Campos et al v. Shepherd et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
TYRA CAMPOS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
VS.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:24-CV-00040
WILLIAM SHEPHERD, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This case was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Mitchel Neurock for case
management (Doc. No. 30), but with Judge Neurock’s consent and in accordance with
Special Order C-2023-1,1 United States Magistrate Judge Julie K. Hampton enters this
memorandum and recommendation. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned
recommends that the district court DENY Plaintiffs’ motion to alter or amend the district
court’s judgment in this case (Doc. No. 48).
On October 3, 2025, the district court granted the defense’s motion to dismiss
Plaintiffs’ remaining claims2 on the basis that Plaintiffs had failed to timely move for
substitution of defendant Gwenyth Shepherd in place of her late husband, defendant
1 Special Order C-2023-1 is a standing order concerning civil matters referred to magistrate judges in this division.
The order allows magistrate judges to assist each other on any referred matter by agreement, including entering
orders, notices, recommendations, and presiding over judicial proceedings.
2 The district court had previously granted a motion for partial summary judgment filed by defendant Gwenyth
Shepherd. (Doc. No. 42.)
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
November 10, 2025
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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William Shepherd. (Doc. No. 46.) The district court entered final judgment that same
day. (Doc. No. 47.)
Fifteen days later, on October 28, Plaintiffs filed a motion to alter or amend the
district court’s decision under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). (Doc. No. 48.)
While stating that they do not seek to relitigate the district court’s ruling, id. at 1, they
argue that the district court’s decision constitutes a “manifest injustice” because it
prevents resolution of the case on the merits. Id. at 2-3. Plaintiffs further contend,
without elaboration, that after receiving notice of William Shepherd’s death, they “took
steps to clarify substitution procedure,” and argue that no prejudice occurred from their
delay because litigation of the case continued. Id. at 4. Plaintiffs conclude by arguing
that the district court unjustifiably failed to adopt Magistrate Judge Neurock’s
recommendation against dismissal. Id. at 4-5.
In opposition, defendant Gwenyth Shepherd argues that Plaintiffs provide no
newly discovered evidence (or indeed any evidence at all) with their motion and do not
point to any intervening change in the law. (Doc. No. 49.) The defense contends that
Plaintiffs are simply attempting to relitigate the district court’s dismissal decision. Id. at
3-4. Plaintiffs did not file a reply to the defense response.
A Rule 59(e) motion calls into question the correctness of a judgment and serves
the narrow purpose of allowing a party to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to
present newly discovered evidence. Templet v. HydroChem, Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 478-79
(5th Cir. 2004). Such a motion therefore must clearly establish either a manifest error of
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law or fact, or must present newly discovered evidence or an intervening change in the
law; a Rule 59(e) motion cannot be used to raise arguments that could and should have
been made before the judgment issued. See Simon v. United States, 891 F.2d 1154, 1159
(5th Cir. 1990).
Here, Plaintiffs have offered no evidence of any kind, let alone any evidence that
is newly discovered. Nor do they argue that the law has changed. Plaintiffs simply
contend that dismissal is too severe a sanction for their failure to timely move for
substitution of defendant Gwenyth in place of the late defendant William. See Doc. No.
48, p. 3. This was the exact issue that the parties already litigated and that the district
court decided. See Doc. No. 46, pp. 6-14 (applying the Pioneer3 factors to determine
whether Plaintiffs’ failure to timely move for substitution was the product of excusable
neglect, and concluding that it was not). Contrary to Plaintiffs’ argument, then, their
motion to alter or amend the judgment is indeed nothing more than an attempt to
relitigate their unsuccessful argument. The district court should reject it and deny the
motion. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5 (2008) (Rule 59(e)
permits a court to alter or amend a judgment, but it may not be used to relitigate old
matters or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the
entry of judgment).
Also unpersuasive is Plaintiffs’ argument that the district court should have
afforded greater deference to Judge Neurock’s recommendation. Plaintiffs appear to
3 See Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 392 (1993); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B).
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contend that a district court should adopt a magistrate judge’s recommendation when that
recommendation “aligns with equitable principles and is well-supported by the record”
unless there is a “compelling reason” not to do so, lest the fairness and efficiency of
judicial proceedings be impaired. (Doc. No. 48, p. 5.) Plaintiffs’ attempt to impose such
a limitation on the district court’s authority is at odds with Article III of the United States
Constitution. It is the district court, not a magistrate judge, who makes final decisions
regarding dispositive matters, and a magistrate judge’s recommendations are just that –
recommendations. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) (district court may “accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate
judge”). Here, the ultimate question was the equitable application and balancing of the
Pioneer factors. The magistrate judge saw the question one way, but the district court
applied the same factors and simply reached a different conclusion. The district court
should reject Plaintiffs’ argument.
In sum, the district court should DENY Plaintiffs’ motion to alter or amend the
judgment (Doc. No. 48).
The Clerk will file this Memorandum and Recommendation and transmit a copy to
each party or counsel. Within 14 days after being served with a copy of the
Memorandum and Recommendation, a party may file with the Clerk and serve on the
United States Magistrate Judge and all parties, written objections, pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b), 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and General Order No. 2002-13, United States
District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
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A failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and
recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within 14 days after
being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from
attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions
accepted by the District Court. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415
(5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
Respectfully submitted on November 10, 2025.
____________________________
Julie K. Hampton
United States Magistrate Judge
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