Vaughn v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
BREOADE V., §
PLAINTIFF, §
§
V. § CASE NO. 3:25-CV-254-X-BK
§
COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY §
ADMINISTRATION, §
DEFENDANT. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Special Order 3, Doc. 8, Plaintiff’s appeal of the
denial of Plaintiff’s application for Social Security disability benefits, Doc. 1, is before the
undersigned United States magistrate judge for findings and a recommended disposition. For the
reasons outlined here, the Commissioner’s decision should be REVERSED and REMANDED
for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration’s (“Commissioner”) final decision denying his application for disability
insurance benefits (“DIB”) under the Social Security Act (the “Act”). Doc. 1.
In September 2021, Plaintiff filed for DIB, claiming that he had been disabled since
March 2020. Doc. 15 at 3. Following the agency’s initial denial of Plaintiff’s application, in
2023, the ALJ issued an adverse decision finding Plaintiff not disabled. Doc. 12-1 at 121-38.
On further review, however, the Appeals Council vacated and remanded the case for further
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administrative proceedings, concluding that the ALJ’s decision did “not contain an adequate
evaluation of whether [Plaintiff] require[d] a walker.” Doc. 12-1 at 145-46.
Following a second administrative hearing on July 15, 2024, the ALJ once again issued
an adverse decision, which was later affirmed by the Appeals Council. Doc. 12-1 at 6-12, 20-33,
124-38. Plaintiff now appeals to this Court under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Doc. 1.
B. Factual History
Plaintiff was 27 years old at the alleged onset of his disability and had a high school
education. Doc. 15 at 4; Doc. 12-1 at 355. Plaintiff’s past relevant work included a job as an
airline security representative. Doc. 15 at 4; Doc. 12-1 at 100. Plaintiff claimed he suffered
from, inter alia, gout, diabetes, swollen extremities, sleep apnea, obesity, and back pain. Doc.
12-1, passim.
C. Medical Opinion Evidence
In 2021, Plaintiff was evaluated by Dr. Paul Worrell, D.O. Doc. 12-2 at 4. Plaintiff was
diagnosed with gout and obesity, among other ailments, and prescribed Diflucan, Losartan,
Hydrochlorothiazide, Singular, and Gabapentin. Doc. 12-2 at 6. In 2021, Plaintiff was also
evaluated by Dr. Atul Singhal, M.D., at the SW Arthritis Group. Doc. 12-1 at 459. Plaintiff’s
bilateral ankles were both observed to be tender and swollen. Doc. 12-1 at 461. For his gout,
Plaintiff received an injection of Triamcinolon Acetonid and was provided with a prescription
for an increased dosage of Allopurinol. Doc. 12-1 at 461.
In 2022, Plaintiff was evaluated by Dr. David Ukoha, M.D., a state agency medical
consultant. Doc. 12-2 at 124. X-rays revealed no abnormalities, but on observation, Plaintiff’s
gait, aided by use of a walker, was noted as very slow. Doc. 12-2 at 127-28. Plaintiff’s
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coordination and muscle tone were normal, but Plaintiff had difficulty squatting, hopping, and
tandem and toe walking, and his spinous process was non-tender, with no paramuscle spasms.
Doc. 12-2 at 127-28. A decreased range of motion was noted in Plaintiff’s lumbar spine, and
straight-leg-raise testing was negative. Doc. 12-2 at 127-28. Based on his evaluation, Dr. Ukoha
diagnosed Plaintiff with type 2 diabetes, chronic non-specified low back pain, obesity, and a
history of gouty arthritis. Doc. 12-2 at 127.
During a May 2022 visit to Parkland Health, it was noted that Plaintiff used a cane and
walker. Doc. 12-2 at 310. At a follow-up appointment a few months later, Plaintiff was seen by
Dr. Kinnari Ruikar, M.D., at Parkland, after reportedly falling while using a rolling walker. Doc.
12-3 at 89. Later, in December 2023, a treatment report completed by Dr. Jhee Un Lee, M.D., at
Parkland indicated that a bariatric walker had been ordered for Plaintiff, based on the
recommendation of a physical therapist. Doc. 12-3 at 274.
D. Plaintiff’s Testimony
At the 2023 administrative hearing, Plaintiff testified that he experienced numerous
symptoms that interfered with his ability to work, including: obesity, gout, osteoarthritis, and
depressive moods. Doc. 12-1 at 64-86. Plaintiff testified that he is seen in the hospital
emergency room six or seven times a year for gout and diabetes complications. Doc. 12-1 at 70.
Plaintiff further testified that he spends most of his days lying around and watching TV and that
he must urinate in a bucket or crawl to the bathroom because he cannot stand up for long. Doc.
12-1 at 71. Plaintiff also testified that he was prescribed a walker by Medical City Hospital in
2021, which he uses to walk around his apartment. Doc. 12-1 at 72-73.
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At the 2024 administrative hearing, following remand, Plaintiff testified that his obesity,
gout, osteoarthritis, and depressive moods interfered with his ability to work. Doc. 12-1 at 89-
101. Plaintiff stated that his gout affected both ankles and feet, but that since the last hearing, he
had begun taking his medication as prescribed, which somewhat controlled his “gout flare ups.”
Doc. 12-1 at 91-92. He indicated his last gout flare up occurred about three months before the
hearing and explained that when they occurred, they lasted about two weeks on average. Doc.
12-1 at 91-92.
Plaintiff testified that he used a cane at home and the bariatric walker when he left the
house. Doc. 12-1 at 93. Plaintiff further testified that he began using a bariatric walker and a
cane in 2023, as directed by his physical therapy provider. Doc. 12-1 at 93-94. Plaintiff also
noted that he was being treated for severe and frequent leg swelling. As for his activities of daily
living, Plaintiff testified that his obesity, back pain, and burning feet caused him to be unable to
prepare meals for himself or wash dishes, shower without assistance, or go anywhere except
doctor appointments. Doc. 12-1 at 97-98.
E. The ALJ’s Findings
Following the initial administrative hearing, the ALJ issued his Hearing Decision
utilizing the five-step sequential evaluation set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 in determining
whether Plaintiff was disabled. At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status
requirements of the Social Security Act through September 30, 2025, and had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since January 1, 2021. At step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff
had the severe impairments of diabetes mellitus, neuropathy, gouty arthritis, degenerative joint
disease of the bilateral feet, and obesity, and the non-severe impairments of sleep apnea, low
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back pain, asthma, psoriatic arthritis, hyperlipidemia, and depression. Doc. 12-1 at 126, 129.
However, the ALJ further found that none of Plaintiff’s impairments, singularly or in
combination, met or medically equaled any listed impairment.
At step three, the ALJ further found that Plaintiff had the Residual Functional Capacity
(RFC) to
perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) except1 lift, carry, push,
and/or pull twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently; sit for six hours
and stand and walk for two hours in an eight-hour day; occasionally climb ramps
and stairs; never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; occasionally balance and stoop;
and never kneel, crouch, or crawl.
Doc. 12-1 at 133. Based on the testimony of the Vocational Expert, the ALJ found at step four
that Plaintiff did not have the RFC to perform his past work. Doc. 12-1 at 136. However, at step
five, the ALJ found that there were a significant number of jobs in the national economy that
Plaintiff could perform. Doc. 12-1 at 137. The ALJ thus concluded that Plaintiff was not
disabled under the Act. Doc. 12-1 at 138.
In his post-remand decision, the ALJ found at step one that Plaintiff met the insured
status requirements of the Act and had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March
10, 2020. Doc. 12-1 at 22. At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from the severe
impairments of (1) diabetes mellitus (2) neuropathy (3) gouty arthritis (4) degenerative joint
disease of the bilateral feet, and (5) obesity, and that his non-severe impairments included
asthma, hyperlipidemia, and psoriatic arthritis. Doc. 12-1 at 22, 26. At step three, however, the
1 It’s not clear whether the ALJ intended to exclude the limitations that followed the word
“except” from the RFC, but a plain reading of the sentence indicates so.
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ALJ found that none of Plaintiff’s impairments, singularly or in combination, met an impairment
listed in the applicable regulations. Doc. 12-1 at 22-24.
The ALJ further found that Plaintiff had the RFC to lift and/or carry up to 20 pounds
occasionally and 10 pounds frequently with specific limitations:
He can stand and/or walk for a combined total of 2 hours in an 8-hour workday. He
can sit for about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday. He cannot climb ladders, ropes, or
scaffolds, kneel, crouch, or crawl. He can occasionally climb ramps and stairs,
balance, and stoop. He can understand, remember, and carry out simple tasks. He
can interact appropriately with co-workers, supervisors, and the general public. He
[is] able to respond appropriately to changes in a routine work setting.
Doc. 12-1 at 27. At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have the RFC to perform his
past work. Doc. 12-1 at 31-32. The ALJ based this finding in part on the vocational expert’s
opinion that the demands of Plaintiff’s past work exceeded his RFC. Doc. 12-1 at 31. But at
step five, the ALJ found that there were a significant number of jobs in the national economy that
Plaintiff could perform. Doc. 12-1 at 32-33. The ALJ thus concluded that Plaintiff was not
disabled under the Act. Doc. 12-1 at 33.
II. APPLICABLE LAW
The definition of disability under the Act is the “inability to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which
can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). To determine whether a
claimant is disabled, the Commissioner utilizes a sequential five-step inquiry: (1) whether the
claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant’s impairments are
“severe”; (3) whether the claimant’s impairment “meets or equals” one of the listings in the
relevant regulations; (4) whether the claimant can still do his past relevant work; and (5) whether
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the impairment prevents the claimant from doing any other available work. Webster v. Kijakazi,
19 F.4th 715, 718 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)). The claimant bears the
burden on the first four steps. Id. (citation omitted). If the claimant meets his burden, the burden
then shifts to the Commissioner to “prove the claimant’s employability.” Id. (citation omitted).
The Court’s review “is exceedingly deferential and limited to two inquiries: whether
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, and whether the ALJ applied the proper legal
standards when evaluating the evidence.” Taylor v. Astrue, 706 F.3d 600, 602 (5th Cir. 2012).
“And whatever the meaning of ‘substantial’ in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary
sufficiency is not high. Substantial evidence, [the Supreme] Court has said, is more than a mere
scintilla. It means—and means only—such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted). The Court can neither “reweigh the evidence or
substitute its judgment for the Commissioner’s.” Perez v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 457, 461 (5th Cir.
2005). A finding that substantial evidence does not exist “is appropriate only if no credible
evidentiary choices or medical findings support the decision.” Whitehead v. Colvin, 820 F.3d
776, 779 (5th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up).
The RFC assessment is based on “all of the relevant evidence in the case record,”
including, but not limited to, medical history, medical signs and laboratory findings, the effects
of treatment, reports of daily activities, lay evidence, recorded observations, medical source
statements, and work evaluations. SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 (July 2, 1996). The ALJ as
factfinder has the sole responsibility for weighing the evidence and determining the relative
weight to be given it. Chambliss v. Massanari, 269 F.3d 520, 523 (5th Cir. 2001).
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Applicable Standards
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in finding that his use of a walker was not medically
necessary. Doc. 15 at 17-32. Upon review, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s arguments have merit.
“The Social Security regulations recognize that hand-held assistive devices can impact a
claimant’s ‘functional capacity by virtue of the fact that one or both upper extremities are not
available for such activities as lifting, carrying, pushing, and pulling.’” Duenes v. Kijakazi, 578
F. Supp. 3d 859, 871 (S.D. Tex. 2022) (Stacy, J.) (citing 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 §
1.00(J)(4)). However, an ALJ need not consider a hand-held assistive device such as a walker in
the RFC determination unless the device is medically necessary. Duenes, 578 F. Supp. 3d at
871.
To find that a hand-held assistive device, like a walker, is medically necessary, the record
must contain “medical documentation establishing the need for a hand-held device to aid in
walking or standing, and describing the circumstances for which it is needed (i.e., whether all the
time, periodically, or only in certain situations; distance and terrain; and any other relevant
information).” SSR 96–9p, 1996 WL 374185, at *7.
As a judge of this Court has noted:
The Fifth Circuit has not clarified the specific type of “medical documentation”
necessary to establish the need for an assistive device. Moore v. Saul, No. 3:20-cv-
48-DPJ-MTP, 2021 WL 909618, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 1, 2021), R. & R. adopted
by 2021 WL 754833 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 26, 2021). But “several circuits have
elaborated and expounded on what documentation is needed in order for a
[p]laintiff to show medical necessity”—e.g., an “unambiguous opinion from a
physician” describing when the device is medically necessary, or documentation
“establishing the need for a hand-held assistive device to aid in walking or standing,
and describing the circumstances for which it is needed.” Id. (quoting Tripp v.
Astrue, 489 F. App’x 951, 955 (7th Cir. 2012), and Staples v. Astrue, 329 F. App’x
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189, 192 (10th Cir. 2009)). Ultimately, the ALJ “must always consider the
particular facts of a case” in evaluating the effect a claimant’s use of an assistive
device has on her ability to work. SSR 96-9p, 1996 WL 374185, at *7.
Maria U. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:22-CV-299, 2023 WL 9789922, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Dec.
27, 2023) (Bryant, Jr., J), adopted by 2024 WL 729834 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 22, 2024).
“Neither a prescription for a hand-held assistive device, nor a lack thereof, is necessarily
dispositive of medical necessity.” Duenes, 578 F. Supp. 3d at 872 (citations omitted).
Ultimately,
[the ALJ] must always consider the particular facts of a case. For example, if a
medically required [walker] is needed only for prolonged ambulation, walking on
uneven terrain, or ascending or descending slopes, the unskilled sedentary
occupational base will not ordinarily be significantly eroded.
SSR 96–9p, 1996 WL 374185, at *7.
B. Discussion
Here, the ALJ explains at the start of his post-remand Hearing Decision that, “[i]n its
remand order, [the] Appeals Council directed the undersigned to consider whether the claimant
had an impairment, or combination of impairments, that met or medically equaled a listed
impairment, including whether there was a documented medical need for a walker.” Doc. 12-1
at 20.
While the Commissioner accurately asserts that no medical provider prescribed Plaintiff’s
walker, see Doc. 20 at 4, Plaintiff is correct that the lack of a prescription for a walker is not
“necessarily dispositive,” see Doc. 15 at 17 (quoting Bivens v. Saul, No. 3:20-cv-1904-K-BH,
2022 WL 869687, at *10 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 7, 2022) (Ramirez, J.), adopted by 2022 WL 865903
(N.D. Tex. May 22, 2022). Again, the regulations provide that the need for the use of a walker
only be reflected in the RFC if “medical documentation establish[es] the need for [it]” and
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“describ[es] the circumstances for which it is needed.” SSR 96-9P, 1996 WL 374185, at *7
(July 2, 1996).
The Court notes that, here, in addition to Plaintiff’s hearing testimony, multiple entries in
the medical records document Plaintiff’s use of a walker. See, e.g., Doc. 12-2 at 916 (August 26,
2020); Doc. 12-2 at 125 (March 30, 2022); Doc. 12-3 at 141-42 (October 20, 2022); Doc. 12-3 at
89 (December 26, 2022). Still, mere observations of walker use do not render the assistance
“medically necessary.” See Duenes, 578 F. Supp. 3d at 872. And in this case, some of the
providers in the record simply observed Plaintiff’s walker use without commenting on its
medical necessity. For example, physician’s assistant Aaron Steven Ford observed that Plaintiff
could “walk with a walker” upon noting Plaintiff’s ankles were swollen and that Plaintiff showed
“degenerative changes of hip and L spine.” Doc. 12-2 at 196.
Nevertheless, some of Plaintiff’s medical providers, though not specifically prescribing
the use of a walker, describe the conditions supporting Plaintiff’s need for an assistive device to
ambulate.
For example, during a physical therapy evaluation in 2020, Plaintiff was assessed with
mobility impairment, gait impairment, decreased upper and lower extremity strength, decreased
activity tolerance, and movement impairment. Doc. 12-2 at 171. It was further noted that upon
mobility testing, Plaintiff used a rolling walker and gait belt, and was noted to have an unsteady
gait pattern, decreased gait speed, excessive upper extremity weight bearing, the need for verbal
cueing for safety, and wide base of support. Doc. 12-2 at 171. Plaintiff also was only able to
ambulate for five feet. Doc. 12-2 at 173. The report lists: “Mobility Assistive Device” as
“Rolling Walker.” Doc. 12-2 at 174.
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Another example is documented in the notes of Dr. Bryan Thibodeau, M.D. Doc. 12-2 at
102-07. Upon examination in the emergency department on April 30, 2021, Dr. Thibodeau
determined that Plaintiff was morbidly obese and suffering from “gouty arthritis” with bilateral
extremity edema from ankle to toes, and some warmth and tenderness to the bilateral medial
malleoli. Doc. 12-2 at 101-02. He also noted that after several attempts at pain control, Plaintiff
still could not self-ambulate with crutch assistance and had fallen when attempting to do so and,
therefore, could not safely be discharged. Doc. 12-2 at 104. And at the time of discharge,
clinical impression included “ambulatory dysfunction.” Doc. 12-2 at 106.
Dr. David Ukoha, M.D., noted on March 30, 2022, that Plaintiff’s gait and station were
assisted with a walker, and that Plaintiff’s gait was very slow secondary to obesity. Doc. 12-2 at
127. Dr. Ukoha also noted Plaintiff had difficulty squatting, hopping, tandem walking, and toe
walking. Doc. 12-2 at 128. Dr. Ukoha concluded that Plaintiff had reduced mobility with
walker dependence. Doc. 12-2 at 128. Notably, when vacating the ALJ’s 2023 decision, the
Appeals Council indicated Dr. Ukoha’s report as evidence supporting Plaintiff’s need for a
walker, see Doc. 12-1 at 145.
In his most recent decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff “reported rather inconsistent
information regarding his need and/or use of an assistive device,” Doc. 12-1 at 29, holding:
The record shows the claimant has been provided a walker for assistance with
ambulation. However, there is no discussion from a doctor discussing the need to
use a walker for balance. The claimant testified that August 2023 was when he was
first prescribed a walker (Testimony). But there is no prescription found in the
record at that time. Instead, the first note of a bariatric walker is not until December
2023. While the record references the claimant’s use of a walker prior to December
2023 and that he even presented with a broken walker that needed to be replaced at
one point, there is no prescription nor medical opinion in the record to support when
the claimant would need to use a walker and why a walker is necessary. There is a
note from the consultative examiner . . . on March 30, 2022, which states his gait
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and station assisted with walker showed no ataxia, but the gait is very slow
secondary to obesity. The report also states that “The examinee claims that before
discharge from the hospital because of difficulty with ambulation he was prescribed
a walker by the physician.” However, there is no such prescription nor analysis
describing the necessity of a walker in the record. At the hearing on July 15, 2024,
the claimant controverted the medical evidence and stated he did not start using a
walker until sometime in 2023 after funding was secured (Testimony). Yet, at the
prior hearing the claimant testified that he has a walker and a doctor at Medical City
Hospital prescribed the walker in 2021 (Testimony). However, again, there is no
such evidence in the record. While it is apparent the claimant utilizes a walker, the
undersigned finds insufficient medical evidence to support a finding of a need for
the use of a walker according to the Social Security Act and Regulations.
Doc. 12-1 at 30 (administrative record citations omitted).2
That the ALJ obviously focused on the lack of prescription for a walker in the
medical records—almost as though it were a requirement—lends credence to Plaintiff’s
argument that the ALJ’s discussion of Plaintiff’s need for a walker was overly selective.
See Doc. 15 at 22-25. The undersigned also finds it telling that while most of Plaintiff’s
medical providers and the medical consultants noted his use of a walker, not one of them
suggested that his use was not necessary.
In sum, despite there being no documentary record of a prescription issued for a walker,
the objective medical evidence establishes Plaintiff’s need for a hand-held assistive device and
describes the circumstances for which it is needed. That is all that the regulations require. See
SSR 96-9P, 1996 WL 374185, at *7 (July 2, 1996). Again, the lack of a prescription is not solely
determinative. Duenes, 578 F. Supp. 3d at 872. Thus, the ALJ erred by failing to consider
Plaintiff’s walker use in determining the RFC. See Heather H. v. Kijakazi, 2021 WL 4138406, at
2 On review of the hearing transcript, in context and considering the objective reports of
Plaintiff’s walker use, it appeared Plaintiff was making a distinction between his use of a walker
(presumably a roller walker) and a bariatric walker in his testimony. See e.g., Doc. 12-1 at 93-94
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*8 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2021) (Palermo, J.) (“The ALJ errs when he ignores medical records
documenting a plaintiff’s need for an assistive device.”).
C. Harmless Error Analysis
Because “[p]rocedural perfection in administrative proceedings is not required” and a
court “will not vacate a judgment unless the substantial rights of a party have been affected,”
Plaintiff must show he was prejudiced by the ALJ’s failure to rely on medical opinion evidence
in assessing his RFC. See Mays v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1362, 1364 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). To
establish prejudice, a plaintiff must show that the ALJ’s failure to rely on a medical opinion as to
the effects his impairments had on his ability to work casts doubt on the existence of substantial
evidence supporting the ALJ’s disability determination. McNair v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,
537 F. Supp. 2d 823, 837 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (citing Morris v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 333, 335 (5th Cir.
1988)).
Interestingly, in the instant case, the ALJ posed an alternative RFC hypothetical to the
VE in the first administrative hearing that included the use of a walker, inquiring, “what about
any impact of a rolling walker for ambulation, is there any impact on the jobs and the numbers
that you provided or [sic]? Doc. 12-1 at 84. The VE responded, “No, Your Honor, I believe that
at the sedentary [sic] you can use the walker to come in and sit at your office and sit at your desk
and complete the work.” Doc. 12-1 at 84.
However, at the second hearing, the ALJ’s inquiry was more limited and the VE’s
response was different. The ALJ asked the VE, “Would there be any impact on those jobs
[previously identified by the VE as available] or those numbers if the individual was going to
require a walker for ambulation?” Doc. 12-1 at 102. The VE responded, “Yes, a walker would
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have to be an accommodation because of the work environment there’s no, you know, guarantee
that the aisles would be – you know, wide enough or that the workstation, you know, would be
able to accommodate a walker.” See Doc. 12-1 at 101-03. Rather than following up to clarify
the necessary accommodations and the impact, if any, of the required use of a walker on the
number of jobs available to someone with Plaintiff’s RFC in the national economy, the ALJ
explicitly abandoned the walker-use hypothetical. See Doc. 12-1 at 102-03. Thus, the record is
unclear whether the Commissioner met the step five burden to prove Plaintiff’s employability.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).
Considering the Court’s finding herein that the substantial evidence supports that
Plaintiff’s walker use was medically necessary, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s hypothetical
questions to the VE failed to adequately incorporate all relevant limitations. See Morrison v.
Kijakazi, 2024 WL 1893604, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 2024) (“‘A defective hypothetical is
reversible error’ and a claimant need not show prejudice.”) (quoting Wilson v. Kijakazi, 2021
WL 3269762, at *3 (S.D. Tex. July 30, 2021)). That notwithstanding, for the foregoing reasons,
remand is warranted because “it is conceivable that the ALJ could make a different
administrative decision upon further review.” Shugart v. Kijakazi, No. 3:21-CV-07, 2022 WL
912777, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2022) (Edison, J.); see also Davidson v. Colvin, 164 F. Supp.
3d 926, 944 (N.D. Tex. 2015) (Ramirez, J.) (same).
Because in the case sub judice the ALJ’s error was not harmless, remand is warranted.
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IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence.
Accordingly, the Commissioner’s decision should be REVERSED and REMANDED for
further proceedings.
SO ORDERED on March 6, 2026.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the manner provided by
law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and recommendation must file specific
written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED.
R. CIV. P. 72(b). An objection must identify the finding or recommendation to which objection is
made, the basis for the objection, and the place in the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific
written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal
conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon
grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417
(5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time
to file objections to 14 days).
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