Gutierrez Sanchez v. Internal Revenue Service

3:25-cv-01331TxndDec 24, 2025

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
MIGUEL A. GUTIERREZ
SANCHEZ,
Plaintiff,
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v. 	Civil Action No. 3:25-cv-1331-G-BT
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
Defendant.
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Miguel A. Gutierrez Sanchez initiated this civil action against the
Internal Revenue Service on May 28, 2025. See generally Compl. (ECF No. 3).
However, Plaintiff has not taken action in this matter since July 7, 2025, and has
failed to keep the Court apprised of his current address. Therefore, the District
Judge should DISMISS this case without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 41(b).
Background
In his four-sentence complaint, Plaintiff alleges:
Intentionally the Internal Revenue Service have changed the 2012
income tax 1040A from Head of Household to single just to make me
pay taxes that I do not owe. According to my file all my [dependents]
are legit. But the Internal Revenue Service and Tax Court have
changed as I show in paper (see attached). I want all of the money
owe[d] to me & family to be refunded back to be clear and also the
[COVID-19] & all that I never got paid.
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Id. at 1. Despite Plaintiff’s statements, there are no attachments to his Complaint.
In the Complaint’s civil cover sheet, Plaintiff indicates that the nature of his suit is
“federal tax.” Id. at 3.
After filing his Complaint, Plaintiff submitted his application to proceed in
forma pauperis (ECF No. 4), which the Court granted after Plaintiff properly
demonstrated that payment of the filing fee would cause him undue financial
hardship (ECF Nos. 8 & 12). Plaintiff also filed a Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF
No. 6), which the Court denied without prejudice (ECF No. 22).
After the U.S. Marshals Service effectuated service of process, Defendant
filed 	its 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss, 	arguing 	that 	this 	Court 	lacks 	subject-matter
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims because Plaintiff has not identified a waiver of
sovereign immunity, and Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. See Def.’s Mot. at 4–9 (ECF No. 20). Defendant mailed a copy of the
motion to Plaintiff, and the Court ordered Plaintiff to respond to the motion by
September 15, 2025. See id. at 11 (certificate of service); Order (ECF No. 21).
Despite the Court’s instruction, Plaintiff did not respond to Defendant’s motion.
Plaintiff provided an address upon filing but documents the Court has tried
to send to Plaintiff at that address—including orders on the above motions—have
been returned to the Court as “undeliverable,” indicating that Plaintiff moved and
failed to advise the Court of his new address. See Mail Returned (ECF Nos. 10, 14,
18, 23, & 24).
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Legal Standard and Analysis
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a court to dismiss
an action sua sponte for failure to prosecute or for failure to comply with the
federal rules or any court order. Griggs v. S.G.E. Mgmt., L.L.C., 905 F.3d 835, 844
(5th Cir. 2018) (citing McCullough v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 1126, 1127 (5th Cir. 1988)
(per curiam)); accord Nottingham v. Warden, Bill Clements Unit, 837 F.3d 438,
440–42 (5th Cir. 2016) (failure to comply with court order); Rosin v. Thaler, 450
F. App’x 383, 383–84 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (failure to prosecute). “This
authority [under Rule 41(b)] flows from the court’s inherent power to control its
docket and prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases.” Boudwin v.
Graystone Ins., 756 F.2d 399, 401 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Link v. Wabash, R.R. Co.,
370 U.S. 626 (1962)). The Court’s authority under Rule 41(b) is not diluted by a
party proceeding pro se, as “[t]he right to self-representation does not exempt a
party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.”
Wright v. LBA Hosp., 754 F. App’x 298, 300 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (quoting
Hulsey v. Texas, 929 F.2d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 1991)).
As highlighted in Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff’s Complaint is
wholly 	devoid 	of 	sufficient 	allegations 	necessary 	to 	establish 	subject-matter
jurisdiction. Federal subject-matter jurisdiction refers to the authority of federal
courts to hear and decide cases. A federal court cannot hear a party’s case unless
there is federal subject-matter jurisdiction. Griffin v. Lee, 621 F.3d 380, 388 (5th
Cir. 2010) (per curiam). Specifically, to establish subject-matter jurisdiction in this
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case, Plaintiff must identify a waiver of federal sovereign immunity. Williamson v.
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 815 F.2d 368, 373–74 (5th Cir. 1987) (“The Supreme Court
has held repeatedly that ‘[t]he United States, as a sovereign, is immune from suit
save as it consents to be sued . . . , and the terms of its consent to be sued in any
court define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.’”) (alteration in original)
(quoting United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980)). When a plaintiff files
a complaint in federal court, it is the plaintiff’s responsibility to show the Court
that there is federal subject-matter jurisdiction. Coury v. Prot, 85 F.3d 244, 248
(5th Cir. 1996). This is because “[t]he party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the
federal court has the burden of proving that jurisdiction exists.” Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co. v. Hillman, 796 F.2d 770, 775 (5th Cir. 1986). A plaintiff can show the
Court that there is federal subject-matter jurisdiction through the allegations in
the complaint.
However, 	the 	Court 	cannot 	communicate 	this 	deficiency 	to 	Plaintiff
because—in contravention of the local rules of this Court, Rule 41(b), and the
Court’s standard instructions to pro se plaintiffs—Plaintiff has failed to keep the
Court apprised of his address. See ECF No. 2 (“Instructions to a Non-Prisoner Pro
Se Plaintiff”); Thompson v. Beatty, 2023 WL 5311518, at *1 (N.D. Tex. July 28,
2023) (Ray, J.) (“Under Rule 41(b), the plaintiff has a duty to keep the Court
apprised of any address changes.”) (citing Lewis v. Hardy, 248 F. App’x 589, 593
n.1 (5th Cir. 2007)), adopted by 2023 WL 5312210 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2023)
(O’Connor, J.); N.D. Tex. Loc. Civ. R. 1.1 (c)(2), 83.13, & 83.14. This case cannot
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proceed because the Court cannot communicate with Plaintiff. As a result, the
Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s case without prejudice for failure to prosecute and
failure to follow Court orders.
Recommendation
The District Judge should DISMISS Plaintiff’s case without prejudice under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to prosecute. If Plaintiff updates
his address before the deadline for objecting to the findings, conclusions, and
recommendation expires (explained in more detail below), the Magistrate Judge
will withdraw the recommendation to dismiss.
SO RECOMMENDED.
December 24, 2025.
REBECCA RUTHERFORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in
the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and
recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being
served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). To be specific,
an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which
objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination
is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the
briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written
objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal
conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district
judge, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto.
Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
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