Willis v. US Bank Trust National Association et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
CEDRIC WILLIS, 	§
§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
V. 	§ 	No. 3:25-cv-516-BN
§
U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, §
AS TRUSTEE, IGLOO SERIES TRUST; §
LOANCARE LLC; and SECURITY 	§
NATIONAL MORTGAGE COMPANY, 	§
INC., 	§
§
Defendants. 	§
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This lawsuit is proceeding before the undersigned United States magistrate
judge for all purposes under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). See Dkt. No. 25.
The operative complaint is pro se Plaintiff Cedric Willis’s first amended
complaint [Dkt. No. 54-1] (the “FAC”), filed June 12, 2025, see Dkt. No. 52.
The FAC stands alone and does not refer to or otherwise incorporate Willis’s
original complaint, the petition filed in state court. So, as to the pleaded claims, the
FAC “supersedes the original complaint and renders it of no legal effect.” King v.
Dogan, 31 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (citation omitted).
Through the FAC, Willis names as defendants U.S. Bank Trust National
Association as Trustee of LB-Treehouse Series VI Trust (“U.S. Bank”), Security
National Mortgage Company (“Security National”), DHI Title Company of Texas
(“DHI”), and Angelia Hudson, who Willis identifies as a real estate agent for Century
21 Judge Fite Company. See Dkt. No. 54-1.
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And, against all Defendants, Willis brings claims under a federal statute – the
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”) – and Texas law – for fraudulent
misrepresentation and negligence – generally based on these facts:
In May 2021, Plaintiff applied for a first-time homebuyer grant
through the Texas State Affordable Housing Corporation (TSAHC).
Plaintiff was introduced to Angelia Hudson, a Century 21 Realtor,
through the program. She assured Plaintiff the mortgage would be an
[Federal Housing Administration, or FHA,] government-backed loan
and guided him through the process.
Hudson 	coordinated 	with 	Ryan 	Jones 	of 	Security 	National
Mortgage Company (SNMC) and selected DHI Title Company of Texas
to handle the closing.
From May 2021 to January 2022, Hudson directed nearly every
decision in the transaction and emphasized the benefits of the FHA loan
structure.
Plaintiff relied on Hudson’s representations and signed closing
documents indicating the presence of an FHA Case Number, confirming
in writing the loan was FHA-backed.
Plaintiff later became ill and temporarily disabled. He requested
loss mitigation options and forbearance under the belief his loan had
FHA protections.
Loan servicing was rotated among Lakeview Loan Servicing,
LoanCare, 	and 	SNMC. 	However, 	Plaintiff 	discovered 	multiple
inconsistencies in loan treatment and classification.
Despite over $32,000 in Homeowner Assistance Fund (HAF)
payments being applied, Plaintiff received a Notice of Default from SN
Servicing Corporation acting for U.S. Bank Trust, demanding over
$48,000.
SN 	Servicing 	and 	U.S. 	Bank 	offered 	a 	modification 	nearly
doubling the original monthly mortgage payment, which Plaintiff could
not afford.
Plaintiff reached out to HUD and other government agencies,
including the HUD National Servicing Center, to verify the FHA status
of the loan.
HUD 	confirmed 	no 	FHA 	Case 	Number 	was 	ever 	officially
registered for Plaintiff’s loan, even though one appeared on the closing
documents. Thus, the loan was never an FHA loan.
Plaintiff 	asserts 	that 	Angelia 	Hudson 	and 	DHI 	Title 	were
involved in misrepresenting the loan product, resulting in denial of FHA
relief, credit harm, and foreclosure threats.
Plaintiff 	now 	brings 	this 	action 	for 	fraud, 	negligence, 	and
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statutory violations based on these misrepresentations.
Dkt. No. 54-1 at 2-3.
U.S. Bank and Security National have moved to dismiss the FAC under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Dkt. Nos. 56 & 60.
U.S. Bank also moves the Court to expunge the lis pendens that Willis recorded
in the Johnson County, Texas property records, asserting that Willis “cannot prevail
as a matter of law and the recorded lis pendens is a cloud on title.” Dkt. No. 56 at 20-
21.
And U.S. Bank has moved for summary judgment. See Dkt. Nos. 63 & 64.
The parties have briefed these motions, and Willis has moved for leave to file
supplemental evidence in response to U.S. Bank’s summary judgment motion, see
Dkt. No. 71.
For the following reasons, the Court grants the motions to dismiss and to
expunge the lis pendens, denies as moot U.S. Bank’s motion for summary judgment
and Willis’s motion for leave, and dismisses with prejudice the claims against U.S.
Bank and Security National.
As to the remaining defendants named for the first time in the FAC – DHI and
Hudson – (1) Willis has shown no efforts to serve these defendants, and, so his claims
against them are subject to dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m),
and (2) even if Willis has alleged, for example, a plausible state law negligence claim
against either based on the facts set out above, Willis has not alleged a plausible
claim under federal law, and the remaining parties are non-diverse.
And, so, the Court intends to dismiss with prejudice all but the state law
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negligence claim against DHI and Hudson for the reasons set out below and will
dismiss the negligence claim without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
This memorandum opinion and order provides notice to Willis of the Court’s
intention. And he may file a response by March 24, 2026 to show why the Court
should not do so. See Carver v. Atwood, 18 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2021) (“The broad
rule is that ‘a district court may dismiss a claim on its own motion as long as the
procedure employed is fair.’ More specifically, ‘fairness in this context requires both
notice of the court’s intention and an opportunity to respond’ before dismissing sua
sponte with prejudice.” (citations omitted)).
Discussion
I. 	The Court grants the Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss.
A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) is “not meant to resolve disputed facts or test the
merits of a lawsuit” but “instead must show that, even in the plaintiff’s best-case
scenario, the complaint does not state a plausible case for relief.” Sewell v. Monroe
City Sch. Bd., 974 F.3d 577, 581 (5th Cir. 2020).
Considering such a motion, the Court “accepts all well-pleaded facts as true,
viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” In re Katrina Canal
Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205-06 (5th Cir. 2007).
But a plaintiff still must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face” and must plead those facts with enough specificity “to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570, 555 (2007).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
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allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
So a court’s “obligation [is] to accept [the] complaint’s factual allegations as
true and assess whether those facts permit a reasonable inference that [a defendant]
is liable.” Sewell, 974 F.3d at 581; cf. Bryant v. Ditech Fin., L.L.C., No. 23-10416, 2024
WL 890122, at *3 (5th Cir. Mar. 1, 2024) (“[J]ust as plaintiffs cannot state a claim
using speculation, defendants cannot defeat plausible inferences using speculation.”).
This “plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678.
So, “[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief.” Id. (cleaned up; quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557); see, e.g.,
Parker v. Landry, 935 F.3d 9, 17 (1st Cir. 2019) (Where “a complaint reveals random
puffs of smoke but nothing resembling real signs of fire, the plausibility standard is
not satisfied.”).
And, while Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) does not mandate detailed
factual allegations, it does require that a plaintiff allege more than labels and
conclusions. So, while a court must accept a plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, it
is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Consequently, a threadbare or formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
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of 	action, 	supported 	by 	mere 	conclusory 	statements, 	will 	not 	suffice. 	See 	id.;
Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 269 (5th Cir. 2023) (“[T]he court does not ‘presume
true a number of categories of statements, including legal conclusions; mere labels;
threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action; conclusory statements; and
naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.’” (quoting Harmon v. City of
Arlington, Tex., 16 F.4th 1159, 1162-63 (5th Cir. 2021))).
Summed up, “to survive” dismissal under Twombly and Iqbal, plaintiffs must
“plead 	facts 	sufficient 	to 	show” 	that 	the 	claims 	asserted 	have 	“substantive
plausibility” by stating “simply, concisely, and directly events” that they contend
entitle them to relief. Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014) (per
curiam) (citing FED . R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)-(3), (d)(1), (e)); cf. Brown v. Tarrant Cnty., Tex.,
985 F.3d 489, 494 (5th Cir. 2021) (While “[p]ro se complaints receive a ‘liberal
construction,’” “mere conclusory allegations on a critical issue are insufficient.”
(cleaned up)).
Starting with RESPA, it “was enacted to protect consumers from unnecessarily
high settlement charges and abusive mortgage practices,” Moreno v. Summit Mortg.
Corp., 364 F.3d 574, 576 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing 12 U.S.C. § 2601), and “is a
comprehensive federal act that ‘ensures ... real estate consumers “are provided with
greater and more timely information on the nature and costs of the settlement process
[with lenders] and are protected from unnecessarily high settlement charges caused
by certain abusive practices.”’” Haase v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 748 F.3d 624,
627 n.2 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting O’Sullivan v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 319
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F.3d 732, 738 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 2601(a))).
And, to his general background allegations, Willis adds that RESPA was
violated in three ways: (1) a “fail[ure] to provide proper notices regarding servicing
transfers”; (2) a “fail[ure] to apply [Homeowner Assistance Fund] funds properly” and
(3) the “deni[al of] modification relief in bad faith.” Dkt. No. 54-1 at 3.
But his assertions as to RESPA are mere conclusions that lack the factual
development to allow the Court to assess whether these alleged violations are
plausibly pleaded – or even count as violations of this statute.
And, even if they do count as violations, Willis has not offered facts from which
the Court can infer that he suffered actual damages because of the alleged RESPA
violations. See Matter of Parker, 655 F. App’x 993, 998 n.28 (5th Cir. 2016) (per
curiam) (“The Parkers also have implicitly claimed a RESPA violation for not being
notified of the assignment of rights of the original lender to Wells Fargo. The record
here is silent on whether actual notice was sent to the Parkers. However, just like in
Hurd, the Parkers’ claim still fails for failure to show any facts ‘giving rise to a
reasonable inference that [they] suffered actual damages from the alleged violation
of the RESPA.’” (quoting Hurd v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, 880 F. Supp. 2d 747,
768-69 (N.D. Tex. 2012))); Williams v. Freedom Mortg. Corp., No. 3:22-cv-1973-N,
2023 WL 1806023, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 7, 2023) (“RESPA claims also require actual
damages.” (cleaned up)); see also Kareem v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., 479 F.
App’x 619, 620 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (“Kareem contends that the defendants
violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act by failing to notify him when
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there was a change in his loan servicer. That statute requires a servicer to notify the
borrower of an assignment, sale, or transfer of the servicing of the loan. 12 U.S.C. §
2605(b); see 24 C.F.R. § 3500.21(d)(1). Kareem points to no evidence that the
defendants failed to comply with that requirement. Moreover, even if we assume that
he did not receive the notice, he does not explain what actual damages he suffered.
See § 2605(f)(1); § 3500.21(f)(1)(i).”).
Next, Willis has not alleged plausible negligence claims against U.S. Bank and
Security National where he specifies that his negligence theory is limited to “a duty
of care in properly disclosing the nature of the loan and ensuring lawful conduct
during the closing and title process.” Dkt. No. 54-1 at 3. As set out above, Willis has
not alleged that U.S. Bank was involved (or, if it was, how it was involved) in the
closing. 	And, 	as 	to 	Security 	National, 	all 	Willis 	has 	alleged 	is 	that 	“Hudson
coordinated with Ryan Jones of [Security National].” Id. at 2.
Under Texas law, the elements of a negligence claim are: (1) a legal duty owed
by one person to another; (2) breach of that duty; and (3) damages proximately caused
by the breach. See Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 565 (5th Cir. 2008); Nabors
Drilling, USA, Inc. v. Escoto, 288 S.W.3d 401, 404 (Tex. 2009).
And Willis fails to allege facts that could support any of these elements as to
U.S. Bank and Security National. Cf. Zimmerman v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 790
S.W.2d 690, 694-95 (Tex. App. – Tyler 1990, writ denied) (“A title company may be
liable for its negligence in closing a real estate transaction. The title insurance agent
may not intentionally or recklessly deceive the parties to a real estate transaction.
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An escrow agent is in a fiduciary relationship with the contracting parties. Among
the obligations of the fiduciary are (1) the duty of the loyalty, (2) the duty to make a
full disclosure, and (3) the duty to exercise a high degree of care to conserve the money
and pay it only to those persons entitled to receive it.” (citations omitted)).
Nor has Willis plausibly pleaded fraudulent misrepresentation claims against
any defendant where his allegations do not meet the requirements of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 9(b), which
imposes a heightened pleading standard for fraud claims and requires
that a party state with particularity facts supporting each element of
fraud. At a minimum, Rule 9(b) requires allegations of the particulars
of time, place, and contents of the false representations, as well as the
identity of the person making the misrepresentation and what he
obtained thereby – “the ‘who, what, when, where, and how’ of the fraud.
Choe v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 3:13-cv-120-D, 2013 WL 6159308, at *4 (N.D. Tex.
Nov. 25, 2013) (cleaned up); cf. Lee v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 717 F. Supp. 3d 585,
591 (S.D. Tex. 2024) (“[T]he requirement of particularity in fraud pleadings is meant
to provide defendants with fair notice of the claims, protect defendants from harm to
reputation and goodwill arising from speculative pleadings, and preclude plaintiffs
from bringing suit as a pretext for discovery in order to discover whether any fraud
actually occurred.” (quoting Stevens v. Ford Motor Co., No. 2:18-CV-456, 2020 WL
12573279, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2020) (citations omitted))).
In sum, Rules 12(b)(6) and 9(b) require that the Court dismiss the claims
against U.S. Bank and Security National.
And, because Willis has still failed to allege a plausible cause of action against
these defendants after being apprised of the deficiencies in his initial pleading and
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allowed the chance to replead, the Court concludes that Willis has now alleged his
“best case” against U.S. Bank and Security National and that further leave to amend
need not be granted. See, e.g., Allen v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, No. 3:24-cv-949-L-BN,
2025 WL 484818, at *13 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2025) (“Granting leave to amend … is not
necessary when the plaintiff has pleaded his or her ‘best case’ after being apprised of
pleading deficiencies. Likewise, a district court need not grant a motion to amend if
doing so would be an exercise in futility.” (citations omitted)).
So the Court dismisses Willis’s claims against U.S. Bank and Security National
with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6) and therefore need not address U.S. Bank’s
summary judgment motion nor Willis’s related motion for leave.
II. 	The Court grants U.S. Bank’s motion to expunge the lis pendens.
As to the U.S. Bank’s request that the Court expunge the lis pendens that
Willis recorded in the Johnson County, Texas property, see Dkt. No. 56 at 20-21, the
Texas Supreme Court has explained that “[a] notice of lis pendens broadcasts ‘to the
world’ the existence of ongoing litigation regarding ownership of the property” and
that, “[w]hen the notice is properly filed, even a subsequent purchaser for value does
not take the property free and clear,” Sommers for Alabama & Dunlavy, Ltd. v.
Sandcastle Homes, Inc., 521 S.W.3d 749, 753 (Tex. 2017) (cleaned up).
And, so, “a lis pendens functions to provide constructive notice, avoid undue
alienation of property, and facilitate an end to litigation.” Id. (cleaned up).
“Texas state law controls the validity of a lis pendens in federal court.” Garza-
Selcer v. 1600 Pac. Subtenant, LLC, Civ. A. No. 3:15-cv-3791-N, 2016 WL 11474103,
at *8 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2016) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1964).
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The Texas Property Code provides that, “during the pendency of an action
involving title to real property, the establishment of an interest in real property, or
the enforcement of an encumbrance against real property,” a party may file a notice
that the action is pending. TEX. PROP. C ODE § 12.007(a).
“But by its plain terms, the lis pendens statute makes clear that the procedure
is available only to ‘a party to the action who is seeking affirmative relief.’” U.S. Bank
Nat’l Ass’n as Tr. to Bank of Am., Nat’l Ass’n v. Bates, No. 21-11251, 2023 WL 187680,
at *1 (5th Cir. Jan. 16, 2023) (quoting TEX . PROP. CODE § 12.007(a)).
“A lis pendens does not operate as a lien on property,” and it “‘operates only
during the pendency of the lawsuits.’” Pruitt v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. 3:15-cv-2359-
L, 2015 WL 6157319, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 2015) (first citing In re Miller, 433
S.W.3d 82, 85 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.); then quoting Berg v.
Wilson, 353 S.W.3d 166, 180 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 2011, pet. denied)).
And a “party to an action in connection with which a notice of lis pendens has
been filed” may “apply to the court to expunge the notice.” TEX. PROP. CODE §
12.0071(a). And the Court
shall order the notice of lis pendens expunged if the court determines
that: (1) the pleading on which the notice is based does not contain a real
property claim; (2) the claimant fails to establish by a preponderance of
the evidence the probable validity of the real property claim; or (3) the
person who filed the notice for record did not serve a copy of the notice
on each party entitled to a copy under [Texas Property Code §] 12.007(d).
TEX. PROP. CODE § 12.0071(c); accord In re Huffines Retail Partners, L.P., 978 F.3d
128, 133 (5th Cir. 2020) (explaining that, “under current law, a party may seek to
overturn a lis pendens based on either (1) the pleadings’ failure adequately to assert
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a ‘real property claim,’ or (2) failure to prove by a preponderance the ‘probable validity
of the real property claim.’” (quoting TEX. P ROP. CODE § 12.0071(c))).
To establish that “the pleading on which the notice is based” contains “a real
property claim” under Section 12.0071(c)(1), a claimant must “demonstrate that the
underlying litigation is ‘an action involving title to real property, the establishment
of an interest in real property, or the enforcement of an encumbrance against real
property.’” In re Moreno, NO. 14-14-00929-CV, 2015 WL 225049, at *2 (Tex. App. –
Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 15, 2015, orig. proceeding) (quoting TEX. PROP. CODE §
12.007(a)).
“A lis pendens notice is limited to situations where the title to the property is
directly implicated by the results of the lawsuit.” Matter of Alabama & Dunlavy, Ltd.,
983 F.3d 766, 778 (5th Cir. 2020). “In other words, the property against which the lis
pendens is filed must be the subject matter of the underlying lawsuit.” Maniatis v.
SLF IV – 114 Assemblage, L.P., No. 06-18-00061-CV, 2019 WL 1560680, at *4 (Tex.
App. – Texarkana Apr. 11, 2019, rev. denied) (quoting In re Collins, 172 S.W.3d 287,
293 (Tex. App. – Fort Worth 2005, orig. proceeding)).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has explained that a
court may “consider[ ] the pleadings alone” when determining whether “the pleading
on which the notice is based” contains “a real property claim.” Huffines, 978 F.3d at
133. And the Fifth Circuit held that a claim was not a “real property claim” where
“the pleading d[id] not ‘involve’ [ ] actual titles to real property or the establishment
of a direct interest in real property” and did “not pray for the real property titles to
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be transferred to them” and where a claim for specific performance of “contracts for
entities that own real property is not specific performance of a contract for deed or
specific performance to transfer deeds or specific performance to recognize ownership
of real property subject to a title dispute.” Id. (cleaned up).
The Fifth Circuit also explained that, under Texas law, where a claim that does
“not ‘involve’ title to real property and instead implicate[s] the real property only
‘collaterally,’” “notices of lis pendens [have been] held void or impermissible.” Id.
(cleaned up). And the Fifth Circuit noted that a Texas court had held that a “lis
pendens is void” where the “claims pled would only address an interest in the
partnership, [and] [a]n interest in the partnership is distinct from an interest in real
estate which may be owned by the partnership.” Id. (cleaned up).
And, even if the Court determines that the claimant pleaded a real property
claim, the Court must expunge the lis pendens if the claimant fails to establish “the
probable validity of its claim by a preponderance of the evidence.” In re I-10 Poorman
Invs., Inc., 549 S.W.3d 614, 617 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, orig.
proceeding) (citation omitted).
As U.S. Bank explains, Willis filed the lis pendens notice on March 20, 2025,
see Dkt. No. 56 at 20-21, so the Court must examine the original petition filed in state
court (even though Willis later amended his claims after removal to federal court),
see, e.g., Park v. Fox, No. 3:24-cv-402-S-BN, 2024 WL 899392, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Feb.
25, 2024) (“Plaintiff’s Amended Original Petition – and not any amended complaint
that Park may file now or later in this Court – is the pleading on which the notice of
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lis pendens is based and to which the Court must look for purposes of Texas Property
Code § 12.0071(c)(1). And that is because Plaintiff’s Amended Original Petition was
Park’s live pleading at the time he filed his notice of lis pendens.” (cleaned up)), rec.
accepted, 2024 WL 899394 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 29, 2024).
That pleading [Dkt. No. 1-4 at 10-17], filed January 23, 2025, asserts claims
for breach of contract, violations of the RESPA and the Fair Housing Act, negligence,
and fraud and misrepresentation, and it only seeks compensatory and punitive
damages, attorneys’ fees, and that Defendants be ordered “to correct all reporting to
credit bureau regarding Plaintiff’s mortgage loan,” id. at 13 & 15.
And, so, applying the standards set out above, the pleading did not implicate a
real property claim. See also, e.g., Pelletier Mgmt. & Consulting, LLC v. InterBank,
No. 6:21-CV-00022, 2022 WL 614917, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 2, 2022) (“The pleading
on which the notices are based is the Original Petition. And the Original Petition
asserts two claims: breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation. Neither of
those claims involve ‘actual titles to real property or the establishment of a direct
interest in real property.’ Nor does PMC ‘pray for the real property titles to be
transferred to it.’ Instead, PMC seeks money damages arising out of the alleged
breach of a promise to provide a permanent loan after meeting the terms of a
forbearance agreement. This is insufficient.” (cleaned up; quoting Huffines, 978 F.3d
at 133)).
III. 	The Court intends to, on its own motion, dismiss the claims against
DHI and Hudson but will allow Willis an opportunity to respond to
show why the Court should not.
The Court’s subject matter jurisdiction turns solely on the existence of a federal
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cause of action (under RESPA) that, for the reasons set out above, should be
dismissed against all defendants as not plausibly pleaded.
After that, there will no longer be an “independent basis of subject matter
jurisdiction” to allow for supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 to the
extent that Willis has alleged a plausible negligence claim under Texas law related
to the closing (against DHI and Hudson). Atkins v. Propst, No. 22-10609, 2023 WL
2658852, at *2 (5th Cir. Mar. 28, 2023) (per curiam) (citing Arena v. Graybar Elec.
Co., Inc., 669 F.3d 214 (5th Cir. 2012)).
What’s more, Willis has not shown that he has attempted to serve DHI and
Hudson, defendants first named in the FAC filed on June 12, 2025. See Deutsche Bank
Nat’l Tr. Co. as Tr. for Argent Sec. Inc., Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2006-W5 v. Morris, 350 F.R.D. 367, 369 (N.D. Tex. 2025) (“[P]ersonal service
of the summons and complaint is not required in order to serve an amended complaint
only once a party has already appeared in the litigation.” (cleaned up)).
This deficiency also means that the claims against DHI and Hudson are subject
to dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). See Epley v. Luong, No. 23-
40038, 2023 WL 8595674, at *2 (5th Cir. Dec. 12, 2023) (per curiam) (“A district court
must dismiss a complaint without prejudice under Rule 4(m) if a defendant is not
served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, unless the plaintiff shows good
cause for the failure. A district court enjoys broad discretion in determining whether
to dismiss an action for ineffective service of process. Good cause requires proof of at
least excusable neglect – simple inadvertence, mistake of counsel, or ignorance of the
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rules usually does not suffice. The plaintiff must provide some showing of good faith
and some reasonable basis for noncompliance with the court’s deadline. The plaintiff
should also show due diligence in attempting to perfect service.” (cleaned up)).
Under 	these 	circumstances, 	a 	balance 	of 	the 	applicable 	factors 	favors
relinquishing jurisdiction over the remaining state law negligence claims against
DHI and Hudson. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); Enochs v. Lampasas Cnty., 641 F.3d 155,
158-59 (5th Cir. 2011); Mendoza v. Murphy, 532 F.3d 342, 346 (5th Cir. 2008).
So, in sum, the Court notifies Willis that – on its own motion and so sooner
than March 24, 2026 – the Court will dismiss with prejudice the RESPA and
fraudulent misrepresentation claims against DHI and Hudson for the reasons set out
above and will dismiss without prejudice the negligence claim against them.
But the Court will allow Willis an opportunity to respond to show why the
Court should not take these actions.
Conclusion
The Court GRANTS Defendants U.S. Bank Trust National Association as
Trustee of LB-Treehouse Series VI Trust’s (“U.S. Bank”) and Security National
Mortgage Company’s motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) [Dkt. Nos. 56 & 60], DENIES AS MOOT U.S. Bank’s motion for summary
judgment [Dkt. No. 63] and Plaintiff Cedric Willis’s motion to supplement [Dkt. No.
71].
The Court also GRANTS U.S. Bank’s motion to expunge the lis pendens [Dkt.
No. 56].
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The Court will, on its own motion, DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE the Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act and Texas fraudulent misrepresentation claims
against Defendants DHI Title Company of Texas (“DHI”) and Angelia Hudson and
DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE the Texas negligence claim against DHI and
Hudson unless Willis shows why the Court should not.
And the Court will enter a separate judgment under either Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 54(b) or 58 after Willis responds as to DHI and Hudson or his deadline
to do so expires.
SO ORDERED.
DATE: March 10, 2026
_________________________________________
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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