Tatum v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
DEMETRIA T.,1
Plaintiff,
v.
FRANK BISIGNANO,2
Defendant.
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Civil Action No. 4:25-CV-00200-BU
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s appeal of the Social Security Administration’s denial
of Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) under Title II of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423,
and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under Title XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §
1382c(a)(3). For the reasons explained below, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security.
I. JURISDICTION
The Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) because Plaintiff
seeks judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner. Dkt. No. 13 at 2. Venue is
proper in the Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth Division, because Plaintiff resides in
1 Due to concerns regarding the privacy of sensitive personal information available to the public through
opinions in Social Security cases, Plaintiff is identified only by first name and last initial.
2 Frank Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security on May 6, 2025, and is “automatically
substituted as a party” by operation of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 25(d); see also 45 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Any action
instituted in accordance with this subsection shall survive notwithstanding any change in the person occu-
pying the office of Commissioner of Social Security or any vacancy in such office.”).
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Tarrant County, Texas. Dkt. No. 1 at 1; 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This case was automatically
referred to the undersigned with a designation to exercise the district court’s full jurisdic-
tion and conduct all proceedings in this case upon the consent of the parties. See Special
Order No. 3-350 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 11, 2023).
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges disability beginning May 13, 2022. Dkt. No. 13 at 2; Administrative
Record, Dkt. No. 12-3 (Tr.) at 17. At that time, she was fifty years old. Dkt. No. 13 at 2.
Plaintiff has an 11th grade education, a dietary aide certificate, and has past work experi-
ence as a cook, floor supervisor/manager, and dietary manager. Id.
Plaintiff filed applications for DIB and SSI on July 11, 2022. Id. at 4; Tr. at 17. The
Social Security Administration denied her claims on May 12, 2023, and again upon recon-
sideration on February 20, 2024. Tr. at 17. On July 24, 2024, Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) Rebecca Sartor held a hearing regarding Plaintiff’s applications. Tr. at 17–18. After
reviewing her applications and the information presented at the hearing, the ALJ deter-
mined Plaintiff was not disabled and denied her benefits on August 16, 2024. Dkt. No. 11
at 2; Tr. at 27. Plaintiff appealed this decision to the Appeals Council (AC) which denied
her request for review. Dkt. No. 11 at 2.
A. Overview of ALJ’s Decision
The ALJ conducted a hearing to review the denial of Plaintiff’s applications and
determine whether she was disabled under the Act. Following the hearing, the ALJ issued
a decision concluding that Plaintiff was not disabled. In support of that determination, the
ALJ found that: (1) Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the SSA through
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December 31, 2024, (2) Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since May
13, 2022, (3) Plaintiff suffered the following severe impairments: osteoarthritis and obesity,
and (4) none of these impairments, alone or in combination, met or medically equaled the
severity of one of the listed impairments in the Social Security Regulations. Tr. at 19–21.
After considering Plaintiff’s impairments, the ALJ determined that she retained the
“residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR
404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except she is limited to occasional handling with her nondom-
inant upper extremity.” Id. at 21.
Based on this RFC, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could not perform any past
relevant work. Id. at 25. However, based on Plaintiff’s RFC, age, education, and work ex-
perience, along with the testimony of a Vocational Expert (VE), the ALJ found that jobs
existed in significant numbers in the national economy that she could perform. Id. at 26–
27. The ALJ therefore concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act. Id.
III. LEGAL STANDARDS
To be entitled to Social Security benefits, a claimant must show that they are disa-
bled within the meaning of the Act. Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 563‒64 (5th Cir. 1995).
Disability is defined as the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason
of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can be expected to last
for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the Commissioner’s analysis proceeds
along five steps. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The Commissioner considers (1) whether
the claimant is engaged in “substantial gainful activity,” (2) the severity and duration of the
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claimant’s impairments, (3) whether the claimant’s impairment “meets or equals” one of
the listings in the relevant regulations, (4) whether the claimant can still do her “past rele-
vant work,” and (5) whether the impairment prevents the claimant from doing any relevant
work. Id. The claimant bears the burden on the first four steps. See Keel v. Saul, 986 F.3d
551, 555 (5th Cir. 2021). If the claimant advances that far, the burden shifts to the Com-
missioner to “prove the claimant’s employability.” Id.
The Court’s review of the Commissioner’s determination “is exceedingly deferen-
tial and limited to two inquiries: whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision,
and whether the ALJ applied the proper legal standards when evaluating the evi-
dence.” Taylor v. Astrue, 706 F.3d 600, 602 (5th Cir. 2012). Substantial evidence is merely
enough that a reasonable mind could arrive at the same decision; though the evidence “must
be more than a scintilla[,] it need not be a preponderance.” Id. Not every error warrants
remand. “[P]rocedural perfection is not required” and remand is not warranted unless a
plaintiff was prejudiced by the Commissioner’s error. Mays v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1362, 1364
(5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam).
IV. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s decision is unsupported by substantial
evidence because she did not incorporate limitations into the RFC from medical source
evidence she found persuasive, nor did she explain her decision to omit such limitations.
Dkt. No. 13 at 6. Plaintiff argues that this alleged deficiency also constitutes legal error
under SR 96-8p. Id. at 2, 6. She further maintains that the error was harmful because, had
the limitation been included in the RFC and posed to the VE, the step-five determination
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may have been different. Id. at 7. As explained below, the ALJ’s decision not to adopt Dr.
Tenny’s persuasive medical opinion verbatim does not warrant remand.
A. The ALJ considered and incorporated Dr. Tenny’s persuasive medical
opinion into the RFC.
An ALJ bears the responsibility for determining a claimant’s residual functional ca-
pacity. Ripley v. Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 557 (5th Cir. 1995). In making that determination,
the ALJ evaluates the medical evidence of record, including physician opinions and the
claimant’s treatment history. See id. The Social Security regulations explain that the ALJ
is the fact-finder in making the RFC assessment, and the ALJ is not required to adopt the
RFC verbatim from a medical opinion, as this would nullify her role as fact-finder. Webster
v. Kijakazi, 19 F.4th 715, 719 (5th Cir. 2021). Although the ALJ is not bound to accept any
particular medical opinion, the rejection of such an opinion ordinarily requires an explana-
tion. Kneeland v. Berryhill, 850 F.3d 749, 761 (5th Cir. 2017).
Furthermore, the treating-physician rule no longer applies to claims filed after
March 27, 2017. Compare 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (2016), with 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c; see
also 82 Fed. Reg. 5853, 5853 (Jan. 18, 2017) (explaining that the revised regulations shift
the focus from the source of an opinion to the content of the evidence). Instead, an ALJ
evaluates the persuasiveness of medical opinions using the factors set forth in § 404.1520c.
The most important of those factors are supportability—whether the opinion is grounded
in objective medical evidence and supporting explanations—and consistency—whether the
opinion accords with other medical and nonmedical evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520c(c).
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Here, the ALJ evaluated the persuasiveness of each medical opinion in accordance
with § 404.1520c and articulated the supportability and consistency considerations under-
lying those opinions. See Tr. 23–25. The ALJ found only one opinion persuasive—Dr.
Tenny’s assessment limiting Plaintiff to lifting ten pounds with the left upper extremity and
precluding repetitive use of the left hand. Id. at 24. In the written decision, the ALJ ex-
plained:
Dr. Tenny’s assessment of a 10-pound lifting limitation with the left upper
extremity and no repetitive use of the left hand is persuasive. Those limita-
tions are consistent with the claimant’s pain complaints and are supported by
Dr. Tenny’s objective findings of tenderness and occasionally mildly reduced
range of motion (Ex. 1F/7; 2F/10). The limitations are accommodated by the
residual functional capacity assessment: the undersigned has limited the
claimant to lifting a total of 20 pounds occasionally, and to occasionally han-
dling with the nondominant left upper extremity.
Tr. at 25.
Contrary to Plaintiff’s contention, the RFC reflects the limitations identified by Dr.
Tenny. The ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the “residual functional capacity to per-
form light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b), except she is lim-
ited to occasional handling with her nondominant upper extremity.” Tr. at 21. Under the
regulations, light work involves lifting no more than twenty pounds at a time, with frequent
lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to ten pounds. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b),
416.967(b).
Social Security Ruling 96-8p provides that “[t]he RFC assessment must always con-
sider and address medical source opinions. If the RFC assessment conflicts with an opinion
from a medical source, the adjudicator must explain why the opinion was not adopted.”
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See SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *7. The question, therefore, is whether the RFC mean-
ingfully conflicts with Dr. Tenny’s opinion.
Here, “[a]fter careful consideration of the entire record,” including reported symp-
toms, objective medical evidence, various medical opinions, and prior administrative med-
ical findings, the ALJ found that plaintiff’s “wrist pain limits her to lifting and carrying up
to 20 pounds occasionally, and to occasional handling with her nondominant left hand.” Tr.
at 21–25. Although the ALJ did not expressly state in the RFC that Plaintiff was limited to
lifting ten pounds with her left upper extremity—as Dr. Tenny opined—she expressly
stated that she “accommodated” that persuasive opinion by limiting Plaintiff to lifting a
total of twenty pounds occasionally and to occasional handling with the nondominant left
upper extremity. Tr. at 24.
The ALJ’s use of the term “accommodated” reflects that the opinion was considered
and incorporated into the RFC assessment. The resulting RFC does not clearly conflict with
Dr. Tenny’s limitation so as to trigger a further explanatory obligation under SSR 96-8p.3
3 Compare Murray v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:23-CV-3000-TSL-RPM, 2025 WL 595807, at *5 (S.D.
Miss. Feb. 7, 2025), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Murray v. Kihakazi, No. 3:23-CV-3000-
TSL-RPM, 2025 WL 595170 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 24, 2025) (“Therefore, while Murray was limited to lifting
only 10 pounds with his dominant (right) upper extremity, he was capable of performing the light-work
jobs identified by the VE because he was capable of lifting up to 20 pounds with his non-dominant (left)
upper extremity. This is not inconsistent with Dr. Geissler’s opinion.”); Clanton v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No.
1:14-CV-1039, 2016 WL 74421, at *11 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 6, 2016) (“The fact that one arm may be further
impaired does not preclude the ability to perform light work.”); Brammer v. Astrue, No. 11-404, 2013 WL
85065, at *6 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 7, 2013) (“[T]he implicit premise of Plaintiff's argument—that a claimant with
a lifting restriction on one arm cannot sufficiently compensate with the other arm to perform light work—
is faulty. Indeed, claimants with such restrictions on a single arm have been found capable of light work.”);
Brammer v. Astrue, No. CIV.A. 11-404-DL, 2013 WL 85065 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 7, 2013) (finding claimant
capable of light work even where he had severe nerve damage to his right hand, and could only “use the
right arm occasionally for grasping ... or as an assist for pushing and pulling”);
with Phillips v. U.S. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 08-CV-0182, 2009 WL 304043, at *4 (W.D. La. Feb.
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Plaintiff cites no binding authority—and the Court is aware of none—holding that an ALJ
commits reversible error by declining to adopt a persuasive medical opinion verbatim
where the RFC does not meaningfully conflict with that opinion.4 Instead, the circum-
stances here more closely resemble those addressed in Webster.
In Webster, the ALJ relied on a state agency assessment and found it persuasive
because it was supported by the record and consistent with the claimant’s other medical
evidence. Webster v. Kijakazi, 19 F.4th 715, 719 (5th Cir. 2021). The state agency
6, 2009) (“The treating specialist’s [total] 10 pound lifting restriction appears to be in conflict with the light
work RFC and its requirement of lifting up to 20 pounds. The ALJ, who ultimately must determine the
proper weight of such an opinion, did not directly address the lifting restriction and attempt to articulate
good cause to disregard it.”); Chipley v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 4:23-CV-00529-RK, 2024 WL
4132697 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 10, 2024) (“The RFC as written led the VE to testify Plaintiff could perform
reasoning level two jobs, which require understanding uninvolved detailed instructions. This directly con-
flicts with the detailed instructions limitation opinions.”); Hickert v. Kijakazi, No. 4:21-CV-00425-DGK,
2022 WL 2966882, at *2 (W.D. Mo. July 27, 2022) (“The ALJ found the opinions of Drs. Toll and Skolnick
“persuasive” since they were consistent with—and supported by—the record evidence as a whole. Those
opinions limited Plaintiff to being able to understand and remember simple instructions. This appears to
conflict with the ALJ’s assessment in the RFC that Plaintiff was able to understand and remember de-
tailed instructions.”).
4 Cases in the Fifth Circuit, discussed below, as well as cases outside the Fifth Circuit seem to agree. For
example, in K.T.B. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:20-CV-110-MSH, 2021 WL 5906372, at *2 (M.D. Ga.
Dec. 14, 2021), the court reasoned:
Plaintiff provides no authority, however, for the proposition that merely because an adju-
dicator finds a source persuasive, he must accept it wholly and incorporate into his RFC
assessment any and all limitations that source suggests. To the contrary, the ALJ must only
explain whether a source statement is persuasive considering its supportability in, and con-
sistency with, the medical evidence as a whole. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2). The ALJ met that standard. To find otherwise, the Court
would have to invade the province of the Commissioner and reweigh the evidence which
is prohibited on judicial review. Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2004).
The Court is limited to determining whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported by
substantial evidence, a standard which “is not high.” Biestek v. Berryhill, ––– U.S. ––––,
139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154, 203 L.Ed.2d 504 (2019). Therefore, the ALJ did not err in his con-
sideration of the statement provided by Dr. Weitzman-Swann.
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determined that Webster could maintain attention and concentration “for two hour periods
... without excessive interruption from psychological symptoms” and could “interact ade-
quately, on a limited basis, receive non-confrontational supervision, and make mental adap-
tions to complete unskilled tasks in a work setting, especially those requiring minimal in-
teraction with others.” Id. It further concluded that Webster “retain[ed] mental capacity to
complete unskilled work tasks for which he remains physically capable.” Id.
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the ALJ adequately incorporated the persuasive
portions of the state agency opinion into the RFC, which limited Webster to light work with
additional postural and mental restrictions, including routine, repetitive tasks and only oc-
casional public contact. Id. at 719–20. Notably, the RFC was not a verbatim recitation of
the persuasive state agency opinion and did not mirror its terminology. Nevertheless, the
Court concluded that the ALJ sufficiently incorporated the substance of the opinion into
the RFC limitations on routine, repetitive tasks with only occasional public contact. Id. at
719–20.
The same reasoning applies here. If a limitation to maintaining attention and con-
centration for two-hour periods may be reflected through broader functional restrictions,
then Dr. Tenny’s ten-pound lifting limitation for the nondominant upper extremity may
likewise be accommodated within an RFC for light work further restricted to occasional
handling with that extremity. As in Webster, the ALJ’s decision here is supported by sub-
stantial evidence and reflects proper application of the governing legal standards. Id. at
719–20.
Similar to the instant case, and relying on Webster, the court in Kirkwood v.
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Commissioner of Social Security held that a persuasive medical opinion stating the plaintiff
“may have trouble with two-step or more complex direction[s]” was properly considered
and incorporated into an RFC limiting the claimant to one- to three-step instructions. No.
1:21-CV-116-MJT, 2022 WL 17347796, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 8, 2022), report and recom-
mendation adopted, 2022 WL 17348164 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2022). The court emphasized
that the RFC was “not a contradiction” of the persuasive opinion.5 Id.
In reply, Plaintiff contends that Webster is distinguishable because, in that case, the
ALJ evaluated the medical opinions as a whole and selectively incorporated certain limi-
tations into the RFC. Dkt. No. 16 at 2. Plaintiff argues that, here, the ALJ expressly ac-
cepted the 10-pound limitation yet failed to include it in the RFC findings. Id. The distinc-
tion is unpersuasive. As in Webster, the ALJ identified one medical opinion as persuasive,
explained why other opinions were not adopted, and then considered and incorporated the
persuasive opinion into the RFC assessment. The fact that the RFC does not replicate Dr.
Tenny’s precise wording does not, by itself, create an unexplained conflict requiring re-
mand.
The authorities Plaintiff relies upon are not controlling and address a different is-
sue—namely, conflicts between vocational expert (“VE”) testimony and the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles (“DOT”) under SSR 00-4p. See Pearson v. Colvin, 810 F.3d 204
5 District courts applying Webster have reached similar conclusions, even where an apparent tension existed
between the RFC and a persuasive opinion. See, e.g., Ballidis v. Kijakazi, No. 4:21-CV-403-ALM-KPJ,
2023 WL 2472632, at *2–6 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:21-CV-
403-ALM-KPJ, 2023 WL 2465581 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2023) (“The ALJ was [] not required to adopt the
sedentary RFC in physical therapist Andrew Martinez’s opinion, even though the ALJ found this opinion
persuasive, because the ALJ must consider the evidence in the record as a whole.”).
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(2015); Chavez-Fuentes v. Saul, No. 1:18-CV-20765-JLK, 2020 WL 5646600 (S.D. Fla.
Aug. 27, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 5644888 (S.D. Fla. Sept.
22, 2020). Those cases concern whether an ALJ must resolve an apparent inconsistency
between VE testimony and DOT job descriptions. No such inconsistency is presented here.6
Plaintiff’s argument instead concerns an alleged conflict between a persuasive medical
opinion and the RFC. The cited authorities do not address that question and therefore do
not compel remand.
Plaintiff’s reliance on Kneeland is misplaced. In Kneeland, the Fifth Circuit identi-
fied as the ALJ’s “root error” the complete failure to address—or even mention—the treat-
ing physician’s opinion. 850 F.3d 749, 761 (5th Cir. 2017). Because that omission rendered
the RFC unsupported by substantial evidence, the court concluded that the hypothetical
question based on that defective RFC was likewise invalid. Id. at 762.
The circumstances here are materially different. The ALJ expressly discussed Dr.
Tenny’s opinion, found it persuasive, and incorporated it—though not verbatim, which is
6 Federal courts review an ALJ’s decision under the rules in effect at the time the decision was issued.
See SSR 24-3p, 2024 WL 5256890, at *2 n.1 (S.S.A. Dec. 6, 2024). Because the ALJ’s decision here pre-
dates January 6, 2025, SSR 00-4p governs. That ruling has since been rescinded and replaced by SSR 24-
3p, which states: “We are rescinding SSR 00-04p and will no longer require our adjudicators to identify and
resolve conflicts between occupational information provided by VSs and VEs and information in the DOT.”
Id. at *2.
Even under SSR 00-4p, however, Fifth Circuit precedent suggested that any “apparent” conflict between
vocational expert testimony and the DOT be direct and obvious. See Carey v. Apfel, 230 F.3d 131, 146 (5th
Cir. 2000). Relying on Carey’s formulation, the court in Johnny R. J. v. Dudek concluded that a limitation
to “occasional overhead reaching” did not present a direct and obvious conflict with DOT descriptions
requiring “frequent reaching.” No. 4:23-CV-4053, 2025 WL 596096 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2025), report and
recommendation adopted sub nom. Jones v. Dudek, No. 4:23-CV-04053, 2025 WL 1261022 (S.D. Tex. Apr.
29, 2025). In any event, that line of authority is inapposite here because Plaintiff does not identify a conflict
between the VE’s testimony and the DOT.
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not required—into the RFC. Accordingly, this case does not involve the type of unex-
plained omission that warranted remand in Kneeland, and the hypothetical posed to the
vocational expert is not undermined on that basis.7
Guided by Fifth Circuit cases, including Webster and Kirkwood, in which medical
opinions were found persuasive and appropriately incorporated into the RFC, the Court
finds the same principle applies here. As in those cases, the ALJ here considered and in-
corporated Dr. Tenny’s persuasive opinion rather than rejecting it without explanation.
While the RFC did not adopt the opinion verbatim, it did not directly conflict with it, and
therefore the opinion was properly reflected in the assessment. Even if a direct conflict
were present, remand would still not be warranted because the ALJ explained that the opin-
ion was consistent with and supported by the record and relied on it as a basis in determin-
ing the ultimate RFC while considering the record as a whole. See Ballidis; K.T.B. It cannot
be said that Dr. Tenny’s persuasive opinion was ignored or that it conflicted with the RFC
to such an extent that further explanation was required. Accordingly, the ALJ did not com-
mit legal error under SSR 96-8p, and the RFC is supported by substantial evidence.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Commissioner
7 As a different point, the Court finds that the ALJ accounted for and incorporated Dr. Tenny’s persuasive
opinion in the RFC. Therefore, any claimed error is harmless. See Murray v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:23-
CV-3000-TSL-RPM, 2025 WL 595807 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 7, 2025), report and recommendation adopted sub
nom. Murray v. Kihakazi, No. 3:23-CV-3000-TSL-RPM, 2025 WL 595170 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 24, 2025). In
that case the ALJ determined an RFC of light work with a 10-pound limitation on the right arm. Id. at *1.
The “generally persuasive” medical opinion stated, “no overhead lifting of 10 pounds” and “limited push-
ing, pulling, and lifting to 10 pounds.” Id. at *3. The court held that even though the persuasiveness of the
opinion was not adequately discussed, it was evident that the ALJ nonetheless accounted for and incorpo-
rated the opinion, rendering any error harmless. Id. at *6.
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denying Plaintiff’s application for DIB and SSI benefits.
ORDERED this 20th day of February 2026.
JOHN R. PARKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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