Kordia v. Noem et al

Memorandum Opinion and Order - Page 1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
LEQAA KORDIA,
Petitioner,
v.
KRISTI NOEM, et al.,
Respondents.
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Civil Action No. 3:25-cv-01072-L-BT
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the court is Petitioner Leqaa Kordia’s Emergency Renewed Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order on Counts II & III of her Amended Habeas Petition (Doc. 98), filed March 6,
2026. After considering the motion, pleadings, evidence, and applicable law, the court denies
Petitioner Leqaa Kordia’s Emergency Renewed Motion for Temporary Restraining Order on
Counts II & III of her Amended Habeas Petition (Doc. 98).
Petitioner Leqaa Kordia (“Petitioner” or “Kordia”) filed this action on April 30, 2025,
against Respondents Kristi Noem, Pamela Bondi, Todd Lyons, Josh Johnson, and Thomas Bergami
(collectively, “Respondents”) seeking, among other things, a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. Petitioner alleges that her continued detention violates the First Amendment, as well as
her right to procedural and substantive due process. For relief, Petitioner seeks to be released from
custody. Am. Pet. at 62–63 (Doc. 69). On March 6, 2026, the immigration court ordered a third
bond hearing set to occur on March 10, 2026. Mot. for TRO at 2 (Doc. 98). Before the bond
hearing is set to occur, Petitioner requests that the court issue injunctive relief in the form of an
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Memorandum Opinion and Order - Page 2
emergency temporary restraining order prohibiting Respondents from invoking and executing the
automatic and discretionary stay provisions. Id. at 1.
There are four prerequisites for the extraordinary relief of a temporary restraining order or
preliminary injunction. To prevail, Plaintiffs must demonstrate: (i) a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits; (ii) a substantial threat of immediate and irreparable harm for which it has
no adequate remedy at law; (iii) that greater injury will result from denying the temporary
restraining order than from its being granted; and (iv) that a temporary restraining order will not
disserve the public interest. Clark v. Prichard, 812 F.2d 991, 993 (5th Cir. 1987); Canal Authority
v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc). The party seeking such relief must satisfy
a cumulative burden of proving each of the four elements enumerated before a temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction can be granted. Mississippi Power and Light Co. v.
United Gas Pipeline, 760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir. 1985); Clark, 812 F.2d at 993. Otherwise stated,
if a party fails to meet any of the four requirements, the court cannot grant the temporary restraining
order or preliminary injunction.
Having reviewed Petitioner’s Emergency Renewed Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order on Counts II & III of her Amended Habeas Petition, as well as the appendix submitted in
support, the court does not see sufficient evidence that would precipitate the necessity of a
temporary restraining order. Petitioner is not currently being detained under the automatic stay
provision. Petitioner’s contention that she will suffer irreparable harm because Respondents may
invoke another automatic or discretionary stay is speculative. Given the pending bond hearing,
the court concludes that Petitioner has failed to meet her burden of showing a substantial risk of
irreparable harm for which she has no adequate remedy at law. For these reasons, the court denies
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Petitioner’s Emergency Renewed Motion for Temporary Restraining Order on Counts II & III of
her Amended Habeas Petition (Doc. 98).
It is so ordered this 9th day of March, 2026.
_________________________________
Sam A. Lindsay
United States District Judge
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