Coleman v. USA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
J ERRAD COLEMAN ,
Movant,
v. 	No. 4:25-cv-1081-P
(No. 4:24-cr-0149-P)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
OPINION AND ORDER
Came on for consideration the motion of Jarrad Coleman under 28
U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence. The Court, having
considered 	the 	motion, 	the 	response, 	the 	record, 	and 	applicable
authorities, concludes that the motion must be DENIED.
BACKGROUND
On June 18, 2024, Movant was named in a two-count information
charging him in count one with conspiracy to rob and unlawfully possess
property of the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and in
count two with robbery of property of the United States, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2114(a) and § 2. CR ECF No.1 23. Movant and his counsel
signed a waiver of indictment, CR ECF No. 37, a factual resume, CR
ECF No. 38, and a plea agreement. CR ECF No. 39. The factual resume
set forth the penalties Movant faced as to each count, the essential
elements of each offense charged, and the stipulated facts establishing
that Movant had committed each of the offenses. CR ECF No. 38. The
plea agreement set forth the maximum penalties Movant faced as to
each count, the Court’s sentencing discretion and role of the guidelines,
the government’s agreement not to bring any additional charges against
Movant based upon the conduct underlying and related to his plea of
guilty, that the plea was made freely and voluntarily and was not the
result of force, threats, or promises, that Movant waived his right to
1 The “CR ECF No. __” reference is to the number of the item on the docket in the
underlying criminal case, No. 4:24-cr-0149-P.
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appeal or otherwise challenge his sentence except in certain limited
circumstances, and that Movant had thoroughly reviewed all legal and
factual aspects of the case with his counsel and was fully satisfied with
counsel’s legal representation. CR ECF No. 39.
On July 2, 2024, Movant appeared in open court for arraignment and
testified under oath that: he had discussed with counsel how the
sentencing 	guidelines 	might 	apply; 	he 	understood 	his 	right 	to
indictment and waived that right; he had received the information and
read and understood it; he understood and admitted that he committed
each of the essential elements of each count of the information; he was
fully satisfied with the representation and advice his counsel had
provided; he signed the plea agreement and asked the Court to approve
it; 	he 	discussed 	the 	waiver of 	appeal provision 	with 	counsel 	and
knowingly and voluntarily waived that right as agreed in the plea
agreement; he voluntarily and of his own free will entered into the plea
agreement; he understood the penalties he faced; and, he signed the
factual resume and the stipulated facts in it were true. CR ECF No. 74.
The probation officer prepared the presentence report (“PSR”). Based
on a total offense level of 30 and a criminal history category of III,
Movant’s guideline imprisonment range was 121 to 151 months. CR
ECF No. 46, ¶ 159. Counsel filed a lengthy memorandum in aid of
sentencing, urging a below-guideline sentence. CR ECF No. 57.
The Court sentenced Movant to a term of imprisonment of 60 months
as to count one and a term of imprisonment of 91 months as to count
two, to be served consecutively for a total term of imprisonment of 151
months. CR ECF No. 66. Movant appealed, CR ECF No. 70, despite
having waived the right to do so. CR ECF No. 39, ¶ 13. Movant’s counsel
filed a motion to withdraw and a brief in accordance with Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit concurred with counsel that the appeal presented no
nonfrivolous issue for review and dismissed the appeal. United States v.
Coleman, No. 24-10975, 2025 WL 1355421 (5th Cir. May 9, 2025).
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GROUNDS OF THE MOTION
Movant urges three grounds in support of his motion contending that
he received ineffective assistance of counsel. ECF No. 1. In his fourth
ground, he alleges that there was an arithmetic error at sentencing. Id.
APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS
A. § 2255
After conviction and exhaustion, or waiver, of any right to appeal,
courts are entitled to presume that a defendant stands fairly and finally
convicted. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 164 (1982); United
States v. Shaid, 937 F.2d 228, 231–32 (5th Cir. 1991). A defendant can
challenge his conviction or sentence after it is presumed final on issues
of constitutional or jurisdictional magnitude only and may not raise an
issue for the first time on collateral review without showing both cause
for his procedural default and “actual prejudice” resulting from the
errors. Shaid, 937 F.2d at 232.
Section 2255 does not offer recourse to all who suffer trial errors. It
is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and other narrow
injuries that could not have been raised on direct appeal and would, if
condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice. United States v.
Capua, 656 F.2d 1033, 1037 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 1981). In other words,
a writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed to do service for an appeal.
Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 345 (1974); United States v.
Placente, 81 F.3d 555, 558 (5th Cir. 1996). Further, if issues “are raised
and considered on direct appeal, a defendant is thereafter precluded
from urging the same issues in a later collateral attack.” Moore v. United
States, 598 F.2d 439, 441 (5th Cir. 1979) (citing Buckelew v. United
States, 575 F.2d 515, 517–18 (5th Cir. 1978)).
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a movant
must 	show 	that 	(1) 	counsel’s 	performance 	fell 	below 	an 	objective
standard of reasonableness and (2) there is a reasonable probability
that, 	but 	for 	counsel’s 	unprofessional 	errors, 	the 	result 	of 	the
proceedings would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466
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U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). “[A] court need not determine whether
counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice
suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; see also United States v. Stewart, 207 F.3d
750, 751 (5th Cir. 2000). “The likelihood of a different result must be
substantial, not just conceivable,” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86,
112 	(2011), 	and 	a 	movant 	must 	prove 	that 	counsel’s 	errors 	“so
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the
trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Cullen v.
Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 189 (2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
686). Judicial scrutiny of this type of claim must be highly deferential
and 	the 	defendant must overcome 	a 	strong 	presumption 	that his
counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Simply making conclusory
allegations of deficient performance and prejudice is not sufficient to
meet the Strickland test. Miller v. Johnson, 200 F.3d 274, 282 (5th Cir.
2000).
ANALYSIS
In support of his first ground, Movant alleges that he relied on the
misrepresentation of counsel that his sentences would run concurrently.
ECF No. 1 at 4.2 The allegation is wholly conclusory and unsupported.
Any contention that Movant relied on a promise of counsel as to what
his sentence would be is belied by the record. In his plea agreement,
Movant acknowledged that the maximum penalties he could receive–
five years’ imprisonment as to count one and ten years’ as to count two–
could run consecutively. CR ECF No. 39, ¶ 3. The factual resume
provided the same information. CR ECF No. 38 at 1. The plea agreement
reflected that Movant had “thoroughly reviewed all legal and factual
aspects” of his case with counsel and was “fully satisfied” with counsel’s
legal representation. CR ECF No. 39, ¶ 14. Further, the plea agreement
reflected that the plea was freely and voluntarily made and not the
result of any promise except as set forth in the agreement. Id. ¶ 12. And,
Movant acknowledged that no one could predict with certainty the
2 The page number references to the motion are to “Page __ of 14” reflected at the top
right portion of the document on the Court’s electronic filing system.
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outcome of the Court’s consideration of the guidelines and that the
sentence was solely in the discretion of the Court. Id. ¶ 5. Movant
affirmed these things at the arraignment hearing. CR ECF No. 74.
Movant’s solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption
of 	verity. 	Blackledge v. Allison, 	431 U.S. 	63, 74 (1977). His plea
agreement and factual resume are likewise entitled to a presumption of
regularity and carry great evidentiary weight. United States v. Abreo,
30 	F.3d 	29, 	32 	(5th 	Cir. 	1994). 	Movant 	has 	not 	produced 	any
independent indicia of the likely merit of any of his allegations to refute
his sworn testimony and is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
United States v. Cervantes, 132 F.3d 1106, 1110 (5th Cir. 1998).
Movant also alleges that counsel rendered ineffective assistance in
failing to make any objection to the PSR “that will exclude the other (7)
seven allegations in the PSR before sentence,” ECF No. 1 at 4, and in
failing to address status points. Id. at 5. In his third ground, Movant
alleges that appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing
to “show these procedural error(s).” Id. at 7. Again, the allegations are
wholly conclusory and fail to raise a cognizable ground.
Counsel does not render ineffective assistance in failing to raise
meritless objections. Clark v. Collins, 19 F.3d 959, 966 (5th Cir. 1994).
(In fact, counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise every nonfrivolous
ground for objecting. United States v. Lagos, 25 F.4th 329, 337 (5th Cir.
2022)). Here, any objection as to Movant’s guideline calculation would
have been frivolous. As explained in the response, the conspiracy count
listed 	the 	separate 	robberies 	that were committed 	as 	part of the
conspiracy and the offense level was properly determined by considering
each of them. ECF No. 5 at 13–14. Moreover, Movant did not receive any
status points, so objecting on that basis would have been frivolous. CR
ECF No. 46, ¶ 101. Had the objections been made, Movant likely would
have lost acceptance of responsibility. See United States v. Shipley, 963
F.2d 56, 59 (5th Cir. 1992) (a defendant must accept responsibility for
all relevant conduct to be entitled to acceptance of responsibility).
To the extent Movant alleges that appellate counsel abandoned him,
ECF No. 1 at 7, the record reflects otherwise. The filing of an Anders
brief does not constitute ineffective assistance; rather, an attorney is
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under an ethical obligation to refuse to prosecute a frivolous appeal and
to seek to withdraw if he finds the case to be wholly frivolous.3 Anders,
386 U.S. at 744; White v. United States, 23 F. App’x 570, 572 (7th Cir.
2001). Movant waived his right to appeal except in certain limited
circumstances not applicable here, CR ECF No. 39, ¶ 13, and the waiver
is enforceable. United States v. Barnes, 953 F.3d 383, 389 & n.11 (5th
Cir. 2020); United States v. Wilkes, 20 F.3d 651, 653 (5th Cir. 1994).
Movant did not have a meritorious claim he could have pursued.
In 	his 	fourth 	ground, 	Movant 	alleges 	an 	arithmetic 	error 	at
sentencing. ECF No. 1 at 8. The argument is wholly confusing but
appears to be based on the status points argument. ECF No. 5 at 13 n.3.
As noted, Movant did not receive any status points, so the argument is
frivolous. There was no arithmetic error. In any event, misapplications
of the sentencing guidelines are not cognizable in a § 2255 motion.
United States v. Williamson, 183 F.3d 458, 462 (5th Cir. 1999).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, Movant’s motion is DENIED.
Further, for the reasons discussed herein, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2553(c), a certificate of appealability is DENIED.
SO ORDERED on this 2nd day of February 2026.
3 Movant had the opportunity to respond to the Anders brief and failed to do so.
Coleman, 2025 WL 1355421, at *1.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
REGINALEA KEMP ,
Plaintiff,
v. 	No. 4:23-cv-00841-P
REGIONS BANK ET AL .,
Defendants.
ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion for Leave to File
Second Amended Complaint. ECF No. 18. Having considered the Motion
and applicable docket entries, the Court GRANTS the Motion.
SO ORDERED on this 18th day of September 2023.
______________________________________________
Mark T. Pittman
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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