Williams v. Mairura et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
ANICSHA WILLIAMS, 	§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	No. 3:25-CV-3230-S-BW
§
METHODIST HOSPITALS OF 	§
DALLAS, et al., 	§
Defendants. 	§ 	Referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge1
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Defendants Marisol Estrada, Edward Mairura, the Mairura Family
Foundation (the “Foundation”), and Methodist Hospitals of Dallas (“Methodist
Hospital”) filed motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims. (See Dkt. Nos. 15, 16, 17, 20.)
For reasons explained below, the undersigned magistrate judge concludes that the
motions should be granted and this action should be dismissed.
I. BACKGROUND
A. 	Williams filed this action complaining of workplace discrimination and
retaliation at Methodist Hospital.
Plaintiff Anischa Williams, appearing pro se in this action, filed this lawsuit
on November 24, 2025. (See Dkt. No. 3 (“Compl.”).) In her complaint, she alleges
that she formerly worked as an operating room nurse at the Midlothian campus of
Methodist Hospital. (Compl. ¶ 3.) She sued Methodist Hospital; Mairura, a surgeon
1 This pro se case has been referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for case
management by Special Order 3-251. (See Dkt. No. 1.)
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affiliated with the hospital; Mairura’s foundation; Brenna Wright and Marisol
Estrada, surgical technologists at the hospital; Marvyn Davis, formerly the operating
room manager who later became operating room director; and Ronald Roberson,
who supervised Williams and served as an operating room charge nurse. (See id.
¶¶ 4-10.) Williams alleges that she reported a violent workplace incident involving
Wright in December 2024 and suffered workplace violence, escalating hostility, and
retaliation thereafter. (Id. ¶¶ 11-12.) She also alleges that Defendants retaliated
against her after she rejected romantic overtures from Davis. (Id. ¶ 13.) Williams
avers that she contacted law enforcement about the December 2024 incident but that
some of the Defendants interfered with her report, encouraged her not to pursue the
matter, and mocked or gossiped about her. (See id. ¶¶ 15-17.) According to the
complaint, Methodist Hospital discouraged minority employees from reporting
safety incidents. (Id. ¶ 18.)
Williams’s complaint also alleges that she was given a “Final Warning” in
May 2025 by Davis and a human resources director, that Davis threatened to remove
her from working on days when Mairura operated, and that Wright and Estrada
gossiped, engaged in hostile behavior, and contributed to a racially hostile
environment. (Id. ¶¶ 19-21.) Williams complains that the Foundation removed her
from a medical mission trip to Kenya in August 2025 but included Wright on that
trip, that Mairura declined to do anything in response to threats made against
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Williams, and that Davis disclosed Williams’s confidential information to Wright,
who disseminated it to others. (Id. ¶¶ 22-26.)
Defendants Wright, Roberson, and Davis have not been served with a
summons and operative complaint. The remaining defendants have been served,
and each as filed a motion to dismiss. Both Estrada and Mairura filed motions to
dismiss on December 15, 2025. (Dkt. Nos. 15 (“Estrada Mot.”), 16 (“Mairura
Mot.”).) The Foundation filed its motion on December 16, 2025. (Dkt. No. 17
(“Found. Mot.”).) And Methodist Hospital filed its motion on December 17, 2025.
(Dkt. No. 20 (“Hosp. Mot.”).) Williams filed responses to each one soon thereafter.
(See Dkt. Nos. 23, 24, 25, 26.) And Mairura, Estrada, and Methodist Hospital each
filed a reply. (See Dkt. Nos. 29, 30, 31.) The Foundation did not file a reply in the
time permitted to do so. See N.D. Tex. L. Civ. R. 7.1(f).
B. 	Williams is pursuing similar claims against the same defendants in another
case.
Each of the Defendants’ who filed a motion points the Court to Williams’s
lawsuit in Case No. 3:25-CV-2631-N-BT (“Case 2631”). Williams, also pro se, filed
a complaint against Methodist Health System, Mairura, and the Foundation on
September 29, 2025. (Dkt. No. 3, Case 2631.) On October 29—about a month prior
to filing this lawsuit—Williams filed an amended complaint in Case 2631 naming the
same seven Defendants in this action. (Dkt. No. 18, Case 2631 (“2631 Compl.”).)
This amended complaint contains the same factual allegations as the complaint filed
in this action, including her complaints pertaining to workplace retaliation after the
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December 2024 incident, retaliation after Williams’s refusal of Davis’s romantic
overtures, interference and retaliation relating to Williams’s attempts to report the
workplace incident to law enforcement, failure to adequately respond to Williams’s
reports of safety concerns, the “Final Warning” and threats of altering Williams’s
work schedule, and her removal from the mission trip. (See 2631 Compl. ¶¶ 11-26.)
Williams asserts some, but not all, of the claims asserted in this action, such as Title
VII retaliation and hostile work environment. (Compare Compl. ¶ 27-28 with 2631
Compl. at 3.) But she includes a claim for defamation or slander that she does not
assert in this action. (See 2631 Compl. at 4.)
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
“Claim-splitting occurs when a single ‘cause of action’ is split by advancing
one part in an initial suit and another part in a later suit.” Ameritox, Ltd. v. Aegis Scis.
Corp., No. 3:08-CV-1168-D, 2009 WL 305874, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2009)
(quoting F.D.I.C. v. Nelson, 19 F.3d 15, 1994 WL 93409, at *2 (5th Cir. Mar. 15,
1994) (unpublished table decision)); see Armadillo Hotel Grp., L.L.C. v. Harris, 84 F.4th
623, 628 (5th Cir. 2023) (“The rule against claim splitting prohibits a party or parties
in privity from simultaneously prosecuting multiple suits involving the same subject
matter against the same defendants.”). A plaintiff cannot prosecute claims arising
out of a single wrong through piecemeal litigation. See Ameritox, Ltd., 2009 WL
305874, at *4. When she does so, “the second suit will be barred if the claim
involves the same parties and arises out of the same transaction or series of
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transactions as the first claim.” Id. (quoting Sensormatic Sec. Corp. v. Sensormatic Elecs.
Corp., 273 F. App’x 256, 265 (4th Cir. 2008)). “A main purpose behind the
rule . . . is to protect the defendant from being harassed by repetitive actions based on
the same claim.” Id. (quoting Matter of Super Van Inc., 92 F.3d 366, 371 (5th Cir.
1996)).
A court considers a four-part test that applies to res judicata when assessing
whether impermissible claim-splitting has occurred: (1) whether the parties in the
current action are the same or in privity with those in the first action; (2) whether the
court in the prior action is one of “competent jurisdiction”; (3) whether the prior
action ended with a judgment on the merits; and (4) whether the same claim or cause
of action is involved in the two suits. Armadillo Hotel, 84 F.4th at 628. When the first
lawsuit is still pending, as Case 2631 is, the court considers only the first and fourth
factors—i.e., the similarity of the parties and claims. Id.
III. ANALYSIS
Each of the motions to dismiss argue that this lawsuit should be dismissed
because it constitutes impermissible claim-splitting. (See Estrada Mot. at 8-9;
Mairura Mot. at 7-9; Dkt. No. 18 at 6-7; Hosp. Mot. at 8-10.) Williams does not
respond to this arguments in her responses to Estrada and Mairura. (See Dkt. Nos.
23, 25.) In response to Methodist Hospital and the Foundation, Williams states only
that dismissal is not mandatory and should not occur when other measures such as
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consolidation, amendment, or a stay “would better serve justice,” (Dkt. No. 24 at 2),
and she argues that dismissal should not be with prejudice, (Dkt. No. 26 at 1-2.)
Considering the relevant factors here, it is clear that this lawsuit constitutes
impermissible claim-splitting by Williams. First, there is complete identity between
the parties. Williams sues precisely the same seven defendants in both cases.
Second, although Williams articulates several more causes of action in this case—17
compared to the 5 asserted in Case 2631—her claims arise out of precisely the same
operative facts, i.e., the December 2024 incident and rejection of Davis’s romantic
overtures, the alleged mistreatment and retaliation that followed these events that
included threatened rescheduling of work shifts, removal from the mission trip, and
alleged failure to remedy harassment or respond to safety concerns. See Armadillo
Hotel, 84 F.4th 632, 640 (5th Cir. 2023) (“[I]t is the ‘nucleus of operative facts, rather
than the type of relief requested, substantive theories advanced, or types of rights
asserted’ that defines the claim.” (quoting Houston Pro. Towing Ass’n v. City of Houston,
812 F.3d 443, 447 (5th Cir. 2016))). These two lawsuits are based on identical
events, and this action epitomizes impermissible claim splitting.
Williams suggests that the Court should take some other measure to remedy
her claim splitting. (See Dkt. No. 24 at 2.) She does not point to any advantage—for
either party or the Court—that would result from consolidating this action into Case
2631 or staying this case. Nor has Williams suggested that she would be prejudiced
by dismissal. A scheduling order has not yet been entered in Case 2631, and there is
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no obvious barrier to her ability to seek to amend her complaint in that action to
make claims exclusively asserted in this case.2 This action is practically a duplicate
of Case 2631, serves no practical purpose, and threatens to continue being simply an
administrative burden and “an extreme waste of valuable judicial resources.” See
Sturns v. Kroger Co., No. 3:22-CV-01891-E, 2023 WL 5312213, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Aug.
16, 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted).
IV. RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants motions to dismiss (Dkt. Nos. 15, 16,
17, 20) should be GRANTED, and this case should be DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE for impermissible claim-splitting.
SO RECOMMENDED on April 8, 2026.
BRIAN McKAY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
2 The undersigned does not suggest that such amendment would or would not be
futile.
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the
manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and
recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being
served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). To be specific,
an objection must identify the finding or recommendation to which objection is
made, state the basis for the objection, and indicate the place in the magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An
objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the
magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the
aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the
magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon
grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415,
1417 (5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)
(extending the time to file objections to 14 days).
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