Burgess v. City of Dallas et al

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
JIBRI HASHIM BURGESS 	§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	No. 3:25-CV-0806-D-BW
§
CITY OF DALLAS, et al., 	§
Defendants. 	§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Special Order 3-251, this pro se civil
action was referred to the United States magistrate judge for case management,
including the entry of findings and a recommended disposition where appropriate.
As detailed below, the undersigned magistrate judge recommends that all federal
claims be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE because the complaint fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. Any remaining state-law claims should be
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Jibri Hashim Burgess filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 in April 2025, “alleging violations of my Fourth Amendment rights,
emotional distress, and other civil rights violations stemming from the actions of the
Dallas Police Department on June 26th, 2024.” (Dkt. No. 11 at 4.)1 Burgess asserts
1 Plaintiff filed an amended complaint (Dkt. No. 11), which is the operative
pleading.
Case 3:25-cv-00806-D-BW Document 31 Filed 03/02/26 Page 1 of 16 PageID <pageID>

2
his claims against the City of Dallas, the Dallas Police Department, and individual
officers Casey Tharp, Michelle Buckland, and Sergeant Swindell, Jr. Service of
process has been withheld pending completion of judicial screening. (See Dkt. No.
7.)
Burgess alleges that on June 26, 2024, officers of the Dallas Police Department
responded to his residence following a report made by the building owner. (Dkt. No.
11 at 5.) According to Burgess, officers entered his premises without a warrant,
probable cause, or consent, and seized two firearms—a Glock handgun and an AR
pistol—despite the absence of any criminal charges against him. (See id. at 6, 31.)
He further alleges that officers called for reinforcements, established a perimeter, and
deployed drones during the encounter. Burgess contends that officers identified him
as a suspect through deceptive means, which led to the discovery of an outstanding
arrest warrant and his subsequent detention. (Id. at 4, 9-10, 26-27.)
Burgess also alleges that while he was receiving medical treatment at Baylor
Scott & White Health following the incident, officers entered his hospital room
without authorization, viewed personal health information displayed on a medical
screen, discussed his condition with nursing staff, and directed that a request for
medical care be denied. (See id. at 5, 13, 17.)
Based on these events, Burgess asserts multiple claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and federal law, including unlawful search and seizure in violation of the Fourth
Amendment; excessive force and due process violations under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments; abuse of authority; violation of the Health Insurance
Case 3:25-cv-00806-D-BW Document 31 Filed 03/02/26 Page 2 of 16 PageID <pageID>

3
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA); racial discrimination in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; false arrest and illegal
identification; police negligence; defamation of character; and intentional infliction
of emotional distress. (See id. at 4-6.) He seeks $4,577,600 in total damages, the
return of his seized firearms, and an independent investigation into the conduct of
the officers involved.
II. LEGAL STANDARD AND ANALYSIS
Because Burgess proceeds in forma pauperis, the complaint is subject to
screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Under this provision, the Court must
dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). A complaint is frivolous
when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous when it is based
on an indisputable meritless legal theory or when the factual contentions are “clearly
‘baseless.’” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992).
A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does
not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted).
Case 3:25-cv-00806-D-BW Document 31 Filed 03/02/26 Page 3 of 16 PageID <pageID>

4
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must still allege
sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for relief. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007) (pro se pleadings are “to be liberally construed,” and “a pro se complaint,
however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.”); Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be
construed so as to do justice”). But conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions
of fact, and legal conclusions masquerading as facts are insufficient. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678.
A. 	Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against the City of Dallas fail because the amended
complaint does not allege a constitutionally deficient municipal policy or
custom.
At the threshold, Burgess’s claims against the City of Dallas fail. A
municipality may be held liable under § 1983 only when “the action that is alleged to
be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance,
regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers,”
or when the deprivation is visited pursuant to “governmental ‘custom’ even though
such a custom has not received formal approval through the body's official decision
making channels.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).
Critically, a municipality cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 simply
because it employs an alleged tortfeasor. Id. at 691; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663
(“[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead
that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual
actions, has violated the Constitution.”). To state a viable Monell claim, a plaintiff
Case 3:25-cv-00806-D-BW Document 31 Filed 03/02/26 Page 4 of 16 PageID <pageID>

5
must identify a policymaker, an official policy or custom, and “a direct causal link”
between that policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Piotrowski
v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001). Proof of a single incident
ordinarily is insufficient to impose municipal liability absent involvement of a final
policy maker. See Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 549 (5th Cir. 2010) (“The
‘single incident exception’ is extremely narrow; ‘a plaintiff must prove that the highly
predictable consequence of a failure to train would result in the specific injury
suffered, and that the failure to train represented the moving force behind the
constitutional violation.’” (citations omitted)).
Here, Burgess identifies no such policy, custom, or practice. The amended
complaint challenges only the conduct of individual officers during a single incident
and does not allege any pattern of similar conduct, any failure-to-train claim
supported by factual allegations, or any decision by an authorized policymaker that
proximately caused the alleged harm. Because respondeat superior liability does not
exist under § 1983, Burgess fails to state a claim against the City of Dallas.
B. 	Plaintiff fails to state a plausible Fourth Amendment claim for unlawful
search or seizure.
Even apart from the deficiencies in the claims against the City of Dallas,
Burgess’s Fourth Amendment allegations do not state a cognizable basis for relief
against any defendant. Burgess alleges, in largely conclusory terms, that officers
entered his premises and seized his firearms without a warrant, probable cause, or
Case 3:25-cv-00806-D-BW Document 31 Filed 03/02/26 Page 5 of 16 PageID <pageID>

6
consent. (See Dkt. No. 11 at 4.) These conclusory allegations, without supporting
factual detail, are insufficient to state a plausible Fourth Amendment violation.
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against unreasonable searches
and seizures, and this protection is at its apex within the home. Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980); Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013). Warrantless entry
into a home is presumptively unreasonable unless justified by consent or exigent
circumstances. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). Likewise, the
reasonableness of any seizure depends on the totality of the circumstances
confronting officers at the time of the intrusion. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,
395 (1989) (reasonableness must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable
officer on the scene and in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them).
To state a Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead facts
permitting the court to infer that the officers’ conduct was objectively unreasonable
in light of those circumstances. See Club Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 204-05
(5th Cir. 2009). Moreover, the bare assertion that officers acted “without probable
cause” or “unlawfully” is a legal conclusion, not a factual allegation, and contributes
nothing to the plausibility of the claim. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
Here, the amended complaint provides no factual context regarding what
precipitated the officers’ presence at Burgess’s residence, the nature of any report or
emergency that prompted their response, the circumstances they encountered upon
arrival, or any facts plausibly negating consent or exigency. Nor does the complaint
describe the manner of entry, the duration of the search, or the circumstances under
Case 3:25-cv-00806-D-BW Document 31 Filed 03/02/26 Page 6 of 16 PageID <pageID>

7
which the firearms were seized. Without such factual details, the Court cannot
assess whether the officers’ actions were objectively unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.
C. 	Plaintiff does not state a plausible claim for excessive force or due process
violations.
In addition to his allegations of unlawful search and seizure, Burgess contends
that officers used excessive force and violated his due process rights during the
incident. These allegations likewise fail to establish an underlying constitutional
violation. Burgess alleges that officers responding to the incident deployed drones,
established a perimeter around his residence, pointed firearms at him, and later
handcuffed him while he was hospitalized. (Dkt. No. 11 at 5, 13, 17.) He also
contends that officers relied on inaccurate information, failed to investigate
adequately, and improperly identified him as a suspect. (See id. at 20-22.) Even
accepting these allegations as true, they do not plausibly show that officers used
excessive force or otherwise violated Burgess’s constitutional rights.
Claims of excessive force arising in the context of an investigatory stop or
arrest are governed exclusively by the Fourth Amendment’s “‘objective
reasonableness’ standard.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. Whether force is excessive
depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including “the
severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the
safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or
attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. at 396.
Case 3:25-cv-00806-D-BW Document 31 Filed 03/02/26 Page 7 of 16 PageID <pageID>

8
Here, the complaint contains no factual allegations describing the
circumstances that prompted these tactics—no account of what the officers knew,
what threat assessment they were operating under, whether any resistance occurred,
or why any particular use of restraint was disproportionate under the circumstances.
Courts do not assess excessive force claims in a factual vacuum. Absent factual
allegations showing that the force used was objectively unreasonable in light of the
circumstances, the claim fails. See Tarver v. City of Edna, 410 F.3d 745, 751-52 (5th
Cir. 2005).
Burgess’s allegations regarding misidentification, reliance on allegedly false
information, or failure to investigate likewise do not state a constitutional violation.
At most, such allegations describe negligent or mistaken conduct, which is not
actionable under § 1983. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 329 (1986) (the Due
Process Clause is not implicated by negligent acts of government officials). Police
officers are not constitutionally required to conduct a perfect investigation, nor does
mistaken identity alone establish a constitutional violation. See Baker v. McCollan,
443 U.S. 137, 145-46 (1979). The amended complaint contains no factual allegations
plausibly suggesting that officers knowingly relied on false information or acted
unreasonably under the circumstances.
To the extent Burgess asserts a substantive due process claim under the
Fourteenth Amendment arising from the use of force or the circumstances of his
detention, that claim also fails as a matter of law. Where a particular constitutional
amendment “‘provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against
Case 3:25-cv-00806-D-BW Document 31 Filed 03/02/26 Page 8 of 16 PageID <pageID>

9
a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized
notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.’”
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843 (1998) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at
395). Because Burgess’s allegations concerning force, restraint, and detention fall
squarely within the Fourth Amendment, any parallel substantive due process claim
must be dismissed.
Accordingly, Burgess fails to state a plausible constitutional claim arising from
the officers’ use of force, investigative conduct, or detention.
D. 	Plaintiff’s Equal Protection claim is conclusory and fails to allege facts
supporting racial animus.
Burgess’s amended complaint states that officers assumed he was a criminal
based on his race and acted with racial bias. (Dkt. No. 11 at 4-5.) The Equal
Protection Clause prohibits intentional discrimination on the basis of race. Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977). To state an
equal protection claim, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating both that he was
treated differently from similarly situated individuals and that the differential
treatment was the product of purposeful discrimination. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S.
279, 292 (1987).
Burgess identifies no similarly situated individuals treated differently, no
statements by officers evidencing racial animus, no statistical pattern or practice, and
no other factual matter from which discriminatory animus can be plausibly inferred.
The bare allegation that officers were racially motivated does not cross the threshold
Case 3:25-cv-00806-D-BW Document 31 Filed 03/02/26 Page 9 of 16 PageID <pageID>

10
from possible to plausible. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Accordingly, the equal protection
claim must be dismissed.
E. 	Plaintiff’s false arrest, misidentification, and negligence allegations do not
state a constitutional violation.
A claim for false arrest under § 1983 requires a showing that the arrest was
made without probable cause. Brown v. Lyford, 243 F.3d 185, 189 (5th Cir. 2001).
Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within the officers’
knowledge would warrant a reasonable belief that the suspect had committed or was
committing an offense. Id. at 190.
Burgess’s amended complaint does not plead facts establishing the absence of
probable cause. It does not describe the circumstances of the arrest, whether an
outstanding warrant existed, what information officers possessed at the time, or any
other fact permitting the court to assess whether the arrest was constitutionally
infirm. Conclusory assertions that an arrest was “illegal” or unsupported by
probable cause are insufficient to state a claim. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Notably,
Burgess himself acknowledges that officers discovered an outstanding arrest warrant
during the encounter. (Dkt. No. 11 at 26.) The existence of a valid warrant
constitutes a complete defense to a false arrest claim arising from that detention. See
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 143-44 (1979).
Additionally, Burgess’s allegations regarding misidentification, reliance on
inaccurate information, or negligent investigation likewise do not give rise to a
constitutional violation. Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for negligent
Case 3:25-cv-00806-D-BW Document 31 Filed 03/02/26 Page 10 of 16 PageID <pageID>

11
conduct by government officials. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 336. Moreover, negligence—
even gross negligence—does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Lewis,
523 U.S. at 849. Section 1983 requires conduct that is at minimum deliberately
indifferent or objectively unreasonable in the constitutional sense. Thus, negligent
investigation, without more, does not satisfy that standard. Id. These claims must
therefore be dismissed.
F. 	Plaintiff’s HIPPA claim fails because the statute does not create a private
right of action
Burgess alleges that his medical information was improperly accessed or
disclosed in violation of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(“HIPAA”). HIPAA, however, does not create a private right of action for damages.
Enforcement authority is vested exclusively in the Secretary of the Department of
Health and Human Services. See Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569, 571-72 (5th Cir. 2006)
(holding that HIPAA “has no express provision creating a private cause of action,”
and that Congress vested enforcement authority exclusively in the federal
government).
Because private individuals may not sue for alleged HIPAA violations,
Burgess cannot obtain relief under the statute as a matter of law. Accordingly, this
claim fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and should be dismissed
with prejudice.
Case 3:25-cv-00806-D-BW Document 31 Filed 03/02/26 Page 11 of 16 PageID <pageID>

12
G. 	Plaintiff fails to state a claim based on alleged denial of medical care
Burgess further alleges that he was denied “critical medical care.” (Dkt. No.
11 at 5.) The amended complaint does not identify which defendant allegedly denied
care, the nature of the medical condition at issue, what treatment was requested or
refused, or how any particular defendant was personally involved in the alleged
deprivation.
To state a constitutional claim based on denial of medical care, a plaintiff
must allege facts showing that a specific defendant acted with deliberate indifference
to a serious medical need. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107 (1976). Importantly,
mere dissatisfaction with medical treatment, disagreement with medical judgment, or
conclusory allegations of inadequate care do not suffice. Rogers v. Jarrett, 63 F.4th
971, 977 (5th Cir. 2023) (explaining that negligent care or disagreement with medical
judgment does not establish deliberate indifference).
Here, the complaint contains no factual allegations from which the Court can
infer that any defendant knowingly disregarded a substantial risk to Burgess’s health
or safety. Nor does it clarify whether the alleged conduct is attributable to law
enforcement officers, medical personnel, or some other entity. The Court is not
required to speculate or construct a claim on Burgess’s behalf.
Because the amended complaint provides only a vague and conclusory
assertion unsupported by factual detail, Burgess fails to state a plausible
constitutional claim based on denial of medical care.
Case 3:25-cv-00806-D-BW Document 31 Filed 03/02/26 Page 12 of 16 PageID <pageID>

13
H. 	Plaintiff’s remaining claims do not state cognizable federal violations
Burgess’s defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims do
not state cognizable federal constitutional violations. Injury to reputation alone does
not constitute a deprivation of liberty or property within the meaning of the Due
Process Clause. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976). To state a § 1983 claim for
reputational harm, a plaintiff must satisfy the “stigma” standard by alleging not only
that the government made a false and stigmatizing statement, but also that it was
accompanied by a tangible alteration of a legal status. Id. at 706-09; Blackburn v. City
of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 935-36 (5th Cir. 1995).
Here, Burgess pleads no such accompanying legal status change beyond the
events already addressed under his other claims. Likewise, the intentional infliction
of emotional distress and defamation claims arise in state tort law, not federal
constitutional law, and do not independently give rise to § 1983 liability. See Geter v.
Fortenberry, 849 F.2d 1550, 1556 (5th Cir. 1988); Brown v. Carlton, No. 3:07-CV-1367-
P, 2008 WL 11425361, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2008).
Burgess also seeks the return of firearms allegedly seized during the incident
pursuant to Article 18.19 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. (See Dkt. No. 11
at 6.) That statute establishes procedures under Texas law for the disposition of
seized weapons and provides a mechanism for requesting their return through the
state courts. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 18.19. Burgess does not identify any
federal basis for the request apart from the alleged unlawful seizure already
Case 3:25-cv-00806-D-BW Document 31 Filed 03/02/26 Page 13 of 16 PageID <pageID>

14
addressed above. To the extent Burgess seeks relief under Article 18.19, his claim
arises solely under state law.
Lastly, Burgess’s “color of law” claim is not an independent cause of action.
Burgess repeatedly asserts violations of the “Color of Law doctrine” as if it were a
standalone cause of action. (See Dkt. No. 11 at 19.) It is not. The color-of-law
element is a required predicate for any § 1983 claim. It does not independently
support relief. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Accordingly, this claim is
duplicative of Burgess’s other § 1983 allegations and states no additional basis for
relief.
Given that no federal claims remain, the Court should decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction and dismiss Burgess’s remaining state-law claims without
prejudice so that he may pursue available remedies in state court. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(3); see also Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 585
(5th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted) (“[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law
claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors . . . will point toward
declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.”); Enochs v.
Lampasas Cnty., 641 F.3d 155, 161 (5th Cir. 2011) (recognizing that supplemental
jurisdiction “is a doctrine of flexibility” and that dismissal of all federal claims
generally “weigh in favor” of remand).
III. LEAVE TO AMEND
Although courts generally allow pro se plaintiffs an opportunity to amend
before dismissal, leave may be denied where a plaintiff has already pled his “best
Case 3:25-cv-00806-D-BW Document 31 Filed 03/02/26 Page 14 of 16 PageID <pageID>

15
case.” Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767-68 (5th Cir. 2009). As demonstrated
above, based on the legal theories Burgess posits, his claims lack an arguable basis in
law or cannot, as a matter of law, state a plausible legal claim.
Here, Burgess has already filed an amended complaint that substantially
expands upon his initial filing. The deficiencies identified above are not mere
pleading technicalities—they reflect fundamental substantive failures, including the
absence of a viable Monell theory, the non-cognizable HIPAA claim as a private right
of action, and the absence of any factual support for discriminatory intent. Thus, the
Court concludes that Burgess has already pleaded his best case and granting further
leave to amend would be futile and cause needless delay.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the District Judge should DISMISS
WITH PREJUDICE Burgess’s federal claims for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. The District Judge should further decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims and DISMISS those claims
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
SO RECOMMENDED on March 2, 2026.
______________________________________
BRIAN McKAY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case 3:25-cv-00806-D-BW Document 31 Filed 03/02/26 Page 15 of 16 PageID <pageID>

16
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the manner
provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and recommendation
must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED . R. C IV. P. 72(b). 	An objection must identify the finding
or recommendation to which objection is made, the basis for the objection, and the
place in the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation the disputed determination
is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing
before the magistrate judge is not specific. 	Failure to file specific written objections
will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions
of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon
grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th
Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time
to object to 14 days).
Case 3:25-cv-00806-D-BW Document 31 Filed 03/02/26 Page 16 of 16 PageID <pageID>