Hernandez Garcia v. Vergara et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BROWNSVILLE DIVISION
MIGUEL H. G.1, 	§
Petitioner, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:26-cv-400
§
MIGUEL VERGARA, et al., 	§
Respondents. 	§
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
TO DENY HABEAS PETITION
Before the Court is Miguel H. G.’s2 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2241 (Dkt. No. 1).3
Because Petitioners’ claim of excessive detention is premature, it is recommended
that the Court (1) DENY the Petition (Dkt. No. 1) and (2) DIRECT the Clerk of Court to
close the case.
I. 	Background and Procedural History
Petitioner provides the Court with only the following few facts. Petitioner is a native
and citizen of Honduras. Dkt. No. 1 at 2. He has been detained at the Port Isabel Detention
Center since March 31, 2026, or a little over two weeks from the date of this Report and
Recommendation. Id. Petitioner became subject to a final order of removal on July 2, 2020.
Id.4
1 Due to significant privacy concerns in immigration cases and noting that judicial opinions are not subject
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2, any opinion, order, judgment, or other disposition in this case will
refer to the petitioner only by first name and last initial.
2 Petitioner states he is also known by a different surname. Dkt. No. 1 at 1-2.
3 The Court issued an order requiring Respondents to show cause why the Writ of Habeas Corpus should
not be granted. Dkt. No. 4. Upon further review of the law, the Court withdrew that order. Dkt. No. __
4 Petitioner also states that “[s]ince the issuance of the final order, DHS has continued to detain” him. Dkt.
No. 1 at 2. However, this appears to be a clerical error because the Petitioner repeats that he has been
detained “since on or about March 31, 2026.” Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 1,4, 9, 26. The Court relies on Petitioner’s
repeated assertions that he has been detained since March 31, 2026, not since July 2020.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
April 16, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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The Petition alleges that, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and in violations of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), Respondents have subjected him to
unjustified and prolonged detention. Dkt. No. 1 at 7-9.
II. 	Legal Standard
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power
authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511
U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A court has “an independent obligation to determine whether subject-
matter jurisdiction exists,” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 501 (2006), and, if it
“determines…that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction,” it “must dismiss the action.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(h)(3). One “essential component[]” of “federal subject-matter jurisdiction” is
“ripeness.” Sample v. Morrison, 406 F.3d 310, 312 (5th Cir. 2005). For a court to exercise
jurisdiction, then, the case “must be ripe for decision, meaning that it must not be premature
or speculative.” Shields v. Norton, 289 F.3d 832, 835 (5th Cir. 2002).
III. 	Discussion
Because Petitioner has not been detained for over six months, see Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 26,
his claim is premature.
Once a removal order becomes final,5 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (“§ 1231”) authorizes
detention of the alien to effectuate removal under two provisions. In the first 90 days
(otherwise known as the “removal period”), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1), the “Attorney General
shall detain the alien” under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2). Once the removal period ends, the source
of authorization shifts to § 1231(a)(6), which states that the alien “may be detained” by the
Attorney General “beyond the removal period.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). To ensure §
1231(a)(6) would not lead to constitutionally excessive detention, the Court in Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) construed it to have an implied limit: authorization of detention
under § 1231(a)(6) would run out when continued detention “exceeds a period reasonably
5 A removal order becomes “administratively final” under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i) upon “(i) a
determination by the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming such order; or (ii) the expiration of the period
in which the alien is permitted to seek review of such order by the Board of Immigration Appeals.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(47)(B).
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necessary to secure removal” and removal “is no longer reasonably foreseeable.” Zadvydas,
533 U.S. at 699. The Court, however, also understood that a reasonableness standard,
standing alone, would risk too much judicial interference with the Executive’s “primacy in
foreign policy matters.” Id. at 701. The Court thus found it “practically necessary” to “limit”
its new standard by recognizing a “presumptively reasonable period of detention” of “six
months.” Id.
Pieced 	together, 	the 	Zadvydas 	framework 	slots claims 	challenging 	post-final-
removal-order detention into two phases:6 1) a six-month period where the statute
constitutionally authorizes detention (and Zadvydas claims are thus not viable); and 2) a
period “after that,” in which the alien can seek conditional release under Zadvydas “if he can
demonstrate there is ‘no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future.’” Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 378 (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701). If a
petitioner seeks release from detention in the first phase—the presumptively reasonable
period—his or her claim is not yet ripe.7 Agyei-Kodie v. Holder, 418 F. App’x 317, 318 (5th
6 Some district courts in this circuit remain skeptical of this tidy two-phase scheme. See, e.g., Ali v. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., 451 F. Supp. 3d 703 (S.D. Tex. 2020); Villanueva v. Tate, 801 F. Supp. 3d 689 (S.D.
Tex. 2025). They, like Petitioner, suggest that Zadvydas prescribes a (rebuttable) presumption of
reasonableness during those first six months—and does not, in effect, proscribe claims brought before that
period elapses. See, e.g., Villaneuva, 801 F. Supp. at 703. Admittedly, Zadvydas is not precise about what
its presumption means for the first six months. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. But the formulation offered by
the Court in and after that case only contemplates petitioners proving their detention is unreasonable after
the six-month period ends. Id. at 701 (“After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to
believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the
Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing”) (emphasis added); Clark, 543
U.S. at 378 (“after that [presumptive period], the alien is eligible for conditional release if he can
demonstrate…”) (emphasis added); Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 529 (2021) (same). The
Fifth Circuit, though not settling the issue, has issued strong signals of its own. It has described the timing
of Zadvydas claims in the same terms, see Andrade v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 538, 543 (5th Cir. 2006); Hersh
v. United States ex rel. Mukasey, 553 F.3d 743, 757 (5th Cir. 2008), approved of district courts dismissing
Zadvydas claims as “premature” when made during the presumptive period, Okpoju v. Ridge, 115 F. App’x
302 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam); Chance v. Napolitano, 453 F. App’x 535, 536 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam),
and itself found a Zadvydas claim to be “premature” for the same reason. Agyei-Kodie v. Holder, 418 F.
App’x 317, 318 (5th Cir. 2011).
7 Whether a claim of unreasonably prolonged detention is offered in statutory or constitutional terms, the
result is the same: it is “presumptively constitutional for alien to be detained for six months after a final
order of removal.” Agyei-Kodie v. Holder, 418 F. App’x 317, 318 (5th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added), and a
constitutional challenge to prolonged detention fails unless it meets the standard set by Zadvydas. See
Andrade v. Gonzales, 459 F. 3d 538, 543 (5th Cir. 2006).
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Cir. 2011); see also Kakhidze v. Venegas, No. 1:25-cv-00136, 2025 WL 2412854, at *3
(S.D. Tex. July 30, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 2411229 (S.D.
Tex. Aug. 20, 2025).
The facts show Petitioner is subject to a final order of removal from July of 2020 and
has been detained since March 31, 2026. Dkt. No. 1 at 1. Petitioner’s detention period still
falls within the initial six-month period of presumptively valid detention. Accordingly, the
Petitioners’ claims are not yet ripe, and the Court therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction
to hear this case.
IV. 	Recommendation
It is recommended that the Court (1) Deny the Petition (Dkt. No. 1) and (2) DIRECT
the Clerk of Court to close the case.
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V. 	Notice to the Parties
The parties have fourteen (14) days from the date of being served with a copy of
this Report and Recommendation in which to file written objections, if any, with the United
States District Judge assigned to the instant case. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). When filing an
objection, a party must object to specific facts or legal findings in this Report and
Recommendation. The District Judge is not required to consider frivolous, conclusive, or
general objections. Battle v. United States Parole Comm’n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir.
1987).
If any party fails to timely object to any factual or legal findings in this Report and
Recommendation, the District Judge is not required to conduct a de novo review of the
record before adopting these findings. If the District Judge chooses to adopt such findings
without conducting a de novo review of the record, the parties may not attack those findings
on appeal, except on the grounds of plain error. Alexander v. Verizon Wireless Servs.,
L.L.C., 875 F.3d 243, 248 (5th Cir. 2017).
Signed on April 16, 2026.
Karen Betancourt
United States Magistrate Judge
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