Brown v. LSI Staffing

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER BROWN, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
V. § No. 3:25-cv-2918-L-BN
§
LSI STAFFING, §
§
Defendant. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Christopher Brown filed a pro se complaint alleging employment
claims. See Dkt. No. 3. Brown also filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis (“IFP”). See Dkt. No. 5. So United States District Judge Sam A. Lindsay
referred Brown’s lawsuit to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for
pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference.
On October 30, 2025, because of deficiencies in the IFP motion, the Court
ordered Brown to file an amended IFP motion or pay the filing fee by December 1,
2025. See Dkt. No. 9. The order warned Brown that “[f]ailure to either file a proper
amended IFP motion or pay the filing fee by December 1, 2025 will result in a
recommendation that the complaint be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 41(b).” Id. at 2 (emphasis removed).
It is now more than a month past the court-ordered deadline to file an amended
IFP motion or pay the filing fee. And Brown has failed to comply with the Court’s
order or otherwise contact the Court.
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Considering this record, the undersigned enters these findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and recommendation that the Court should dismiss this action
without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).
Discussion
Rule 41(b) “authorizes the district court to dismiss an action sua sponte for
failure to prosecute or comply with [a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure or] a court
order.” Griggs v. S.G.E. Mgmt., L.L.C., 905 F.3d 835, 844 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing
McCullough v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 1126, 1127 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)); accord
Nottingham v. Warden, Bill Clements Unit, 837 F.3d 438, 440 (5th Cir. 2016) (failure
to comply with a court order); Rosin v. Thaler, 450 F. App’x 383, 383-84 (5th Cir.
2011) (per curiam) (failure to prosecute); see also Campbell v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d
798, 800-01 (5th Cir. 2021) (holding that the text of Rule 41(b) does not extend to a
failure to comply with a court’s local rule insofar as that violation does not also qualify
as a failure to prosecute (discussing Berry v. CIGNA/RSI-CIGNA, 975 F.2d 1188 (5th
Cir. 1992))).
This authority “flows from the court’s inherent power to control its docket and
prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases.” Boudwin v. Graystone Ins.
Co., Ltd., 756 F.2d 399, 401 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S.
626 (1962)); see also Lopez v. Ark. Cnty. Indep. Sch. Dist., 570 F.2d 541, 544 (5th Cir.
1978) (“Although [Rule 41(b)] is phrased in terms of dismissal on the motion of the
defendant, it is clear that the power is inherent in the court and may be exercised sua
sponte whenever necessary to ‘achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of
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cases.’” (quoting Link, 370 U.S. at 631)); Campbell, 988 F.3d at 800 (“It is well
established that Rule 41(b) permits dismissal not only on motion of the defendant,
but also on the court’s own motion.” (citing Morris v. Ocean Sys., Inc., 730 F.2d 248,
251 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing, in turn, Link, 370 U.S. at 631))).
And the Court’s authority under Rule 41(b) is not diluted by a party proceeding
pro se, as “[t]he right of self-representation does not exempt a party from compliance
with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Wright v. LBA Hospitality,
754 F. App’x 298, 300 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (quoting Hulsey v. Texas, 929 F.2d
168, 171 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting, in turn, Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir.
Nov. 1981))).
A Rule 41(b) dismissal may be with or without prejudice. See Long v. Simmons,
77 F.3d 878, 879-80 (5th Cir. 1996).
Although “[l]esser sanctions such as fines or dismissal without prejudice
are usually appropriate before dismissing with prejudice, ... a Rule 41(b)
dismissal is appropriate where there is ‘a clear record of delay or
contumacious conduct by the plaintiff and when lesser sanctions would
not serve the best interests of justice.’”
Nottingham, 837 F.3d at 441 (quoting Bryson v. United States, 553 F.3d 402, 403 (5th
Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (in turn quoting Callip v. Harris Cnty. Child Welfare Dep’t,
757 F.2d 1513, 1521 (5th Cir. 1985))); see also Long, 77 F.3d at 880 (a dismissal with
prejudice is appropriate only if the failure to comply with the court order was the
result of purposeful delay or contumacious conduct and the imposition of lesser
sanctions would be futile); cf. Nottingham, 837 F.3d at 442 (noting that “lesser
sanctions” may “‘include assessments of fines, costs, or damages against the plaintiff,
conditional dismissal, dismissal without prejudice, and explicit warnings’” (quoting
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Thrasher v. City of Amarillo, 709 F.3d 509, 514 (5th Cir. 2013))).
“When a dismissal is without prejudice but ‘the applicable statute of
limitations probably bars future litigation,’” that dismissal operates as – i.e., it is
reviewed as – “a dismissal with prejudice.” Griggs, 905 F.3d at 844 (quoting
Nottingham, 837 F.3d at 441); see, e.g., Wright, 754 F. App’x at 300 (affirming
dismissal under Rule 41(b) – potentially effectively with prejudice – where “[t]he
district court had warned Wright of the consequences and ‘allowed [her] a second
chance at obtaining service’” but she “disregarded that clear and reasonable order”).
By not complying with the order to file an amended IFP motion or pay the filing
fee – in addition to leaving the impression that Brown no longer wishes to pursue
these claims – Brown has prevented this action from proceeding and has thus failed
to prosecute this lawsuit.
A Rule 41(b) dismissal of this lawsuit without prejudice is therefore warranted
under these circumstances.
Because the undersigned concludes that lesser sanctions would be futile, as the
Court is not required to delay the disposition of this case until such time as Brown
decides to obey the Court’s order or contact the Court, the Court should exercise its
inherent power to prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases and sua
sponte dismiss this action without prejudice under Rule 41(b).
Insofar as this dismissal may prejudice Brown, these findings, conclusions, and
recommendation afford notice, and the opportunity to file objections (further
explained below) affords an opportunity to respond, to explain why this case should
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not be dismissed for the reasons set out above. Cf. Carver v. Atwood, 18 F.4th 494,
498 (5th Cir. 2021) (“The broad rule is that ‘a district court may dismiss a claim on
its own motion as long as the procedure employed is fair.’ More specifically, ‘fairness
in this context requires both notice of the court’s intention and an opportunity to
respond’ before dismissing sua sponte with prejudice.” (citations omitted)).
Recommendation
The Court should dismiss this action without prejudice under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 41(b).
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these
findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections
within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.
P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or
recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation
where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure
to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the
factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or
adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.
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United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
DATED: January 8, 2026
_________________________________________
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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