Bell v. Dallas County Texas et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
CANDACE BELL, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
V. § No. 3:26-cv-88-B-BN
§
DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS, ET AL., §
§
Defendants. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Without paying the filing fee, Plaintiff Candace Bell filed a pro se complaint
alleging civil rights claims relating to enforcement of a February 2017 state family
court order (the “SAPCR Order”). See Dkt. No. 3. And Senior United States District
Judge Jane J. Boyle referred Bell’s lawsuit to the undersigned United States
magistrate judge for screening under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of
reference.
And the undersigned enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
recommendation that the Court should dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
Legal Standards
A district court is required to screen a civil complaint filed IFP (that is, without
payment of the filing fee) and may summarily dismiss that complaint (or any portion
of it) if the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
“The language of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) tracks the language of Federal Rule of Civil
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Procedure 12(b)(6).” Black v. Warren, 134 F.3d 732, 733-34 (5th Cir. 1998) (per
curiam).
A district court may exercise its “inherent authority ... to dismiss a complaint
on its own motion ... ‘as long as the procedure employed is fair.’” Gaffney v. State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co., 294 F. App’x 975, 977 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (quoting Carroll,
470 F.3d at 1177; citation omitted).
“[F]airness in this context requires both notice of the court’s intention to
dismiss sua sponte and an opportunity to respond.” Id. (cleaned up; quoting Lozano
v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 489 F.3d 636, 643 (5th Cir. 2007)); see also Carver v.
Atwood, 18 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2021) (“The broad rule is that ‘a district court
may dismiss a claim on its own motion as long as the procedure employed is fair.’
More specifically, ‘fairness in this context requires both notice of the court’s intention
and an opportunity to respond’ before dismissing sua sponte with prejudice.”
(citations omitted)).
And these findings, conclusions, and recommendations provide notice, while
the period for filing objections affords an opportunity to respond. See, e.g., Starrett v.
U.S. Dep’t of Defense, No. 3:18-cv-2851-M-BH, 2018 WL 6069969, at *2 (N.D. Tex.
Oct. 30, 2018) (citations omitted), rec. accepted, 2018 WL 6068991 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 20,
2018), aff’d, 763 F. App’x 383 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 142
(2019).
And, because “‘[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,’ possessing
‘only that power authorized by Constitution and statute,’” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S.
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251, 256 (2013) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377
(1994)), “subject-matter delineations must be policed by the courts on their own
initiative even at the highest level,” Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574,
583-84 (1999) (citations omitted).
And, if the party invoking federal jurisdiction fails to establish it, the lawsuit
must be dismissed. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time
that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”).
Because federal jurisdiction is not assumed, “the basis upon which jurisdiction
depends must be alleged affirmatively and distinctly and cannot be established
argumentatively or by mere inference.” Getty Oil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N.A., 841 F.2d
1254, 1259 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Ill. Cent. Gulf R. Co. v. Pargas, Inc., 706 F.2d 633,
636 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1983)); see also MidCap Media Fin., L.L.C. v. Pathway Data, Inc.,
929 F.3d 310, 313 (5th Cir. 2019) (“Because federal courts have limited jurisdiction,
parties must make ‘clear, distinct, and precise affirmative jurisdictional allegations’
in their pleadings.” (quoting Getty Oil, 841 F.2d at 1259)).
As to dismissal for failure to state a claim, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a)(2) does not require that a complaint contain detailed factual allegations, just
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a
‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). So,
“[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s
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liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement
to relief.” Id. (cleaned up; quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). On the other hand, “[a]
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id.
“The burden is on the plaintiff to frame a ‘complaint with enough factual
matter (taken as true) to suggest’ that he or she is entitled to relief.” Robbins v.
Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
And, while a court must accept a plaintiff’s allegations as true, it is “not bound to
accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In fact, “the court does not ‘presume true a number of
categories of statements, including,’” in addition to legal conclusions, “‘mere labels;
threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action; conclusory statements; and
naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.’” Armstrong v. Ashley, 60
F.4th 262, 269 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Harmon v. City of Arlington, Tex., 16 F.4th
1159, 1162-63 (5th Cir. 2021)).
And, so, to avoid dismissal, plaintiffs must “plead facts sufficient to show” that
the claims asserted have “substantive plausibility” by stating “simply, concisely, and
directly events” that they contend entitle them to relief. Johnson v. City of Shelby,
Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014) (per curiam) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)-(3), (d)(1), (e));
see also Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890, 899
(5th Cir. 2019) (“‘Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief’
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is ‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.’” (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679)).
Analysis
Bell asserts claims against Dallas County and its sheriff in her official capacity,
Collin County, the Child Support Division of the Office of Attorney General of Texas,
Plano Independent School District and an elementary school principal in her official
capacity, and a law enforcement officer in his individual capacity for enforcing the
SAPCR Order. See Dkt. No. 6 at 3-4. Other than with respect to the law enforcement
officer, Plaintiff states that all defendants are sued for declaratory and prospective
injunctive relief only. See id.
Bell asserts that her “action is not an appeal of a state family-court ruling.” Id.
at 4. But all her claims require this Court to determine that the SAPCR order is void
not because of any violation of federal Constitutional provisions or federal law but
because of defects in venue under the Texas Family Code. See id. at 2.
Enforcement of a state court’s orders lies with the state court, and issues with
its enforcement or requests for modification of such orders are matters that should
be appealed through the state courts as the federal district courts lack jurisdiction
“to modify or reverse” a state proceeding under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Truong
v. Bank of Am., N.A., 717 F.3d 377, 382 (5th Cir. 2013) (“‘Reduced to its essence, the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine holds that inferior federal courts do not have the power to
modify or reverse state court judgments’ except when authorized by Congress.”
(quoting Union Planters Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Salih, 369 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir. 2004)));
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accord Liedtke v. State Bar of Tex., 18 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Jordaan
v. Hall, 275 F. Supp. 2d 778, 789 (N.D. Tex. 2003) (noting that the doctrine prevents
“thinly veiled attempt[s] to circumvent the state appellate process and to collaterally
attack – in the guise of a federal civil rights action – the validity of a state court
[judgment] and other related orders”).
And, although Bell asserts that the defects in venue rise to the level of a
substantive due process claim, her claims are “inextricably intertwined” with the
state court judgment. Liedetke, 18 F.3d at 318 (dismissing Section 1983 due process
claims and claims for declaratory and injunctive relief under Rooker-Feldman); see
also Moore v. Tex. Ct. of Crim. App., 561 F. App’x 427 (5th Cir. 2014) (same); Price v.
Porter, 251 F. App’x 925, 926-27 (5th Cir. 2009) (claims that state court judgment
violated due process and equal protection because of judicial conflict of interest
dismissed under Rooker-Feldman). “Constitutional questions arising in state
proceedings must be resolved by the state courts, with recourse at the federal level
available only through an application for a writ of certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court.” Price, 251 F. App’x at 926 (citing Liedtke, 18 F.3d at 317).
So Bell’s complaint should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Ordinarily, a pro se plaintiff should be granted leave to amend her complaint
before dismissal, but leave is not required when she has already pled her “best case.”
Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767-68 (5th Cir. 2009). Bell has failed to state a
cognizable claim or any facts from which a cognizable claim can be inferred. Based on
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the most deferential review of her complaint, it is highly unlikely that, given the
opportunity, Bell could allege viable legal claims over which this Court has
jurisdiction. Thus, the undersigned concludes that granting leave to amend under
these circumstances would be futile and cause needless delay.
Recommendation
The Court should dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these
findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections
within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.
P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or
recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation
where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure
to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the
factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or
adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
DATED: January 23, 2026
_________________________________________
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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