Hernandez v. Valdez et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SAN ANGELO DIVISION
JOEL MENDOZA HERNANDEZ,
Petitioner,
v. 	No. 6:26-CV-00053-H
WARDEN, EDEN
DETENTION CENTER,
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner Joel Mendoza Hernandez, a self-represented immigrant detainee, filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging his continued
detention in the Eden Detention Center—despite being granted voluntary departure by the
immigration court and having paid the required bond. See Dkt. No. 1. Petitioner seeks
immediate release so that he can comply with the Immigration Court’s February 27, 2026
deadline for voluntary departure. 	Id. at 7. Respondent filed a response in opposition to the
petition along with relevant records. Dkt. Nos. 7, 8. Petitioner filed a reply and an
emergency motion for temporary restraining order. Dkt. Nos. 9, 10.
As explained below, after considering the record, the parties’ pleadings and
arguments, and the applicable law, the Court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to relief,
and the petition should be denied and dismissed with prejudice. The Court also denies
Petitioner’s requests for injunctive relief. Dkt. No. 10. 	Considering the timing of
Petitioner’s deadline for voluntary departure, the Court entered a brief order advising the
parties of its decision on February 26, 2026. Dkt. No. 13. The Court’s reasoning is
explained here.
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1. 	Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Venezuela who was an applicant for admission to
the United States. On January 28, 2026, the Immigration Court held a final hearing in
removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. The immigration judge denied Petitioner’s
application for asylum and withholding of removal. See Dkt. No. 8 at 16–19. By the same
order, the immigration judge granted Petitioner’s application for post-conclusion voluntary
departure under INA § 240B(b) under safeguards, ordered him to post a $500 bond within
five days, and to depart by February 27, 2026. Id. at 17. The order also stated that if
Petitioner failed to depart within the time specified, or within any extensions granted by
DHS, he would be subject to a civil monetary penalty as provided by relevant statute,
regulation, and policy. Id. at 18. And the order provides that if Petitioner fails to depart
within the time specified, the alternate order of removal shall automatically take effect, and
Petitioner shall be ineligible, for 10 years, for voluntary departure or relief under sections
240A, 245, 248, and 249 of the INA. Id. at 17–18. The order reflects that Petitioner
reserved his right to appeal by February 27, 2026. Id. at 19. On February 3, 2026,
Petitioner timely posted the $500 mandatory departure bond. Dkt. No. 1-2 at 7. But as of
February 27, 2026, he had not appealed.1
A. 	Petitioner’s grounds for review
On February 17, 2026, Plaintiff filed this Section 2241 petition. Dkt. No. 1. In it, he
lists these grounds for review:
1. 	Petitioner’s arbitrary detention after bond approval violates due process.
2. 	ICE’s refusal to release Petitioner after his bond was approved on February 3,
2026 is preventing him from making the necessary travel arrangements to comply
1 See https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation (last visited Feb. 27, 2026).
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with the Immigration Judge’s order, and amounts to unlawful obstruction of a
judicial order under 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26.
3. 	Petitioner lacks adequate administrative remedies to force ICE to physically
release him from custody.
4. 	Petitioner’s detention is making it impossible for him to follow the law, and if he
cannot leave by the deadline because ICE refuses to release him, he will face a
final order of removal and a 10-year ban.
Dkt. No. 1 at 6–7.
Petitioner seeks immediate release so that he can comply with the Immigration
Court’s order of voluntary departure by the deadline of February 27, 2026. Id. at 7.
Alternatively, Petitioner requested an order to show cause requiring ICE to justify his
continued detention despite the payment and official approval of his bond. Id. He also
asked the Court to order Respondent to keep him within the territorial jurisdiction of this
Court while his petition is being decided. Dkt. No. 1-1.
B. 	Respondent’s Response
Respondent contends that Petitioner is not entitled to relief under Section 2241
because—despite having posted the voluntary departure bond—Petitioner is not in custody
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. See Dkt. No. 7.
Respondent explains that despite payment of the voluntary departure bond, discretionary
release is unavailable to him based on the condition that his voluntary departure is “under
safeguards.” Id. at 4 (citing Matter of M-A-S-, Respondent, 24 I&N Dec. 762, 765-6 (BIA
2009)). Thus, Petitioner will remain in custody until he is placed on the carrier vehicle to be
transported from the United States. Id.; 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(c)(3).
Respondent then explains that the timetable for Petitioner’s ability to take advantage
of the benefits of voluntary departure is complicated because he reserved his right to appeal
from the Immigration Judge’s order which, aside from granting voluntary departure under
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safeguards, also denied his applications for asylum and withholding of removal. Dkt. No. 7
at 4. As a result, Petitioner must remain in the United States during the appeal process—
and in Petitioner’s case, in custody because of the “under safeguards” provision—otherwise
he would waive his right to appeal. And the deadline for him to file his appeal is 30 days
from the date of his final order—February 27, 2026—which is also the same deadline for his
voluntary departure.
Respondent then discussed the relationship between the appellate timetable and the
voluntary departure period, which the Court need not repeat here. Id. at 5–6. But there are
various factors that could determine what impact Petitioner’s remaining in the country after
February 27 may have on his ability to benefit from the voluntary departure order, which
depend on his actions (or inactions). For example, if Petitioner had waived his right to
appeal, the voluntary departure could have gone forward without delay. But if he timely
appeals the Immigration Judge’s order, the voluntary departure period would be reinstated,
and the deadline would run from the date of the Board’s order disposing of the appeal.
Respondent also explained that physical inability to comply with the voluntary
departure excuses the time period affected as to the civil penalties of Section 1229c(d). Id.
(citing In re Bozena Zmijewska, Respondent 24 I&N Dec. 87 (BIA 2007)). And they note that
while it appears the failure to depart by the deadline for any reason will cause the order to
convert to an order of removal, Petitioner has other available relief in the form of a request
for an extension of time to depart from the district director or the deputy executive associate
commissioner for detention and removal in accordance with C.F.R. § 1240.26(f). See Dkt.
No. 12 at 2. But the request must be made by February 27, 2026. See id. (correcting typo in
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original response stating the date as “January 27, 2026”). Respondent suggests that
Petitioner could speak with his assigned deportation officer about requesting an extension.
C. 	Petitioner’s Reply and Requests for Injunctive Relief
In reply, Petitioner contends that Respondent mischaracterized his claim to argue
that posting a voluntary departure bond, by itself, automatically entitles him to release in
every case. See Dkt. No. 9 at 2. And he alleges, for the first time, that he has been informed
by an officer at the Eden Detention Center that he will be deported, and asked to choose a
destination country, which he declined to do while this action is pending. Id. In other
words, Petitioner clarifies that his actual claim is that, under the urgent facts of his case, his
continued custody—and threatened removal—places him at immediate risk of losing
meaningful access to court and the practical benefit of the immigration order while this
habeas petition is pending. Id. 	He complains that Respondent did not provide clear
assurance that he will not be removed before this Court can rule and asserts that the “under
safeguards” provision of his voluntary departure does not defeat this Court’s power to
preserve jurisdiction and prevent irreparable harm.2 Id. at 3. Petitioner contends that he
should not be required to exhaust his administrative remedies based on the urgency of his
request. Id. at 4.
Finally, Petitioner asks for emergency injunctive relief that (1) preserves the status
quo by preventing his removal while this action is pending; (2) alternatively, provides for
temporary release under appropriate conditions, or other relief sufficient to prevent
2 Petitioner also noted timing inconsistencies in the Response, which the Court ordered the
Respondent to address in an expedited order. See Dkt. No. 11. Respondent replied with a redlined
correction indicating that the dates in question should have been February 27, 2026, instead of
January 27, 2026. See Dkt. No. 12.
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irreparable harm and preserve this Court’s jurisdiction; (3) orders Respondents to maintain
and document the steps necessary for him to preserve his ability to pursue available rights
and avoid prejudice caused by detention-related timing issues; and (4) any other relief this
Court deems just and proper. See id. at 4, Dkt. No. 10.
2. 	Legal Standard
A. 	Habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241
A petitioner may seek habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 if he is “in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c).
Habeas exists solely to “grant relief from unlawful imprisonment or custody and it cannot
be used properly for any other purpose.” Pierre v. United States, 525 F.2d 933, 935–36 (5th
Cir. 1976). “Simply stated, habeas is not available to review questions unrelated to the
cause of detention.” Id. at 935.
B. 	Injunctive Relief
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 authorizes courts to issue temporary restraining
orders and injunctions. A temporary restraining order, or TRO, is “simply a highly
accelerated and temporary form of preliminary injunctive relief.” Hassani v. Napolitano,
No. 3:09-CV-1201, 2009 WL 2044596, at *1 (N.D. Tex. July 15, 2009). Thus, the party
seeking a TRO or preliminary injunction must satisfy the same four-factor standard for
preliminary injunctive relief. Greer’s Ranch Café v. Guzman, 540 F. Supp. 3d 638, 645 (N.D.
Tex. 2021). The party seeking relief must show (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the
merits; (2) a substantial threat of irreparable harm; (3) the balance of hardships weighs in the
movant’s favor; and (4) issuing the injunction will not disserve the public interest. Daniels
Health Scis., LLC v. Vascular Health Scis., LLC, 710 F.3d 579, 582 (5th Cir. 2013).
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A TRO, like any injunction, is an “extraordinary remedy.” Lewis v. S.S. Baune, 534
F.2d 1115, 1121 (5th Cir. 1976). “The decision to grant [such relief] ‘is to be treated as the
exception rather than the rule.’” Jones v. Bush, 122 F. Supp. 2d 713, 718 (N.D. Tex. 2000)
(quoting Miss. Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir.
1985)). To prevail, the movant “must satisfy a cumulative burden of proving each of the
four elements” for injunctive relief. Clark v. Prichard, 812 F.2d 991, 993 (5th Cir. 1987).
“Otherwise stated, if a party fails to meet any of the four requirements, the court cannot
grant the TRO or preliminary injunction.” Speed v. America’s Wholesale Lender, No. 3:14-CV-
3425, 2014 WL 4755485, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 24, 2014) (emphasis in original).
3. 	Analysis and Conclusion
The Court has thoroughly examined Petitioner’s pleadings, Respondent’s response,
the relevant records, and the applicable law. As explained below and based on the facts and
law set forth in Respondent’s response, the Court finds that Petitioner’s allegations do not
entitle him to earlier or speedier release from detention. Thus, he is not entitled to habeas
relief.
In short, Petitioner complains that his continued detention is unlawful because he
has posted the mandatory voluntary departure bond, which frustrates the Immigration
Court’s order, and prevents him from leaving the country by the deadline. He fears the legal
consequences if his voluntary departure is converted to an involuntary removal, including
civil penalties that are monetary (up to $5,000) and a 10-year bar of certain immigration-
related relief under 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d). But Petitioner’s allegations do not entitle him to
earlier or speedier release from detention.
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As explained by Respondent, Petitioner has no right to release based on his posting
of the voluntary departure bond because the Immigration Judge ordered his voluntary
departure “under safeguards.” Indeed, the government can detain an alien “to ensure the
alien’s timely departure” under Section 1229c. See El Badrawi v. United States, 787 F. Supp.
2d 204, 231–32 (D. Conn. 2011) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(b)(3)(i)). In fact, the relief
afforded to petitioner—voluntary departure with safeguards—“appears to refer generally to
a procedure involving detention until departure.” Id.; see In re M-A-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 762,
766 (BIA 2009) (“[T]he term ‘voluntary departure with safeguards’ is commonly used to
characterize the requirement that an alien remain in custody until he or she departs from the
United States.”). And Petitioner must remain in the United States during the appeal
process. Since the time for filing an appeal had not expired as of the time he filed this
petition, and Petitioner had not waived his right to appeal, his continued detention for the
30-day period for filing a notice of appeal was proper. Thus, Petitioner has not shown that
limited detention is improper here.
The Court understands Petitioner’s concern that the expiration of his voluntary
departure deadline will pass while he is detained and, therefore, he will be unable to
physically depart as required. And he appears to allege that the government intends to
remove him involuntarily and so he will face the legal consequences of the order of
voluntary departure being converted to an order of removal. The Court has no information
about the government’s efforts to bring about petitioner’s voluntary departure in
consideration of his reserved right to appeal and the concurrent deadlines for appeal and
voluntary departure. See United States v. Texas, 599 U.S. 670, 678–79 (2023) (noting the
government’s discretion in enforcing federal immigration law). But Petitioner’s conclusory
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assertions that involuntary removal is imminent and that he will inevitably suffer the
consequences of missing his voluntary departure deadline do not entitle him to habeas relief.
Likewise, Petitioner is not entitled to the extraordinary relief he seeks in his emergency
motion for injunctive relief. For the reasons discussed here, he cannot show a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits. And because he maintains the ability to seek an
extension of time to voluntarily depart, he cannot show a substantial threat of irreparable
harm. Thus, he has failed to establish the elements required for a TRO and his request must
be denied.
And Petitioner is not without relief outside of habeas because, as explained by
Respondent, he may request an extension of his voluntary departure date. And, in any
event, case law suggests that even if his voluntary departure converts to an involuntary
removal, he will not be prejudiced if he is in custody when the voluntary departure deadline
passes. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit has held that an alien detainee in custody when his
voluntary departure deadline passed “was not capable of leaving on time and thus could not
be held legally liable for not leaving on time pursuant to the grant of voluntary departure.”
See Cal-Yuja v. Garland, 852 F. App’x 139, 140 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Matter of Zmijewska, 24
I. & N. Dec. 87, 94–95 (BIA 2007)).
For the reasons discussed above and based on the facts and law set forth in
Respondent’s response, the Court finds that Petitioner is an inadmissible alien after a denial
of his applications for asylum and withholding who is being held in accordance with law
and the terms of the Immigration Judge’s order. Thus, his continued detention is warranted
and lawful. The Court denies the petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241
and the requests for injunctive relief.
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All relief not expressly granted and any pending motions are denied.
The Court will enter judgment accordingly.
So ordered.
Dated March 3, 2026.
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