May v. Gilchrist Automotive Group LLC et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
ROOSEVELT M AY ,
Plaintiff,
v. 	No. 4:24-cv-01070-P
G ILCHRIST AUTOMOTIVE G ROUP, LLC,
ET AL .,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF
No. 38. 	Having 	considered 	the 	briefing, 	evidence 	of 	record, 	and
applicable law, the Court concludes the Motion should be and hereby is
GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
This 	case 	arises 	from Plaintiff Roosevelt May’s 	termination 	as
general manager of three automotive dealerships in Lawton, Oklahoma:
Southwest 	Buick 	GMC, 	Southwest 	HMS, 	and 	Southwest 	MMC
(collectively, the “Dealerships”). Defendant Gilchrist Automotive Group,
LLC owns and manages these Dealerships.
In fall of 2022, Defendants offered May employment as general
manager of the Dealerships. He signed a written pay plan providing
(among other terms) a monthly salary, a monthly commission tied to net
profit, and an option to purchase up to 20% ownership interest in each
dealership. May later exercised that option to purchase 10% interest in
the Mazda dealership.
However, during May’s tenure as general manager, Defendants
became dissatisfied with his work performance. The summary judgment
record contains evidence that May routinely failed to work during the
Dealerships’ operations hours; missed Saturdays; left the Dealerships
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during the workday without the required notice; and failed to enforce
company policies. The record also reflects concerns regarding May’s
management and oversight of the Dealerships. This includes employee
relations issues, failure to document and investigate a report of sexual
harassment, and repeated errors in reviewing expenses and vehicle
deals.
Defendants terminated May’s employment in February 2024. May
contends that he was both hired and fired because of his race and that
Defendants manipulated dealership expenses in a manner that reduced
the compensation owed to him under the pay plan.
May filed this suit asserting: (1) race discrimination under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; (2) race discrimination under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981; (3) breach of contract relating to the pay plan; and (4) fraudulent
misrepresentation in the alternative to the contract claim. Defendants
move for summary judgment on all claims. The Motion is now ripe for
review.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper if “there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” FED. R. CIV . P. 56(a). A dispute is “genuine” if the evidence
presented would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict in favor of
the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 242–43
(1986). A fact is “material” if it would affect a case’s outcome. Id. at 248.
Generally, the “substantive law will identify which facts are material,”
and “[f]actual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be
counted.” Id. In assessing whether summary judgment is appropriate,
the Court views evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
Cunningham v. Circle 8 Crane Servs., LLC, 64 F.4th 597, 600 (5th Cir.
2023).
The Court may rely on any evidence of record but need only consider
those materials cited by the parties. FED. R. CIV . P. 56(c)(1)–(3); see
generally Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (noting
summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
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any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law”). But the
Court need not mine the record for evidence supporting the nonmovant;
the burden falls on the moving party to simply show a lack of evidence
supporting the nonmovant’s case. See Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393,
404–05 (5th Cir. 2003).
ANALYSIS
Defendants seek summary judgment on each of the claims levied by
May. The Court will address each in turn.
A. Race Discrimination (Title VII & Section 1981)
May’s Title VII and Section 1981 claims are evaluated under the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework when, as here, the
plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence. Wesley v. Gen. Drivers,
Warehousemen & Helpers Loc. 745, 660 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 2011).
McDonnell Douglas requires a three-step burden-shifting framework for
evaluating discrimination claims. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The burden initially lies with the plaintiff to
establish a prima facie case. Id. It then shifts to the defendant to
“articulate 	some 	legitimate, 	nondiscriminatory 	reason 	for 	the
[employment action].” Id. Finally, a plaintiff is afforded an opportunity
to show through adequate evidence that the defendant’s stated reasons
were a mere pretext for discrimination. Id. at 804.
Courts review “racial discrimination and retaliation claims based on
Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981[] under the same rubric of analysis.”
Johnson v. Halstead, 916 F.3d 410, 420 (5th Cir. 2019). Assuming
without deciding that May can establish a prima facie case, the burden
shifts to Defendants to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for the termination. Johnson v. PRIDE Indus., 7 F.4th 392, 406 (5th Cir.
2021).
Defendants meet that burden here. The summary judgment record
includes evidence that May was terminated for poor performance and
an inability to fulfill the duties of a general manager. Including repeated
attendance 	problems, 	failures 	to 	enforce 	workplace 	policies,
mishandling of employee relations issues, and mistakes resulting in
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financial losses and operational problems for the Dealerships. See ECF
No. 39 at 3–9. Even independently, each constitutes a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for termination.
May attempts to rebut these justifications with argument rather
than evidence. For example, he contends that Defendants’ witnesses
lacked “detail” regarding leadership failures, and he disputes whether
he should have been blamed for employee misconduct. ECF No 41 at
4, 9. 	But 	the 	evidentiary 	record 	contains 	specific 	operational 	and
personnel issues that Defendants attributed to May’s management.
ECF No. 39 at 3–9. While Plaintiff may disagree with Defendants’
assessment of these events, his arguments fail to create a fact issue on
discriminatory motive. To the extent some of the provided reasons for
termination violated the discovery rules, ECF No. 41 at 5–6, even
assuming the truth of that argument, Defendants provide a variety of
further justification for Mays termination. Each of which suffices as a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification for his termination.
The burden consequently returns to May to identify competent
evidence, creating a genuine dispute that Defendants’ stated reasons are
mere pretext for discrimination. Johnson, 7 F.4th at 406. May fails to
meet that burden in both instances. May relies on remarks by a third
party regarding how May was allegedly hired on the basis of his race.
ECF No. 41 at 2–3. Even if May presented this evidence in an admissible
form, evidence of hiring decisions has no bearing on his termination, nor
does it show how the proffered reasons for his termination were merely
pretextual. See Corley v. Louisiana, 816 F. Supp. 2d 297, 316 (M.D. La.
2011) (finding that the supposed evidence of racial hiring does not
support an inference that race was a motivating factor in the ultimate
employment action).
The relevant question at the pretext stage is whether Defendants’
reasoning for the adverse action—here, the termination of May—was
not the real reason for the decision, but rather a disguise for unlawful
discrimination. Even if evidence of a DEI initiative is accurate, it does
not meaningfully address the question at hand. Employers can hire and
later fire employees for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. The fact
that May’s hiring may have been based on his race does not, by itself,
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make 	the 	later 	performance-based 	reasons 	for 	his 	termination
pretextual.
To survive summary judgment, Plaintiff must point to evidence that
Defendants’ explanation for his termination is unworthy of credence.
Because May provides no competent summary judgment evidence tying
his 	termination 	to 	race, 	he 	has 	failed 	to 	overcome 	his 	summary
judgment burden.
May also argues that Defendants’ rationale for termination has
shifted. ECF No. 41 at 3. Even so, Defendants’ evidence consistently
centers on May’s performance while employed, and the additional
examples offered at summary judgment are not inconsistent with that
core explanation. The justification for May’s termination has always
been, 	and 	remains, 	performance-based. 	Providing 	additional
justifications now does not alter the nature of the termination. In any
event, May must produce evidence of intentional discrimination, not
merely dispute the wisdom of Defendants’ personnel decisions. He has
failed to do so.
Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on May’s
Title VII and Section 1981 claims.
B. Breach of Contract
May’s theory for breach of contract relies on the pay plan tying his
monthly 	commission 	and 	annual 	bonus 	to 	net 	profit, 	and 	that
Defendants “falsely inflated expenses” during his employment, reducing
his net income and therefore reducing his commission, constituting a
breach. ECF No. 1 at 10. May’s briefing provides very little for the Court
to review. May’s only evidence in support of this theory is the deposition
of Mr. Gilchrist, in which he discusses the concept of “packs.” ECF No.
41 at 15. This theory relies upon the idea that these “packs,” purchased
by consumers, were not included in the gross profits of the dealerships
and thus impacted May’s bottom line. Id.
Even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-
movant, it does not create a genuine dispute of material fact. From
Plaintiff’s 	bare 	briefing, 	it 	is 	unclear 	how 	these 	packs 	“inflated”
dealership expenses. See id. In fact, using the packs as described by May
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and in the deposition of Mr. Gilchrist was likely to increase gross profits.
ECF No. 41–2 at 36 (“[I]t just accumulates in perpetuity until there’s
some emergency . . . if a store isn’t doing well, it’s going into other
income.”).
The evidence in the summary judgment record must be “such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Ibanez
v. Tex. A&M Univ. Kingsville, 118 F.4th 677, 682 (5th Cir. 2024)
(quoting Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., 402 U.S. F.3d 536, 540 (5th
Cir. 2005)). May’s conclusory briefing on the subject and the citation to
a single deposition simply do not overcome this low bar. The evidence is
“so weak [and] tenuous on an essential fact that it could not support a
judgment in favor of the nonmovant.” Armstrong v. City of Dallas, 997
F.2d 62, 67 (5th Cir. 1993). At present, that essential fact is the whole
claim, and the minimal briefing is insufficient to even explain May’s
breach of contract theory. Consequently, no reasonable jury could arrive
at a verdict in May’s favor, and Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment as a matter of law.
C. Fraudulent Misrepresentation
May’s 	fraudulent 	misrepresentation 	claim 	rests 	on 	the 	same
“inflated expenses” theory, and May dedicates a single sentence in his
Response to the claims defense. ECF No. 41 at 41. For the same reasons
above, it also fails to overcome summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Summary Judgment should be
and 	hereby 	is 	GRANTED. 	All 	claims 	are 	DISMISSED 	with
prejudice. 	Any 	pending 	requests 	for 	evidentiary 	sanction 	are
DENIED.
SO ORDERED on this 20th day of January 2026.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
REGINALEA KEMP ,
Plaintiff,
v. 	No. 4:23-cv-00841-P
REGIONS BANK ET AL .,
Defendants.
ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion for Leave to File
Second Amended Complaint. ECF No. 18. Having considered the Motion
and applicable docket entries, the Court GRANTS the Motion.
SO ORDERED on this 18th day of September 2023.
______________________________________________
Mark T. Pittman
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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