England v. Mullin et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BROWNSVILLE DIVISION
YENNIFER N. E., 1 	§
Petitioner, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:26-cv-379
§
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, et al., 	§
in their official capacities, 	§
Respondents. 	§
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
TO GRANT PETITIONER’S HABEAS PETITION
Before the Court is Petitioner’s “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus” (Dkt. No. 1)
(“Petition”) and Respondents’ “Response to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Motion to
Dismiss or Alternatively for Summary Judgment” (Dkt. No. 6) (“MTD”).
Petitioner is a Mexican citizen who has, per the filings before this court, deferred action status
under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) program. Dkt. No. 1-3. Despite this
DACA status, Petitioner is currently detained at the El Valle Detention Center in Raymondville,
Texas under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) pending proceedings to remove her from this country. Dkt. No.
6 at 2. Petitioner alleges—and Respondents do not dispute—that her DACA status was not
terminated by Respondents under the procedure laid out under the relevant regulations, Dkt. No. 1
at 8, which requires the government to “provide a Notice of Intent to Terminate and an opportunity
to respond prior to terminating a grant of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals.” 8 C.F.R. §
236.23(d)(1).
This is no casual omission. As this court recently articulated in Doe v. Lyons, 1:25-cv-00350
(S.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2026), a complete abandonment of the process set out by regulations, when that
process “safeguard[s] important, individual rights” amounts to a due process violation. Id.; see also
Gov’t of Canal Zone v. Brooks, 427 F.2d 346, 347 (5th Cir. 1970). Respondents failed to follow the
established process here, and they have accordingly violated Petitioner’s due process rights.
Because release is an appropriate remedy for detaining DACA holders in violation of due
1 Due to significant privacy concerns in immigration cases and noting that judicial opinions are not subject to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2, any opinion, order, judgment, or other disposition in this case will refer to the petitioner
only by first name and last initial.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
April 13, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
Case 1:26-cv-00379 Document 7 Filed 04/13/26 in TXSD Page 1 of 2

process, see Santiago v. Noem, 2025 WL 2792588, at *14 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 2025), addressing the
Petition’s other challenges to Petitioner’s detention is at this point unnecessary. And because the
Petition’s challenge is aimed not at the commencement of removal proceedings itself but a failure to
follow crucial procedures incident to her detention, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) does not strip this court of
jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s challenges. See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.,
525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999).
Because Respondents failed to offer the proper procedure for terminating Petitioner’s DACA
status, see 8 C.F.R. § 	236.23, it is recommended that the Court (1) GRANT the Petition (Dkt. No.
1) in part, (2) DENY the MTD (Dkt. No. 6), (3) ORDER Respondents to release Petitioner and
thereafter comply with the regulations governing DACA status termination, and (4) DIRECT the
Clerk of Court to close the case.
The parties have fourteen (14) days from the date of being served with a copy of this Report
and Recommendation in which to file written objections, if any, with the United States District Judge
assigned to the instant case. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). When filing an objection, a party must object to
specific facts or legal findings in this Report and Recommendation. The District Judge is not required
to consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. Battle v. United States Parole Comm’n, 834
F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987).
If any party fails to timely object to any factual or legal findings in this Report and
Recommendation, the District Judge is not required to conduct a de novo review of the record before
adopting these findings. If the District Judge chooses to adopt such findings without conducting a de
novo review of the record, the parties may not attack those findings on appeal, except on the grounds
of plain error. Alexander v. Verizon Wireless Servs., L.L.C., 875 F.3d 243, 248 (5th Cir. 2017).
Signed on April 13, 2026.
Karen Betancourt
United States Magistrate Judge
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