Gooden v. Lhoist North America of Texas, LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
T IM G OODEN ,
Plaintiff,
v. 	No. 4:24-cv-00750-P
L HOIST N ORTH A MERICA
OF T EXAS, LLC,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF
No. 64. Having considered the briefing and evidence of record, the Court
concludes the Motion should be and hereby is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Defendant Lhoist North America of Texas, LLC (“Lhoist”) is a
subsidiary of a Belgium-based company engaged in the production and
sale of lime products. ECF No. 73 at 1. Lhoist operates nine terminals
in Texas, where it mixes and distributes lime, and employs hundreds of
semi-truck drivers to transport its products throughout the state. ECF
No. 73 at 2.
Lhoist hired Plaintiff Tim Gooden, who is Black, as a truck driver in
2005 and assigned him to its Hurst, Texas terminal. ECF No. 73 at 2.
Gooden remained employed with Lhoist for approximately eighteen
years. ECF No. 73 at 2. During his employment, Gooden primarily drove
routes between Clifton and Hurst, Texas, and occasionally hauled longer
interstate loads. ECF No. 73 at 2.
Lhoist 	drivers 	routinely 	worked 	overnight 	or 	extended 	shifts
depending on route demands. ECF No. 73 at 6. Lhoist maintained
written safety policies addressing driver fatigue and instructed drivers
to rest as necessary to comply with company policies and federal safety
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regulations. ECF No. 73 at 6, 27. Drivers were compensated for logged
work time, and Lhoist monitored compliance with timekeeping, safety,
and operational policies. ECF No. 73 at 6.
At 	various 	points 	during 	his 	employment, 	Gooden 	proposed
operational 	changes 	and 	suggested 	that 	he 	assume 	additional
responsibilities intended to supplement existing operations. ECF No. 73
at 7. These suggestions included assisting with dispatch coordination,
training, and preparatory tasks. ECF No. 73 at 7. Lhoist did not create
permanent positions, managerial roles, or full-time assignments based
on these proposals. ECF No. 65 at 6–7. Certain operational adjustments
were implemented as part of routine supervisory discretion, but the
additional tasks did not involve a change in title, compensation, or
supervisory authority. ECF No. 65 at 6–7.
In 	or 	around 	2021, 	Lhoist 	experienced 	changes 	in 	terminal
management and reassessed driver assignments and operational needs.
ECF No. 	73 	at 	6–7. 	As 	part of 	that reassessment, 	certain 	tasks
previously 	performed 	by 	Gooden—such 	as 	interstate 	hauling 	and
specialized testing activities—were reassigned based on business needs
and supervisory judgment. ECF No. 65 at 17. Lhoist continued to employ
Gooden as a truck driver following these changes. ECF No. 73 at 7.
In April 2023, Gooden raised concerns with management regarding
workplace issues, including scheduling and timekeeping practices. ECF
No. 73 at 8. These complaints did not reference race or allege unlawful
discrimination. ECF No. 73 at 8; ECF No. 65 at 12. Later in mid-2023,
Gooden 	discussed 	perceived 	unfair 	treatment 	with 	management
personnel. ECF No. 65 at 10–11. Lhoist addressed these concerns
through routine supervisory channels. ECF No. 65 at 11–13.
In 	August 	2023, 	Lhoist 	investigated 	Gooden 	for 	timekeeping
violations, including extended periods of non-work activity while on the
clock. 	ECF 	No. 	65 	at 	13. 	Lhoist 	determined 	that 	Gooden 	had
accumulated approximately sixty hours of unauthorized time. ECF No.
65 at 13. On August 25, 2023, Lhoist suspended Gooden pending the
investigation. ECF No. 73 at 9. Lhoist offered Gooden a Last Chance
Agreement addressing policy compliance expectations. ECF No. 73 at
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10. 	Gooden 	proposed 	revisions 	to 	the 	agreement, 	which 	Lhoist
ultimately declined. ECF No. 73 at 11. Gooden returned to work on
September 11, 2023. ECF No. 73 at 11.
On August 28, 2023—after his suspension—Gooden filed a charge of
discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
ECF No. 73 at 10.
In 	October 	2023, 	Gooden 	applied 	for 	the 	position 	of 	Regional
Terminal Operations Manager. ECF No. 65 at 20. The position required
multi-site management experience, supervisory responsibility, and prior
leadership over terminal operations. ECF No. 65 at 20. Lhoist selected
Chris Clark, who possessed extensive experience managing terminal
operations across multiple facilities and supervising employees. ECF
No. 65 at 21. Gooden did not possess comparable management or multi-
site supervisory experience. ECF No. 73 at 19–20.
In 	April 	2024, 	Lhoist 	investigated 	a 	safety 	incident 	involving
Gooden’s use of a tow strap on company equipment. ECF No. 73 at 13–
14. Lhoist concluded that Gooden failed to follow safety procedures and
engaged 	in 	inappropriate 	conduct 	during 	a 	subsequent 	meeting
regarding the incident. ECF No. 65 at 22–23. At the time, Gooden
remained subject to disciplinary expectations following the prior Last
Chance Agreement. ECF No. 65 at 24. On April 11, 2024, Lhoist
terminated Gooden’s employment citing his the violations and conduct
concerns. ECF No. 65 at 24.
Gooden sued Lhoist for racial discrimination and retaliation claims
under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, initiating this
action on August 7, 2024. ECF No. 1. Gooden filed a Second Amended
Complaint on March 21, 2025, which is the live complaint in this case.
ECF No. 27. After discovery, Lhoist moved for summary judgment on all
claims on October 31, 2025. The Motion is now ripe for review.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper if “there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” FED. R. CIV . P. 56(a). A dispute is “genuine” if the evidence
presented would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict in favor of
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the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 242–43
(1986). A fact is “material” if it would affect a case’s outcome. Id. at 248.
Generally, the “substantive law will identify which facts are material,”
and “[f]actual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be
counted.” Id.
In assessing whether summary judgment is appropriate, the Court
views 	evidence 	in 	the 	light 	most 	favorable 	to 	the 	nonmovant.
Cunningham v. Circle 8 Crane Servs., LLC, 64 F.4th 597, 600 (5th Cir.
2023). The Court may rely on any evidence of record but need only
consider those materials cited by the parties. FED. R. CIV . P. 56(c)(1)–(3);
see generally Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (noting
summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law”). But the
Court need not mine the record for evidence supporting the nonmovant;
the burden falls on the moving party to simply show a lack of evidence
supporting the nonmovant’s case. See Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393,
404–05 (5th Cir. 2003).
ANALYSIS
Defendant 	seeks 	summary 	judgment 	on 	Plaintiff’s 	race
discrimination and retaliation claims under the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
42 U.S.C. § 1981. The Court takes both claims in turn.
A. Section 1981 Race Discrimination Claims
Defendant Lhoist counters that Gooden cannot establish a prima
facie case of race discrimination. Specifically, Lhoist contends that
Gooden cannot show that he suffered an actionable adverse employment
action or that he was treated less favorably than similarly situated
employees outside his protected class.
A § 1981 race discrimination claim based on circumstantial evidence
is analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Melvin v. Barr Roofing Co., 806 F.
App’x 301, 305 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Rogers v. Pearland Indep. Sch.
Dist., 827 F.3d 403, 408 (5th Cir. 2016)).
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Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must first establish a prima
facie case of race discrimination. Rogers, 827 F.3d at 408. If the plaintiff
does so, the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action. Id. “If
the employer satisfies this burden, the presumption of discrimination
drops out of the picture, and the employee must offer some evidence
that” the employer’s reason was pretextual, or that the plaintiff’s
protected 	characteristic 	was 	a 	“motivating 	factor” 	for 	the 	alleged
discrimination. Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted).
To establish a prima facie case, Gooden must show that he (1) is a
member of a protected class; (2) was qualified for the position sought; (3)
suffered 	an 	adverse 	employment 	action; 	and 	(4) 	was 	replaced 	by
someone outside his protected class or was treated less favorably than
similarly situated employees outside his class. Haire v. Bd. of Sup’rs of
La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll., 719 F.3d 356, 363 (5th Cir. 2013).
The first element is undisputed. Gooden is a Black man and thus a
member of a protected class. The remaining elements are contested.
1. The 2017 Role, the 2020 Role, and the Fleet Lead Role
Gooden identifies seven alleged adverse employment actions: (1) the
employment disputes concerning the 2017 role; (2) the 2020 role; (3) the
Fleet Lead role; (4) Lhoist’s decision not to promote him to Regional
Terminal 	Operations 	Manager; 	(5) 	alleged 	pay 	disparities; 	(6) 	his
suspension and placement on a Last Chance Agreement; and (7) his
termination. The Court takes the first three together.
a. Statute of Limitations
To begin, Lhoist argues that the claims based on the 2017 and 2020
roles are time-barred. Section 1981 contains no express statute of
limitations, so courts apply the most closely analogous state limitations
period. Jones v. Alcoa, Inc., 339 F.3d 359, 364 (5th Cir. 2003). Generally,
in Texas, when a § 1981 claim is brought, the two-year statute of
limitations for personal injury actions controls. See Byers v. Dallas
Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 424 (5th Cir. 2000); Price v. Digital
Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir. 1988).
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Some courts, however, apply a four-year statute of limitations to
claims arising under the 1991 amendments to § 1981, which cover post-
contract-formation conduct such as termination. Teamah v. Applied
Materials, Inc., 715 Fed. Appx. 343, 346 n.13. (5th Cir. 2017).
Here, the 2017 position was proposed and filled before 2017, and the
2020 position was proposed in 2020. ECF No. 65 at 7. Gooden filed his
first complaint on August 7, 2024. ECF No. 1. Accordingly, both claims
are time-barred under either a two-year or four-year limitations period.
b. Lack of Actionable Adverse Employment Action
But even assuming arguendo that these claims are timely, the 2017
and 2020 roles are not actionable under § 1981. See Hamilton v. Dall.
Cty., 79 F.4th 494, 505 (5th Cir. 2023) (explaining that Title VII does not
permit liability for de minimis workplace trifles); Sambrano v. United
Airlines, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 3d 652, 665 (N.D. Tex. 2023) (requiring more
than a de minimis harm). A plaintiff must show some harm affecting an
identifiable term or condition of employment. Muldrow v. City of St. Louis,
601 U.S. 346, 354 (2024). In other words, the challenged action must
meaningfully alter the terms of employment and injure the employee.
Fleming v. Methodist Healthcare Sys. Of San Antonio, Ltd. L.L.P., No.
SA-21-CV01234-XR, 2024 WL 1055120, at *12 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 11,
2021). In short, the plaintiff must show a disadvantageous change in an
employment term or condition.
Here, the 2017 and 2020 roles were temporary assignments involving
additional responsibilities intended to supplement hours. They were not
full-time positions. Gooden offers no evidence that the failure to assign
these responsibilities altered the terms or conditions of his employment
or caused him injury.
The same is true of the Fleet Lead role. Gooden describes that role
as arriving early to prepare for the day before other drivers arrived. See
ECF No. 65 at 5–8. But this, too, involved additional responsibilities
rather than a separate job or promotion. The employee assigned these
duties received no pay increase, held no managerial title, and exercised
no supervisory authority. Therefore, the failure to assign these tasks
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does not constitute an adverse employment action. See Hamilton, 79
F.4th at 505.
Because these alleged actions are either not timely or not actionable,
Gooden fails to establish a prima facie case as to the 2017 role, the 2020
role, and the Fleet Lead role.
2. 	Failure 	to 	Promote 	to 	Regional 	Terminal 	Operations
Manager
Gooden next alleges that Lhoist denied him a promotion to Regional
Terminal 	Operations 	Manager 	in 	2023. 	Although 	he 	satisfies 	the
protected-class element and alleges an adverse employment decision, he
fails to establish the remaining elements of a prima facie case.
The Regional Terminal Operations Manager position was several
levels above Gooden’s role as a truck driver. Gooden presents no
evidence that he possessed the qualifications required for the position
beyond his experience as a driver and his years of service. As the record
demonstrates, that showing is insufficient for the managerial role he
sought.
Gooden also has not demonstrated that Lhoist treated a similarly
situated employee outside his protected class more favorably. The
selected candidate, Chris Clark, is White. But Clark is not similarly
situated. He had 17 years of terminal management experience and
additional experience as a production supervisor, maintenance planner,
and 	operations 	manager. 	ECF 	No. 	65 	at 	20. 	Because 	Clark 	was
significantly more qualified, he is not a valid comparator.
Gooden, therefore, fails to establish a prima facie case of race
discrimination based on the failure to promote.
3. Alleged Pay Disparities
Gooden also alleges that he was paid less than similarly situated
White drivers. He identifies Blendon and Payne as comparators. The
record shows, however, that neither worked at the same terminal as
Gooden. As a result, they are not similarly situated.
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Gooden offers no evidence that non-Black employees performing the
same job with the same responsibilities were paid more. This claim fails
at the prima facie stage.
4. Suspension, Last Chance Agreement, and Termination
Gooden further alleges discrimination arising from his suspension,
placement on a Last Chance Agreement, and termination. Each claim
fails for the same reason: Gooden has not identified a similarly situated
non-Black employee who received more favorable treatment.
However, “the [F]ifth Circuit defines ‘similarly situated’ narrowly.”
Agoh v. Hyatt Corp., 992 F. Supp. 2d 722, 735 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (citation
omitted). Similarly situated individuals must be ‘nearly identical’ and
outside the plaintiff’s protective class. Id. at 735–36 (citing Wheeler v.
BL Dev. Corp., 415 F.3d 399, 405 (5th Cir. 2005)). Here, Gooden does not
provide evidence of another individual with a nearly identical history of
misconduct: 	such 	as 	an 	individual 	who 	took 	60 	hours 	worth 	of
unauthorized breaks on the clock who received preferential treatment
or 	was 	not 	disciplined. 	His 	general 	assertions 	do 	not 	satisfy 	the
requirements to make a prima facie showing.
The termination claim fails for the same reason. At the time of his
termination, Gooden was returning from a suspension and on a Last
Chance Agreement for stealing company time. He was approached about
a safety issue. Lhoist asserts that when confronted, Gooden was upset
and became aggressive. He started yelling, called the supervisor a liar,
accused the supervisor of trying to get employees fired, and accused the
supervisor of belittling employees. Lhoist sent Gooden home and later
terminated him.
Gooden presents evidence of another employee, Mr. Kalahiki, as
someone similarly situated. Kalahiki falls outside of Gooden’s protected
class. However, Kalahiki is not similarly situated. He does not share the
nearly identical disciplinary history. ECF No. 73 at 22. For example, the
evidence presented does not show that Kalahiki was also on a Last
Chance Agreement, that he was previously suspended, or that he
reacted similarly when approached about the tow strap. ECF No. 73 at
22. Gooden contends that they are similarly situated because they both
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tied a tow strap to the front of their respective trucks, in contravention
of company policy. However, participating in the same action does not
make individuals similarly situated. Kalahiki is not “nearly identical,”
especially when considering Gooden’s disciplinary history, and thus
cannot be used to demonstrate preferential treatment.
Ultimately, Gooden fails to demonstrate a prima facie case of racial
discrimination in each instance because: (1) the failure to promote
Gooden to take on extra responsibilities is not an adverse employment
action, (2) Gooden has not demonstrated that he was qualified for the
Regional Terminal Operations Manager role, and (3) or shown that he
was treated less favorably than someone similarly situated in regards to
his suspension and termination.
B. Section 1981 Retaliation Claims
Lhoist also challenges the existence of a causal connection needed to
establish a prima facie case for retaliation. Even if Gooden can show a
causal connection, Lhoist argues there is a legitimate, non-retaliatory
reason for Gooden’s termination.
Retaliation claims under Title VII and § 1981 are both also analyzed
under McDonnell Douglas. See Davis v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 383
F.3d 309, 319 (5th Cir. 2004). To establish a prima facie case, Gooden
must show that (1) he engaged in protected activity; (2) he was subjected
to an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link exists between
the protected activity and the adverse employment action. See id. A
protected activity under a § 1981 retaliation claim is either (1) opposing
racial discrimination or (2) participating in an investigation, proceeding,
or hearing. Yarbrough v. SlashSupport, Inc., 152 F.4th 658, 667 (5th Cir.
2025).
After a prima facie showing is made, the burden shifts to Lhoist to
articulate 	a 	legitimate, 	non-retaliatory 	reason 	for 	the 	adverse
employment action. Id. If Lhoist can demonstrate such a reason, the
burden shifts back to Gooden, who must then demonstrate “substantial
evidence” that Lhoist’s articulated legitimate reason was a pretext for
retaliation. Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 969 F.3d 571, 657 (5th
Cir. 2020).
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Gooden 	alleges 	retaliation 	based 	on 	the 	same 	seven 	actions
underlying his discrimination claims.
1. The 2017 role, the 2020 role, and the Fleet Lead Role.
As with the discrimination claims, the alleged retaliation tied to the
2017 role, the 2020 role, and the Fleet Lead role fails. As discussed
above, two of these claims are time-barred. But even assuming arguendo
that they are not, Gooden fails to establish a prima facie showing for all
three 	positions. 	He 	points 	to 	not 	being 	assigned 	the 	additional
responsibilities in the 2017, 2020, or Fleet Lead roles. However, at that
time, 	Gooden 	had 	not 	engaged 	in 	protected 	activity 	before 	2020.
Gooden’s earliest complaint of discrimination was in July 2023. 	Years
after the alleged retaliation. Thus, Gooden has not shown that he faced
retaliation regarding the alleged positions he created.
The same is true of Gooden’s pay-disparity claim. Gooden alleges
that 	he 	was 	paid 	less 	in 	retaliation. 	However, 	Gooden 	had 	not
participated in protected activity at the time that the pay disputes arose,
which was before he filed an EEOC charge in August 2023. He does not
offer any evidence that his pay changed after filing an EEOC charge in
August 2023. This claim fails at the prima facie stage.
2. 	Failure 	to 	Promote 	to 	Regional 	Terminal 	Operations
Manager
Next, Gooden also fails to show that there was retaliation for Lhoist’s
decision not to promote him to Regional Terminal Operations Manager
in October 2023. This was after he filed a charge of discrimination with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) against
Lhoist in August 2023. This, taken together, satisfies the first two
elements of a prima facie showing of retaliation. Gooden participated in
opposition activity, and he was subject to an adverse employment action.
As the Court explains above, it remains skeptical that Gooden was
subject to an adverse employment action, but even assuming arguendo
he was, he still fails to satisfy the other elements of a prima facie case.
Namely, Gooden has not demonstrated a causal link between the
protected activity and the adverse employment action.
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To establish a causal link between the defendant’s conduct and the
plaintiff’s injury, the plaintiff must show that harm would not have
occurred but for the defendant’s conduct. U. of Tex. Southwestern. Med.
Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 346–47 (2013). A causal link between the
defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury can be established by
temporal 	proximity, 	such 	as 	the 	protected 	act 	and 	the 	adverse
employment action being very close in time to establish causation by
timing alone. Porter v. Houma Terrebonne Housing Authority Bd. Of
Com’rs, 810 F.3d 940, 948 (5th Cir. 2015). Gooden filed his EEOC charge
two 	months 	before 	he 	was 	not 	promoted 	to 	Regional 	Terminal
Operations Manager. This establishes temporal proximity between the
protected act and the adverse employment action. Therefore, the burden
shifts to Lhoist to demonstrate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason.
Lhoist demonstrated such a reason for its decision not to promote
Gooden. Lhoist was looking for a candidate with previous multi-site
manager experience, as well as management and leadership experience.
Lhoist did not move forward with his application because Gooden did
not meet the minimum qualifications required for the role. Gooden
asserts that he was qualified because he (1) created the aforementioned
positions and procedures; (2) had 19 years of truck driving experience
for Lhoist; and (3) was a qualified truck driver. He did not offer any
evidence that he had experience in management or leadership. The
candidate 	that 	Lhoist 	selected, 	Chris 	Clark, 	did 	meet 	the 	job
requirements. Lhoist presented evidence that he had (1) 17 years of
terminal 	management 	experience; 	(2) 	experience 	as 	a 	production
supervisor, maintenance planner, and operations manager; and (3)
managed terminals all over the central part of the southern United
States. ECF No. 65 at 21. In short, Lhoist presented sufficient evidence
to demonstrate that Gooden was not promoted for his lack of experience
and that it picked a more qualified candidate.
Because Lhoist has shown a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason, the
burden shifts back to Gooden, who must then demonstrate “substantial
evidence” that Lhoist’s reason was a pretext for retaliation. An employee
establishes pretext by showing that the adverse actions would not have
occurred but for the employer’s retaliatory reason for the action. Nassar,
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570 U.S. at 346–47. Gooden fails to do so here. He has presented no
evidence that he was qualified for the job or that Mr. Clark was not
qualified. (ECF. No. 71)
3. Suspension, Last Chance Agreement, and Termination
Finally, Gooden points to his suspension and placement on a Last
Chance Agreement as retaliatory. Here, Gooden’s claims fail again
because he had not engaged in any protected activity before he was
suspended on August 25, 2023.
Gooden references a series of complaints that he made before his
suspension as protected activity. He complained to management about
a hostile work environment and “[p]laying with [his] time.” ECF No. 65
at 10. However, some of these complaints contain no reference to race or
any other protected characteristic. They do not allege that Lhoist was
engaging in unlawful employment practices. Thus, these complaints are
not protected activity. See Washington v. Nat’l Oilwell Varco, L.P., 634
F.Supp 3d. 316, 323 (N.D. Tex. 2022) (holding that vague complaints
that do not allege racial animus are not “protected activities”). Gooden’s
other complaints vaguely reference “retaliation” or a “hostile work
environment.” But these complaints still lack the specificity required to
amount to protected activity. Davis v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 448 Fed.
Appx. 485, 493 (5th Cir. 2022) (“We have consistently held that a vague
complaint . . . does not constitute protected activity.”).
Gooden also refers to a series of complaints made after he was
suspended 	on 	August 	28, 	2023. 	First, 	his 	EEOC 	charge. 	Second,
Gooden’s Reply mentions three different complaints after his suspension
on September 8, 14, and 20 of 2023. ECF. No. 73 at 23. These complaints
were submitted post-suspension and made in opposition to Gooden’s own
suspension. Thus, any retaliatory claim based on these complaints fails
to show that the desire to retaliate was the but-for cause of the
challenged employment action. Nassar, 570 U.S. at 352.
Gooden next alleges he was fired in retaliation for participating in
protected activity. Gooden participated in protected activity in August
2023 when he failed his EEOC charge. He was terminated eight months
later. This satisfies the first two prongs of a prima facie retaliation case.
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However, this claim fails on the third prong because Gooden has not
demonstrated a causal link between the protected activity and the
adverse employment action.
As mentioned above, the plaintiff must show that harm would not
have 	occurred 	but 	for 	the 	defendant’s 	conduct, 	and 	this 	can 	be
established by the activities being close in time. Nassar, 570 U.S. at
346–47; Porter, 810 F.3d at 948. Gooden filed his EEOC charge eight
months before he was terminated. The Fifth Circuit has held that “a
five-month 	lapse 	is 	not 	close 	enough, 	without 	other 	evidence 	of
retaliation, to establish the ‘causal connection’ element.” Lyons v. Katy
Indep. Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 298, 305 (5th Cir. 2020). Here, the eight-
month period is longer than the five months mentioned in Lyons.
Gooden 	asserts 	that 	he 	submitted 	another 	complaint 	after 	his
suspension, alleging race discrimination, on September 1, 2023. ECF
No. 73 at 24. However, this complaint occurred seven months before his
termination. Thus, it is also outside the time frame used to establish
temporal proximity. Gooden’s briefing on this issue is bare and presents
no other evidence that his protected activity is the reason for his
termination. Thus, he fails to establish the final prima facie prong.
Ultimately, 	Gooden 	fails 	to 	demonstrate 	a 	prima 	facie 	case 	of
retaliation in each instance because: (1) he did not engage in protected
activity before the employment dispute concerning 2017 role, 2020, role,
Fleet Lead role, and the pay discrepancy; (2) he has not demonstrated
Lhoist’s reason to not promote him to Regional Terminal Operations
Manager role was pretextual, and (3) he cannot establish that his
protected activity is the causal link for his termination.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court concludes that Summary Judgment
should be and hereby is GRANTED. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims are
DISMISSED with prejudice.
SO ORDERED on this 23rd day of January 2026.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
REGINALEA KEMP ,
Plaintiff,
v. 	No. 4:23-cv-00841-P
REGIONS BANK ET AL .,
Defendants.
ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion for Leave to File
Second Amended Complaint. ECF No. 18. Having considered the Motion
and applicable docket entries, the Court GRANTS the Motion.
SO ORDERED on this 18th day of September 2023.
______________________________________________
Mark T. Pittman
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 4:24-cv-00750-P Document 106 Filed 01/23/26 Page 13 of 13 PageID <pageID>