Henson v. Commissioner of Social Security

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
LUBBOCK DIVISION
STACY H.,
Plaintiff,
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
v. 	Case No. 5:25-cv-00048-BT
COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Stacy H.’s1 civil action seeking judicial review
under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of a final adverse decision by the Commissioner of Social
Security. 	For 	the 	reasons 	explained 	below, 	the 	Commissioner’s 	decision 	is
REVERSED.
Background
Plaintiff alleges that she is disabled due to lumbago with sciatica, obsessive
compulsive disorder (OCD), anxiety, depression, bipolar disorder, and severe
migraines. Admin. R. at 101 (ECF No. 10-1).2 Plaintiff was born in 1975 and alleges
1 The Court uses only Plaintiff’s first name and last initial as instructed by the May
1, 	2018, 	Memorandum 	Re: 	Privacy 	Concern 	Regarding 	Social 	Security 	and
Immigration Opinions issued by the Committee on Court Administration and Case
Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States.
2 Citations to the administrative record refer to the CM/ECF page numbers at the
top of each page rather than page numbers at the bottom of each filing.
Case 5:25-cv-00048-BT Document 17 Filed 03/27/26 Page 1 of 13 PageID <pageID>

2
an amended disability onset date of October 16, 2021. Id. at 47, 101. Plaintiff has a
high school education and completed a year of college. Id. at 48–49.
Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits (DIB) on January 20, 2022,
and supplemental security income (SSI) on April 1, 2022, under Title II and XVI
of the Social Security Act (the “Act”). Id. at 260–61 (application for DIB), 272–78
(application for SSI). Her claims were denied initially and upon reconsideration.
Id. at 131, 149. Thereafter, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ), who conducted a video hearing on December 7, 2023. Id. at 165
(request for hearing), 45 (consenting to video hearing).
On February 23, 2024, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff has
not been under a disability within the meaning of the Act from her alleged
amended onset disability date through the date of the decision, and thus not
entitled to DIB or SSI. Id. at 35. As an initial matter, the ALJ found that Plaintiff
met the insured status requirements under the Act through December 31, 2021. Id.
at 26. Using the five-step sequential evaluation, the ALJ first found that Plaintiff
had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged amened onset
disability date. Id. At the second step, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff experienced the
following severe impairments: lumbago with sciatica, migraine headaches, bipolar
disorder, 	dysthymic 	disorder, 	post-traumatic 	stress 	disorder 	(PTSD), 	and
agoraphobia. Id.
At the third step, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s impairments did not
meet or medically equal any listed impairment in appendix 1 of the social security
Case 5:25-cv-00048-BT Document 17 Filed 03/27/26 Page 2 of 13 PageID <pageID>

3
regulations. Id. at 27. In considering whether Plaintiff met the “paragraph B”
criteria, the ALJ determined that her severe mental impairments (bipolar disorder,
dysthymic disorder, PTSD, and agoraphobia) resulted in “moderate” limitations in
the 	mental 	functioning 	areas 	of 	“interacting 	with 	others,” 	“concentrating,
persisting or maintaining pace,” and “adapting or managing oneself.” Id. at 27–28.
“Moderate limitation” means that her functioning in these areas independently,
appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis is only “fair.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404,
Subpt. P, App. 1 (Listings) § 12.00(F)(2)(c).3 Specifically regarding “interacting
with others,” the ALJ explained she found that the evidence, including records of
examinations and Plaintiff’s own testimony, did not support further limitations.
Admin. R. at 28 (ECF No. 10-1).
Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual
functional capacity (RFC)
to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and
416.967(a) 	except 	[Plaintiff] 	is 	limited 	to 	occasional 	climbing
ramps/stairs; 	no 	climbing 	ladders, 	ropes, 	or 	scaffolds; 	frequent
balancing; occasional stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling;
capable 	of 	concentrating, 	persisting, 	and 	maintaining 	pace 	with
detailed 	but 	not 	complex 	instructions; 	can 	tolerate 	occasional
interaction with coworkers, supervisors and the public; and can adapt
to occasional changes in the work routine.
3 “Interacting with others” refers to the abilities to relate to and work with
supervisors, co-workers, and the public; and examples include: “cooperating with
others; asking for help when needed; handling conflicts with others; stating own
point of view; initiating or sustaining conversation; understanding and responding
to social cues (physical, verbal, emotional); responding to requests, suggestions,
criticism, correction, and challenges; and keeping social interactions free of
excessive irritability, sensitivity, argumentativeness, or suspiciousness.” 20 C.F.R.
Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 (Listings) § 12.00(E)(2).
Case 5:25-cv-00048-BT Document 17 Filed 03/27/26 Page 3 of 13 PageID <pageID>

4
Id. at 29. Finally at step five, relying on the testimony of a vocational expert (VE),
the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the ability to perform the jobs of election
clerk, charge account clerk, and call out operator, and that such jobs existed in
significant numbers in the national economy. Id. at 34.
Plaintiff appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Appeals Council. Id. at 16. The
Appeals Council found no “basis for changing the [ALJ]’s decision.” Id. at 6.
Plaintiff then filed this action in federal district court.
Legal Standard
Judicial review of the Commissioner’s findings is limited to whether the
decision to deny benefits is supported by substantial evidence and whether the
proper legal standards were used. Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir.
1994) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3)). Substantial evidence is defined as
“that which is relevant and sufficient for a reasonable mind to accept as adequate
to support a conclusion; it must be more than a scintilla, but it need not be a
preponderance.” Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 564 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting
Anthony v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289, 295 (5th Cir. 1992)). “The Commissioner,
rather than the courts, must resolve conflicts in the evidence.” Martinez v. Chater,
64 F.3d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). The reviewing court does “not
reweigh the evidence, try the issues de novo, or substitute” its own judgment, but
scrutinizes the record as a whole to determine whether substantial evidence is
present. Greenspan, 38 F.3d at 236. The Court “may affirm only on the grounds
Case 5:25-cv-00048-BT Document 17 Filed 03/27/26 Page 4 of 13 PageID <pageID>

5
that the Commissioner stated for [her] decision.” Copeland v. Colvin, 771 F.3d 920,
923 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Cole v. Barnhart, 288 F.3d 149, 151 (5th Cir. 2002) (per
curiam)).
Analysis
On appeal, Plaintiff makes two arguments. First, Plaintiff contends that the
ALJ failed to consider the “total limiting effects” of Plaintiff’s impairments. Pl.’s
Br. at 3 (ECF No. 13). Specifically, Plaintiff avers that the ALJ erroneously found
that Plaintiff’s self-described limitations were inconsistent with the medical
evidence. Id. at 4–6. The Commissioner counters that the ALJ acknowledged
Plaintiff’s self-described limitations, and the RFC determination is supported by
substantial evidence. Def.’s Br. at 2–4 (ECF No. 15).
Second, Plaintiff argues that the “ALJ’s finding that [Plaintiff] could only
occasionally tolerate social interaction in the workplace is internally inconsistent
with her finding that Plaintiff could perform jobs requiring frequent talking.” Pl.’s
Br. at 10 (ECF No. 13). In response, the Commissioner states that “the ALJ properly
relied upon the vocational expert’s testimony[.]” Def’s Br. at 8 (ECF No. 15). As
Plaintiff’s 	second 	argument 	is 	dispositive 	and 	requires 	remand, 	the 	Court
pretermits discussion of Plaintiff’s first argument.
At step five of the sequential analysis, the ALJ may consult a VE to explain
the types of jobs that a claimant can perform despite her impairments. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1566(e). “A vocational expert is called to testify because of his familiarity
with job requirements and working conditions.” Vaughan v. Shalala, 58 F.3d 129,
Case 5:25-cv-00048-BT Document 17 Filed 03/27/26 Page 5 of 13 PageID <pageID>

6
132 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Fields v. Bowen, 805 F.2d 1168, 1170 (5th Cir. 1986)).
“The 	value 	of 	a 	vocational 	expert 	is 	that 	he 	is 	familiar 	with 	the 	specific
requirements of a particular occupation, including working conditions and the
attributes and skills needed.” Id.
“An ALJ in a hearing such as [Plaintiff’s] has an affirmative responsibility to
ask about any possible conflict between VE evidence and the DOT before relying
on VE evidence to support a determination of not disabled.” Graves v. Colvin, 837
F.3d 589, 592 (5th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up); see also SSR 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704,
at *1 (Dec. 4, 2000) (requiring ALJs to “[i]dentify and obtain a reasonable
explanation 	for 	any 	conflicts 	between 	occupational 	evidence 	provided 	by
VEs . . . and information in the [DOT], including its companion publication, the
Selected Characteristics of Occupations Defined in the Revised Dictionary of
Occupational Titles (SCO)”). When there is a conflict between VE evidence and the
DOT, neither the DOT nor the VE evidence automatically “trumps” the other. SSR
00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704, at *2. Rather, the ALJ must resolve the conflict by
determining whether the VE’s explanation is reasonable and provide a basis for
relying on the VE testimony rather than on the DOT information. Id. The ALJ must
explain in her decision how any conflict that has been identified was resolved. Id.
“A direct conflict between VE testimony and the DOT may arise when, as
here, the VE’s testimony concerning the exertional or skill level of a job is facially
different from 	the description of the job found in the DOT.” 	Eileen D. 	v.
Commissioner, 2019 WL 4648259, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 6, 2019) (Rutherford, J.)
Case 5:25-cv-00048-BT Document 17 Filed 03/27/26 Page 6 of 13 PageID <pageID>

7
(citing Carey v. Apfel, 230 F.3d 131, 145 (5th Cir. 2000)), adopted by 2019 WL
4643648 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 24, 2019) (Godbey, J.). In this case, the VE testified at
the administrative hearing that a hypothetical individual who has the RFC to,
among other things, “tolerate occasional interaction with co-workers, supervisors
and the public” could perform the jobs of election clerk (DOT 205.367-030),
charge account clerk (DOT 205.367-014), and call out operator (DOT 237.367-
014). Admin. R. at 34, 64–65 (ECF No. 10-1). However, the DOT and SCO provide
that these jobs require more than occasional social interaction with the public and
coworkers.4 Indeed, the SCO provides that all the jobs identified by the VE require
“frequent” talking. See Pl.’s Reply, Ex. 1 at 2–4 (ECF No. 16-1). “Talking” means
“[e]xpressing or exchanging ideas by means of the spoken word to impart oral
information to clients or to the public and to convey detailed spoken instructions
to other workers accurately, loudly, or quickly.” Id. at 5.
For example, the DOT description for an election clerk provides that an
individual performs the following duties during elections:
Compiles and verifies voter lists from official registration records.
Requests identification of voters at polling place. Obtains signatures
and records names of voters to prevent voting of unauthorized
persons. 	Distributes 	ballots 	to 	voters 	and 	answers 	questions
concerning 	voting 	procedure. 	Counts 	valid 	ballots 	and 	prepares
official reports of election results.
4 The SCO defines “occasionally” to mean the activity or condition exists up to 1/3
of the time; “frequently” means the activity or condition exists from 1/3 to 2/3 of
the time. Pl.’s Reply, Ex. 1 at 6 (ECF No. 16-1).
Case 5:25-cv-00048-BT Document 17 Filed 03/27/26 Page 7 of 13 PageID <pageID>

8
DOT 205.367-030 (emphasis added); see also Pl.’s Reply, Ex. 1 at 3 (SCO providing
that election clerk position requires frequent talking). Similarly, the description for
the charge account clerk job requires frequent customer contact, as the individual
performing the job:
Interviews customers applying for charge accounts[.] Confers with
customer to explain type of charge plans available. Assists customer
in filling out application or completes application for customer.
Reviews applications received by mail. Files credit applications after
credit 	department 	approves 	or 	disapproves 	credit. 	May 	check
references by phone or form letter and notify customer of acceptance
or rejection of credit . . . . May verify entries and correct errors on
charge accounts . . . , using adding machine. May answer credit rating
requests 	from 	banks 	and 	credit 	bureaus. 	May 	issue 	temporary
shopping slip when credit references appear satisfactory.
DOT 205.367-014 (emphasis added); see also Pl’s Reply at 2 (ECF No. 16-1) (SCO
providing that the charge account clerk position requires frequent talking). And
finally, the DOT includes the following description of the call out operator position:
Compiles 	credit 	information, 	such 	as 	status 	of 	credit 	accounts,
personal references, and bank accounts to fulfill subscribers’ requests,
using telephone. Copies information onto form to update information
for credit record on file, or for computer input. Telephones subscriber
to 	relay 	requested 	information 	or 	submits 	data 	obtained 	for
typewritten report to subscriber.
DOT 237.367-014 (emphasis added); see also Pl.’s Reply at 4 (ECF No. 16-1) (SCO
providing that the call out operator position requires frequent talking). Thus, there
is 	a 	direct 	conflict 	between 	the 	DOT 	and 	SCO 	descriptions 	of 	the 	jobs
recommended by the VE, which require frequent talking and social interaction,
and the ALJ’s RFC which limits Plaintiff to only occasional social interaction. See
Kevin T. v. Commissioner, 2025 WL 678544, at *3, n.6 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2025)
Case 5:25-cv-00048-BT Document 17 Filed 03/27/26 Page 8 of 13 PageID <pageID>

9
(Rutherford, J.) (explaining that a “direct and obvious” conflict exists “when the
VE’s testimony conflicts with the DOT”); Eileen D., 2019 WL 4648259, at *4
(finding a direct conflict when jobs required frequent social interaction but the
plaintiff was limited to occasional contact with the public or coworkers); Davis v.
Kijakazi, 2022 WL 18396221, at *5 (S.D. Tex. May 2, 2022) (finding a discrepancy
between VE testimony and the DOT regarding occasional contact with others).
When a direct conflict exists between the DOT and the VE’s testimony, the
ALJ must explain or resolve the conflict. Kevin T., 2025 WL 678544, at *3. If the
ALJ does not resolve the conflict, the weight of the VE’s testimony is lessened such
that “reversal and remand for lack of substantial evidence usually follows.” Id. at
*3 (quoting Osborne v. Colvin, 2015 WL 4755488, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 2015)
(Horan, J.)). A remand is appropriate if the plaintiff establishes that she was
prejudiced by the ALJ’s error to resolve the conflict, which can be achieved by
showing that, “if the ALJ had fully developed the record,” additional evidence
would have been produced that “might have led to a different decision.” Newton v.
Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 458 (5th Cir. 2000).
Although the ALJ relied on the VE’s testimony to find that there are jobs that
exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform,
nothing in the record explains how such jobs can be performed by someone who is
limited to occasional social interaction. And the ALJ did not resolve the conflict in
her decision. See Admin. R. at 35 (ECF No. 10-1) (“Pursuant to SSR 00-4p, the
undersigned has determined that the vocational expert’s testimony is consistent
Case 5:25-cv-00048-BT Document 17 Filed 03/27/26 Page 9 of 13 PageID <pageID>

10
with the information contained in the [DOT].”); SSR 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704, at
*2 (“The [ALJ] must resolve the conflict by determining if the explanation given by
the VE . . . is reasonable and provides a basis for relying on the VE . . . testimony
rather than on the DOT information.”). The ALJ asked the VE whether any
conflicts existed between the VE’s testimony and the DOT. Admin. R. at 65 (ECF
No. 10-1). Although the VE testified that his testimony was consistent with the
DOT, this testimony itself directly conflicts with the DOT and SCO. Rather, it
appears that neither the ALJ nor the VE were aware of the conflict. As a result,
substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s determination at step five that
there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that
Plaintiff can perform.
The Commissioner relies on Laurent v. Astrue, 366 F. App’x 559 (5th Cir.
2010) (per curiam) and Johnny H. v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 16935252 (N.D. Tex. Oct.
20, 2022), adopted by 2022 WL 16927797 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2022) (Cummings,
J.) to support its argument that the ALJ properly relied on the VE’s testimony when
making 	her 	disability 	determination. 	Def.’s 	Br. 	at 	7–8 	(ECF 	No. 	15). 	The
Commissioner correctly notes that the Fifth Circuit in Laurent stated that the
“DOT job descriptions should not be given a role that is exclusive of more specific
vocational expert testimony with respect to the effect of an individual claimant’s
limitations on his or her ability to perform a particular job.” Laurent, 366 F. App’x
at 561. However, in the sentence immediately before this quotation, the Fifth
Circuit reiterates that “when a VE’s testimony conflicts with the DOT, ‘the ALJ may
Case 5:25-cv-00048-BT Document 17 Filed 03/27/26 Page 10 of 13 PageID <pageID>

11
rely on the vocational expert’s testimony provided that the record reflects an
adequate basis for doing so.’” Id. (quoting Carey, 230 F.3d at 146). Nothing in the
record indicates Plaintiff can perform a job that requires frequent talking, and the
ALJ apparently agreed when she limited Plaintiff’s RFC to occasional social
interaction.
In Johnny H., the ALJ similarly limited the plaintiff to occasional interaction
with supervisors, coworkers, and the general public, but adopted jobs requiring
frequent talking. Johnny H., 2022 WL 16935252, at *1, *10. The plaintiff in Johnny
H. argued that “the amount of talking . . . required for the jobs adopted conflicts
with [p]laintiff’s RFC limitations[.]” Id. at *10. The Johnny H. court affirmed the
ALJ’s determination and found that “the ALJ was permitted to rely on the VE’s
testimony, and the [p]laintiff’s subjective reading of the DOT’s job descriptions
does [not] support a conflict.” Id.
However, 	the 	Court 	finds 	this 	case 	distinguishable 	for 	the 	reasons
articulated by Plaintiff. See Pl.’s Reply at 6 (ECF No. 16). The court in Johnny H.
dismissed the plaintiff’s argument because it was “unclear how the Plaintiff
conclude[d] that these jobs require frequent talking” and thus resulted in an
alleged conflict. Johnny H., 2022 WL 16935252, at *10. The court noted that the
plaintiff “trie[d] to support [his] argument with footnotes to descriptions in SSR
83-12—although upon further review it is clear [the plaintiff] meant SSR 83-10”
and that SSR 83-10 did not mention the jobs the ALJ adopted, nor does it discuss
how often those jobs required talking. Id. at *9. By contrast, Plaintiff here
Case 5:25-cv-00048-BT Document 17 Filed 03/27/26 Page 11 of 13 PageID <pageID>

12
presented evidence that the VE’s recommended jobs require frequent talking,
which directly conflicts with the ALJ’s RFC determination and the DOT and SCO.
See Pl.’s Reply, Ex. 1 at 2–4 (ECF No. 16-1). Again, although the Johnny H. court
recognized that “the categorical DOT job descriptions are neither comprehensive
nor exclusively probative of a claimant’s ability to perform a particular job,” this
does not dispose of the ALJ’s duty to resolve conflicts between the VE’s testimony
and the DOT and SCO. Johnny H., 2022 WL 16935252, at *10 (quoting Carey, 230
F.3d at 144). By failing to identify and address the conflict between the VE’s
testimony and the DOT, the ALJ erred.
Nevertheless, the court “will not reverse the decision of an ALJ for failure to
fully and fairly develop the record unless the claimant shows that he or she was
prejudiced by the ALJ’s failure.” Graves, 837 F.3d at 592–93 (quoting Carey, 230
F.3d at 142). The error in this case certainly prejudiced Plaintiff. See Owen v.
Astrue, 2011 WL 3348064, at *9 (N.D. Tex. May 12, 2011) (Cureton, J.) (finding
that the “ALJ’s failure to abide by SSR 00-4p prejudiced [the plaintiff]”), adopted
by 2011 WL 3347921 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2011) (Means, J.). “Had the ALJ fully
developed the record and further inquired into the conflict, additional evidence
may have emerged that might have led to a different decision.” Eileen D., 2019 WL
4648259, at *5. The ALJ likely would have realized that Plaintiff’s RFC precluded
her from performing any of the jobs recommended by the VE. However, the court
is 	not 	permitted 	to 	resolve 	a 	conflict 	that 	the 	ALJ 	did 	not 	consider, 	and
consequently, the case must be remanded. Id. (collecting cases and remanding ALJ
Case 5:25-cv-00048-BT Document 17 Filed 03/27/26 Page 12 of 13 PageID <pageID>

13
decision where there was no explanation for conflict between VE testimony and
the DOT); Owen, 2011 WL 3348064, at *9 (finding that remand was appropriate
when ALJ failed to abide by SSR 00-4p); Davis, 2022 WL 18396221, at *7 (finding
that the plaintiff made the requisite showing of prejudice because “the ALJ’s failure
to develop the record could have altered the result”).
Conclusion
For the reasons stated, the Court REVERSES the Commissioner’s decision
and REMANDS the case to the Commissioner for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
March 27, 2026.
REBECCA RUTHERFORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case 5:25-cv-00048-BT Document 17 Filed 03/27/26 Page 13 of 13 PageID <pageID>