Tennyson v. LoanCare LLC

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
RACHEL TENNYSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
LOANCARE LLC,
Defendant.
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Case No. 3:25-cv-00661-K-BT
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This civil action arises out of pro se Plaintiff Rachel Tennyson’s purchase
money mortgage and her later requests for loan modification and assistance. For
the reasons stated below, the District Judge should DISMISS Plaintiff’s action
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).
Background
Plaintiff filed this civil action against LoanCare LLC asserting claims of
breach of contract; violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act, and Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act; quiet title;
negligence; and fraudulent inducement. See Compl. (ECF No. 3); Am. Compl. at
13–30 (ECF No. 25). Succinctly stated, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant engaged in
“systemic mortgage servicing misconduct [and] fraudulent documentation” and
attempted “to enforce a loan through [unlawful] means.” Am. Compl. at 4, ¶ 7 (ECF
No. 25). Due to these allegedly unlawful actions and her fear of “fraud and
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uncertainty regarding the true status of her loan and title,” Plaintiff quitclaimed
her interest in her home to the “Rachel N. Tennyson Trust.” Id. at 9, ¶ 34; see also
id., Ex. K (quitclaim deed). Plaintiff represents that she is “acting as trustee of the
Rachel N. Tennyson Trust,” which is the current owner of the property at issue.
Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 5, 7–8 (ECF No. 27) (“Although Plaintiff
quit-claimed her personal interest in the property, she did so in her capacity as
settler and trustee of the Rachel N. Tennyson Trust”; “Plaintiff continues to act in
her legal capacity as trustee”; and “Plaintiff, as trustee, represents the trust which
does own the property”).
Legal Standard and Analysis
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a court to dismiss
an action sua sponte for failure to prosecute or for failure to comply with the
federal rules or any court order. Griggs v. S.G.E. Mgmt., L.L.C., 905 F.3d 835, 844
(5th Cir. 2018) (citing McCullough v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 1126, 1127 (5th Cir. 1988)
(per curiam)); accord Nottingham v. Warden, Bill Clements Unit, 837 F.3d 438,
440–42 (5th Cir. 2016) (failure to comply with court order); Rosin v. Thaler, 450
F. App’x 383, 383–84 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (failure to prosecute). “This
authority [under Rule 41(b)] flows from the court’s inherent power to control its
docket and prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases.” Boudwin v.
Graystone Ins., 756 F.2d 399, 401 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Link v. Wabash, R.R. Co.,
370 U.S. 626 (1962)). The Court’s authority under Rule 41(b) is not diluted by a
party proceeding pro se, as “[t]he right to self-representation does not exempt a
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party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.”
Wright v. LBA Hosp., 754 F. App’x 298, 300 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (quoting
Hulsey v. Texas, 929 F.2d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 1991)).
“In an Article III court, a non-attorney trustee may not represent a trust pro
se.” Dillard Family Trust v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 2011 WL 6747416, at *5 (N.D.
Tex. Dec. 23, 2011) (Lindsay, J.) (collecting cases). Plaintiff represents in court
filings that she is proceeding as the trustee of the Rachel N. Tennyson Trust, but
“[a] pro se individual cannot represent the interests of a trust and the Court cannot
allow the case to proceed.” Hand of Yhwh Trust v. Dominguez, 2020 WL 2476984,
at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 21, 2020) (Reno, J.), adopted by 2020 WL 2476423 (N.D.
Tex. May 13, 2020) (Kacsmaryk, J.). So this case is subject to dismissal under Rule
41(b). See id. (dismissing case under Rule 41 because a pro se plaintiff cannot
represent a trust); Linwood v. Fin. Am. LLC, 2025 WL 432834, at *2–3 (N.D. Tex.
Jan. 23, 2025) (McKay, J.) (same), adopted by 2025 WL 663102 (N.D. Tex. Feb.
28, 2025) (Scholer, J.); Calvin v. Jackson, 2022 WL 4281016, at *1–2 (N.D. Tex.
Aug. 17, 2022) (Ray, J.) (same), adopted by 2022 WL 4280644 (N.D. Tex. Sept.
15, 2022) (O’Connor, J.).
Recommendation
The District Judge should DISMISS Plaintiff’s case without prejudice
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). If Plaintiff retains counsel to represent
the trust before the deadline for objecting to the findings, conclusions, and
recommendation expires (explained in more detail below), or by such other
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deadline as set by the District Judge, the Magistrate Judge will withdraw the
recommendation to dismiss.
SO RECOMMENDED.
February 5, 2026.
REBECCA RUTHERFORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the
manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and
recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being
served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). To be specific,
an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which
objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination
is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the
briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written
objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal
conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district
judge, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto.
Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
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