Murphy v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
STEVEN M.,
Plaintiff,
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
v. 	Case No. 4:25-cv-00057-BT
COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Steven M.’s1 civil action seeking judicial review
under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of a final adverse decision by the Commissioner of Social
Security. 	For 	the 	reasons 	explained 	below, 	the 	Commissioner’s 	decision 	is
REVERSED.
Background
Plaintiff alleges that he is disabled due to chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease (COPD), hypertension, degenerative joint disease in his left hand, and
alcohol abuse in remission. Admin. R. at 101 (ECF No. 10-1).2 Plaintiff was born in
1 The Court uses only Plaintiff’s first name and last initial as instructed by the May
1, 	2018, 	Memorandum 	Re: 	Privacy 	Concern 	Regarding 	Social 	Security 	and
Immigration Opinions issued by the Committee on Court Administration and Case
Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States.
2 Citations to the administrative record refer to the CM/ECF page numbers at the
top of each page rather than page numbers at the bottom of each filing.
Case 4:25-cv-00057-BT Document 14 Filed 03/20/26 Page 1 of 12 PageID <pageID>

2
1963 and alleges an amended disability onset date of October 9, 2019. Id. at 25,
119. Plaintiff has a high school education. Id. at 120.
Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits (DIB) on April 10, 2020,
and supplemental security income (SSI) on July 27, 2023, under Title II and XVI
of the Social Security Act (the “Act”). Id. at 376–77 (application for DIB), 390–95
(application for SSI). His claims were denied initially and upon reconsideration.
Id. at 168, 179. Thereafter, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ), who conducted a hearing by telephone on February 29, 2024.
Id. at 182 (request for hearing); 116–17 (consenting to hearing by telephone).
On March 22, 2024, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff has not
been under a disability within the meaning of the Act from his alleged amended
onset disability date through the date of the decision, and thus not entitled to DIB
or SSI. Id. at 107. As an initial matter, the ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured
status requirements under the Act on December 31, 2023. Id. at 100. Using the
five-step sequential evaluation, the ALJ first found that Plaintiff had not engaged
in substantial gainful activity for a continuous 12-month period. Id. at 101. At the
second step, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff experienced a severe combination of
impairments, 	including 	“chronic 	obstructive 	pulmonary 	disease/emphysema,
hypertension, left hand degenerative joint disease/arthralgia, and alcohol abuse in
remission by self-report.” Id. At the third step, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s
impairments did not meet or medically equal any listed impairment in appendix 1
of the social security regulations. Id.
Case 4:25-cv-00057-BT Document 14 Filed 03/20/26 Page 2 of 12 PageID <pageID>

3
Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual
functional capacity (RFC)
to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the
following nonexertional limitations: he could use his non-dominant
left upper extremity for feeling on a frequent but not constant basis.
He could utilize his non-dominant left upper extremity for gross and
fine manipulation only [on] an occasional basis. The [Plaintiff] was
required to avoid concentrated exposure to environmental irritants,
unprotected heights, and hazardous machinery, and was limited to
performing 	simple, 	routine, 	and 	repetitive 	tasks, 	in 	a 	work
environment involving only simple work related decisions.
Id. at 103. Finally at step five, relying on the testimony of a vocational expert (VE),
the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the ability to perform the jobs of package
sealer, sales route driver helper, and counter supply clerk, and that such jobs
existed in significant numbers in the national economy. Id. at 106.
Plaintiff appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Appeals Council. Id. at 370
(request for review); 12–16 (decision of Appeals Council). The Appeals Council
agreed and adopted the ALJ’s findings on Plaintiff’s disability. Id. at 12–13.3
Plaintiff then filed this action in federal district court.
Legal Standard
Judicial review of the Commissioner’s findings is limited to whether the
decision to deny benefits is supported by substantial evidence and whether the
proper legal standards were used. Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir.
3 The Appeals Council found that the ALJ “erroneously limited the disability
inquiry to the period only through December 31, 2023.” Admin R. at 12 (ECF No.
10-1). However, the Appeals Council otherwise agreed with and adopted the ALJ’s
“findings and conclusions regarding whether [Plaintiff] is disabled[.]” Id. at 12–13.
Case 4:25-cv-00057-BT Document 14 Filed 03/20/26 Page 3 of 12 PageID <pageID>

4
1994) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3)). Substantial evidence is defined as
“that which is relevant and sufficient for a reasonable mind to accept as adequate
to support a conclusion; it must be more than a scintilla, but it need not be a
preponderance.” Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 564 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting
Anthony v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289, 295 (5th Cir. 1992)). The reviewing court does
“not reweigh the evidence, try the issues de novo, or substitute” its own judgment,
but scrutinizes the record as a whole to determine whether substantial evidence is
present. Greenspan, 38 F.3d at 236. “[A]n ALJ’s decision is not subject to reversal,
even if there is substantial evidence in the record that would have supported the
opposite conclusion, so long as substantial evidence supports the conclusion that
was reached by the ALJ.” Corpany v. Colvin, 2014 WL 1255316, at *9 (N.D. Tex.
Mar. 26, 2014) (McBryde, J.) (citing Dollins v. Astrue, 2009 WL 1542466, at *5
(N.D. Tex. June 2, 2009) (McBryde, J.)).
“Nevertheless, the substantial evidence review is not an uncritical ‘rubber
stamp’ and requires ‘more than a search for evidence supporting the [ALJ’s]
findings.’” Hill v. Saul, 2020 WL 6370168, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2020)
(Ramirez, J.) (quoting Martin v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 1027, 1031 (5th Cir. 1984)),
adopted by 2020 WL 6363878 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 29, 2020) (Lindsay, J.). The Court
“must scrutinize the record and take into account whatever fairly detracts from the
substantiality of the evidence supporting” the ALJ’s decision. Id. A no-substantial-
evidence finding is appropriate only if there is a “conspicuous absence of credible
Case 4:25-cv-00057-BT Document 14 Filed 03/20/26 Page 4 of 12 PageID <pageID>

5
choices” or “no contrary medical evidence.” Id. (quoting Johnson v. Bowen, 864
F.2d 340, 343 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)).
Analysis
On appeal, Plaintiff makes two arguments. First, Plaintiff contends that the
ALJ’s RFC determination is based on the ALJ’s own lay interpretations and
opinions rather than the required substantial evidence. Pl.’s Br. at 5–12 (ECF No.
11). Second, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not resolve an obvious conflict
between the VE’s testimony and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. Id. at 12–
15. In response to both arguments, the Commissioner argues that substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s determinations. Def.’s Br. at 3, 6 (ECF No. 12). As the
first argument is dispositive and requires remand, the Court pretermits discussion
of Plaintiff’s second argument.
The purpose of assessing a claimant’s RFC is to determine the work that can
be performed despite recognized limitations. Myers v. Apfel, 238 F.3d 617, 620
(5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). “The RFC determination
is a combined ‘medical assessment of an applicant’s impairments with descriptions
by physicians, the applicant, or others of any limitations on the applicant’s ability
to work.’” Hill, 2020 WL 6370168, at *6 (cleaned up) (quoting Hollis v. Bowen,
837 F.2d 1378, 1386-87 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)). It “is an assessment of an
individual’s ability to do sustained work-related physical and mental activities in a
work setting on a regular and continuing basis.” Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96-
8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *1 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996). An individual’s RFC should be
Case 4:25-cv-00057-BT Document 14 Filed 03/20/26 Page 5 of 12 PageID <pageID>

6
based on all the relevant evidence in the record, including opinions submitted by
treating 	physicians 	or 	other 	acceptable 	medical 	sources. 	20 	C.F.R.
§ 404.1545(a)(3); see also SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *1.
In this case, the Court finds that ALJ’s RFC determination is not supported
by substantial evidence. The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has the RFC “to perform
a full range of work at all exertional levels[.]” Admin. R. at 103 (ECF No. 10-1). But
the ALJ imposed the following nonexertional limitations: (1) Plaintiff “could use
his non-dominant left upper extremity for feeling on a frequent but not consistent
basis,” and (2) Plaintiff “could utilize his non-dominant left upper extremity for
gross and fine manipulation only [on] an occasional basis.” Id. He further limited
Plaintiff 	to 	“performing 	simple, 	routine, 	and 	repetitive 	tasks, 	in 	a 	work
environment involving only simple work related decisions.” Id. And he found that
Plaintiff “was required to avoid concentrated exposure to environmental irritants,
unprotected heights, and hazardous machinery.” Id.
In reaching this decision, the ALJ points to Plaintiff’s symptoms and the
objective medical evidence. Id. The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s “medically
determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause certain of the
alleged symptoms; however, [Plaintiff’s] statements concerning the intensity,
persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with
the medical evidence and other evidence in the record[.]” Id. at 104.
Specifically as to the limitations posed to Plaintiff’s use of his hands, the ALJ
noted that imaging studies showed “mild to moderative degenerative changes in
Case 4:25-cv-00057-BT Document 14 Filed 03/20/26 Page 6 of 12 PageID <pageID>

7
his left hand,” but the medical evidence showed Plaintiff’s extremity strength and
range of motion were normal, and Plaintiff did not indicate trouble using his left
hand. Id. And regarding his COPD, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s COPD was
established in objective testing, but “respiratory findings have generally been
essentially or entirely normal apart from intermittent [COPD] exacerbations.” Id.
The ALJ further noted that these normal COPD findings were made while Plaintiff
engaged in cigarette smoking. Id.
The ALJ also based the limitations on Plaintiff’s testimony that he had been
employed or engaged in search of employment during the relevant period. Id. The
ALJ found that Plaintiff engaged in various daily activities, including “meal
preparation, pet care, shopping, driving, laundry, and the performance of small
repairs and household chores, while denying that he had difficulties in such mental
functions as memory, concentration, understanding, getting along with others,
and following instructions.” Id. Further, the ALJ cited a third-party function report
from Plaintiff’s friend stating that Plaintiff’s impairments affected his “lifting,
squatting, bending, walking, talking, stair climbing, and completing tasks,” but
that Plaintiff was still able to care for his personal hygiene and pet, prepare meals,
perform household chores, follow instructions, manage stress, and work well with
authority figures. Id. at 104–05.
Notably absent from the ALJ’s decision is any medical source evidence on
how Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms affected his ability to work. The administrative
record 	reveals 	that 	the 	state 	agency 	medical 	consultants 	found 	insufficient
Case 4:25-cv-00057-BT Document 14 Filed 03/20/26 Page 7 of 12 PageID <pageID>

8
evidence to determine Plaintiff’s abilities and limitations. Id. at 105; see also id. at
151–53, 166–67 (noting insufficient evidence). And the ALJ stated that “[n]o
treating, examining or reviewing medical or psychological source has opined that
[Plaintiff] is more limited or less capable than is reflected” in the RFC. Id. at 105.
“There is no requirement that an ALJ’s RFC finding must mirror or match a
medical opinion.” Nic R. v. Kijakazi, 2023 WL 2529930, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 21,
2023) (citation omitted) (Rutherford, J.), adopted by 2023 WL 2531492 (N.D. Tex.
Mar. 15, 2023) (Kinkeade, J.). “Even the absence of medical opinions does not
necessarily render a record inadequate to support an ALJ’s RFC determination.”
Id. at *5 (citing Ripley v. Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 557 (5th Cir. 1995) and Joseph-Jack
v. Barnhart, 80 F. App’x 317, 318 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam)). But “as a non-
medical 	professional, 	the 	ALJ 	is 	not 	permitted 	to 	‘draw 	his 	own 	medical
conclusions from some of the data, without relying on a medical expert’s help.’”
Kenneth S. v. Saul, 2019 WL 3881618, at *5 (N.D. Tex. July 31, 2019) (Horan, J.)
(quoting Frank v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 618, 621–22 (5th Cir. 2003)), adopted by
2019 WL 3859653 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2019) (Lindsay, J.). ALJs must resist the
urge to “play[ ] doctor” and make independent medical assessments. Id. at *7
(citation omitted); see also Wanda K.W. v. Commissioner, 2024 WL 1078300, at
*3 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 22, 2024) (Toliver, J.) (“The ALJ also may not rely on her own
unsupported opinion of the limitations the claimant’s medical conditions might
present.”), adopted by 2024 WL 1078242 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2024) (Scholer, J.).
Case 4:25-cv-00057-BT Document 14 Filed 03/20/26 Page 8 of 12 PageID <pageID>

9
This is because “[c]ommon sense can mislead” and “lay intuitions about medical
phenomena are often wrong.” Frank, 326 F.3d at 622 (citation omitted).
Here, the record shows that the ALJ based his RFC decision on evidence that
merely describes Plaintiff’s medical conditions. See, e.g., Admin. R. at 48 (ECF No.
10-2) (describing Plaintiff’s degenerative changes in left hand as “moderate” and
“mild”); 632 (describing Plaintiff’s lung sounds as “clear”), 164 (stating that
Plaintiff’s “blood pressure is usually adequately controlled”); 163, 183, 214 & 225
(providing Plaintiff’s lab results); 195 & 686 (describing Plaintiff’s hypertension as
“controlled”); 616 (noting that Plaintiff is on medication for COPD and CT showed
bullous emphysema). But evidence that merely describes Plaintiff’s impairments
without discussing how those impairments limit his ability to work is insufficient
to support the RFC determination. See Antonio A. v. O’Malley, 2024 WL 495260,
at *5 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 7, 2024) (Rutherford, J.) (finding no foundational basis for
RFC determination because there were “no medical opinions in the record
regarding the effects of [p]lainitff’s visual impairments on his ability to work,” and
therefore the Court concluded “that the ALJ relied on his own interpretation of the
medical and other evidence”); Wanda K.W., 2024 WL 1078300, at *3 (reversing
ALJ’s RFC determination because “there was no medical source evidence as to how
[p]laintiff’s mental limitations affected [the plaintiff’s] ability to work”); Donna A.
v. Commissioner, 2023 WL 5004867, at *6 (N.D. Tex. July 17, 2023) (Bryant, J.)
(finding error where the ALJ’s RFC finding rested only on the plaintiff’s testimony
and self-reporting history, observation and examination records from treatment
Case 4:25-cv-00057-BT Document 14 Filed 03/20/26 Page 9 of 12 PageID <pageID>

10
notes, and clinical test results without evidence that demonstrated the plaintiff’s
ability to work despite limitations), adopted by 2023 WL 5004073 (N.D. Tex. Aug.
4, 	2023) 	(Hendrix, 	J.). 	The 	ALJ 	should 	have 	requested 	a “medical 	source
statement” describing types of work the claimant is still capable of performing
despite his condition. Ripley, 67 F.3d at 557. The Commissioner does not point to
any medical source evidence supporting the ALJ’s RFC analysis and makes no
attempt to distinguish Plaintiff’s cited cases. It appears that the ALJ based his RFC
determination on his own opinion of the limitations Plaintiff’s impairments might
present without a foundational basis, and thus the RFC determination is not
supported by substantial evidence.
Nevertheless, “[p]rocedural perfection in administrative proceedings is not
required” and a court “will not vacate a judgment unless the substantial rights of a
party have been affected.” Mays v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1362, 1364 (5th Cir. 1988) (per
curiam) (citations omitted). Rather, “Plaintiff must show he was prejudiced by the
ALJ’s failure to rely on medical opinion evidence in assessing his RFC.” Antonio
A., 2024 WL 495260, at *6 (citing Mays, 837 F.2d at 1364). Stated differently, “[t]o
establish prejudice, he must show that the ALJ’s failure to rely on a medical
opinion” as to the effects his impairments had on his ability to work “casts doubt
on the existence of substantial evidence supporting the disability determination.”
Id. (citing McNair v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 537 F. Supp. 2d 823, 837 (N.D.
Tex. 2008)).
Case 4:25-cv-00057-BT Document 14 Filed 03/20/26 Page 10 of 12 PageID <pageID>

11
Courts in this district and other districts throughout Texas have found that
“the ALJ’s failure to rely on a medical opinion concerning the claimant’s RFC
necessarily casts doubt on the disability determination.” Amy Y., 2023 WL
5209813, at *7 (N.D. Tex. July 25, 2023) (Bryant, J.) (collecting cases); see also
Sheila P. v. Bisignano, 2026 WL 529285, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2026) (finding
prejudice and remanding where ALJ made a physical RFC determination without
evidence in the record clearly establishing the effect of the plaintiff's impairments
on her ability to work), adopted by 2026 WL 528024 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2026);
Tiede v. Dudek, 770 F. Supp. 3d 965, 971–73 (W.D. Tex. 2025) (finding prejudice
and remanding where there was no medical opinion on the plaintiff's ability to
work and the sole evidence on her ability to work came from her own testimony);
Antonio A., 2024 WL 495260, at *6 (finding prejudice and remanding where the
administrative record lacked medical opinions on the effects of the plaintiff’s
impairments on his ability to work); Donna A., 2023 WL 5004867, at *6 (finding
prejudice 	and 	remanding 	where 	the 	administrative 	record 	did 	“not 	clearly
establish how [p]laintiff’s conditions impact[ed] her ability to perform medium
work and there [were] no medical opinions to otherwise serve as a foundation for
that decision”); Stephen R. v. Commissioner, 2025 WL 888496, at *5 (N.D. Tex.
Mar. 21, 2025) (Toliver, J.) (finding prejudice and remanding where the ALJ
appeared “to have relied upon his own interpretation of the medical record and
testimonial evidence”). As in the above cases, the Court concludes that Plaintiff
Case 4:25-cv-00057-BT Document 14 Filed 03/20/26 Page 11 of 12 PageID <pageID>

12
was prejudiced by the ALJ’s failure to obtain a medical opinion and remand is
required.
Indeed, if the ALJ had fully developed the record by using the many options
available to receive a medical opinion—a consultive examination, a medical source
statement, 	an 	evaluation 	of 	the 	new 	records 	by 	state 	agency 	medical 	and
psychological 	consultants, 	a 	treating 	source 	opinion, 	or 	interrogatories—the
evidence could have led to a more limiting RFC. It is “conceivable,” as Plaintiff
contends, see Pl.’s Br. at 12 (ECF No. 11), that a medical expert after reviewing the
evidence related to Plaintiff’s pulmonary functioning would opine that Plaintiff
could not do the lifting, carrying, standing, and/or walking required for medium
exertion work. And if he were limited to performing light work, Plaintiff may be
disabled under the Medical-Vocational grid rules. Id.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated, the Court REVERSES the Commissioner’s decision
and REMANDS the case to the Commissioner for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
March 20, 2026.
REBECCA RUTHERFORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case 4:25-cv-00057-BT Document 14 Filed 03/20/26 Page 12 of 12 PageID <pageID>