Sanders et al v. Commissioner, Texas Department of Family and Protective Services et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
JASON LAMONTE SANDERS and 	§
JOSLYN LASHAE HERNDON 	§
SANDERS, 	§
Plaintiffs, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	No. 3:26-CV-96-X-BW
§
COMMISSIONER, TEXAS 	§
DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND 	§
PROTECTIVE SERVICES, et al., 	§
Defendants. 	§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court are two motions filed by pro se Plaintiffs Joslyn Lashae
Herndon Sander (“Joslyn”) and Jason Lamonte Sanders (“Jason”) (collectively,
“Plaintiffs”) requesting an expedited determination of subject matter jurisdiction.
(See Dkt. Nos. 9, 14 (collectively, “Motions to Expedite”).) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b) and Special Order No. 3-251, this case is referred to the undersigned United
States magistrate judge for pretrial management, which includes making findings,
conclusions, and a recommended disposition when appropriate. (Dkt. No. 1.)
Based on the relevant filings and applicable law, the undersigned recommends
that the Motions to Expedite (Dkt. Nos. 9, 14) be granted and further recommends
that, because Plaintiffs have not established federal subject matter jurisdiction, this
lawsuit should be dismissed without prejudice.
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I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs filed this pro se civil rights lawsuit against the Texas Department of
Family and Protective Service (“DFPS”) and certain of its employees, apparently
based on the removal of minor child J.S. from Joslyn’s custody and placement into
foster care. (See generally Dkt. No. 3 (“Complaint”) (“Compl.”).) As alleged in the
Complaint, Joslyn is the “biological and legal mother” of J.S., and Jason is the
biological grandfather. (See Compl. ¶ 11-12.) Plaintiffs allege that “[a] termination
order was entered by the 362nd District Court of Denton County; however, [] the
court never lawfully acquired jurisdiction due to warrantless seizure, lack of exigent
circumstances, and fraud in the procurement of jurisdiction, rendering the order void
ab initio.” (Id. ¶ 11.)
According to the Complaint, DFPS “procured [J.S.’s removal] through
affidavits and reports containing false statements and material omissions, including
withholding exculpatory evidence.” (Id. ¶ 19.) Other than alleging that “[l]aw-
enforcement records, body cam, and contemporaneous evidence contradict the
allegations used to justify removal,” Plaintiffs provide no detailed factual allegations
regarding the circumstances of J.S.’s removal. (See Compl ¶ 20.) Nor do they
provide any details about underlying removal proceedings other than stating that
“J.S. is currently placed with a foster parent[, and] a permanency hearing is
scheduled for February 2026[.]” (Id. ¶ 24.)
Plaintiffs assert constitutional violations under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments. (Id. ¶¶ 27-29.) Plaintiffs request that this Court “[o]rder the
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immediate return [of J.S.] to his mother;” “[e]njoin Defendants from enforcing any
CPS, termination, custody, or related orders . . . and proceeding with any
permanency or adoption proceedings pending finding resolution”; “[o]rder
preservation of all records and evidence”; and “[g]rant such other and further
equitable relief as the Court deems just.” (Id. at ECF p.5.) Plaintiffs also request a
declaration from this Court “pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 that the seizure was
unconstitutional and void ab initio.” (Id. ¶ 32.)
Plaintiffs filed an Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order
(“TRO”) and Request for Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. No. 4), which was denied the
same day by United States District Judge Brantley Starr (Dkt. No. 7). As Judge Starr
explained: “The domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction means the Court
likely lacks jurisdiction over this case. Accordingly, the Court cannot say plaintiffs
are likely to prevail on the merits.” On January 27, 2026, Plaintiffs filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of the TRO (Dkt. No. 11), which Judge Starr again denied (Dkt.
No. 13), noting that the motion for reconsideration merely reasserted the same
arguments as the original TRO motion (see id.).
Then, on January 27, 2026, Plaintiffs filed an Emergency Motion to Expedite
Consideration of Jurisdiction and Request for Prospective Injunctive Relief (Dkt.
No. 9), and on February 10, 2026, filed a “Post-Fee Motion Establishing Subject-
Matter Jurisdiction and Requesting Threshold Article III Determination (Dkt. No.
14), both of which seek an expedited ruling on this Court’s subject matter
jurisdiction. Because Plaintiffs have not established federal subject matter
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jurisdiction over this child custody dispute, the undersigned recommends that this
lawsuit be dismissed without prejudice.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and absent jurisdiction
conferred by statute, lack the power to adjudicate claims.” La. Real Est. Appraisers Bd.
v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 917 F.3d 389, 391 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Texas v. Travis Cnty.,
910 F.3d 809, 811 (5th Cir. 2018)). Courts “must presume that a suit lies outside this
limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests on the
party seeking the federal forum.” Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 916 (5th
Cir. 2001).
While pleadings by pro se plaintiffs are construed liberally, see, e.g., Perez v.
United States, 312 F.3d 191, 194–95 (5th Cir. 2002); Mass v. McDonald’s Corp., No.
3:04-CV-0483-M, 2004 WL 2624255, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 2004), the court
“must presume that a suit lies outside [its] limited jurisdiction, and the burden of
establishing federal jurisdiction rests on the party seeking the federal forum.” Howery
v. Allstate Ins., 243 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). And “even
though a particular statute or rule need not necessarily be cited by name[,]” the party
asserting jurisdiction must allege the jurisdictional basis “affirmatively and
distinctly”; jurisdiction cannot be “established argumentatively or by mere
inference.” Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R. Co. v. Pargas, Inc., 706 F.2d 633, 636 (5th Cir. 1983)
(citations omitted). “[C]ourts are not obligated to search out the identity of a party’s
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vaguely-pleaded claims.” Mass, 2004 WL 2624255, at *2. Ultimately, “[t]he plaintiff
is the master of his own pleadings, and even a pro se litigant has the right to plead
himself out of court, just as an attorney may do.” Estrada v. Dominguez, No. 2:00-CV-
0064, 2001 WL 506982, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 14, 2001).
A federal court has an independent duty, at any level of the proceedings, to
determine whether it properly has subject matter jurisdiction over a case. Ruhgras
AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) (“[S]ubject-matter delineations must
be policed by the courts on their own initiative even at the highest level.”); McDonal
v. Abbott Labs., 408 F.3d 177, 182 n.5 (5th Cir. 2005) (A “federal court may raise
subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte.”) (citation omitted). Furthermore, federal
courts do not have to—and in fact, should not—wait for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to
determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists. On the contrary, “[i]f the court
determines at any time that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss
the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). The court “is duty-bound to examine its
subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte.” Burciaga v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 871
F.3d 380, 384 n.4 (5th Cir. 2017); see also Ins. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) (explaining that while under Rule 12(h) defenses for
lack of personal jurisdiction are waived if untimely, even an appellate court may
review subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte).
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III. DISCUSSION
Although Plaintiffs allege violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, their complaint makes clear that their
allegations arise from a state family law case involving child protection and removal
proceedings commenced by DFPS and Plaintiffs’ disagreement about the outcome of
those proceedings. (See generally Compl.)
“[I]n general it is appropriate for the federal courts to leave delicate issues of
domestic relations to the state courts.” Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542
U.S. 1, 13 (2004). “‘The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and
wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the
United States.’ Federal courts repeatedly have declined to assert jurisdiction over
divorces that presented no federal question.” Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572,
581 (1979) (quoting In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-594 (1890)); see also Crouch v.
Crouch, 566 F.2d 486, 487-88 (5th Cir. 1978). “[W]hen a suit is in substance a
domestic relations suit, brought in the guise of a civil rights or federal question
action, federal courts will decline to exercise jurisdiction. Because state courts
historically have decided these matters, they have developed a proficiency and
expertise in these cases and a strong interest in disposing of them.” Shean by and
through Shean v. White, 620 F. Supp. 1329, 1331 (N.D. Tex. 1985) (quoting and citing
Firestone v. Cleveland Trust Co., 654 F.2d 1212, 1215 (6th Cir. 1981) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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Even where a plaintiff sues under Section 1983 such that the Court has
federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, “federal courts abstain from
adjudicating family-law disputes under Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).”
Walker v. Walker, Civ. A. No. 4:20-1204, 2021 WL 3642077, at *3 (S.D. Tex. July 28,
2021) (quoting Estate of Merkel v. Pollard, 354 F. App’x 88 at 92 (citing, in turn,
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 705-06 (1992))); see also DuBroff v. DuBroff, 833
F.2d 557, 561 (5th 1987) (“In Burford v. Sun Oil Co., … the [United States] Supreme
Court established the principle that some cases properly brought in federal courts
should nevertheless be dismissed to the state courts for resolution because of a
concern for comity between sovereigns.”); see also Congleton v. Holy Cross Child
Placement Agency, Inc., 919 F.2d 1077, 1079 (5th Cir. 1990) (concluding that “the final
resolution of this dispute is of necessity so intertwined with parental rights and the
custodial status of the child that it cannot fairly be separated” and therefore,
abstaining from hearing action under the domestic relations exception); Shean, 620 F.
Supp. 1329 at 1331 (“[W]hen a suit is in substance a domestic relations suit, brought
in the guise of a civil rights or federal question action, federal courts will decline to
exercise jurisdiction.”).
In addition to the domestic relations exception, Younger abstention also
counsels against a federal court exercising jurisdiction over what appears to be an
ongoing child custody dispute. “Under the Younger abstention doctrine, federal
courts should generally decline to exercise jurisdiction when: (1) the federal
proceeding would interfere with an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) the state
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has an important interest in regulating the subject matter of the claim; and (3) the
plaintiff has an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional
challenges.” Gates v. Strain, 885 F.3d 874, 880 (5th Cir. 2018) (internal quotations
omitted); see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–47 (1971).
Although Plaintiffs contend that Younger abstention is inapplicable because
they suffered constitutional violations during the removal proceedings (see Compl.
¶¶ 9, 19), there is no reason to conclude that Plaintiffs cannot raise these claims with
the Texas state courts. See Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n,
457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982) (“Minimal respect for the state processes . . . precludes any
presumption that the state courts will not safeguard federal constitutional rights.”)
(emphasis in original).
Finally, to the extent Plaintiffs complain of injuries caused by a state-court
judgment, Rooker–Feldman doctrine establishes that a federal court lacks subject
matter when issues in federal court are “inextricably intertwined” with a final state
court judgment such that the court is “in essence being called upon to review a state-
court decision.” Davis v. Bayless, 70 F.3d 367, 375 (5th Cir. 1995); see also Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (The Rooker-Feldman
doctrine bars federal “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries
caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”)
In sum, Plaintiffs’ complaint amounts to a collateral attack on ongoing state
proceedings concerning the custody of a child, which the state has an important
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interest in regulating. Plaintiffs present no reason for this Court to interfere. Thus,
Plaintiffs’ claims are best left to the state courts and their appellate remedies.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Motions to Expedite
(Dkt. Nos. 9, 14) be GRANTED and further RECOMMENDS that this lawsuit be
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
SO RECOMMENDED on March 5, 2026.
____________________________________
BRIAN McKAY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the
manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and
recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being
served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); F ED . R. C. P. 72(b). To be specific, an
objection must identify the finding or recommendation to which objection is made,
state the basis for the objection, and indicate the place in the magistrate judge’s
report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An
objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the
magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the
aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the
magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon
grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415,
1417 (5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)
(extending the time to file objections to 14 days).
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