Inc., et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
MARIE ANNETTE NAVARRETE,
Plaintiff,
VS.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:24-CV-00111
TA DEDICATED, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION OF
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This case has been referred to United States Magistrate Judge Mitchel Neurock for
case management and recommendations on dispositive matters, see 28 U.S.C. § 636, but
with Judge Neurock’s consent and in accordance with Special Order C-2023-1,1 United
States Magistrate Judge Jason B. Libby enters the following memorandum and
recommendation.
This case arises from a trucking accident in Live Oak County, Texas. (Doc. No.
56, p. 2.) There are three defendants: (1) the driver of the truck, Jafarrh Jaquavious
Beverly (“Mr. Beverly”); (2) Mr. Beverly’s employer and owner of the truck that he was
operating, Contract Freighters, Inc., (“CFI”); (3) the owner of the trailer that Mr. Beverly
1 Special Order C-2023-1 is a standing order concerning civil matters referred to magistrate judges in this division.
The order allows magistrate judges to assist each other on any referred matter by agreement, including entering
orders, notices, recommendations, and presiding over judicial proceedings.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
January 30, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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was towing, TA Dedicated, Inc., (“TA Dedicated”).2 Plaintiff Marie Annette Navarrette
filed this lawsuit against these defendants in state court, and the suit was removed to
federal court in May 2024. (Doc. No. 1.)
A. Proceedings and background.
Before the district court is TA Dedicated’s motion for summary judgment on all of
Plaintiff’s claims against it. (Doc. No. 40). Plaintiff responded to this motion (Doc. No.
51), and TA Dedicated replied (Doc. No. 60). A separate motion for summary judgment
by Contract Freighters is pending in this case, see Doc. Nos. 37 & 69, but this
memorandum and recommendation only pertains to TA Dedicated’s motion, (Doc. No.
40).
B. Jurisdiction.
The district court has diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 as there is
complete diversity between the parties. (Doc. Nos. 1, 2.)
C. Plaintiff’s allegations, legal claims, and requested relief.
1. Plaintiff’s allegations.
Plaintiff claims that Mr. Beverly, while employed and driving a vehicle owned and
operated by CFI and TA Dedicated, struck her vehicle while traveling on North Highway
59 in Live Oak County, Texas. (Doc. No. 56, pp. 2-3.)3 Plaintiff alleges that Mr.
2 TA Dedicated also does business as Transport Corporation of America (“TCA”), and the motion that is the subject
of this M&R was filed under that name.
3 Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, Doc. No. 56, is the operative complaint in this case.
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Beverly failed to stop at a stop sign because he did not “keep a proper lookout and
disregarded the stop and go signal.” Id.
2. Plaintiff’s contested legal claims.
TA Dedicated has moved for summary judgment on all four claims against it.
(Doc. No. 40, p. 1.) Plaintiff brings claims against Defendant for the following: (1)
negligent entrustment of its trailer to Mr. Beverly; (2) negligent hiring, training, and
retention of Mr. Beverly; (3) liability under a respondeat superior theory of liability for
Mr. Beverly’s negligence; (4) strict liability for the “acts of the vehicle” that it is “the
registered owner of.” (Doc. No. 56, pp. 3-5, 7.)
3. Requested relief.
Plaintiff requests money damages for her bodily and property injuries. (Doc. No.
56, p. 6.) Plaintiff includes among her injuries her medical expenses, physical
impairment, physical pain and suffering, and mental anguish. Id. Plaintiff alleges that
her injuries amount to over $1,000,000.00 in damages. Id. at 7.
D. The motions and responses.
1. Defendant’s motion.
TA Dedicated moved for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of all of
Plaintiff’s claims against it. (Doc. No. 40, p. 1.) Defendant first argues that because CFI
“already agreed that Mr. Beverly was its employee and acting in the course and scope” of
his employment during the accident, Plaintiff’s respondeat superior claim cannot extend
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to Defendant. Id. at 3. TA Dedicated further asserts that “[t]here is absolutely no
evidence to support a claim that he was an employee of [Defendant’s] at the time of the
accident . . . .” Id. And because TA Dedicated is not Mr. Beverly’s employer, it argues,
it cannot be liable because it entrusted the trailer to CFI, not Mr. Beverly. Id.
TA Dedicated expands on this argument, stating that the issue before the district
court is who had the “right to control the vehicle at the time it [was] entrusted,” not who
had “mere ownership” over it. (Doc. No. 40, pp. 3-4.) To support that claim, TA
Dedicated cites Schneider v. Esperanza Transmission Co., 744 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. 1987),
a case in which the Supreme Court of Texas held that plaintiff’s negligent entrustment
claim failed. Id. at 4-5. There a company entrusted a vehicle to its employee, and the
employee entrusted it to a friend who then caused an accident. Id. TA Dedicated argues
that this case is analogous here because TA Dedicated entrusted the trailer to CFI, and
there is no liability for “double entrustment” scenarios. Id. at 5.
On that basis, TA Dedicated argues that no negligent entrustment claim is viable,
but even if the district court finds that one is, TA Dedicated had no duty to investigate
Mr. Beverly’s competence before he used the trailer. (Doc. No. 40, p. 5-6.) TA
Dedicated argues that there was no requirement for it to “vet each of CFI’s drivers before
lending a trailer to CFI,” especially when the drivers had valid licenses, as Mr. Beverly
did. Id. at 6.
Finally, TA Dedicated argues that the trailer itself had no part in the accident here,
other than that it was attached to the truck that Mr. Beverly was operating. (Doc. No. 40,
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p. 6.) And because Plaintiff has not claimed that the trailer specifically contributed to the
accident, i.e., through lack of maintenance, a missing brake light, or it having a worn tire,
TA Dedicated argues that their trailer was insignificant to the accident. Id.
2. Plaintiff’s response.
Plaintiff responded to TA Dedicated’s motion. (Doc. No. 51.) She first argues
that TA Dedicated did not adequately prove, through evidence, that it was not Mr.
Beverly’s employer. Id. at 2. (“[TA Dedicated] asserts, without citation to anything in
the record, that ‘there is absolutely no evidence’ Beverly was an employee of TCA.”).
She argues that this is significant because multiple employers can be liable for an
employee’s conduct, so both TA Dedicated and CFI could be liable for Mr. Beverly’s
alleged accident. Id. at 3 (quoting Puga v. About Tyme Transp., Inc., 227 F. Supp. 3d
760, 765 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (Ramos, J.)). And because multiple employers could be liable
for his conduct, Plaintiff argues that TA Dedicated did not provide enough evidence to
prove that it was not Mr. Beverly’s employment. (Doc. No. 51, p. 3.)
Plaintiff next argues that TA Dedicated should be considered the statutory
employer of Beverly under the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Act (“FMCSA”). 49 U.S.C.
§ 31132(3); (Doc. No. 51, p. 3.) Per Plaintiff, the statute implicates TA Dedicated
because it is an entity “engaged in a business affecting interstate commerce that owns or
leases a commercial motor vehicle in connection with that business[.]” Id. Plaintiff
asserts that because TA Dedicated’s trailer exceeds 10,001 pounds, it qualifies as a
“towed vehicle” under the statute, making it a “commercial motor vehicle.” Id. at 3-4.
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Plaintiff substantiates this argument by drawing attention to the ownership and lending
habits of TA Dedicated and CFI. Id. at 4. Plaintiff argues that it is unlikely that TA
Dedicated would let CFI use its trailer without compensation, suggesting that TA
Dedicated is actually a motor carrier, and thus Mr. Beverly’s statutory employer, under
the definition of the statute. Id.
3. TA Dedicated’s reply.
TA Dedicated replied, also making an evidentiary argument. (Doc. No. 60.) TA
Dedicated specifically argues that Plaintiff’s response did not meet the evidentiary
burden of Rule 56(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is no
evidence that Mr. Beverly was its employee. Id. at 1-2. And because Plaintiff did not
meet their evidentiary burden, TA Dedicated argues, summary judgment should be
granted in its favor. Id.
TA Dedicated then shifts to Plaintiff’s statutory employer argument, raising a
counterpoint that a “trailer is not a commercial motor vehicle,” exempting it from the
statute. (Doc. No. 60, p. 3.) To support this assertion, TA Dedicated cites Rangel v. Doe,
No. 4:24-CV-00684, 2025 WL 744479 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 7, 2025), withdrawn, No. 4:24-
CV-00684, 2025 WL 1225103 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2025), a case in which the district
court found that the defendant could not be considered the driver’s employer because
there was no evidence that he was “operating as a motor carrier.” (Doc. No. 60, p. 3.) 4
4 The district court should be aware that TA Dedicated, while not disclosing that it was doing so, cited the March 7,
2025, order from Rangel, which has since been withdrawn by a subsequent order.
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TA Dedicated argues that this case applies here instead of Plaintiff’s cited case—Puga v.
About Tyme Transp., Inc.—because there is no evidence here that Mr. Beverly “picked
up a load at” its discretion or was responding to its directions. TA Dedicated made a
similar argument about Plaintiff’s other cited case, Morales v. OK Trans, Inc., No. 2:19-
CV-00094, 2024 WL 1348405 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2024) (Morales, J.), where the district
court found that there was no arrangement between the motor carrier and the driver and
owner of the vehicle. (Doc. No. 60, p. 4.)
E. Legal standards.
1. Summary judgment standard.
“The purpose of summary judgment is to isolate and dispose of factually
unsupported claims or defenses to help ‘secure the just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action.’” Ellis v. Klawonn, No. 4:21-CV-00977, 2023 WL
3993043, at *2 (E.D. Tex. June 8, 2023) (quoting Nat’l Cas. Co. v. Kiva Const. & Eng’g,
Inc., 496 F. App’x 446, 449 (5th Cir. 2012)). Summary judgment is proper if there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine issue exists “if the evidence is such that
a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The district court must examine “whether the
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evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it
is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 251-52.
2. Nonmovant’s summary judgment obligation.
Allegations in a plaintiff's complaint are not evidence. Wallace v. Texas Tech
Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1047 (5th Cir.1996) (“[P]leadings are not summary judgment
evidence.”); Johnston v. City of Houston, 14 F.3d 1056, 1060 (5th Cir.1994). For the
party opposing the motion for summary judgment, “‘only evidence—not argument, not
facts in the complaint—will satisfy’” the summary judgment burden of production. Solo
Serve Corp. v. Westowne Assoc., 929 F.2d 160, 164 (5th Cir. 1991). Unsubstantiated
assertions, conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation
are not competent summary judgment evidence. Phillips v. Super Servs. Holdings, LLC,
189 F. Supp. 3d 640, 646 (S.D. Tex. 2016) (Harmon, J.) (citing Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d
1527, 1533 (5th Cir.1994)). Instead, the nonmovant must “go beyond the pleadings and
by [his] own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for
trial.” Giles v. Gen. Elec. Co., 245 F.3d 474, 493 (5th Cir.2001) (quoting Celotex, 477
U.S. at 324).
3. Erie Doctrine.
“Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress,
the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state.” Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
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U.S. 64, 78 (1938). Under the Erie doctrine, federal courts sitting in diversity apply state
substantive law and federal procedural law. The applicable state law here, and the parties
do not dispute this, is Texas law.
F. Analysis.
1. Plaintiff’s employment-contingent claims.
a. Employment through evidence.
In its motion, TA Dedicated contends that summary judgment is proper on the
employment-contingent claims because it was not Mr. Beverly’s employer. (Doc. No. 40,
p. 3.) Plaintiff in response argues that TA Dedicated is Mr. Beverly’s employer, but they
attach no relevant exhibits, evidence, or record citations to substantiate this claim. See
Doc. No. 51. Plaintiff accordingly fails its burden of production under the summary
judgment standard. “The defendant’s summary judgment motion is typically dressed in
one of two styles: the defendant may affirmatively offer evidence which undermines one
or more of the essential elements of the plaintiff's case; or, the defendant may simply
demonstrate that the evidence in the record falls short of establishing an essential element
of the plaintiff's case.” Int'l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264 (5th Cir.
1991) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)). Because TA Dedicated
demonstrated that there was no evidence to support that it was Mr. Beverly’s employer, it
was on Plaintiff to provide evidence to support their allegation. And while it is true that
“the plaintiff need not offer all of the evidence tending to support its case,” she must
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produce “enough evidence ‘from which a jury might return a verdict in [its] favor.’” Int'l
Shortstop, Inc., 939 F.2d at 1264 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257).
Plaintiff has not provided any evidence here to support her claim that TA
Dedicated is Mr. Beverly’s employer. While TA Dedicated has likewise not produced
evidence that Mr. Beverly is not its employee, its “sister company,” Doc. No. 40, p. 1,
Doc. No. 40-2, p. 5, has stipulated that it is Mr. Beverly’s employer. See Doc. No. 57, p.
3 n.1. (“Defendant stipulates that the driver was in the course and scope of
employment.”). This amounts to a judicial admission, largely removing the issue of who
Mr. Beverly’s employer is from contention. Martinez v. Bally’s Louisiana, Inc., 244 F.3d
474, 476 (5th Cir. 2001) (“A judicial admission is a formal concession in the pleadings or
stipulations by a party or counsel that is binding on the party making them. Although a
judicial admission is not itself evidence, it has the effect of withdrawing a fact from
contention.”). Plaintiff rightly raises that multiple employers can be liable for an
employee’s conduct, Doc. No. 51, p. 3, but she has not carried her burden at this stage to
establish that there were multiple employers here.
b. Statutory employment.
Plaintiff argues that TA Dedicated was Mr. Beverly’s statutory employer. To
establish that, she cites several sections of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Act. (Doc.
No. 51, p. 3.) She argues that, by definition, TA Dedicated is Mr. Beverly’s statutory
employer because its trailer—which was towed by Mr. Beverly at the time of the alleged
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accident—exceeds 10,000 pounds and was used in interstate commerce. Id. (citing 49
U.S.C. § 31132(3)). Her argument fails for two reasons.
First, Plaintiff’s statutory employment argument fails because “[a] claim which is
not raised in the complaint but, rather, is raised only in response to a motion for summary
judgment is not properly before the court.” Cutrera v. Bd. of Sup’rs of Louisiana State
Univ., 429 F.3d 108, 113 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Fisher v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 895
F.2d 1073, 1078 (5th Cir.1990)). Plaintiff alleged no such theory of statutory liability in
her complaint; she only included basic allegations that TA Dedicated is liable as an
employer because it owned the trailer that was towed during the alleged accident. See
Doc. No. 56. For this reason alone, this argument should not be considered as it is not
properly before the court. Fuller v. Biggs, 532 F. Supp. 3d 371, 381-82 (N.D. Tex. 2021)
(cleaned up) (rejecting similar statutory employment argument under FMCSA where
theory of liability was not included in complaint).
Second, even though the district court is not required to consider her argument,
Plaintiff’s FMCSA argument fails because it is not raised under the proper statute or
supported by evidence. In raising this argument, Plaintiff cites a definitions section of the
FMCSA to establish that TA Dedicated is Mr. Beverly’s statutory employer. (Doc. No.
51, p.3) (citing 49 U.S.C. § 31132(3)). Plaintiff likely meant to raise her argument under
Chapter 131 of Title 49, where parties typically argue that an entity is a motor carrier and
thus a statutory employer. See, e.g., Morales v. OK Trans, Inc., No. 2:19-CV-00094,
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2023 WL 2495065, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 3, 2023); Puga v. About Tyme Transp., Inc., 227
F. Supp. 3d 760, 763-64 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (Ramos, J.).
“[F]or an entity to be a statutory employer, in this case, the entity must be a motor
carrier.” Morales, 2023 WL 2495065, at *2 (cleaned up). And to be a motor carrier, the
entity must “provid[e] motor vehicle transportation for compensation.” Id. (quoting 49
U.S.C. § 13102(14)) (internal quotations omitted). At the outset, Plaintiff has not
attached any evidence that TA Dedicated has received compensation in connection with
Mr. Beverly’s use of their trailer; she has only claimed—in her responsive briefing—that
it seems unlikely that TA Dedicated would loan CFI its trailer without a “business benefit
in return.” (Doc. No. 51, p. 4.) Absent an evidentiary showing that TA Dedicated
received any compensation or benefit from CFI’s use of its trailer, Plaintiff’s statutory
argument fails.
Plaintiff’s statutory employment argument is both improperly before the district
court and without merit, and her arguments that TA Dedicated was Mr. Beverly’s
employer at the time of the accident are unsubstantiated with evidence. Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s employment-contingent claims against TA Dedicated—should be dismissed.
See Doc. No. 56, pp. 3-4.
2. Negligent Entrustment
While Plaintiff’s employment-contingent claims are meritless and fail, her
negligent entrustment claim does not require an employment relationship and warrants
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additional discussion. To plead a plausible claim for negligent entrustment under Texas
law, the plaintiff must show that “(1) the defendant entrusted the vehicle to the driver; (2)
that person was an unlicensed, incompetent, or reckless driver; (3) at the time of the
entrustment, the defendant knew or should have known that the driver was an unlicensed,
incompetent, or reckless driver; (4) the driver was negligent on the occasion in question;
and (5) the driver's negligence proximately caused the accident.” Phillips, 189 F. Supp.
3d at 651-52 (citing Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 758 (Tex.
2007)).
Facing a similar flaw as her employment-contingent claims, Plaintiff has again
attached no relevant evidence, nor pointed to any evidence in the record, that provides an
evidentiary basis for these elements. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an
essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts
immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. To support her claim, Plaintiff only a “Safer
Company Snapshot” and a crash report. (Doc. Nos. 51-1, 51-2.) She also referenced the
deposition that TA Dedicated attached to its motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 51,
p. 4) (citing Doc. No. 40-1.) But, saying nothing of all the elements, these documents at
the very least do not provide an evidentiary basis for whether (1) TA Dedicated entrusted
its trailer to Mr. Beverly; (2) Mr. Beverly was unlicensed, incompetent, or reckless; (3)
TA Dedicated knew or should have known that Mr. Beverly was unlicensed,
incompetent, or reckless. Accordingly, the district court should dismiss Plaintiff’s
negligent entrustment claim because she failed to provide an evidentiary basis for it.
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3. Strict Liability.
Plaintiff makes a final strict liability claim against TA Dedicated alleging that it is
liable because it is the registered “owner” of the tractor—not trailer—involved in the
alleged incident. (Doc. No. 56, p. 7.) This claim, too, fails because Plaintiff has not
alleged a viable strict liability claim or theory here. “Strict liability is imposed only in
very limited situations, such as in products liability cases involving dangerously defective
products or dangerous animal cases.” Prather v. Brandt, 981 S.W.2d 801, 804 (Tex.
App. – Houston, 1998) (cleaned up). Plaintiff broadly asserts that TA Dedicated is liable
as an “owner” of the tractor, but they point to no authority or statute that creates strict
liability for owning a vehicle that was involved in an accident. Nor does Plaintiff provide
any competent evidence that TA Dedicated owns the tractor. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
strict liability claim should be dismissed. (Doc. No. 56, p. 7.)
G. Conclusion and recommendation.
The district court should GRANT TA Dedicated’s motion for summary judgment
(Doc. No. 40), and DISMISS all of Plaintiff’s claims against TA Dedicated with
prejudice, (Doc. No. 56, pp. 3-5, 7.) TA Dedicated can then be effectively removed as a
party from this case.
H. Notice.
The Clerk will file this Memorandum and Recommendation and transmit a copy to
each party or counsel. Within 14 days after being served with a copy of the
Memorandum and Recommendation, a party may file with the Clerk and serve on the
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United States Magistrate Judge and all parties, written objections, pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b), 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and General Order No. 2002-13, United States
District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
A failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and
recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within 14 days after
being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from
attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions
accepted by the District Court. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415
(5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
Respectfully submitted on January 30, 2026.
_______________________________
Jason B. Libby
United States Magistrate Judge
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