Carruth et al v. Communities Foundation of Texas Inc et al

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
EMILY ELIZABETHANN
CARRUTH, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
COMMUNITIES FOUNDATION OF
TEXAS, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
Civil Action No. 3:26-CV-0741-K-BT
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs Emily Carruth and Christopher Warren Russell, appearing pro se, filed
an “Emergency Supplemental Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive
Relief” 	(the 	“Supplemental 	Motion”) 	(Doc. 	No. 	7). 	For 	the 	following 	reasons,
Plaintiffs’ supplemental motion for a TRO –their second motion for a TRO in this
action—is DENIED.
In 	their 	Supplemental 	Motion, 	Plaintiffs 	contend 	that 	Emily 	Carruth
(“Carruth”) is the sole fiduciary and beneficiary of the W.W. Caruth Jr. Foundation
(the “Foundation”). Doc. No. 7 at 1. Plaintiffs claim that unspecified actors retaliated
against Carruth after she “disclosed evidence of alleged trust fraud” by initiating
criminal proceedings against her in Tarrant County and freezing the Foundation’s
accounts at Defendant Bank of America N.A., resulting in a “starve out” that impedes
Carruth’s ability to meet basic needs. Id. Plaintiffs move the Court to, among other
Case 3:26-cv-00741-K-BT Document 16 Filed 03/25/26 Page 1 of 4 PageID <pageID>

2
things, enjoin the state criminal proceedings, which they claim will interfere with this
Court’s ability to decide the “federal estate audit and related federal issues” in their
complaint. Id. at 2.
Temporary restraining orders are “extraordinary relief and rarely issued.” Albright
v. City of New Orleans, 46 F. Supp. 2d 523, 532 (E.D. La. 1999). Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 65 governs injunctions and restraining orders. Here, Plaintiffs appear to seek
an ex parte TRO, but they have not satisfied Rule 65(b)(1), which provides that a Court
can issue an ex parte TRO without notice to the adverse party or its attorneys only if:
(A) 	specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that
immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage, will result to the movant
before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and
(B) 	the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and
the reasons why it should not be required.
F ED . R. CIV. P. 65(b)(1)(A)-(B). Plaintiffs have not provided an affidavit or verified
complaint showing irreparable injury before Defendants can be heard. And while
Plaintiffs claim that Defendants were served with their supplemental motion for a TRO
through the ECF system (Doc. No. 7 at 3), Defendants have not appeared in this case
and, therefore, would not receive notice of Plaintiffs’ filings via the ECF system.
Additionally, Plaintiffs fail to show that a TRO is warranted on the merits. For
a district court to grant a TRO, Plaintiffs must show: (1) a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits, (2) a substantial threat that the movant will suffer irreparable
injury if the request is denied, (3) that the threatened injury outweighs any damage
that the injunction might cause the defendant, and (4) that the injunction will not
Case 3:26-cv-00741-K-BT Document 16 Filed 03/25/26 Page 2 of 4 PageID <pageID>

3
disserve the public interest. Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, 760 F.3d 448, 452
(5th Cir. 2014); see Lee v. Verizon Commc’ns Inc., Civ. Action No. 3:12–CV–4834–D,
2012 WL 6089041, at *1 n.2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2012) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (explaining
that a temporary restraining order is “simply a highly accelerated and temporary form
of preliminary injunctive relief,” thus the movant must establish the same four elements
for obtaining a preliminary injunction.).
Here, Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Motion fails to satisfy all four requirements.
Plaintiffs appear to raise claims for “obstruction of federal fiduciary authority,”
retaliatory state action, and civil rights violations. Doc. No. 8 at 6. Because Plaintiffs
fail to show a likelihood of success on the merits of any of these claims, they are not
entitled to a TRO. Walgreen Co. v. Hood, 275 F.3d 475, 477 (5th Cir. 2001) (explaining
that because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate the first element, there was no need for
the court to “reach the other three criteria for granting a preliminary injunction.”); see
Bluefield 	Water 	Ass’n 	v. 	City 	of 	Starkville, 	577 	F.3d 	250, 	253 	(5th 	Cir. 	2009)
(emphasizing that injunctive relief should not be granted unless the movant “clearly
carried the burden of persuasion” on all four elements for obtaining a preliminary
injunction.).
Further, 	to 	the 	extent 	Plaintiffs 	seek 	to 	enjoin 	ongoing 	state 	criminal
proceedings, federal courts generally do not interfere with ongoing state criminal
prosecutions, which is an additional reason to deny Plaintiffs’ requested relief. Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971).
Case 3:26-cv-00741-K-BT Document 16 Filed 03/25/26 Page 3 of 4 PageID <pageID>

4
For these reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ supplemental motion for a TRO
(Doc. No. 7).
SO ORDERED.
Signed March 25th , 2026.
____________________________________
ED KINKEADE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 3:26-cv-00741-K-BT Document 16 Filed 03/25/26 Page 4 of 4 PageID <pageID>