Al Shannan v. Warden, Port Isabel Detention Center et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BROWNSVILLE DIVISION
GHASSAN A. S.1, 	§
Petitioner, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:26-cv-427
§
WARDEN, PORT ISABEL 	§
DETENTION CENTER, et al., 	§
Respondents. 	§
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO DISMISS
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Before the Court is Petitioner Ghassan A. S.’s “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.” Dkt. No. 1. For the reasons offered in the Court’s order denying
Petitioner’s Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Dkt. No. 5, the Court
recommends the Court DENY the Petition (Dkt. No. 1).
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Iraq, currently detained by Immigration and
Customs Enforcement at the Port Isabel Deten Center in Cameron County, Texas. Dkt. No.
1 at 4. He alleges he has been detained for nearly eight months. Dkt. No. 1 at 5. Petitioner
alleges that he was lawfully admitted to the United States as a refugee in 2014. Dkt. No. 1
at 5. He states that he is still involved in removal proceedings. Dkt. No. 1 at 5. Petitioner
also states he suffers from many medical conditions. Dkt. No. 1 at 6.
Petitioner raises only two claims for relief. Dkt. No. 1 at 14-15. First, Petitioner
claims his “prolonged detention violates substantive due process.” Dkt. No. 1 at 14.
Second, Petitioner claims the Court “should grant a stay of removal to protect Petitioner’s
constitutional rights.” Dkt. No. 1 at 15.
1 Due to significant privacy concerns in immigration cases and noting that judicial opinions are not subject
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2, any opinion, order, judgment, or other disposition in this case will
refer to the petitioner only by first name and last initial.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
May 08, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Regarding Petitioner’s first claim, Petitioner is detainable under 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(2), Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2026), and, as
pleaded, Petitioner’s constitutional claim of a violation of substantive due process cannot
succeed. Detention “during removal proceedings,” even where such detention is without a
bond hearing, is generally a “constitutionally permissible part of that process.” Demore v.
Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003). As relevant here, “when the Government deals with
deportable aliens, the Due Process Clause does not require [Congress] to employ the least
burdensome means to accomplish its goal.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 528.; Kanda v. Cole, No.
5:26-CV-158, 2026 WL 1014400, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 10, 2026). Therefore, Petitioner’s
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause claim is precluded, at this juncture, by Demore
because the Government may constitutionally detain him as a deportable alien during the
limited period necessary for his removal proceedings. Demore, 538 U.S. at 523.
Petitioner also alleges in furtherance of the substantive due process claim that his
continued detention has worsened severely his medical condition. 	While the Court is
sympathetic to Petitioner’s ailments, the allegations of mistreatment, though serious,
cannot be brought as a habeas claim and should instead be offered in a civil rights action.
See, e.g., Pierre v. United States, 525 F.2d 933, 935 (5th Cir. 1976); Petgrave v. Aleman,
529 F.Supp.3d 665, 679 (S.D. Tex. 2021).
Petitioner also seems to allege at least some of the Immigration Judge’s decisions
were wrong. See Dkt. No. 1 at 6-7 (stating that “[t]he underlying basis for the IJ’s
dangerousness finding is fundamentally flawed.”). To the extent that Petitioner challenges
the correctness of the Immigration Judge’s rulings concerning whether Petitioner may be
released on bond, the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this claim. Nielsen v. Preap, 586
U.S. 392, 401 (2019); see Hernandez-Gabriel v. Tate, No. CV H-25-5687, 2026 WL
161192, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 20, 2026) (slip copy) (Hittner, J.) (explaining that “district
courts have no jurisdiction to review discretionary decisions made by an immigration judge
regarding a bond.”) (citing Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. at 401)).
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Regarding Petitioner’s second claim, Petitioner does not articulate a viable claim to
stay removal, so a stay of removal is not necessary to protect any of Petitioner’s
constitutional rights.
Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DENY Petitioner Ghassan Al
S.’s “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241” (Dkt. No. 1).
The parties have fourteen (14) days from the date of being served with a copy of
this Report and Recommendation in which to file written objections, if any, with the United
States District Judge assigned to this case. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). A party filing objections
must specifically identify the factual or legal findings to which objections are being made.
The District Judge is not required to consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections.
Battle v. United States Parole Comm’n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987).
If any party fails to timely object to any factual or legal findings in this Report and
Recommendation, the District Judge is not required to conduct a de novo review of the
record before adopting these findings. If the District Judge chooses to adopt such findings
without conducting a de novo review of the record, the parties may not attack those findings
on appeal, except on the grounds of plain error. Alexander v. Verizon Wireless Servs.,
L.L.C., 875 F.3d 243, 248 (5th Cir. 2017).
Signed on May 7, 2026.
Karen Betancourt
United States Magistrate Judge
.
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