Randles et al v. Blacklock et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
SAMUEL RANDLES, et al. 	§
§
Plaintiffs, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	Civil Action No. 4:25-cv-01422-O-BP
§
JIMMY BLACKLOCK, et al., 	§
§
Defendants. 	§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court are the Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support that Ray Wheless filed on
February 4, 2026 (ECF Nos. 15, 16) and Response that Plaintiffs filed on February 12, 2026 (ECF
No. 34). By order entered on February 5, 2026, the Court notified Plaintiffs that that they should
respond to the Motion as if all Defendants made similar arguments for dismissal. See Taylor v.
Acxiom Corp., 612 F.3d 325, 340 (5th Cir. 2010); Bonny v. Soc’y of Lloyd’s, 3 F.3d 156, 162 (7th
Cir. 1993). ECF No. 18. After reviewing the pleadings and applicable legal authorities, the
undersigned RECOMMENDS that Chief United States District Judge Reed O’Connor GRANT
the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 15) and DISMISS Plaintiffs’ claims against all Defendants.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs assert that visiting judges in Texas state family law cases to which they are parties
unconstitutionally deprived them of their statutory right to object under Tex. Gov’t Code § 74.053
and of a duly identified and impartial tribunal. ECF No. 9 at 5. Plaintiffs argue that various state
court rulings entered within this allegedly unconstitutional visiting judge system are invalid. Id. at
12. While Plaintiffs cast their claims as requests for prospective relief and assert that they do not
seek “review, reversal, vacatur, or collateral attack on any state-court judgment,” their suit asks
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the Court to invalidate an entire system implemented by state courts and several judgments entered
by state courts operating in this system. See id.
Plaintiffs also allege they were unlawfully charged court fees despite their indigent status,
received improper or inadequate notice of court proceedings due to illegible handwriting, and were
unlawfully denied access to assignment records. Id. at 40. They claim that several presiding judges
participated in proceedings despite conflicts of interests created by their own private financial
interests in alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) businesses. Id. at 35. They also contend that
“Tarrant County and the District Clerk’s Office have adopted and implemented a pattern and
practice of facilitating Rule 145 contests against indigent litigants.” Id. at 25.
Plaintiffs sue the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Texas, the Presiding Judges of the
First, Eighth, and Eleventh Administrative Judicial Regions, four retired judges sitting by
assignment, the presiding judges of the 296th Judicial Court of Denton County, Texas and 325th
Judicial District Court of Tarrant County, Texas, the court coordinator, court clerk, and court
reporter of the 325th District Court, and Tarrant County, Texas. Id. at 9-11. Plaintiffs seek relief
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth amendments to the United
States Constitution and for violations of state law. Id. at 5. They also request declaratory judgment
and damages. Id.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A. 	Rule 12(b)(1) Standard
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to move for dismissal
of a complaint based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Because
“[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction[, t]hey possess only that power authorized by
Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Kokkonen v. Guardian
Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted). If a Court lacks subject matter
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jurisdiction, it must dismiss the action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). In determining whether subject
matter jurisdiction exists, a court “must presume that a suit lies outside this limited jurisdiction,
and the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests on the party seeking the federal forum.”
Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001). “A case is properly dismissed for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to
adjudicate the case.” CleanCOALition v. TXU Power, 536 F.3d 469, 473 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Home Builders Ass’n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998)).
“When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the court
should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack on the merits.”
Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Hitt v. City of Pasadena, 561
F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir. 1977)). This “prevents a court without jurisdiction from prematurely
dismissing a case with prejudice.” Id. Dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction “is not a
determination of the merits and does not prevent the plaintiff from pursuing a claim in a court that
does have proper jurisdiction.” Id.
B. 	Younger Abstention Doctrine
Federal courts generally must decide cases within their jurisdiction. “[T]he pendency of an
action in [a] state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the federal court
having jurisdiction.” Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 73 (2013). However, under
the abstention doctrine explained in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) and its progeny, courts
recognize “certain instances in which the prospect of undue interference with state proceedings
counsels against federal relief.” Sprint, 571 U.S. at 72. Younger abstention applies in three
“exceptional” circumstances: “state criminal prosecutions, civil enforcement proceedings, and
civil proceedings involving certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’
ability to perform their judicial functions.” Id. at 73 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
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New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 367-68 (2013)). Federal
courts have a duty to ensure abstention under Younger would not be proper for the cases before
them and may raise the issue sua sponte. Lawrence v. McCarthy, 344 F.3d 467, 470 (5th Cir.
2003); Murphy v. Uncle Ben’s, Inc., 168 F.3d 734, 737 n.1 (5th Cir. 1999).
C. 	Eleventh Amendment
Under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution, states may not be sued in federal court
unless they unequivocally consent to the suit or unless Congress, pursuant to a valid exercise of
power, unequivocally expresses its intent to abrogate immunity. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99-100 (1984). The Eleventh Amendment also bars § 1983 claims against
agencies of a state of officials sued in the official capacities. Fox v. Mississippi, 551 Fed. Appx.
772, 774-775 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing K.P. v. LeBlanc, 627 F.3d 115, 124 (5th Cir. 2010)).
However, there are three possible exceptions to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity:
(1) for claims seeking injunctive or declaratory relief against a state official under Ex Parte Young,
209 U.S. 123 (1908); (2) a state’s waiver or consent, Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261,
267 (1997); and (3) Congress’s abrogation of the state’s immunity through section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 364 (2001).
Young allows only the granting of “prospective injunctive relief to prevent a continuing
violation of federal law” against state officers in their official capacities and does not allow
damages or other retrospective relief. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985). “Determining if
the exception applies involves ‘a straightforward inquiry into whether the complaint alleges an
ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.’” Spec’s
Fam. Partners, Ltd. v. Nettles, 972 F.3d 671, 680 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Va. Off. for Protection
& Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 255 (2011) (cleaned up)).
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Sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional bar. See Carver v. Atwood, 18 F.4th 494, 497 (5th
Cir. 2021). “Because sovereign immunity deprives the court of jurisdiction, the claims barred by
sovereign immunity can be dismissed only under Rule 12(b)(1) and not with prejudice.” Warnock
v. Pecos Cnty., Tex., 88 F.3d 341, 343 (5th Cir. 1996).
D. 	Qualified immunity
“Qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from
liability unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known.” Gibson v. Rich, 44 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing
Babb v. Dorman, 33 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir. 1994)).
To overcome the defense of qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show “(1) that the official
violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the
time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (citations omitted).
“[A] good-faith assertion of qualified immunity alters the usual summary judgment burden of
proof, shifting it to the plaintiff to show that the defense is not available.” Ratliff v. Aransas Cty.,
948 F.3d 281, 287 (5th Cir. 2020).
“[T]he immunity issue must be resolved at the earliest possible stage of the litigation since
it entails an entitlement to immunity from suit and not merely a defense to liability.” Gibson v.
Rich, 44 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 226 (1991)).
Qualified immunity can be decided at the motion to dismiss stage as it is the earliest possible stage
in litigation. Carswell v. Camp, 37 F.4th 1062, 1068 (5th Cir. 2022).
E. 	Judicial Immunity
Judicial immunity is an absolute immunity from suit, not just from the ultimate assessment
of damages. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Allegations of bad faith, malice, or corruption
do not overcome judicial immunity. Id. Judicial immunity is inapplicable only when: (1) a judge
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takes an action that is not within his or her official capacity; or (2) as it concerns judicial actions
“taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. Courts must construe jurisdiction broadly
for purposes of judicial immunity. Adams v. McIlhany, 764 F.2d 294, 299 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978)).
F. 	Pro Se Standard
The Court subjects a pro se party’s pleadings to less rigid analysis than those of a party
represented by counsel. “[A] pro se complaint, ‘however inartfully pleaded,’ must be held to ‘less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
106 (1976) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). However, “even a liberally-
construed pro se . . . complaint must set forth facts giving rise to a claim on which relief may be
granted.” Levitt v. Univ. of Texas at El Paso, 847 F.2d 221, 224 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Bounds v.
Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825-26 (1977)). Thus, a court inquires “whether within the universe of
theoretically provable facts there exists a set which can support a cause of action under [the]
complaint, indulgently read.” Covington v. Cole, 528 F.2d 1365, 1370 (5th Cir. 1976).
The liberal construction of pro se pleadings stems from a “well-established policy that
[plaintiffs] be given every opportunity to state a claim.” Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161 (citing Hitt,
561 F.2d at 608). It is federal policy to decide cases on the merits rather than technicalities, and
thus whenever possible the Fifth Circuit recommends that suits be dismissed without prejudice on
Rule 12 motions. See Great Plains Tr. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305,
329 (5th Cir. 2002). As a result, courts generally allow plaintiffs at least one opportunity to amend
following a Rule 12 dismissal on the pleadings. Id. However, a complaint may be dismissed with
prejudice, thus foreclosing that opportunity, whenever amendment of the pleadings would be
futile. Stem v. Gomez, 813 F.3d 205, 215-16 (5th Cir. 2016).
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III. 	ANALYSIS
A. 	Plaintiffs do not have standing to bring their suit.
The Court must address standing before evaluating any argument on the merits or any
attack on the pleadings’ sufficiency. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992);
United States v. Rodriguez, 33 F.4th 807, 811 (5th Cir. 2022) (“Standing is a matter of jurisdiction,
and courts must assess their jurisdiction before turning to the merits.”). The Court first considers
whether Plaintiffs have standing to bring their claims. A plaintiff in federal court must have
standing before the court can exercise subject matter jurisdiction. Arbraugh v. Altimus, 26 F.4th
298, 303 (5th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). In ruling on motions to dismiss, the court is free to
weigh evidence and satisfy itself that subject matter jurisdiction exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(l).
“Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement imposes an ‘irreducible constitutional minimum
of standing.’” Yarls v. Bunton, 905 F.3d 905, 909 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. 555,
560-561 (1992). To satisfy Article III standing, a plaintiff must show: (1) injury in fact; (2)
causation; and (3) redressability. U.S. Const. art. 3, § 2, cl. 1; Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167
(1997).
To show injury in fact, a plaintiff must “implicate ‘an invasion of a legally protected
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical.’” Gabriel v. Outlaw, No. 3:20-cv-60-K-BK, 2002 WL 617628, * 1 (N.D. Tex. Feb.
14, 2022) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (internal quotations and citations omitted)). Next, the
causation prong requires the injury to be “fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful
conduct.” Nat’l Park Hosp. Ass ‘n v. Dept. of Interior, 538 U.S. 803 (2003) (quoting Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)). Finally, “redressability requires that it is likely, as opposed to
merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at
561. Notably, “the party invoking federal subject matter jurisdiction bears the burden of
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establishing each element [of the standing requirement].” Id. (quoting Ramming v. United States,
281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001)). “Accordingly, the plaintiff constantly bears the burden of proof
that jurisdiction does in fact exist.” Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161 (quoting Menchaca v. Chrysler
Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir. 1980)).
Plaintiffs have not established standing for any of their claims because they do not satisfy
the case or controversy requirement. Plaintiffs argue that the visiting judge system they believe is
unconstitutional created directly traceable injuries for each Plaintiff to the respective presiding
judges of the administrative judicial region. ECF No. 34 at 14. Plaintiffs also claim that state court
actors refused to recuse themselves, misused public funds, denied access to records, maintained
conflicts of interest, unequally applied fees, obstructed indigent litigants’ ability to obtain judicial
review, and retaliated against Plaintiffs. ECF No. 9 at 20, 32, 36, 40, 64, 66-67,
However, Plaintiffs have no case or controversy with these Defendants. If Plaintiffs
disagree with a state court ruling or the actions of a state court clerk, coordinator, or reporter, they
can appeal any such ruling in state court. However, they do not have a remedy in federal court
directly against a state judge or court employee for damages or injunctive relief. See Machetta v.
Moren, 726 F. App’x 219, 219-20 (5th Cir. 2018) (“no case or controversy exists between ‘a judge
who adjudicates claims under a statute and a litigant who attacks the constitutionality of the
statute.’” (quoting Bauer v. Texas, 341 F.3d 352, 361 (5th Cir. 2003)). While Plaintiffs’ pleadings
include an amalgam of exceptional allegations, their arguments rely on the untenable foundation
that they have standing to sue in federal court for unfavorable outcomes in a state court proceeding.
Fifth Circuit precedent is clear that they do not. See, e.g., Machetta, 726 F. App’x at 219-20 (5th
Cir. 2018) (internal citation omitted) (providing that a disgruntled family court litigant lacked
standing to sue the family law judge in federal court for an unfavorable decision).
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Consequently, the Court finds that there is no case or controversy as to Plaintiffs’ claims
arising from the state family law court system. Because there is no “case or controversy there is
no standing, and without standing, no subject matter jurisdiction.” Machetta, 726 F. App’x at 220
(citing Ruiz v. Estelle, 161 F.3d 814, 829 (5th Cir. 1998)). The Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’
claims without prejudice. See Ehm v. San Antonio City Council, 269 F. App’x 375, 376 (5th Cir.
2008) (dismissing without prejudice a pro se plaintiff’s claims for lack of standing).
B. 	Younger abstention also applies.
Even if Plaintiffs did have standing, the Court should abstain from exercising subject
matter jurisdiction under the Younger doctrine. See Younger 401 U.S. 37. Younger requires sua
sponte abstention where “(1) the federal proceeding would interfere with an ‘ongoing state judicial
proceeding’; (2) the state has an important interest in regulating the subject matter of the claim;
and (3) the plaintiff has ‘an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional
challenges.’” Bice v. La. Pub. Def. Bd., 677 F.3d 712, 716 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Middlesex
Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)) (analyzing two of the
three elements in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case); Murphy, 168 F.3d at 737 n.1 (authorizing sua sponte
abstention).
Here, the Court should abstain because all three conditions are met. Plaintiffs acknowledge
their state court proceedings are ongoing. ECF No. 34 at 16. Continuation of this case in federal
court necessarily would interfere with the state court proceedings because Plaintiffs request relief
from the various state court proceedings they allege violated their rights. Moreover, divorce and
family law issues like those at issue in the state cases are important state interests. See id. at 16
(referring to one of the underlying state court proceedings as a family law case); ECF No. 9 at 19
(explaining that another involved divorce proceedings adjudicating property rights); Moore v.
Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 434 (1979) (“Family relations are a traditional area of state concern”); Crouch
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v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 486, 487 (5th Cir. 1978) (emphasizing “the strong state interest in domestic
relations matters, the competence of state courts in settling family disputes, the possibility of
incompatible federal and state court decrees in cases of continuing judicial supervision by the state,
and the problem of congested dockets in federal courts.”). Finally, the right to appeal an adverse
judgment to the applicable state appellate court or to seek extraordinary relief from that court
affords Plaintiffs an adequate opportunity to litigate their claims. See Middlesex Cnty., 457 U.S. at
435. As a result, the grounds for abstention under Younger are present in this case.
Even though Plaintiffs ask this Court to provide relief in seemingly unrelated issues such
as invalidating the visiting judge system, the effect of these actions would effectively rule on the
validity of ongoing state court cases. And while they argue in their Response (ECF No. 34) that
“adequate state remedies are unavailable,” the right to seek extraordinary relief and to appeal
adverse judgments within the state court system provides a sufficient opportunity to litigate their
claims.
Therefore, any constitutional questions regarding the validity of the Texas visiting judge
system must be brought in state court, and the Court should abstain from ruling under the Younger
doctrine even if Plaintiffs did have standing. On the facts presented here and because Plaintiffs
have not shown any reason that abstention would be inappropriate, the Court should abstain from
entertaining their claims under Rule 12(b)(1) and Younger and dismiss the claims without
prejudice. See Nobby Lobby, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 970 F.2d 82, 86 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that
“[u]nder Younger and its companion cases, a federal district court must abstain from exercising
jurisdiction over a suit when state criminal proceedings are currently pending against the federal
plaintiff.”); see also Foster v. City of El Paso, 308 F. App’x 811, 812 (5th Cir. 2009) (dismissal
under Younger abstention is without prejudice).
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C. 	The Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiffs’ claims against the judges in their
official capacities.
“Official-capacity suits are not ‘against the official personally, for the real party in interest
is the entity.’” Diaz v. Cantu, 123 F.4th 736, 744 (5th Cir. 2024) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473
U.S. 159, 166, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985)). “For purposes of state sovereign immunity,
the relevant question is whether ‘the state is the real, substantial party in interest.’” Id. (citing
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663, (1974)).
Here, Plaintiffs sue various judges who are the presiding judges of several Texas
Administrative Judicial Regions in their official capacities. ECF No. 9 at 1. “An administrative
judicial region is a state entity created by statute.” Rylander v. Brown, No. 4:25-cv-2079, 2025
WL 2306829, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2025) (citing Tex. Gov't Code § 74.042(1)). Therefore,
suits against these judges are “properly construed as [suits] against the State of Texas,” and
sovereign immunity applies. Id. Similarly, Texas District courts are “arms of the state,” and
therefore their judges are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Diaz, 123 F.4th at 745. And
“the Texas Supreme Court is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Washington Legal
Found. v. Tex. Equal Access to Justice Found., 94 F.3d 996, 1005 (5th Cir. 1996), aff’d sub nom.
Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998).
Plaintiffs allege that there is an ongoing violation of their Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights through the visiting judge system in Texas. However, Plaintiffs neither pleaded
nor directed the Court to authority showing that the State has waived its Eleventh Amendment
immunity from suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Cox v. Texas, 354 F. App’x 901, 903 (5th
Cir. 2009). The Supreme Court has expressly held that § 1983 does not abrogate a state’s Eleventh
Amendment immunity. See, e.g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 338 n.7 (1979) (“section 1983
does not explicitly and by clear language indicate on its face an intent to sweep away the immunity
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of the States[.]”); Sessions v. Rusk State Hospital, 648 F.2d 1066, 1069 (5th Cir. 1981) (“Section
1981 contains no congressional waiver of the state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.”).
Therefore, the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiffs’ claims against the justices of the Texas
Supreme Court, presiding judges of the Administrative Judicial Regions of Texas, and district
courts judges in their official capacities because the State has not consented to suit, and Congress
has not abrogated the State’s immunity. Accordingly, even if the Plaintiffs had standing and
Younger abstention did not apply, the Court still should dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against Chief
Justice Blacklock and Judges Evans, Brown, Wheless, Catterton, Harris, Dean, Cooks, Roach, and
Terry in their official capacities, without prejudice.
D. 	Judicial immunity also bars the Plaintiffs’ claims against the judges and court
employees.
Because the judges sued in this case enjoy judicial immunity from civil actions for any
judicial act over which their court has jurisdiction, dismissal is proper. Stump, 435 U.S. at 356
(citing Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 351 (1871)). Judicial immunity is an immunity from suit,
not just from the ultimate assessment of damages. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11. Allegations of bad faith,
malice, or corruption do not overcome judicial immunity. Id. Repeatedly, federal courts have found
that judges are absolutely immune from claims for damages arising out of acts performed in the
exercise of their judicial functions. Ramirez v. Abdal Khallaq, 4:17-cv-093-Y, 2019 WL 764420,
at *3 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2019); Morgan v. City of Fort Worth, Tex., 4:13-cv-004-Y, 2013 WL
3196580, at *2 (N.D. Tex. June 25, 2013) (involving, among others, a Tarrant County associate
family law judge); see Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11 (citing Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227-29
(1988) & Stump, 435 U.S. at 360); see also Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 284 (5th Cir. 1994).
A plaintiff can overcome absolute judicial immunity only if he shows that the alleged
actions were nonjudicial in nature or that the actions were taken in the complete absence of all
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jurisdiction. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11; Boyd, 31 F.3d at 284. Section 1983 also provides absolute
judicial immunity to judicial officers against claims for injunctive relief. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiffs sue the judges in their official capacities. However, Plaintiffs do not show that
the judges’ actions were nonjudicial in nature or that they took them in the complete absence of
jurisdiction. Plaintiffs’ first claim that retired Senior Judge Catterton signed an ex parte order
without prior notice to the parties and that David Evans did not provide notice that Judge Catterton
was a retired Senior Judge sitting by assignment. ECF No. 9 at 61. Then they claim that Senior
Judge Harris was assigned to preside in a matter without providing them with sufficient
notification. Id. at 17. Plaintiffs make nearly identical allegations against Judge Dean. Id. at 18-
19. They also allege Judge Roach’s spouse served as their mediator, creating an undisclosed
conflict of interest. Id. at 19-20. They claim that Judge Cooks denied their motion to recuse despite
their objections, violating procedural laws. Id. at 20. They contend that the retired judge’s for-
profit mediation and ADR businesses create unconstitutional appearances of partiality. Finally,
they allege systemic assignment practices, denial of access to assignment records, absence of
conflict screening, and expansion of the “visiting judge” practice violate state and constitutional
law. Id. at 37-42.
None of the Plaintiffs’ claims relate to nonjudicial acts by the judges, nor actions that were
taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11; Boyd, 31 F.3d at 284.
And as for Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding judges who did not recuse, the decision not to recuse
also warrants immunity. See Brenham v. Rosenberg, No. 3:21-cv-2972-B-BN, 2021 WL 6297750,
at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 6, 2021) (quoting Kemp ex rel. Kemp v. Perkins, 324 F. App’x 409, 412 (5th
Cir. 2009)) (“Neither ‘[r]ecusal’ nor, by implication, the failure to recuse is ‘the type[ ] of
administrative or ministerial conduct for which judicial immunity is unavailable.’”), rec. adopted,
2022 WL 60350 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2022).
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Because the pleadings show that the judges’ actions in the state cases were within their
capacities as district judges, they are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from Plaintiffs’ claims
in this case. See Tex. Const. art. V, § 8 (“District Court jurisdiction consists of exclusive, appellate,
and original jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings, and remedies, except in cases where exclusive,
appellate, or original jurisdiction may be conferred by this Constitution or other law on some other
court, tribunal, or administrative body.”); see also Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 75
(Tex. 2000) (“A Texas district court . . . is a court of general jurisdiction” and “all claims are
presumed to fall within the jurisdiction of the district court unless the Legislature or Congress has
provided that they must be heard elsewhere.”).
Similarly, § 1983 does not permit such suits against court clerks like Wilder. Here,
Plaintiffs allege Wilder improperly charged Plaintiffs court fees. ECF No. 9 at 27. Court clerks
have immunity for actions taken in the scope of their professional duties. Court clerks “have
absolute immunity from actions for damages arising from acts they are specifically required to do
under court order or at a judge’s direction . . . .” Tarter v. Hury, 646 F.2d 1010, 1013 (5th Cir.
1981). Clerks enjoy “only qualified immunity for those routine duties not explicitly commanded
by a court decree or by the judge’s instructions.” Clay v. Allen, 242 F.3d 679, 682 (5th Cir. 2001).
Therefore, Wilder as District Clerk of Tarrant County is also immune from this suit.
Additionally, claims against court coordinators like Grimaldi are not permitted. Here,
Plaintiffs sue Grimaldi alleging she issued a contest notice that bore an illegible handwritten
hearing date. ECF No. 9 at 24. Plaintiffs claim she took no corrective action when they notified
her of the illegibility. Id. Court coordinators sued in their “individual capacity are barred by quasi-
judicial immunity and qualified immunity.” Diggles v. Surratt, No. 4:23-cv-78, 2023 WL
6963666, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 20, 2023). As for official capacity claims, even if Grimaldi “is not
considered a state official protected by sovereign immunity,” Plaintiffs’ claims are unsuccessful
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because they have not “plead facts establishing the elements of municipal liability in order to state
a claim against her in her official capacity.” Id. at 5, 6 (citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25
(1991)). “[M]unicipal liability under section 1983 requires proof of three elements: a policymaker;
an official policy; and a violation of constitutional rights whose ‘moving force’ is the policy or
custom.” Id. at 7. Plaintiffs did not establish a factual basis as to any of these three elements. As a
result, Plaintiffs’ claims against Grimaldi in both her individual and official capacities are barred.
Plaintiffs claim that Moss, as a court reporter, “sought approximately $500,000 in reporter-
related fees/costs.” ECF No. 9 at 27. However, claims against court reporters like Moss, brought
“in [their] individual capacity are barred by qualified immunity.” Id. at 7. These court employees
whom Plaintiffs accuse of constitutional violations all have immunity from those accusations, and
Plaintiffs have not pleaded facts to show that they are liable in their individual capacities or that
they would not have qualified immunity from any such claims.
Plaintiffs’ accusations do not rebut judicial immunity as to the judges, or immunity as to
the court coordinator, court clerk, or court reporter. Accordingly, even if the Court need not abstain
from hearing the case under the Younger Doctrine and Plaintiffs had standing, the Court should
dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against Chief Justice Blacklock, Judges Evans, Brown, Wheless, Harris,
Dean, Cooks, Roach, and Terry, and Grimaldi, Moss, and Wilder. See Devabhaktuni v. Godbey,
No. 3:19-cv-2215-K, 2019 WL 5068557, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 2019) (adopting the findings of
the magistrate judge, recommending dismissal of claims barred by judicial immunity).
E. 	Qualified immunity bars the Plaintiffs’ claims against the judges and court
personnel in their individual capacities.
“Claims under § 1983 may be brought against persons in their individual or official
capacity, or against a governmental entity.” Goodman v. Harris Cty., 571 F.3d 388, 395 (5th Cir.
2009) (internal citations omitted). The judicial defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to
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the claims against them in their individual capacities because Plaintiffs did not plead any facts to
show that any of the judges, clerks, or other court personnel acted in their individual capacities
as to the actions that allegedly violated Plaintiffs’ rights. A plaintiff’s complaint must “state with
precision and specificity” the basis for the claim which necessarily includes why the defendant
official cannot successfully maintain the defense of immunity. Anderson v. Pasadena Indep. Sch.
Dist., 184 F.3d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 1999). The Fifth Circuit adheres to a “heightened pleading”
standard in civil rights cases against government officials. See Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427,
1433-34 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (affirming the continuing validity of Elliot v. Perez, 751 F.2d
1472 (5th Cir. 1985)).
Plaintiffs assert that the defendants’ lack of notice and assignment in various state court
matters through the visiting judge system violated their constitutional rights. However, Plaintiffs
do not cite adequate legal authority for the contention that the visiting judge system constitutes
such a violation. And merely stating so is not enough to establish a violation of any of Plaintiffs’
constitutional rights. Even if Plaintiffs had pleaded facts to show that any of the judges, clerks, or
other court personnel could be liable in his or her individual capacity, Plaintiffs’ allegations do not
demonstrate a violation of a constitutional right or that the constitutional right was clearly
established at the time of the challenged conduct. Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741. Instead of stating facts
that support their claims, Plaintiffs make “cursory and unsupported allegations,” which the Court
need not accept as true. Harmon v. City of Arlington, Tex., 16 F.4th 1159, 1162-63 (5th Cir. 2021).
Thus, 	Plaintiffs have not 	pleaded facts that would 	overcome qualified 	immunity.
Accordingly, Chief Justice Blacklock, Judges Evans, Brown, Wheless, Harris, Dean, Cooks,
Roach, and Terry, and court employees Grimaldi, Moss, and Wilder would be entitled to qualified
immunity from Plaintiffs’ claims against them in their individual capacity, if Plaintiffs had pleaded
facts to show any violations of the law in one of those Defendant’s individual capacity. So, even
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if Plaintiffs had standing to pursue their claims and the Court need not abstain under Younger, the
Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against these Defendants. Reiter v. Treacy, 220 F.3d 584
(5th Cir. 2000) (affirming dismissal of claims based on qualified immunity against defendants in
their individual capacities.)
F. 	The Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against Tarrant County.
Plaintiffs also sue Tarrant County, but their claims lack merit.
[A] county “can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or
injunctive relief where . . . the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional
implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or
decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.”
Furthermore, a county “may be sued for constitutional deprivations visited
pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ even though such a custom has not
received formal approval through the body’s official decisionmaking
channels.” To succeed on this type of claim—called a Monell claim—the
plaintiff must show that “(1) an official policy (2) promulgated by a
municipal policymaker (3) was the moving force behind the violation of a
constitutional right.”
Thornton v. Dallas Cnty., No. 3:23-cv-1945-D, 2024 WL 3357840, at *3 (N.D. Tex. July
10, 2024) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978),
Webb v. Town of St. Joseph, 925 F.3d 209, 215 (5th Cir. 2019)).
Plaintiffs argue that the Tarrant County Criminal District Attorney’s Office harassed them.
ECF No. 9 at 5. They also allege that the Tarrant County District Clerk’s Office had a “policy,
practice, or custom of routinely waiving or failing to assess filing fees for Rule 145 contests filed
by favored court reporters and other court-affiliated parties,” which facilitated such contests
against Plaintiffs. Id. at 22, 25-26. But Plaintiffs do not show any factual basis that Tarrant County
implemented or executed “a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision [that was]
officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.” Thornton, 2024 WL 3357840, at *3.
Nor do Plaintiffs show that there was an official policy promulgated by a municipal policymaker,
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that was the moving force behind the violation of a constitutional right. Id. As a result, the Court
also should dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against Tarrant County.
G. 	The Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against all Defendants.
Dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims against all Defendants is appropriate. See Taylor v. Acxiom
Corp., 612 F.3d at 340 (“While the district court did dismiss sua sponte some defendants who did
not join the motion to dismiss, there is no prejudice to the plaintiffs in affirming the judgment in
its entirety because the plaintiffs make the same allegations against all defendants.”); Bonny v.
Soc’y of Lloyd’s, 3 F.3d at 162 (“A court may grant a motion to dismiss even as to nonmoving
defendants where the nonmoving defendants are in a position similar to that of moving defendants
or where the claims against all defendants are integrally related.”).
The Court previously noted that due to the commonality of Plaintiffs’ claims against
Defendants, Plaintiffs should respond to Judge Wheless’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 15) as if all
Defendants made similar arguments for dismissal. See ECF No. 18. Plaintiffs attack the visiting
judge system in Texas and Tarrant County’s internal administrative practices through a panoply
of allegations against current and former judges, court employees, and Tarrant County itself. While
their claims relate to separate actions in multiple state district courts, these disparate examples
merely serve as the foundation for their common claim that the visiting judge system is unlawful
and should be invalidated, and Tarrant County’s operation of the state court system is improper.
The claims against all Defendants in this action are integrally related. Bonny, 3 F.3d at 162. In
addition, Plaintiffs’ allegations, and the issues of abstention and various immunities that they raise,
are common to all Defendants in this action. Accordingly, the Court should grant the Motion to
Dismiss (ECF No. 15) and dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against all Defendants.
The undersigned concludes that dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint should be
without leave to amend. The decision to allow amendment of the pleadings is within the sound
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discretion of the district court. Norman v. Apache Corp., 19 F.3d 1017, 1021 (5th Cir.1994). In
determining whether to allow an amendment of the pleadings, the Court considers the following:
undue delay in the proceedings, undue prejudice to the opposing parties, timeliness of the
amendment, 	and 	futility 	of 	the 	amendment. See Foman 	v. 	Davis, 371 	U.S. 	178, 	182
(1962); Chitimacha Tribe of La. v. Harry L. Laws Co., Inc., 690 F.2d 1157, 1163 (5th Cir. 1982).
Allowing Plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their Amended Complaint would be an inefficient use
of the Court's resources, would cause unnecessary delay, and would be futile because of the lack
of standing, need for abstention under Younger even if the Plaintiffs had standing, and the
sovereign, judicial, and qualified immunity that would bar Plaintiffs’ claims against the judicial
and court personnel Defendants.
Plaintiffs already have filed an 82-page Amended Complaint and a 26-page Response and
Objection to Judge Wheless’ Motion to Dismiss. See ECF Nos. 9, 34. that No amount of
amendment or revised pleadings would change the legal requirement that Plaintiffs have standing
to pursue their case, that the Court should abstain under Younger, and that sovereign, judicial, and
qualified immunity bar their claims against the named judges and court personnel. Nor would it
permit Plaintiffs’ claims against Tarrant County to proceed. The undersigned concludes based on
their extensive pleadings and the nature of their claims that Plaintiffs have pleaded their best,
though legally insufficient, case against the Defendants, and further amendment of their Amended
Complaint would be futile.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Chief Judge O’Connor GRANT
the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 15), ABSTAIN from exercising jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’
claims, and DISMISS Plaintiffs’ claims against all Defendants WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on all parties
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in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions,
and recommendation must file specific written objections within fourteen days after being served
with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1). In order to be specific, an
objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which the objection is made,
state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings,
conclusions, and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that
merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific.
Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual
findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district
court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d
1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)
(extending the time to file objections to 14 days).
SIGNED on February 18, 2026.
______________________________________
Hal R. Ray, Jr.
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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