Lujano-Avalos v. United States Of America

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BROWNSVILLE DIVISION
CARLOS LUJANO-AVALOS 	§
Petitioner, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:25-cv-034
§
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	§
Respondent. 	§
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO DENY
PETITIONER’S 28 U.S.C. § 2255 MOTION
I. 	Synopsis
Carlos Lujano-Avalos1 complains his attorney was ineffective at sentencing. Mr. Lujano
pled guilty to multiple offenses, some of which were grouped for sentencing. Mr. Lujano had a
serious criminal history. The District Judge sentenced Lujano to a maximum sentence of 77
months. Mr. Lujano now complains to this Court that his attorney was ineffective in failing to
research, object and advocate the way his sentencing guideline was calculated regarding its
grouping and criminal history points. The issue before this Court is whether Lujano’s counsel was
ineffective at sentencing under Strickland v. Washington. Lujano’s attorney is not required to raise
meritless arguments regarding grouping and did address Lujano’s complaint regarding criminal
history points. Therefore, the record does not support Lujano’s ineffective assistance of counsel
claim. Lujano’s motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 should be denied.
II. 	Jurisdiction and Venue
The Court has jurisdiction over Carlos Lujano-Avalos’s (“Lujano”) 28 U.S.C. § 2255
motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) and § 2255 (federal custody; remedies on
motion attacking sentence). Further, “[a] 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion must be filed in the district
court which imposed the sentence.” Morris v. Prescott, 92 Fed. Appx. 79, 2004 WL 298448 (5th
Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (citing Solsona v. Warden, F.C.I., 821 F.2d 1129, 1132 (5th Cir. 1987); 28
U.S.C. § 2255(a) (stating a prisoner “may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate,
set aside or correct the sentence.”) (emphasis added). Venue is proper in this Court because Lujano
1 Lujano proceeds without a legal representative. Plaintiffs without a legal representative are considered
pro se plaintiffs and receive the benefit of liberal construction of their claims. See Kaltenbach v. Richards,
464 F.3d 524, 527 (5th Cir. 2006).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
January 21, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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was sentenced by a United States District Judge in the Brownsville Division of the Southern
District of Texas. See United States of America vs. Carlos Lujano-Avalos Criminal Docket in 1:23-
cr-00302-1 (“CR”) Minute Entry dated February 14, 2024 (Sentencing before District Judge
Rolando Olvera) and CR Dkt. No. 56 (Final Judgment).
III. 	Background
On May 30, 2023, Lujano plead guilty to Counts One, Three, and Four of the Amended
Indictment before a U.S. Magistrate Judge in the Southern District of Texas. See CR Docket Entry
dated May 30, 2023. Count One charged Lujano with Evading Immigration Checkpoint in Vehicle
at High Speed, in violation of Title 18, United States Code § 758. CR Dkt. No. 54, p. 1. Count
Three charged Lujano with Transporting a certain alien within the U.S., in violation of Title 8,
United States Code, § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) and 1324(a)(1)(B)(i). Id. Count Four charged Lujano with
Illegal Reentry into the United States in violation of Title 8, United States Code, § 1326(a) and
(b)(1). Id. Lujano pled guilty with a plea agreement. CR Dkt. No. 28.
On February 14, 2024, Judge Olvera sentenced Lujano to 77 months imprisonment. CR
Docket Entry dated February 14, 2024. The sentence was 60 months as to Count 1 and 77 months
for Counts 3 and 4, to be served concurrently. CR Dkt. No. 56. Judgment was entered on February
26, 2024. Id. The Government dismissed Count Two. Id.
On March 5, 2024, Lujano, appearing pro se, appealed his judgment and sentence to the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. CR Dkt. No. 58. The Fifth Circuit appointed Lujano counsel for
his appeal on September 6, 2024. CR Dkt. No. 67. On January 24, 2025, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals dismissed Lujano’s appeal for want of prosecution. CR Dkt. No. 81.
Lujano filed a pro se “Motion for Review of Amendment 821,” seeking a sentence
reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 35829(c)(2) on August 14, 2024. CR Dkt. No. 64. District Judge
Olvera denied the motion on November 27, 2024. CR Dkt. No. 76. Lujano, appearing pro se,
appealed this denial which was dismissed by the Fifth Circuit. CR Dkt. Nos. 77, 82.
On February 25, 2025, Lujano filed his pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel and requesting the Court vacate his sentence and remand his case for
resentencing. Dkt. No. 1, pp. 21, 25. Lujano specifically claims his counsel was ineffective in
failing to object to a grouping and criminal history point assessment. Id. The Court ordered
Respondent, the United States of America (“Government”), to file a response. Dkt. No. 7. On May
30, 2025, the Government responded with a request the Court deny Lujano’s § 2255 Motion
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without further proceedings and that the Court deny Lujano a certificate of appealability. Dkt. No.
20, p. 24. The Government argues that Lujano’s claims fail on the merits. Dkt. No. 20, p. 1. Lujano
filed “Supplement to Ground one of Motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence under 28
U.S.C. § 2255,” continuing to argue his ineffective assistance counsel claim. Dkt. No. 22.
IV. 	Standard of Review
a. 	28 U.S.C. § 2255
Lujano seeks relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Dkt. No. 1. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255,
a defendant may move to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence if: (1) the sentence was imposed
in violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United States; (2) the district court was without
jurisdiction to impose the sentence; (3) the sentence imposed was in excess of the maximum
authorized by law; or (4) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
A petitioner who seeks to challenge a final conviction by collateral attack, can do so on
constitutional or jurisdictional grounds. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a); U.S. v. Shaid, 937 F.2d 228, 233 (5th
Cir. 1991). “In a habeas action, federal courts stand willing to review issues of jurisdiction,
allegations of substantial constitutional violations, and claims that exceptional circumstances
resulted in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Lawrence v. McCarthy, 344 F.3d 467, 474 (5th
Cir. 2003). Where a § 2255 petitioner exhausts or waives his direct appeal, courts may presume
that he was fairly convicted. U.S. v. Willis, 273 F.3d 592, 595 (5th Cir. 2001). A claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel may be brought for the first time in a § 2255 motion. Shaid, 937
F.2d at 232.
b. 	Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The Court analyzes an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel in a § 2255 motion
under the two-prong test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); United
States v. Willis, 273 F.3d 592, 598 (5th Cir. 2001). In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court
held that in order to succeed on an ineffective assistance claim, a convicted defendant must show
both: (1) that counsel “made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment[,]” and (2) that “the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense[,]” and shows “errors so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial,
a trial whose result is reliable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
Under the deficient performance prong, the defendant carries the burden of proof because
the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of
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reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 700; Williams, 529 U.S. 362, 390–91 (2000); Darden
v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 184 (1986); Andrews v. Collins, 21 F.3d 612, 621 (5th Cir. 1994).
Additionally, the defendant must overcome a strong presumption that the conduct of his trial
counsel falls within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance. See Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 687–91; Jones v. Cain, 227 F.3d 228, 230 (5th Cir. 2000). When reviewing counsel's
performance, the Court must be “highly deferential,” must make every effort “to eliminate the
distorting effects of hindsight,” and must “indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance[.]” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
Under the prejudice prong, the convicted defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 669. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome. Williams, 529 U.S. at 391; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The
prejudice prong of Strickland, then, focuses on whether counsel's deficient performance rendered
the result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally unfair. “Unreliability or unfairness
does not result if the ineffectiveness of counsel does not deprive the defendant of any substantive
or procedural right to which the law entitles him.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 393 n.17; Strickland, 466
U.S. at 692.
A failure to establish either deficient performance or actual prejudice under the test will
ordinarily make it unnecessary to examine the other prong. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700;
Ransom v. Johnson, 126 F.3d 716, 721 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Seyfert, 67 F.3d 544, 547
(5th Cir. 1995). Similarly, it is also generally unnecessary to consider whether counsel's
performance was deficient where there is an insufficient showing of prejudice. See Black v.
Collins, 962 F.2d 394, 401 (5th Cir. 1992); Martin v. McCotter, 796 F.2d 813, 821 (5th Cir. 1986).
V. 	Analysis
Lujano alleges his counsel at sentencing (1) “remained silent and did not challenge the
District Court’s application of the grouping Guidelines to Petitioner’s offenses, particularly the
failure of the Court to group” all his offenses together, (Dkt. No. 1, p. 7), and (2) “fail[ed] to
introduce evidence to [the Court] that would have been very [vital] to his defense” that his prior
criminal conviction of April 13, 1992, could not be counted as criminal history points “because it
was over 15 years old” (Dkt. No. 1, p. 22).
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The Government argues the trial court at sentencing correctly applied the grouping rules
under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”), therefore any objection by his counsel
would be futile, not ineffective. Dkt. No. 20, pp. 10-17. The Government further argues Lujano’s
complaint about the lack of investigation of his trial counsel regarding his 1992 conviction that
warranted criminal history points fails to raise deficient or prejudicial performance. Id. at 18-24.
The Government argues the trial court at sentencing correctly applied the sentencing guideline
time rule allowing the 1992 conviction to warrant criminal history points. Id. The Government
argues Lujano fails to show under Strickland v. Washington that his counsel at sentencing was
either deficient or so lacking it prejudiced him. Id.
a. 	Alleged failure to challenge the grouping of all Lujano’s offenses
In preparing the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), the United States Probation
Officer (“USPO”) grouped together Counts 1 (Evading Immigration Checkpoint in Vehicle at
High Speed) and 3 (Transporting a Certain Undocumented Alien with the United States for
Commercial Advantage and Private Financial Gain). CR Dkt. No. 54, ¶¶ 29-30. The two counts
were grouped together because “one (1) of the counts embodies conduct that is treated as a specific
offense characteristic in, or other adjustment to, the guideline applicable to another of the count(s),
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(c).” Id. at ¶ 30. Together, these counts established a base offense
level of 12. Id. at ¶¶ 30-31. The USPO adjusted the offense level to include: an additional four
levels because the offense was committed after sustaining two or more felony immigration
offenses, id. at ¶ 32; an additional two levels because the offense involved intentionally or
recklessly creating a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another, id. at ¶ 33; and
an additional four levels because a person sustained serious bodily injury, id. at ¶ 34. With these
adjustments, Lujano’s adjusted offense level for Counts 1 and 3 grouped together was 22. Id. at ¶
38.
Lujano’s adjusted offense level for Count 4 (Alien Unlawfully Found in the United States
after Deportation) after adjustments was also 22. Id. at ¶ 45. The base offense level was 8. Id. at ¶
39. Four additional levels were added because the offense was committed after sustaining a
conviction for felony illegal reentry. Id. at ¶ 40. Ten levels were added because Lujano had been
deported after sustaining a conviction for a felony offense for which the sentence imposed was at
least five years. Id. at ¶ 41.
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Lujano received a two-level increase in his offense level based on the grouping unit’s
adjustment. Id. at ¶ 48. The two point grouping adjustment stemmed from Lujano having two
offenses before the court that each equaled an offense level of 22. Id. at ¶ 46. The additional
grouping unit points brought Lujano’s offense level to a 24. Id. at ¶ 49. It is this two point grouping
assessment of which Lujano claims his sentencing counsel was ineffective.
Lujano alleges his counsel should have challenged the grouping of his offenses. According
to Lujano, counts 1, 3, and 4 should have been grouped together. Dkt. Nos. 1, 22. The PSR adopted
by the Court grouped together only Counts 1 and 3. CR Dkt. No. 54.
According to the Sentencing Guidelines, “[a]ll counts involving substantially the same
harm shall be grouped together into a single Group.” U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2. Whether counts are or are
not grouped together depends on 	whether 	doing so is appropriate, 	and “a case-by-case
determination must be made based upon the facts of the case and the applicable guidelines.”
U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2.
To group together all Lujano’s counts would be an improper application of the grouping
rules because Count 4 did not involve the same act or transaction as Counts 1 and 3. U.S.S.G. §
3D1.2(a). See United States v. Kimler, 167 F.3d 889, 893 (5th Cir. 1999) (“An attorney's failure to
raise a meritless argument ... cannot form the basis of a successful ineffective assistance of counsel
claim.”).
Given that the sentencing guidelines do not provide an avenue for grouping together all
Lujano’s counts, the result of this proceeding, his sentencing, was neither unreliable nor
fundamentally unfair, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Considering this, Lujano cannot demonstrate
that his counsel’s performance caused him to suffer prejudice.
Lujano’s failure to establish actual prejudice renders examination of the other Strickland
prong unnecessary. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700; Ransom v. Johnson, 126 F.3d 716, 721 (5th
Cir. 1997); United States v. Seyfert, 67 F.3d 544, 547 (5th Cir. 1995). However, the Court proceeds
to examine the deficient performance prong. The Court must indulge a strong presumption that the
conduct of Lujano’s counsel falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Here, Lujano challenges his counselor’s decision to forgo challenging
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the grouping of his counts.2 However, this does not present an issue of deficient performance.
Given that grouping the counts together would be a misapplication of the law, counsel’s decision
to forgo this challenge does not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. See United
States v. Kimler, 167 F.3d at 893.
Any argument by Lujano that United States v. Garcia-Figueroa, 753 F.3d 179 (5th Cir.
2014), requires grouping of his offenses is misplaced. Dkt. No. 1, pp. 11-17. The facts in Garcia-
Figueroa are distinguished here: there is no evidence Lujano illegally entered the United States in
the course of transporting the alien; he was convicted of evading an immigration checkpoint for
which no facts establish was the same transaction as his illegal re-entry. See CR Dkt. Nos. 28, 54.
Because Lujano fails to establish actual prejudice as well as deficient performance, he fails
to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Consequently,
Lujano fails to establish a violation of his rights under the U.S. Constitution. Because Lujano
cannot show his sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United
States, the Court cannot vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
b. 	Alleged failure to introduce evidence on Lujano’s prior conviction
Lujano’s criminal history score was 15, which falls into a criminal history category of VI.
CR Dkt. No. 54, ¶ 64. 	Lujano’s criminal history score included a three-point assessment for a
1992 murder conviction from which he was released on parole on July 18, 2008, had his parole
revoked on November 2, 2012, and was discharged from parole on December 5, 2012. CR Dkt.
No. 54, ¶ 55. Lujano claims his sentencing counsel was ineffective in his research and advocacy
of the application of this three-point calculation for the 1992 conviction.
At Lujano’s December 13, 2023, sentencing hearing, his counsel raised oral objections to
the Court regarding the three-point criminal enhancement for the murder conviction. CR Dkt. No.
69, p. 3. The Court continued the sentencing hearing, in part, to grant Lujano’s counsel time file
objections in writing. CR Dkt. No. 69, p. 9. Lujano’s counsel filed written objections to the
counting of this 1992 conviction as outside the 15-year limit. CR Dkt. No. 50. At the next
sentencing hearing, on February 14, 2024, counsel for the Government informed the sentencing
judge that documentation concerning Lujano’s prior conviction, and in particular, when his parole
2 Lujano’s sentencing counsel did file an objection to “the assessment of the 2 base offense levels” regarding
the grouping, but his counsel argued in the objection and at sentencing that it was tied to the counting of
the 1992 conviction. Dkt. No. 50, p. 2; Dkt. No. 70, pp. 8-9. Because the grouping sentencing guideline
was correctly applied, this Court does not address Lujano’s counsel’s objection and sentencing argument.
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term was revoked, was provided to Lujano’s counsel. CR Dkt. No. 70, p. 7. According to the
documentation, the committed offenses still fell within fifteen years of the original offense. CR
Dkt. No. 70, p. 7. “So the date of the new offense, April 7th, 2023, which was the committed
offense, does fall within 15 years of the original April 7th, 2008.” (Counsel for the Government.
CR Dkt. No. 70, p. 7.) Lujano’s counsel informed the Court that according to the documentation,
Lujano missed the exemption by a period “short of three months.” 3 CR Dkt. No. 70, p. 7.
Accordingly, the Court overruled Lujano’s counsel’s objection. CR Dkt. No. 70, p. 7. Still, his
counsel argued for a variance regarding the prior criminal conviction “either under Section 3553
or under Section 4A1.3 which deals with departures based on inadequacy of criminal history. That
would be section b specific which addresses downward departures.” CR Dkt. No. 70, p. 14.
The record shows Lujano’s counsel requested extra time to obtain documentation regarding
Lujano’s 1992 murder conviction for his objection to the three-point criminal enhancement. The
record shows counsel reviewed documents related to Lujano’s past offense, but the documents did
not support an objection to the three-point criminal enhancement. The District Judge agreed.
Additionally, Lujano’s counsel requested a variance regarding Lujano’s prior criminal conviction.
Therefore, Lujano’s claim his counsel failed to introduce evidence regarding whether his prior
criminal conviction could be counted as criminal history points is unsupported by the record.
To the extent Lujano argues his counsel should have introduced specific evidence, such as
contacting the Illinois Department of Corrections to ask for all his records, this claim fails to
demonstrate counsel’s performance was deficient. The Court must indulge a strong presumption
that the conduct of Lujano’s counsel falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Further, the Court must make every effort to eliminate the
distorting effects of hindsight. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Considering the deference this court
must show, counsel’s performance here, which the record shows includes requesting additional
time and finding documentation concerning the past offense, does not meet the deficient
performance prong of Strickland.
3 Lujano’s parole was revoked and his last incarceration on the 1992 murder conviction ended on July 18,
2008; his parole was revoked and Lujano was incarcerated a second time on November 2, 2012, with a final
discharge of his parole on December 5, 2012. CR Dkt. No. 54, ¶ 55. He committed the new offense for
which this case arises on April 7, 2023. CR Dkt. No. 35. Therefore, the new offense was committed 14
years and 9 months since his last incarceration on the first revocation and 10 years and 5 months since his
last incarceration on his second revocation. See U.S.S.G. §§ 4A1.2(e)(1) and 4A1.2(k)(2) (indicating the 3-
point criminal history for the 1992 murder conviction was properly assessed).
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Again, Lujano’s failure to establish deficient performance renders examination of the other
Strickland prong unnecessary. However, the Court proceeds to examine the prejudice prong.
Lujano’s 1992 murder conviction was properly counted. Lujano’s counsel objected in writing to
its counting, reviewed evidence from the Government on its applicability, and advocated for a
sentencing reduction based on the age of the conviction. Given counsel’s actions, Lujano fails his
burden to show his counsel’s actions resulted in prejudice to his defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at
687.
Further, any argument Lujano makes asserting his 1992 murder conviction parole was
never revoked is without merit. Dkt. No. 1, pp. 22-25. At Lujano’s sentencing, the Government
established documentation from researching the 1992 murder conviction, and the Government
provided the documentation to Lujano’s counsel. CR Dkt. No. 70, p. 7. That documentation proved
the revocation of the 1992 conviction. CR Dkt. No. 70, p. 7. Thus, this Court’s review of the record
shows Lujano only presents declarations not supported by the record. Lujano fails to meet his
burden that he was prejudiced, or that his counsel was deficient in the review of the documentation
or that any documentation exists proving otherwise.
Because the record does not support Lujano’s challenge, Lujano fails to demonstrate
counsel’s performance fell below an objective level of reasonableness or caused him actual
prejudice. As a result, Lujano fails to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Consequently, Lujano fails to establish a violation of his rights under
the U.S. Constitution. Because Lujano cannot show his sentence was imposed in violation of the
Constitution or the laws of the United States, the Court cannot vacate, set aside, or correct his
sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
VI. 	Certificate of Appealability
Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”), a petitioner
may not appeal the denial of a § 2255 motion to the Fifth Circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a),(c)(1). A
petitioner may receive a COA only if he makes a “substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.” § 2253(c)(2); Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). This requires
a “showing that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition
should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to
deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (internal
quotations and citations omitted). In other words, if Petitioner’s claims have been dismissed on the
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merits, the movant/petitioner “must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district
court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Id. at 484. Where claims have
been dismissed on procedural grounds, the movant/petitioner must show that “jurists of reason
would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional
right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its
procedural ruling.” Id.
District courts may deny certificates of appealability sua sponte, without requiring further
briefing or argument. Alexander v. Johnson, 211 F.3d 895, 898 (5th Cir. 2000).
A certificate of appealability should not issue in this case because Lujano has not made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.
After reviewing Lujano’s § 2255 motion and the applicable Fifth Circuit precedent, the
Court is confident that no outstanding issue would be debatable among jurists of reason. Lujano’s
§ 2255 motion raises issues that the Court has carefully considered; he fails to make a “substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that a COA should be denied.
VII. 	Recommendation
It is RECOMMENDED that (1) Lujano’s § 2255 Motion be DISMISSED with prejudice
(Dkt. No. 1); (2) the Court DECLINE to issue a Certificate of Appealability; and (3) the Clerk of
Court be DIRECTED to close this case.
VIII. 	Notice to the Parties
The parties have fourteen (14) days from the date of being served with a copy of this Report
and Recommendation in which to file written objections, if any, with United States District Judge
Rolando Olvera. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). When filing an objection, a party must object to specific
facts or legal findings in this Report and Recommendation. The District Judge is not required to
consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. Battle v. United States Parole Comm’n, 834
F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987).
If any party fails to timely object to any factual or legal findings in this Report and
Recommendation, the District Judge is not required to conduct a de novo review of the record
before adopting these findings. If the District Judge chooses to adopt such findings without
conducting a de novo review of the record, the parties may not attack those findings on appeal,
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except on the grounds of plain error. Alexander v. Verizon Wireless Servs., L.L.C., 875 F.3d 243,
248 (5th Cir. 2017).
Signed on January 21, 2026
Karen Betancourt
United States Magistrate Judge
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