Davis v. Highland Park Independent School District

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
TIMOTHY DAVIS, 	§
§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
VS. 	§ 	Civil Action No. 3:25-CV-3463-D
§
HIGHLAND PARK INDEPENDENT 	§
SCHOOL DISTRICT, 	§
§
Defendant. 	§
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
In this pro se action, plaintiff Timothy Davis (“Davis”) sues his former employer,
Highland Park Independent School District (“HPISD”), alleging claims for race and gender
discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”),
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. 	HPISD moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which
relief can be granted. 	For the reasons that follow, the court grants HPISD’s motion but
grants Davis leave to replead.
I
In January 2024 HPISD hired Davis, a Black male, to work as a Special Education
lead teacher at Boone Elementary School. Not long after he was hired, Davis began to have
“persistent issues” with “private nurse Renee” (“Nurse Renee”) and the two teacher aides
assigned to his classroom. Compl. (ECF No. 1-3) at 12. According to Davis’ complaint,
Nurse Renee and the two aides “question[ed] his methods and interventions with his students
that followed hurtful stereotypes of Black men being too aggressive or violent and
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untrustworthy with children.” Id.
Davis reported his “concerns” regarding the two aides and Nurse Renee to the
School’s principal, Amanda Reyes (“Reyes”), but her “lack of substantive intervention . . .
allow[ed] the bigoted views to perpetuate and continue to be discussed by these aides.” Id.
Davis also reported to Reyes that the aides were violating safety and sanitary policies in the
Special Education Fundamentals classroom, but Reyes “simply asked [Davis] to reinforce
the policies himself,” and the aides did not suffer any negative consequence for their alleged
violations. Id.
Davis alleges that, on April 4, 2024, Nurse Renee became “unreasonably angry with
[him for] asking her to keep her student in the presence of other District employees at all
times,” and assaulted him. Id. District Police were alerted and performed an investigation
that resulted in Davis’ being placed on administrative leave. 	On April 11, 2024 Reyes
informed Davis that she wished to terminate his contract. According to Davis, “[i]n order
to protect his business reputation, [he] was pressured into resigning before the termination
occurred.” Id.
On April 17, 2024 Davis filed a report of race discrimination and retaliation with
HPISD, but the district’s independent investigator concluded that Davis’ claims were
unsubstantiated.
Davis then sued HPISD in state court, alleging claims for race and gender
discrimination and retaliation, in violation of Title VII. 	HPISD removed the case to this
court and now moves to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Davis has not responded to
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HPISD’s motion, which the court is deciding on the briefs, without oral argument.
II
Pro se complaints are to be liberally construed. See, e.g., Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520-21 (1972) (per curiam); Hernandez v. Maxwell, 905 F.2d 94, 96 (5th Cir. 1990).
And they are to be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers[.]” Haines, 404 U.S. at 520. Nevertheless, “[a]lthough pro se pleadings are to be
liberally construed, they must state a ‘plausible claim for relief to survive [] a motion to
dismiss.’” 	Little v. Tex. Att’y Gen., 2015 WL 5613321, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 24, 2015)
(Fitzwater, J.) (alteration in original) (quoting Scott v. Cohen, 528 Fed. Appx. 150, 152 (3d
Cir. 2013) (per curiam)), aff’d sub nom. Little v. Obryan, 655 Fed. Appx. 1027 (5th Cir.
2016).
“In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court evaluates the sufficiency of
[the plaintiff’s] complaint by ‘accept[ing] all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff.’” Bramlett v. Med. Protective Co. of Fort Wayne, Ind.,
855 F.Supp.2d 615, 618 (N.D. Tex. 2012) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (second alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d
191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007)). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must
plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 	“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
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“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555 (“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level[.]”). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘shown’—‘that the
pleader is entitled to relief.’” 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 	(brackets omitted) (quoting Rule
8(a)(2)). 	“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678.
III
The court begins with Davis’ claim for race and gender discrimination.
A
Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). When a plaintiff alleges a Title VII claim of race or
gender discrimination based on circumstantial evidence, as Davis does, the court can use the
McDonnell Douglas1 framework as a reference when determining whether the plaintiff has
plausibly alleged the ultimate elements of his claim.2 Under this framework, a plaintiff must
1McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
2
The familiar McDonnell Douglas standard for evaluating employment discrimination
claims is an evidentiary framework, not a pleading standard. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema
N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002). Accordingly, “a plaintiff need not make out a prima facie
case of discrimination in order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim.” Raj v. La. State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 331 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Swierkiewicz,
534 U.S. at 510-12); see also, e.g., Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 470 (5th
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sufficiently plead that (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the
position; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) others similarly situated but
outside his protected class were treated more favorably. 	See, e.g., Saketkoo v. Adm’rs of
Tulane Educ. Fund, 31 F.4th 990, 997-98 (5th Cir. 2022). Under the fourth element, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that he was treated less favorably than other similarly situated
employees under “nearly identical circumstances.” Lee v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 574 F.3d
253, 259 (5th Cir. 2009); see Willis v. W. Power Sports, Inc., 2024 WL 448354, at *2 (5th
Cir. Feb. 6, 2024) (per curiam) (affirming Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal where plaintiff failed to
identify comparator who “under nearly identical circumstances” was treated more favorably
than he was). Nearly identical circumstances exist “when the employees being compared
held the same job or responsibilities, shared the same supervisor or had their employment
status determined by the same person, and have essentially comparable violation histories.”
Lee, 574 F.3d at 260 (citations omitted). Additionally, “the plaintiff’s conduct that drew the
Cir. 2016) (“Although Chhim did not have to submit evidence to establish a prima facie case
of discrimination at this stage, he had to plead sufficient facts on all of the ultimate elements
of a disparate treatment claim to make his case plausible.”). To survive HPISD’s motion to
dismiss, however, Davis must plausibly plead the ultimate elements of his discrimination
claim. 	See Chhim, 836 F.3d at 470. 	And since McDonnell Douglas will govern when a
plaintiff relies on indirect evidence of discrimination, it can be helpful to reference that
framework when the court is determining whether a plaintiff has plausibly alleged the
ultimate elements of his claim. See Cicalese v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch, 924 F.3d 762, 767
(5th Cir. 2019) (Title VII case) (“If a plaintiff’s . . . claim depends on circumstantial
evidence, he will ‘ultimately have to show’ that he can satisfy the McDonnell Douglas
framework. In such cases, we have said that it can be ‘helpful to reference’ that framework
when the court is determining whether a plaintiff has plausibly alleged the ultimate elements
of the . . . claim.” (quoting Chhim, 836 F.3d at 470-71)).
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adverse employment decision must have been ‘nearly identical’ to that of the proffered
comparator who allegedly drew dissimilar employment decisions.” Id.
B
HPISD moves to dismiss Davis’ discrimination claims on the ground, inter alia, that
Davis has failed to allege facts indicating that HPISD’s actions toward him were based on
his race or gender or that the district treated similarly situated employees more favorably.
As noted above, Davis has not responded to HPISD’s motion.
C
Davis has not pleaded a plausible Title VII claim for race- or gender-based
discrimination. He alleges no facts that enable the court to draw the reasonable inference that
others similarly situated outside his protected group were treated more favorably. 	Davis
makes the conclusory assertion that “two White, female educational aides were never
disciplined or terminated for a history of insubordinate behavior and policy failures, yet a
new Black, male teacher was terminated after being assaulted on campus based on pretextual
reasons that had not previously warranted documentation.” Compl. (ECF No. 1-3) at 18. But
he does not assert that his comparators—the two teacher aides—had similar experience,
qualifications, or held the same job or responsibilities. Davis’ “allegations lack factual detail
and are insufficient to enable the court to draw the reasonable inference that [his] White [,
female] coworkers were treated more favorably under nearly identical circumstances.”
Butler v. Our Cmty. Our Kids, 2025 WL 3650759, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2025)
(Fitzwater, J.) (citing cases). 	Moreover, Davis alleges that he was terminated “based on
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pretextual reasons,” including “two unsubstantiated complaints of the aides” and because he
“was out of the classroom too often.” 	Compl. (ECF No. 1-3) at 18. 	The conduct his
comparators allegedly engaged in include “insubordinate behavior and policy failures.” Id.
These allegations, even if taken as true, do not enable the court to draw the reasonable
inference that Davis engaged in conduct “nearly identical” to his proffered comparators who
were treated more favorably. 3 See Lee, 574 F.3d at 259-60.
Accordingly, the court grants HPISD’s motion to dismiss Davis’ Title VII claim for
race and gender discrimination.
IV
The court now turns to Davis’ retaliation claim.
A
To plead a plausible Title VII retaliation claim, the plaintiff must allege sufficient
facts for the court to draw the reasonable inference: “(1) that the plaintiff engaged in activity
protected by Title VII, (2) that an adverse employment action occurred, and (3) that a causal
link existed between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Banks v. E. Baton Rouge
Par. Sch. Bd., 320 F.3d 570, 575 (5th Cir. 2003).
B
HPISD moves to dismiss Davis’ retaliation claim on the ground that he has not alleged
3In concluding that Davis has failed to allege that others similarly situated but outside
his protected class were treated more favorably, the court does not intend to suggest that he
has otherwise plausibly alleged a Title VII claim for race or gender discrimination.
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that he engaged in a protected activity prior to his alleged discharge. As noted above, Davis
has not responded to HPISD’s motion.
C
The court concludes that Davis has failed to plausibly allege a claim for retaliation
under Title VII because he does not plead that he engaged in a protected activity.
Davis alleges that, at some point during his employment (he does not specify when),
he reported to Reyes his “concerns” about Nurse Renee and the two aides. Compl. (ECF No.
1-3) at 18. 	But Davis has not provided any detail regarding the “concerns” he allegedly
reported. Accordingly, the court cannot draw the reasonable inference that Davis engaged
in protected activity when he reported his “concerns” to Reyes. See Davis v. Dall. Indep.
Sch. Dist., 448 Fed. Appx. 485, 493 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (“[A] vague complaint,
without any reference to an unlawful employment practice under Title VII, does not
constitute protected activity.”); Kirk v. Our Cmty. Our Kids, 2025 WL 2432614, at *6 (N.D.
Tex. Aug. 22, 2025) (Fitzwater, J.) (complaining of “discriminatory practices” did not “give
rise to a reasonable inference that [plaintiff] engaged in protected activity”); E.E.O.C. v.
Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp., 516 F. Supp. 2d 678, 705 (N.D. Tex. 2007) (Stickney, J.) (“Vague
concerns and even vague assertions of discrimination are not sufficient to constitute an
opposition to an unlawful employment practice.”).
Davis does plausibly plead that he engaged in protected activity on April 17, 2024
when he “filed a report of racial discrimination and retaliation” with HPISD. Compl. (ECF
No. 1-3) at 18. 	But he has not plausibly pleaded causation with respect to this protected
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activity. Nor can he: Davis filed the report after the adverse employment action allegedly
occurred.
Accordingly, because Davis has failed to plausibly allege a Title VII retaliation claim,
the court grants HPISD’s motion to dismiss this claim.
V
Although the court is granting HPISD’s motion to dismiss, it will allow Davis to
replead.
In view of the consequences of dismissal on the complaint
alone, and the pull to decide cases on the merits rather than on
the sufficiency of pleadings, district courts often afford plaintiffs
at least one opportunity to cure pleading deficiencies before
dismissing a case, unless it is clear that the defects are incurable
or the plaintiffs advise the court that they are unwilling or
unable to amend in a manner that will avoid dismissal.
In re Am. Airlines, Inc., Priv. Litig., 370 F.Supp.2d 552, 567-68 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (Fitzwater,
J.) (alteration omitted) (quoting Great Plains Tr. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co.,
313 F.3d 305, 329 (5th Cir. 2002)). It is not apparent that the pleading deficiencies in Davis’
complaint are entirely incurable, and Davis has not advised the court that he is unwilling or
unable to amend in a manner that will avoid dismissal. And, in granting leave to replead, the
court takes into consideration that Davis is proceeding pro se. See, e.g., Smallwood v. Bank
of Am., 2012 WL 32654, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2012) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (granting leave to
file third amended complaint because plaintiffs were appearing pro se).
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* 	* 	*
For the reasons explained, the court grants HPISD’s motion to dismiss and grants
Davis 28 days from the date of this memorandum opinion and order to file an amended
complaint.
SO ORDERED.
February 24, 2026.
_________________________________
SIDNEY A. FITZWATER
SENIOR JUDGE
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