Rodriguez v. BHG Financial LLC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
NELFI J. RODRIGUEZ, 	§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	No. 3:25-CV-1166-D-BW
§
BHG FINANCIAL, LLC, 	§
Defendant. 	§ 	Referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge1
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Based on the relevant filings and applicable law, the Court should DISMISS
this civil action without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for
failure to prosecute or follow orders of the Court.
I. BACKGROUND
Nelfi J. Rodriguez, proceeding pro se, filed this employment action against his
former employer, BHG Financial, LLC. (See Dkt. No. 3.) Because the Court
granted Rodriguez’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) in this case,
his complaint is subject to preliminary screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). (See
Dkt. Nos. 4, 6.) As part of its preliminary screening and in accordance with Watson
v. Ault, 525 F.2d 886, 892-93 (5th Cir. 1976), on January 28, 2026, the Court ordered
Rodriguez to complete and return a First Magistrate Judge’s Questionnaire
(“Questionnaire”) no later than February 11, 2026. (See Dkt. No. 7.) In the
1 By Special Order No. 3-251, this pro se case has been automatically referred for
judicial screening.
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Questionnaire, the Court notified Rodriguez that it perceived the facts set forth in his
complaint as inadequate in whole or in part to state a claim against BHG Financial
and warned him that failure to file answers to the Questionnaire could result in the
dismissal of his complaint for failure to prosecute. (See id.)
It is now over three weeks past the February 11 deadline, and Rodriguez still
has not filed answers to the Questionnaire or filed anything else in this case
manifesting an intent to proceed with this action.
II. INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “authorizes the district
court to dismiss an action sua sponte for failure to prosecute or comply with [a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure or] a court order.” Griggs v. S.G.E. Mgmt., L.L.C.,
905 F.3d 835, 844 (5th Cir. 2018). This authority flows from a court’s inherent
power to control its docket, prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases,
and avoid congested court calendars. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-31
(1962). Further, a court’s authority under Rule 41(b) is not diluted merely because a
party proceeds pro se, as “[t]he right of self-representation does not exempt a party
from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Wright v.
LBA Hospitality, 754 F. App’x 298, 300 (5th Cir. 2019).
A dismissal under Rule 41(b) is generally without prejudice, but when, as
here, a plaintiff may be barred by the applicable statute of limitations from
reasserting the same claims in a new lawsuit, a Rule 41(b) dismissal is in effect
tantamount to a dismissal with prejudice, and a heightened standard of review
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applies. See Berry v. CIGNA/RSI-CIGNA, 975 F.2d 1188, 1191 (5th Cir. 1992).
Under this heightened standard of review, a court must find “at least one of three
aggravating factors: ‘(1) delay caused by [the] plaintiff himself and not his attorney;
(2) actual prejudice to the defendant; or (3) delay caused by intentional conduct.’”
Id. (citations omitted); see also Nottingham v. Warden, Bill Clements Unit, 837 F.3d 438,
441 (5th Cir. 2016).
Here, the heightened standard of review has been satisfied. Rodriguez has
failed to respond to the Court’s Questionnaire, which involves necessary steps in the
advancement of this litigation, despite warnings that his complaint, as filed, was
inadequate and that a failure to answer the Questionnaire could result in dismissal of
his case for failure to prosecute. Since Rodriguez is representing himself, this delay
and implied refusal to comply is attributable to him alone. See Berry, 975 F.2d at
1191. Further, it does not appear that a lesser sanction will prompt diligent
prosecution of this case as Rodriguez has taken no action manifesting an intent to
pursue this action since May 2025.2
Accordingly, the Court should exercise its inherent power to prevent undue
delays in the disposition of pending cases and dismiss this action without prejudice
under Rule 41(b) for failure to prosecute or follow court orders, even if an applicable
statute of limitations may prevent re-litigation of the same claims. See Nottingham,
2 Despite Rodriguez’s inactivity, the Court notes that the 14-day period to file
objections to this recommendation, detailed below, will provide Rodriguez a final
opportunity to comply with the Court’s order to complete the Questionnaire and to show
that this action should not be dismissed under Rule 41(b).
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837 F.3d at 441 (holding that the court did not abuse its discretion by applying the
heightened standard of review under Rule 41(b) and dismissing pro se action due to
the plaintiff’s noncompliance with court orders).
III. RECOMMENDATION
The Court should DISMISS this action without prejudice under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to prosecute or follow orders of the Court.
SO RECOMMENDED on March 6, 2026.
____________________________________
BRIAN McKAY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the
manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and
recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being
served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). To be specific,
an objection must identify the finding or recommendation to which objection is
made, state the basis for the objection, and indicate the place in the magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An
objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the
magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the
aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the
magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon
grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415,
1417 (5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)
(extending the time to file objections to 14 days).
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