Tran v. Bachus et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
JADE PHUONG TRAN, 	§
§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
V. 	§ 	No. 3:25-cv-302-K-BN
§
RICHARD BACHUS, ET AL., 	§
§
Defendants. 	§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Jade Phuong Tran filed this pro se lawsuit requesting monetary
damages 	against 	an 	individual 	Denton 	County 	constable, 	the 	Dallas 	Police
Department, and the City of Dallas, alleging that, because she was evicted in
violation of a state court order, the defendants (1) violated the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution (since “[t]he execution of the eviction
was illegal because of the active appeal and court-approved motion to stay” and was
accomplished “without due process, ignoring the legally valid stay of execution”); (2)
the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”)
(because of an asserted disability); and (3) Texas law. See Dkt. No. 1.
United States District Judge Ed Kinkeade referred Tran’s complaint to the
undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28
U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference.
The Court granted Tran leave to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. §
1915. See Dkt. No. 7.
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And, having reviewed the complaint and considered the public record of which
the Court may take judicial notice, the undersigned recommends that the Court
dismiss this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Legal Standards
Section 1915(e)(2) requires that the Court “dismiss the case at any time” if it
“fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Under this standard, a pro se complaint need not contain detailed factual
allegations – just “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks
for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
But, “[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief.” Id. (cleaned up; quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
On the other hand, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
And, while a court must accept a plaintiff’s allegations as true, it is “not bound
to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
In fact, “the court does not ‘presume true a number of categories of statements,
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including,’” in addition to legal conclusions, “‘mere labels; threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action; conclusory statements; and naked assertions devoid of
further factual enhancement.’” Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 269 (5th Cir. 2023)
(quoting Harmon v. City of Arlington, Tex., 16 F.4th 1159, 1162-63 (5th Cir. 2021)).
So, to avoid dismissal, plaintiffs must “plead facts sufficient to show” that the
claims asserted have “substantive plausibility” by stating “simply, concisely, and
directly events” that they contend entitle them to relief. Johnson v. City of Shelby,
Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014) (per curiam) (citing FED . R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)-(3), (d)(1), (e));
see also Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008) (“The burden is
on the plaintiff to frame a ‘complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to
suggest’ that he or she is entitled to relief.” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556)); cf.
Brown v. Tarrant Cnty., Tex., 985 F.3d 489, 494 (5th Cir. 2021) (While “[p]ro se
complaints receive a ‘liberal construction,’” “mere conclusory allegations on a critical
issue are insufficient.” (cleaned up)).
Analysis
Undertaking the analysis set out above, the Court is not limited to the four
corners of Tran’s complaint and may take judicial notice of the state court proceedings
referenced in that complaint as a matter of public record. See Dkt. No. 1 at 1 (referring
to Tran’s appeal of “an eviction judgment”); see, e.g., Starke v. Kohutek, No. 3:24-cv-
1434-G-BN, 2025 WL 2212197, at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 27, 2025) (“[O]n judicial
screening under Section 1915(e), the Court may take notice of Starke’s state criminal
prosecution as a matter of public record.” (citing Stiel v. Heritage Numismatic
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Auctions, Inc., 816 F. App’x 888, 892 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (under Federal Rule
of 	Evidence 	201, 	a district 	court 	considering 	the 	plausibility 	of 	a 	complaint’s
allegations may “take judicial notice of the state court’s orders, final judgment, and
docket as matters of public record”))), rec. accepted, 2025 WL 2211789 (N.D. Tex. Aug.
4, 2025).
Tran’s theory as to why the defendants violated the Constitution, the ADA,
and the FHA – and subjected her to intentional infliction of emotional distress, in
violation of Texas law – is that they acted “outside their lawful authority” when she
was evicted on February 6, 2025 because, “[o]n November 15, 2024, [she] filed an
appeal against an eviction judgment, staying the eviction process under Texas law”
and, “[o]n December 30, 2024, [her] motion to stay execution of the writ of possession
was accepted by the court, meaning Defendants had no legal right to proceed with
the eviction.” Dkt. No. 1 at 1-2.
The appeal that Tran centers her allegations on, from a decision of the County
Court at Law No. 2, in Denton County, Texas, was docketed in the Fort Worth Court
of Appeals but was dismissed as moot on May 29, 2025 after that “court learned that
on February 6, 2025 – after Tran had filed her notice of appeal – the constable
executed a writ of possession that turned possession of the property over to 2600
Ventures.” Tran v. 2600 Ventures, No. 02-24-00513-CV, 2025 WL 1536394 (Tex. App.
– Fort Worth May 29, 2025) (“On April 17, 2025, we sent Tran a letter stating that
we were concerned that her appeal was moot. We stated that unless she or any party
desiring to continue the appeal filed a response showing grounds for doing so on or
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before April 28, 2025, the appeal would be dismissed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a), 44.3.
Tran did not respond to our letter.”).
The docket from this appeal confirms that Tran did file an emergency motion
to stay the execution of the writ of possession that was received by the court of appeals
on February 6, 2025, in which Trans asserts that, under “Texas Property Code §
24.007, the filing of an appeal automatically suspends the enforcement of a writ of
possession, barring any further eviction until the appeal is resolved.”
But the undersigned cannot agree with Tran’s reading of that provision of
Texas law. Section 24.007 instead provides that
[a] final judgment of a county court in an eviction suit may not be
appealed on the issue of possession unless the premises in question are
being used for residential purposes only. A judgment of a county court
may not under any circumstances be stayed pending appeal unless,
within 10 days of the signing of the judgment, the appellant files a
supersedeas bond in an amount set by the county court. In setting the
supersedeas bond the county court shall provide protection for the
appellee 	to 	the 	same 	extent 	as 	in 	any 	other 	appeal, 	taking 	into
consideration the value of rents likely to accrue during appeal, damages
which may occur as a result of the stay during appeal, and other
damages or amounts as the court may deem appropriate.
TEX. PROP. CODE § 24.007.
And Tran fails to allege that she filed a supersedeas bond. So she has not
plausibly alleged that, in effecting the eviction, any defendant took any action in
violation of a court order, Texas law, or the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments. Cf.
Mount v. Escondido Vill., LLC, No. 10-21-00300-CV, 2022 WL 3453375, at *1 (Tex.
App. – Waco Aug. 17, 2022) (“Because no supersedeas bond was filed, this Court
denied” the appellant’s “Emergency Motion to Stay the Writ of Possession in this
Court.”).
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Nor has Tran plausibly alleged that the eviction amounted to disability
discrimination under eithr the ADA or the FHA where she fails to provide factual
content that could support a reasonable inference that she was evicted because of a
disability. See Thompson v. Microsoft Corp., 2 F.4th 460, 470 (5th Cir. 2021) (a
plausible claim of ADA discrimination requires a plaintiff to provide facts to support
“that he has a disability” (cleaned up)); Crain v. City of Selma, 952 F.3d 634, 640-41
(5th Cir. 2020) (“a prima facie claim of disparate treatment under the FHA” requires
a plaintiff to establish “membership in a protected class” (cleaned up)).
The Court should therefore dismiss the complaint under Section 1915(e) for
failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
And 	the 	opportunity 	file 	objections 	to 	these 	findings, 	conclusions, 	and
recommendation (as further explained below) allows Tran an opportunity to show
that this case should not be dismissed and that the Court should instead grant leave
to amend. See Scott v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 16 F.4th 1204, 1209 (5th Cir. 2021) (per
curiam) (“A court should freely give leave to amend when justice so requires, but a
movant must give the court at least some notice of what his or her amendments would
be and how those amendments would cure the initial complaint’s defects. If the
plaintiff does not provide a copy of the amended complaint nor explain how the defects
could be cured, a district court may deny leave.” (citations omitted)).
Recommendation
Unless Plaintiff Jade Phuong Tran shows through timely objections a basis to
amend the complaint to allege a plausible claim, the Court should dismiss this
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lawsuit with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim on
which relief may be granted.
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these
findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections
within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED . R. CIV.
P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or
recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation
where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure
to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the
factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or
adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
DATED: December 10, 2025
_________________________________________
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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