Young v. United Parcel Service et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
MIKEL YOUNG, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
V. § No. 3:25-cv-3558-B-BN
§
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, ET AL., §
§
Defendants. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Mikel Young filed a pro se complaint alleging retaliation for filing a
charge of discrimination with the EEOC. See Dkt. No. 3. And Senior United States
District Judge Jane J. Boyle referred Young’s lawsuit to the undersigned United
States magistrate judge for screening under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order
of reference.
Young moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). See Dkt. No. 5.
And the undersigned entered an order and notice of deficiency (“NOD”) explaining
that the verified financial information in Young’s IFP motion prevented a finding that
requiring Young to pay the $405 filing fee would cause undue financial hardship,
particularly given the inconsistencies in the information provided, and requiring that
Young pay the filing fee by February 23, 2026. See Dkt. No. 6. And the Court warned
Young that, “failure to timely follow the directions in this order subjects this lawsuit
to dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).” Id. at 4.
Although it has now been more than a month since the court-imposed deadline
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to pay the filing fee, Young has not paid the fee or filed anything further in this action.
Considering this record, the undersigned enters these findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and recommendation that the Court should deny the IFP motion and dismiss
this action without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).
Discussion
The IFP statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, “was designed to ensure that litigants would
not be deprived of meaningful access to the federal judicial system due to their
financial circumstances.” Bucklew v. St. Clair, No. 3:18-cv-2117-N-BH, 2019 WL
2250886, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 15, 2019) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324
(1989)), rec. accepted, 2019 WL 2249718 (N.D. Tex. May 24, 2019). But, to gain access,
“[a] litigant seeking IFP status must submit an affidavit identifying all assets he
possesses, as well as a statement that he is unable to pay the necessary fees of
bringing a federal civil action.” Smith-Garcia v. Harrison Cnty., 776 F. App’x 226, 227
(5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1)).
The Court must then examine the financial condition of the applicant in order
to determine whether the payment of fees would “cause undue financial hardship.”
Prows v. Kastner, 842 F.2d 138, 140 (5th Cir. 1988). “This entails a review of other
demands on individual [applicants’] financial resources, including whether the
expenses are discretionary or mandatory.” Id. And, while “[t]he term ‘undue financial
hardship’ is not defined and, therefore, is a flexible concept[,] ... a pragmatic rule of
thumb contemplates that undue financial hardship results when prepayment of fees
or costs would result in the applicant’s inability to pay for the ‘necessities of life.’”
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Walker v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch, No. 1:08-CV-417, 2008 WL 4873733, at *1 (E.D.
Tex. Oct. 30, 2008) (citing Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339
(1948)); see also Williams v. Louisiana, Civ. A. No. 14-00154-BAJ-EWD, 2017 WL
3124332, at *1 (M.D. La. Apr. 14, 2017) (noting that the applicable standard “requires
a showing of more than an inconvenience to the applicant” (citations omitted)).
“[W]hether the litigant is ‘unable to pay’ the costs [associated with initiating a
lawsuit also] ... depend[s] in part on [the] litigant’s actual ability to get funds from a
spouse, a parent, an adult sibling, or other next friend.” Williams v. Spencer, 455 F.
Supp. 205, 209 (D. Md. 1978); see Fridman v. City of New York, 195 F. Supp. 2d 534,
537 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“In assessing an application to proceed in forma pauperis, a
court may consider the resources that the applicant has or can get from those who
ordinarily provide the applicant with the necessities of life, such as from a spouse,
parent, adult sibling or other next friend.” (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted)); accord Pisano v. Astrue, No. 11-30269-KPN, 2012 WL 79188, at *2 (D.
Mass. Jan. 10, 2012) (collecting cases).
And a financial affidavit that is either “incomplete” or “internally inconsistent”
is insufficient to find that a movant qualifies for leave to proceed IFP. Muhammad v.
La. Attorney Disciplinary Bd., Civ. A. No. 09-3431, 2009 WL 3150041, at *2 (E.D. La.
Sept. 25, 2009) (citing Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d 886, 891 (5th Cir. 1976) (“[W]here the
in forma pauperis affidavit is sufficient on its face to demonstrate economic eligibility,
the court should first docket the case and then proceed to the question ... of whether
the asserted claim is frivolous or malicious.”); collecting cases).
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These legal standards were set out in the NOD sent to Young. See Dkt. No. 6.
And as also set out in the NOD, see id. at 3, Young’s IFP motion and financial affidavit
inconsistently state that he is currently being paid $3,600 per month by Penske
Logistics either since November 23 or since November 2023, that he expects to receive
$3,000 next month in employment, and that his average monthly income for the past
12 months was $2,800. See Dkt. No. 5 at 1, 2. This information also contradicts his
assertion in the complaint that he has “not worked one day since UPS learned about
the complaint with EEOC.” Dkt. No. 3 at 4.
Young reports no dependents, and assuming that to be true, the applicable
poverty guideline for an individual in Texas for 2026 is $15,960. See Annual Update
of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 91 Fed. Reg. 1797, 1798 (Jan. 15, 2026). So even
taking the lowest of the employment income amounts provided, Young’s reported
annual income of $33,600 is more than twice the federal poverty guideline. See Logan
v. Logan, No. 4:23-cv-1252-P, 2023 WL 9052109, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 29, 2023) (“The
Court has discretion to make [IFP] decision guided by an array of considerations and
(most importantly) informed by the federal poverty guidelines.” (citing Prows v.
Kastner, 842 F.2d 138, 140 (5th Cir. 1988))).
Considering the IFP motion as filed, the undersigned cannot recommend that
the IFP motion be granted consistent with the legal standards set out above.
The record here further support dismissal under Rule 41(b), which “authorizes
the district court to dismiss an action sua sponte for failure to prosecute or comply
with [a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure or] a court order.” Griggs v. S.G.E. Mgmt.,
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L.L.C., 905 F.3d 835, 844 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing McCullough v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d
1126, 1127 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)); accord Nottingham v. Warden, Bill Clements
Unit, 837 F.3d 438, 440 (5th Cir. 2016) (failure to comply with a court order); Rosin
v. Thaler, 450 F. App’x 383, 383-84 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (failure to prosecute);
see also Campbell v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 798, 800-01 (5th Cir. 2021) (holding that the
text of Rule 41(b) does not extend to a failure to comply with a court’s local rule insofar
as that violation does not also qualify as a failure to prosecute (discussing Berry v.
CIGNA/RSI-CIGNA, 975 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1992))).
This authority “flows from the court’s inherent power to control its docket and
prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases.” Boudwin v. Graystone Ins.
Co., Ltd., 756 F.2d 399, 401 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S.
626 (1962)); see also Lopez v. Ark. Cnty. Indep. Sch. Dist., 570 F.2d 541, 544 (5th Cir.
1978) (“Although [Rule 41(b)] is phrased in terms of dismissal on the motion of the
defendant, it is clear that the power is inherent in the court and may be exercised sua
sponte whenever necessary to ‘achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of
cases.’” (quoting Link, 370 U.S. at 631)); Campbell, 988 F.3d at 800 (“It is well
established that Rule 41(b) permits dismissal not only on motion of the defendant,
but also on the court’s own motion.” (citing Morris v. Ocean Sys., Inc., 730 F.2d 248,
251 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing, in turn, Link, 370 U.S. at 631))).
And the Court’s authority under Rule 41(b) is not diluted by a party proceeding
pro se, as “[t]he right of self-representation does not exempt a party from compliance
with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Wright v. LBA Hospitality,
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754 F. App’x 298, 300 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (quoting Hulsey v. Texas, 929 F.2d
168, 171 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting, in turn, Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir.
Nov. 1981))).
A Rule 41(b) dismissal may be with or without prejudice. See Long v. Simmons,
77 F.3d 878, 879-80 (5th Cir. 1996).
Although “[l]esser sanctions such as fines or dismissal without prejudice
are usually appropriate before dismissing with prejudice, ... a Rule 41(b)
dismissal is appropriate where there is ‘a clear record of delay or
contumacious conduct by the plaintiff and when lesser sanctions would
not serve the best interests of justice.’”
Nottingham, 837 F.3d at 441 (quoting Bryson v. United States, 553 F.3d 402, 403 (5th
Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (in turn quoting Callip v. Harris Cnty. Child Welfare Dep’t,
757 F.2d 1513, 1521 (5th Cir. 1985))); see also Long, 77 F.3d at 880 (a dismissal with
prejudice is appropriate only if the failure to comply with the court order was the
result of purposeful delay or contumacious conduct and the imposition of lesser
sanctions would be futile); cf. Nottingham, 837 F.3d at 442 (noting that “lesser
sanctions” may “‘include assessments of fines, costs, or damages against the plaintiff,
conditional dismissal, dismissal without prejudice, and explicit warnings’” (quoting
Thrasher v. City of Amarillo, 709 F.3d 509, 514 (5th Cir. 2013))).
“When a dismissal is without prejudice but ‘the applicable statute of
limitations probably bars future litigation,’” that dismissal operates as – i.e., it is
reviewed as – “a dismissal with prejudice.” Griggs, 905 F.3d at 844 (quoting
Nottingham, 837 F.3d at 441); see, e.g., Wright, 754 F. App’x at 300 (affirming
dismissal under Rule 41(b) – potentially effectively with prejudice – where “[t]he
district court had warned Wright of the consequences and ‘allowed [her] a second
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chance at obtaining service’” but she “disregarded that clear and reasonable order”).
By not complying with the NOD – in addition to leaving the impression that
Young no longer wishes to pursue these claims – Young has prevented this action
from proceeding and has thus failed to prosecute this lawsuit.
A Rule 41(b) dismissal of this lawsuit without prejudice is therefore warranted
under these circumstances.
Because the undersigned concludes that lesser sanctions would be futile, as the
Court is not required to delay the disposition of this case until such time as Young
decides to obey the Court’s order or contact the Court, the Court should exercise its
inherent power to prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases and sua
sponte dismiss this action without prejudice under Rule 41(b).
Insofar as this dismissal may prejudice Young, these findings, conclusions, and
recommendation afford notice, and the opportunity to file objections (further
explained below) affords an opportunity to respond, to explain why this case should
not be dismissed for the reasons set out above. Cf. Carver v. Atwood, 18 F.4th 494,
498 (5th Cir. 2021) (“The broad rule is that ‘a district court may dismiss a claim on
its own motion as long as the procedure employed is fair.’ More specifically, ‘fairness
in this context requires both notice of the court’s intention and an opportunity to
respond’ before dismissing sua sponte with prejudice.” (citations omitted)).
Recommendation
The Court should deny Plaintiff Mikel Young leave to proceed in forma
pauperis and, because he has already been ordered to pay the filing fee but failed to
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do so, dismiss this action without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41(b).
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these
findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections
within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.
P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or
recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation
where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure
to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the
factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or
adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
DATED: March 26, 2026
_________________________________________
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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