Johnson v. Trans Union LLC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
KIMBERLY JOHNSON, 	§
§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
V. 	§ 	No. 3:25-cv-273-X-BN
§
TRANS UNION, LLC, 	§
§
Defendant. 	§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
As 	initially 	filed, 	Plaintiff 	Kimberly 	Johnson’s 	pro 	se 	complaint 	alleged
violations of federal and Texas laws. See Dkt. No. 3.
United States District Judge Brantley Starr referred Johnson’s lawsuit to the
undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28
U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference.
In response to motions to dismiss, Johnson amended her claims twice. See Dkt.
Nos. 12-27. And, through the latest version of her complaint – the second amended
complaint [Dkt. No. 27] (the “SAC”) – Johnson alleges just violations of the Fair
Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”).
Defendant Trans Union LLC (“TU”) moved to dismiss the SAC under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see Dkt. Nos. 29 & 30; see also Dkt. No. 26 (setting
out the procedural background leading up to the filing of the SAC).
Johnson responded to the motion. See Dkt. No. 32. TU replied. See Dkt. No. 35.
Johnson then moved for leave to supplement her SAC. See Dkt. No. 36. TU responded.
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See Dkt. No. 37. Johnson failed to reply, and the deadline to so has expired. See N.D.
TEX. L. C IV . R. 7.1(f).
For the reasons set out below, the Court should grant the motion to dismiss
and deny the motion to supplement.
Legal Standards
A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) is “not meant to resolve disputed facts or test the
merits of a lawsuit” but “instead must show that, even in the plaintiff’s best-case
scenario, the complaint does not state a plausible case for relief.” Sewell v. Monroe
City Sch. Bd., 974 F.3d 577, 581 (5th Cir. 2020).
Considering such a motion, the Court “accepts all well-pleaded facts as true,
viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” In re Katrina Canal
Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205-06 (5th Cir. 2007).
But a plaintiff still must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face” and must plead those facts with enough specificity “to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570, 555 (2007).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
So a court’s “obligation [is] to accept [the] complaint’s factual allegations as
true and assess whether those facts permit a reasonable inference that [a defendant]
is liable.” Sewell, 974 F.3d at 581; cf. Bryant v. Ditech Fin., L.L.C., No. 23-10416, 2024
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WL 890122, at *3 (5th Cir. Mar. 1, 2024) (“[J]ust as plaintiffs cannot state a claim
using speculation, defendants cannot defeat plausible inferences using speculation.”).
This “plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678.
So, “[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief.” Id. (cleaned up; quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557); see, e.g.,
Parker v. Landry, 935 F.3d 9, 17 (1st Cir. 2019) (Where “a complaint reveals random
puffs of smoke but nothing resembling real signs of fire, the plausibility standard is
not satisfied.”).
And, while Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) does not mandate detailed
factual allegations, it does require that a plaintiff allege more than labels and
conclusions. So, while a court must accept a plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, it
is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Consequently, a threadbare or formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of 	action, 	supported 	by 	mere 	conclusory 	statements, 	will 	not 	suffice. 	See 	id.;
Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 269 (5th Cir. 2023) (“[T]he court does not ‘presume
true a number of categories of statements, including legal conclusions; mere labels;
threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action; conclusory statements; and
naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.’” (quoting Harmon v. City of
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Arlington, Tex., 16 F.4th 1159, 1162-63 (5th Cir. 2021))).
Summed up, “to survive” dismissal under Twombly and Iqbal, plaintiffs must
“plead 	facts 	sufficient 	to 	show” 	that 	the 	claims 	asserted 	have 	“substantive
plausibility” by stating “simply, concisely, and directly events” that they contend
entitle them to relief. Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014) (per
curiam) (citing FED . R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)-(3), (d)(1), (e)); cf. Brown v. Tarrant Cnty., Tex.,
985 F.3d 489, 494 (5th Cir. 2021) (While “[p]ro se complaints receive a ‘liberal
construction,’” “mere conclusory allegations on a critical issue are insufficient.”
(cleaned up)).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d), a “court may permit a party to
file a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events which
have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented.” Burns v.
Exxon Corp., 158 F.3d 336, 343 (5th Cir.1998) (citing FED . R. CIV. P. 15(d)).
“While the text of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 15(a) provides that leave
should be freely granted, the text of Rule 15(d) does not similarly provide.” Id.
Instead, “Rule 15(d) is clear that the court may permit a supplemental pleading
setting forth changed circumstances.” Id.
Even so, “[j]udicial decisions to grant or deny Rule 15(d) motions to supplement
pleadings are generally based on the same factors of fairness courts weigh when
considering motions to amend pleadings under Rule 15(a).” Tomasella v. Div. of Child
Support, No. 3:20-cv-476-S-BH, 2021 WL 3710659, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 2021)
(citing Hyde v. Hoffman-La Roche Inc., No. 3:04-cv-1473-B, 2008 WL 2923818, at *3
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(N.D. Tex. July 30, 2008)).
And Rule 15(a) requires that leave to amend be granted freely “when justice so
requires,” FED . R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2), and, so, there is a “strong presumption in favor of
granting leave to amend,” Fin. Acquisition Partners, LP v. Blackwell, 440 F.3d 278,
291 (5th Cir. 2006), and the Court must do so “unless there is a substantial reason to
deny leave to amend,” Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 598 (5th Cir.
Nov. 1981).
One such reason is futility – also recognized as a factor that justifies denying
a Rule 15(d) motion to supplement. Tomasella, 2021 WL 3710659, at *2 (citing
Schiller v. Phys. Res. Grp. Inc., 342 F.3d 563, 566 (5th Cir. 2003)).
And, so, “[i]f the complaint, as amended [or supplemented], would be subject
to dismissal, then amendment [or supplementation] is futile and the district court [is]
within its discretion to deny leave to amend [or supplement].” Martinez v. Nueces
Cnty., Tex., 71 F.4th 385, 391 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Ariyan, Inc. v. Sewage & Water
Bd. of New Orleans, 29 F.4th 226, 229 (5th Cir. 2022)).
In this regard, the Court must “ask whether, in [the] proposed amended
complaint [or, as applicable, the proposed supplement, a plaintiff] has pleaded
‘factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that [a]
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678);
cf. Peña v. City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 618 (5th Cir. 2018) (“Where the
district court’s denial of leave to amend was based solely on futility, [the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit] applies a de novo standard of review
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identical, in practice, to the standard used for reviewing a dismissal under [Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(6).” (cleaned up)).
Analysis
Johnson’s FCRA claims are based on alleged inaccuracies on a credit report
that she received from TU in April 2024, inaccuracies that Johnson alleges she then
disputed with TU, in September 2024, October 2024, and January 2025. See Dkt. No.
27, ¶¶ 29-65 & 71 (also listing the addresses, names, phone numbers, employers, and
payment histories that appeared in the report that Johnson alleges are inaccurate).
Johnson further appears to allege that inquires that appeared in her consumer
credit file were without a permissible purpose and that she reported this to TU. See
id., ¶ 75.
And Johnson alleges that TU violated provisions of the FCRA related to her
reporting identity theft to TU and requesting information from TU.
“Concerned by ‘abuses in the credit reporting industry,’ Congress enacted the
FCRA to ensure fair and accurate credit reporting that protects consumers while
meeting the needs of commerce. To that end, the Act imposes several obligations on
[credit reporting agencies (“CRAs”)] and authorizes consumers to bring a private
cause of action in response to negligent or willful violations.” Hammer v. Equifax Info.
Sevs., L.L.C., 974 F.3d 564, 567 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co.
v. Johnson, 884 F.2d 881, 883 (5th Cir. 1989); citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b)); see also
Donna v. Countrywide Mortg., No. 14-cv-03515-CBS, 2015 WL 9456325, at *5 (D.
Colo. Dec. 28, 2015) (“The FCRA was enacted “to require that consumer reporting
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agencies 	adopt 	reasonable 	procedures 	for 	meeting 	the 	needs 	of 	commerce 	for
consumer credit ... in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer, with
regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of such
information.’” (quoting Section 1681(b))).
Johnson specifies that TU, a CRA, violated five separate provisions of the
FCRA: 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681i, 1681e(b), 1681c-1, 1681g(a), and 1681c-2. See Dkt. No. 27
at 22-30.
Starting with the Section 1681i and Section 1681e(b) claims, to prevail under
either, “a plaintiff must prove that her consumer reports included inaccurate
information.” Warner v. Equifax Info. Servs. LLC, No. 3:23-cv-1286-E, 2025 WL
714243, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2025) (cleaned up; quoting McDonald v. Equifax
Inc., No. 3:15-cv-3212-B, 2017 WL 879224, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2017)), rec.
accepted, 2025 WL 714165 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2025).
“The FCRA’s accuracy requirement in the Fifth Circuit mandates CRAs to
preclude 	both 	technically 	inaccurate 	information 	and 	technically 	accurate
information that could otherwise mislead a third party.” Bray v. Transunion, LLC,
No. 2:23-CV-197-Z-BR, 2024 WL 4150454, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 11, 2024) (citing
Sepulvado v. CSC Credit Servs., Inc., 158 F.3d 890, 895 (5th Cir. 1998) (“A credit
entry may be ‘inaccurate’ within the meaning of [Section 1681e(b)] either because it
is patently incorrect, or because it is misleading in such a way and to such an extent
that it can be expected to adversely affect credit decisions.”)).
The SAC includes multiple bullet points listing addresses, names, and phone
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numbers that Johnson asserts are inaccurate (or at least not currently accurate –
because X “is not Plaintiff’s address” is not the same as X was never Plaintiff’s
address).
But whether a report includes inaccurate information requires more at the
pleadings stage than a plaintiff making the conclusion without further factual
elaboration that X address or X name is inaccurate, and, so, “courts [ ] routinely
dismiss Section 1681e(b) and 1681i claims like this that do not identify specific
misstatements and explain why they were incorrect.” Rogers v. Equifax Info. Servs.
LLC, 23-CV-0537 (RPK) (TAM), 2024 WL 2862363, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. June 6, 2024)
(collecting cases).
But, even had Johnson provided the required facts to “explain why” the
information is incorrect, that’s still not enough to allege a plausible claim under either
Section 1681i or Section 1681e(b), as neither imposes “strict liability for inaccuracies,”
and, so, “the failure to allege what steps [the CRA] took or failed to take pertaining
to the accuracy of its reports is an independent basis to dismiss” these claims. Id. at
*3 (collecting cases).
That is because “a credit reporting agency, when preparing a credit report on
a consumer, is required to ‘follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible
accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the report
relates.’” Cahlin v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 936 F.2d 1151, 1156 (11th Cir.
1991) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b)), superseded by statute on other grounds as
recognized in Santos v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Grp., LLC, 90 F.4th 1144, 1156
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(11th Cir. 2024).
And, so, the FCRA “does not impose strict liability for inaccurate entries.
Rather, the plaintiff must show that the inaccuracy resulted from a negligent or
willful 	failure 	to 	use 	reasonable 	procedures 	when 	the 	report 	was 	prepared.”
Sepulvado, 158 F.3d at 896 (citing Thompson v. San Antonio Retail Merchants Assoc.,
682 F.2d 509, 513 (5th Cir. 1982)).
And, “if a consumer disputes the completeness or accuracy of any information
contained in her file and she notifies the credit reporting agency of the dispute, the
agency must ‘conduct a reasonable reinvestigation to determine whether the disputed
information is inaccurate.’” Middlebrooks v. Equifax, Inc., No. 23-11086, 2024 WL
631000, 	at 	*6 	(11th 	Cir. 	Feb. 	15, 	2024) 	(per 	curiam) 	(quoting 	15 	U.S.C. 	§
1681i(a)(1)(A)).
So “the consumer must present evidence tending to show that the agency
prepared a report containing inaccurate information.” Id. (citing Losch v. Nationstar
Mortg. LLC, 995 F.3d 937, 944 (11th Cir. 2021)).
To do so, a plaintiff must provide facts from which the Court may infer that
“such inaccuracies resulted from a failure to maintain reasonable procedures or
conduct a reasonable investigation.” Holloway v. Equifax, No. 4:23-cv-1038-P, 2024
WL 1741814, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 2024), rec. accepted, 2024 WL 2747734 (N.D.
Tex. May 29, 2024); see also, e.g., Bryant v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 1:13-cv-
02210-CC-RGV, 2013 WL 12382798, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 31, 2013) (“Courts have
made clear that ‘failure to follow reasonable procedures is a material element
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necessary for recovery under § 1681e(b). For that reason, the plaintiff must plead
factual material addressed to this element.’” (quoting Allmond v. Bank of Am., No.
3:07-cv-186-J-33JRK, 2008 WL 2445652, at *2 (M.D. Fla. June 16, 2008); footnote
omitted)), rec. adopted, 2014 WL 12860071 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 27, 2014); Benson v. Trans
Union, LLC, 387 F. Supp. 2d 834, 842-43 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (“Benson claims that Trans
Union violated its duties under Section 1681i(a) when it continued to report the CBC
Account after he notified Trans Union that it was not his. While it must be assumed
for purposes of this motion that Trans Union’s inclusion of the CBC Account on his
credit report was inaccurate, Benson has failed to show that such inaccuracy
stemmed from Trans Union’s failure to perform a reasonable reinvestigation of his
dispute.” (footnote omitted)); Grayson v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs., 18-CV-6977
(MKB), 2021 WL 2010398, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2021) (“[E]ven assuming that the
information Defendant is reporting is inaccurate because it is the result of identity
theft, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Defendant failed to follow reasonable
procedures to ensure the accuracy of the information.”).
And, because Johnson fails to plead facts that go to a CRA’s reasonableness (or
any lack thereof), she has not alleged a plausible claim to relief against TU under
these provisions of the FCRA. And they should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).
Next, Johnson alleges that TU violated Section 1681c-1 and supports this claim
with what she alleges is a transcript of a call between TU and her, during which the
TU representative advised Johnson that her online account was suspended as a
security measure, which appears to be the act that underlies this claim. See, e.g., Dkt.
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No. 27 at 26 (“Plaintiff submitted valid identity theft documentation, including a
police report and FTC affidavit, qualifying Plaintiff for heightened protections under
§ 1681c-1, including enhanced monitoring tools and alerts. Rather than provide these
protections, TransUnion responded by permanently disabling Plaintiff’s online access
to her credit monitoring portal, without warning or explanation.”).
But Section 1681c-1 is lengthy. Cf. Heller v. First Light Fed. Credit Union, 669
F. App’x 287, 287 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (“The various provisions of § 1681c-1
require potential creditors faced with a report on a consumer who has requested a
fraud alert to take certain steps before setting up a new credit plan or extension of
credit in that consumer’s name. See § 1681c-1(h)(1)(B)(i)-(ii), (h)(2)(B).”).
And, while some of its provisions may support a claim where a CRA fails to
timely inform a plaintiff that it imposed a security freeze, see 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-
1(i)(2)(A), a violation of that provision does not seem to be supported by the facts that
Johnson has provided.
So, in sum, Johnson’s lack of factual development as to this claim renders it
not plausibly pleaded. And it too should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).
Next 	up, 	“Section 	1681g(a) 	requires 	CRAs 	to 	disclose 	to 	consumers 	all
information in the consumer’s file and the sources of that information. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681g(a).” Thompson v. Equifax Info. Servs. LLC, 20-CV-6101 (RPK) (ST), 2022 WL
2467662, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2022); see also generally Brauer v. ExamOne World
Wide Inc., 683 F. Supp. 3d 1054 (C.D. Cal. 2023) (concluding that, “under §
1681g(a)(2), [a plaintiff’s] request for a copy of his ‘file’ triggered the Defendants’
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obligation to provide [the plaintiff] with the sources of information in the Report”)
And Johnson alleges that she “requested a complete copy of [her] consumer file
from TransUnion pursuant to § 1681g(a)” and “TransUnion breached its duty under
this section by failing to provide a complete disclosure of all information in [her] file,
instead providing only a limited ‘credit report’ and omitting crucial file contents such
as Plaintiff’s dispute history, investigative notes, identity theft documentation, and
internal logs.” Dkt. No. 27 at 27.
But Johnson’s allegations are not enough to plead a plausible violation of
Section 1681g(a) where she has not alleged facts setting out the nature and scope of
her request for disclosure. See, e.g., Byrd v. Equifax Consumer Servs., LLC, No. 11:19-
cv-04417-CAP-RGV, 2019 WL 11343566, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 14, 2019), rec. adopted,
2019 WL 11422015 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 11, 2019).
Johnson alleges that she requested “a complete copy of her consumer file,
including all investigative notes, consumer statements, identity-theft documentation,
and any internal CRA logs,” but that description is conclusory where she next alleges
that TU “responded by providing only a single ‘credit report,’ Exhibit 13” and where
Exhibit 13 to the SAC is merely a single page with no substantive information and
instead states that “[w]e understand that recently something on your credit report
did not seem right to you. We take this matter seriously, and we want to make sure
your TransUnion credit report is accurate. It’s our commitment to you. In the pages
that follow you will see a full copy of your credit report.” Dkt. No. 27 at 20 & 53.
And, so, this claim should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).
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Johnson last alleges that TU violated Section 1681c-2, which
requires a consumer credit reporting agency to block information that
the consumer identifies as information that resulted from an alleged
identity theft. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681c-2(a). The agency then notifies the
furnisher of information that the information may be a result of identity
theft, that an identity theft report has been filed, and that a block has
been 	requested 	by 	the 	consumer. 	15 	U.S.C.A. 	§ 	1681c-2(b). 	The
consumer credit reporting agency may decline to block information
relating to a consumer if it reasonably determines that the information
was blocked in error or a block was requested by the consumer in error;
if the information was blocked or requested to be blocked by the
consumer on the basis of a material misrepresentation of fact; or if it
determines that the consumer obtained possession of goods, services, or
money as a result of the blocked transaction. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681c-2(c)(1).
Eldridge v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. 1:25 CV 1910, 2026 WL 27584, at *2 (N.D.
Ohio Jan. 5, 2026).
And the undersigned agrees with TU that this claim is also not plausibly
pleaded where Johnson fails to allege the “information that resulted from an alleged
identity theft.” Id.; Dkt. No. 30 at 27 (“[N]otably absent from the Complaint is any
details regarding which credit accounts and other information Plaintiff contends is
inaccurately reporting on his Trans Union credit file as a result of identity theft.”
(cleaned up)); see generally Dkt. No. 27.
And, so, this claim should also be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).
Turning finally to Johnson’s proposed supplement, it too presents claims that
suffer from the same lack of factual content as the claims outlined above. See Dkt.
No. 36-1. So, as those claims would not survive a challenge under Rule 12(b)(6),
allowing Johnson to supplement would be futile.
The Court should therefore deny the motion to supplement and dismiss the
SAC.
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And, because Johnson has already amended her complaint multiple times, it’s
likely that she has now alleged her “best case,” and further leave to amend need not
be granted. See, e.g., Allen v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, No. 3:24-cv-949-L-BN, 2025
WL 484818, at *13 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2025) (“Granting leave to amend … is not
necessary when the plaintiff has pleaded his or her ‘best case’ after being apprised of
pleading deficiencies. Likewise, a district court need not grant a motion to amend if
doing so would be an exercise in futility.” (citations omitted)).
That said, the opportunity file objections to these findings, conclusions, and
recommendation 	(as 	further 	explained 	below) 	allows 	Johnson 	yet 	another
opportunity to show that this case should not be dismissed and that the Court should
instead grant leave to amend. See Scott v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 16 F.4th 1204, 1209
(5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (“A court should freely give leave to amend when justice
so requires, but a movant must give the court at least some notice of what his or her
amendments would be and how those amendments would cure the initial complaint’s
defects. If the plaintiff does not provide a copy of the amended complaint nor explain
how the defects could be cured, a district court may deny leave.” (citations omitted)).
Recommendation
The Court should grant Defendant Trans Union LLC’s motion to dismiss
Plaintiff Kimberly Johnson’s second amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) [Dkt. No. 29], deny Johnson’s motion to supplement under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d), and, unless Johnson shows through timely objections
to these recommendations a basis to amend that alleges a plausible claim, the Court
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should dismiss this lawsuit with prejudice.
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these
findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections
within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED . R. CIV.
P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or
recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation
where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure
to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the
factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or
adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
DATED: January 27, 2026
_________________________________________
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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