Rodriguez Vidal v. Gonzalez

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BROWNSVILLE DIVISION
YAONDRI RODRIGUEZ VIDAL, §
Petitioner, §
§
v. § Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-00324
§
ADAM R. GONZALES,
Respondent.
§
§
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is Yoandri Rodriguez Vidal’s “Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Vidal’s “§ 2241 Petition”). Dkt. No. 1. For the reasons discussed
below, it is recommended that the Court: (1) DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE
Vidal’s § 2241 Petition; and (2) DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
Vidal, proceeding pro se, a citizen of Cuba, is in immigration custody at the Port
Isabel Detention Center (“PIDC”) located in Los Fresnos, Texas. Dkt. No. 1 at 1; Dkt. No.
1-1 at 1. Vidal has lived in the United States since 2000. Dkt. No. 1 at 6. On January 12,
2009, an immigration judge ordered Vidal’s removal. Dkt. No. 1 at 2. Since then, Vidal
has been under an Order of Supervision with Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”). Dkt. No. 1-1 at 9; 11. Vidal did not appeal the immigration judge’s decision to the
1 Information obtained from Vidal’s § 2241 Petition. See Dkt. No. 1.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
January 20, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). See id. at 2–5. On August 13, 2025, Vidal was
taken into immigration custody where he has remained. Id. at 4.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Standing and Ripeness
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power
authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511
U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Federal courts presume that any given case lies outside this limited
jurisdiction, and the party seeking to invoke jurisdiction has the burden of showing
otherwise. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377; Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Hillman, 796 F.2d 770, 775
(5th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, federal courts have an independent obligation to examine
their own subject matter jurisdiction, even sua sponte. Rivero v. Fid. Invs., Inc., 1 F.4th
340, 344 (5th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S.Ct. 1670 (2022) (quoting Arbaugh v. Y&H
Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006)).
The United States Constitution limits federal jurisdiction to the resolution of
“cases” and “controversies.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992); U.S.
Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Standing is an “essential and unchanging part” of the
Constitution’s case-or-controversy requirement. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559. Standing
requires, in part, an “actual or imminent” injury, i.e., one that is “ripe for decision.” Id. at
560; Shields v. Norton, 289 F.3d 832, 835 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied sub nom. Schuehle
v. Norton, 537 U.S. 1071 (2002). For a claim to be ripe, it must have “matured sufficiently
to warrant judicial intervention.” Contender Farms, L.L.P. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 779
F.3d 258, 267 (5th Cir. 2015) (internal quotations omitted). A premature claim for relief
is not judicially ripe and falls outside the federal courts’ limited jurisdiction. Shields, 289
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F.3d at 835; see also Sample v. Morrison, 406 F.3d 310, 312 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam)
(noting that standing and ripeness are “essential components of federal subject-matter
jurisdiction.”).
Without subject matter jurisdiction, federal courts have no authority to adjudicate
a case and must dismiss it. Goodrich v. United States, 3 F.4th 776, 779 (5th Cir. 2021);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is without
prejudice. Carver v. Atwood, 18 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2021).
B. 28 U.S.C. § 2241: Habeas Review of Final Orders of Removal
The district courts may grant writs of habeas corpus to persons in federal custody
in violation of federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), (c)(1), (c)(3). This power extends to
immigrant detainees in custody beyond the statutorily mandated removal period. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(1)(A); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 688 (2001). Habeas review of removal
orders, however, is conditioned on the detainee first exhausting all available
administrative remedies. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). Failure to exhaust administrative
remedies should result in dismissal without prejudice. Dawson Farms, LLC v. Farm Serv.
Agency, 504 F.3d 592, 607 (5th Cir. 2007).
III. DISCUSSION
Immigration judges are authorized to issue orders of removal, which become final
once the BIA has acted or the time to seek review of a removal order expires. See generally
8 C.F.R. § 1241.1; Texas v. United States, 524 F. Supp. 3d 598, 614 (S.D. Tex. 2021)
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(Tipton, J.). Generally, the Government has 90 days to execute a final removal order and
remove the unauthorized immigrant from the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A).
Though § 2241 proceedings “remain available as a forum for statutory and
constitutional challenges to post-removal-period detention,” the detainee’s ability to seek
habeas relief is subject to certain time constraints. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 688. When the
Government fails to execute a removal order within the 90-day period, post-removal
detention must be limited to a period “reasonably necessary” to effectuate removal;
indefinite detention is impermissible. Id. at 689.
This does not mean that any amount of post-removal-period of confinement is
unlawful; rather, the Government’s obligation to rebut a presumption of indefinite
detention does not activate until after detention has been ongoing longer than six months,
and only after the immigrant detainee first makes a showing that “there is no significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. at 701. Up to six months
of immigration detention after entry of a final removal order is, therefore, “presumptively
reasonable.” Id.; Chance v. Napolitano, 453 F. App'x 535, 536 (5th Cir. 2011) (per
curiam).
In arriving at the six-month presumption, the United States Supreme Court
acknowledged the sensitive interplay of separation of powers concerns and national
interests in the immigration context. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 700. The six-month
presumption, then, reflected a reasoned judgment that earlier review of post-removal-
period detention posed too great a risk to institutional interests to properly warrant
judicial scrutiny.
Here, Vidal asks the Court to “order [his] immediate release under reasonable
conditions of supervision, [and] enjoin [him] from further detention absent a
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demonstrable & immediate plan for removal to cuba.” Dkt. No. 1 at 7 (errors in original).
As Vidal is proceeding pro se, his pleadings are liberally construed under a less stringent
standard of review than a formal pleading drafted by a lawyer. Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nevertheless, a pro se filing must still “abide by the rules that govern
federal courts.” E.E.O.C. v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 484 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Frazier v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 541 Fed. Appx. 419, 421 (5th Cir. 2013). The Court,
then, liberally construes his claim for relief under Zadvydas.2 Dkt. No. 1 at 8; E.E.O.C.,
767 F.3d at 484.
Vidal was taken into custody on August 13, 2025, so only five months have passed
since his detention began. Dkt. No. 1 at 4. This is fatal to Vidal’s § 2241 Petition because
it falls short of six months; it falls within the window of presumptive reasonableness. See
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701; see also Chance, 453 F. App’x at 536. Further, Vidal has not
shown a significant likelihood that he will not be removed in the foreseeable future. See
Dkt. No. 1 at 6–8.
As a result, judicial intervention at this stage is premature and, for the reasons
explained in Zadvydas, would be imprudent considering the Executive branch’s primary
prerogative over the administration of immigrant removal. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at
700. Accordingly, Vidal’s claim is not ripe and is subject to dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
2 Vidal’s § 2241 Petition includes space for a petitioner to state up to four grounds to support the petitioner’s
claim for relief. See generally Dkt. No. 1. Vidal filled out all four sections but used the space as an extended
facts and procedural history section. Id. at 6–7.
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IV. RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the Court: (1) DISMISS
WITHOUT PREJUDICE Vidal’s § 2241 Petition; and (2) DIRECT the Clerk of Court
to CLOSE this case.
V. NOTICE TO PARTIES
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions,
and recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within fourteen
days after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain
error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal
conclusions accepted by the district court, provided that the party has been served with
notice that such consequences will result from a failure to object. Douglass v. United
Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);
FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b).
SIGNED on this 20th day of January, 2026 at Brownsville, Texas.
____________________________
Ignacio Torteya, III
United States Magistrate Judge
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