Bandeev v. Bradford et al

1/6
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BROWNSVILLE DIVISION
TIMUR BANDEEV, §
Petitioner, §
§
v. § Civil Action No. 1:26-cv-471
§
WARDEN, in his/her official capacity,
Port Isabel Detention Center, et al.,
Respondents.
§
§
§
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is Petitioner Timur Bandeev’s “Verified Petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241” (Bandeev’s “§ 2241 Petition”). Dkt. No. 1.
For the reasons discussed below, it is recommended that the Court: (1) DISMISS
WITHOUT PREJUDICE Bandeev’s § 2241 Petition; and (2) DIRECT the Clerk of
Court to CLOSE this case.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
In January, 2024, Bandeev, a citizen of Russia, entered the United States. Dkt. No.
1 at 12. Immigration officers detained Bandeev and placed him in immigration
proceedings before the Greenspoint Park Immigration Court in Houston, Texas. Id. On
October 23, 2025, Bandeev was detained in McAllen, Texas; on October 27, 2025, he was
transferred to the Port Isabel Detention Center (“PIDC”) in Los Fresnos, Texas. Id. On
February 3, 2026, an immigration judge denied Bandeev’s asylum claim, issued a final
1 Information obtained from Bandeev’s § 2241 Petition. See Dkt. No. 1.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
June 11, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
Case 1:26-cv-00471 Document 15 Filed 06/11/26 in TXSD Page 1 of 6

2/6
order of removal against him, and granted a withholding of removal to Russia. Id.
Bandeev remains in immigration custody at PIDC. Id. at 13.
On April 21, 2026, Bandeev filed his § 2241 Petition in the Houston Division of the
Court. Dkt. No. 1, see generally Dkt. No. 4. On April 27, 2026, Bandeev’s case was
transferred from the Houston Division to the Brownsville Division of the Court. Dkt. No.
4 at 2.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Standing and Ripeness
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power
authorized by Constitution and statute[.]” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Federal courts presume that any given case lies outside this
limited jurisdiction, and the party seeking to invoke jurisdiction has the burden of
showing otherwise. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377; Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Hillman, 796
F.2d 770, 775 (5th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, federal courts have an independent obligation
to examine their own subject matter jurisdiction, even sua sponte. Rivero v. Fid. Invs.,
Inc., 1 F.4th 340, 344 (5th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S.Ct. 1670 (2022) (quoting
Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006)).
The United States Constitution limits federal jurisdiction to the resolution of
“cases” and “controversies.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992); U.S.
Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Standing is an “essential and unchanging part” of the
Constitution’s case-or-controversy requirement. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559. Standing
requires, in part, an “actual or imminent” injury, i.e., one that is “ripe for decision.” Id. at
560; Shields v. Norton, 289 F.3d 832, 835 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied sub nom. Schuehle
Case 1:26-cv-00471 Document 15 Filed 06/11/26 in TXSD Page 2 of 6

3/6
v. Norton, 537 U.S. 1071 (2002). For a claim to be ripe, it must have “matured sufficiently
to warrant judicial intervention.” Contender Farms, L.L.P. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 779
F.3d 258, 267 (5th Cir. 2015) (internal quotations omitted). A premature claim for relief
is not judicially ripe and falls outside the federal courts’ limited jurisdiction. Shields, 289
F.3d at 835; see also Sample v. Morrison, 406 F.3d 310, 312 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam)
(noting that standing and ripeness are “essential components of federal subject-matter
jurisdiction.”).
Without subject matter jurisdiction, federal courts have no authority to adjudicate
a case and must dismiss it. Goodrich v. United States, 3 F.4th 776, 779 (5th Cir. 2021);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is without
prejudice. Carver v. Atwood, 18 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2021).
B. Zadvydas v. Davis
Immigration judges are authorized to issue orders of removal, which become final
once the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) has acted or the time to seek review of a
removal order expires. See generally 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1; Texas v. United States, 524 F.
Supp. 3d 598, 614 (S.D. Tex. 2021) (Tipton, J.). Generally, the Government has 90 days
to execute a final removal order and remove the unauthorized immigrant from the United
States. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A).
Though § 2241 proceedings “remain available as a forum for statutory and
constitutional challenges to post-removal-period detention,” the detainee’s ability to seek
habeas relief is subject to certain time constraints. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 688. When the
Government fails to execute a removal order within the 90-day period, post-removal
detention must be limited to a period “reasonably necessary” to effectuate removal;
indefinite detention is impermissible. Id. at 689.
Case 1:26-cv-00471 Document 15 Filed 06/11/26 in TXSD Page 3 of 6

4/6
This does not mean that any amount of post-removal-period of confinement is
unlawful; rather, the Government’s obligation to rebut a presumption of indefinite
detention does not activate until after detention has been ongoing longer than six months,
and only after the immigrant detainee first makes a showing that “there is no significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. at 701. Up to six months
of immigration detention after entry of a final removal order is, therefore, “presumptively
reasonable.” Id.; Chance v. Napolitano, 453 F. App'x 535, 536 (5th Cir. 2011) (per
curiam).
In arriving at the six-month presumption, the United States Supreme Court
acknowledged the sensitive interplay of separation of powers concerns and national
interests in the immigration context. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 700. The six-month
presumption, then, reflects a reasoned judgment that earlier review of post-removal-
period detention poses too great a risk to institutional interests to properly warrant
judicial scrutiny.
III. DISCUSSION
Bandeev alleges that his continued detention is indefinite and that the Government
has “made no actual efforts to remove [Bandeev] to a specifically identified third country.”
Dkt. No. 1 at 17. However, as he admits in his § 2241 Petition, Bandeev’s “removal order
became administratively final on February 03, 2026.” Id. Accordingly, Bandeev has been
detained under a final order of removal for only four months and his § 2241 Petition [Dkt.
No. 1] is unripe. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(i)(B)(i) (“The removal period begins … [t]he date the
order of removal becomes administratively final.”); Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 688 (stating
Case 1:26-cv-00471 Document 15 Filed 06/11/26 in TXSD Page 4 of 6

5/6
that the post-removal-period detention statute applies only after a noncitizen has been
ordered removed).
As a result, judicial intervention at this stage is premature and, for the reasons
explained in Zadvydas, would be imprudent considering the Executive branch’s primary
prerogative over the administration of immigrant removal. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at
700. The Court interprets Bandeev’s remaining arguments as derivative of his claim that
his detention is unreasonably prolonged and there is no significant likelihood of removal.
Dkt. No. 1 at 14–17. Accordingly, Bandeev’s claim is not ripe and is subject to dismissal
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the Court: (1) DISMISS
WITHOUT PREJUDICE Bandeev’s § 2241 Petition [Dkt. No. 1]; and (2) DIRECT the
Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case.
Case 1:26-cv-00471 Document 15 Filed 06/11/26 in TXSD Page 5 of 6

6/6
V. NOTICE TO PARTIES
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions,
and recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within fourteen
days after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain
error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal
conclusions accepted by the district court, provided that the party has been served with
notice that such consequences will result from a failure to object. Douglass v. United
Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);
FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b).
SIGNED on this 11th day of June, 2026 at Brownsville, Texas.
____________________________
Ignacio Torteya, III
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 1:26-cv-00471 Document 15 Filed 06/11/26 in TXSD Page 6 of 6