Jones v. Driver Pipeline et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
KARNELL JONES, 	§
§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-CV-0121-B
§
DRIVER PIPELINE and
DOES 1-25 INCLUSIVE,
§
§
§
Defendants. 	§
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Karnell Jones’s Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 11). Jones
asks the Court to alter or amend the Final Judgment (Doc. 8) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e), or alternatively, relieve Jones from the Final Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b). For the reasons explained below, the Court DENIES Jones’s Motion.
I.
BACKGROUND
The factual background of this case is presented in detail in the Court’s Memorandum
Opinion and Order granting a motion to dismiss brought by Defendants Driver Pipeline Company,
Inc. (“Pipeline”) and Does 1-25 (collectively “Defendants”). See Doc. 7, Mem. Op. & Order, 1-2. In
August 2024, Jones filed a Charge of Discrimination (the “Charge”) against Pipeline with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and Texas Workforce Commission. Doc 1-1, Pet.
¶¶ 11-22; see also Doc. 4-1, Charge Discrimination, 1. The Charge listed “Age, Color, National
Origin, Other, Race, Retaliation” as the bases for discrimination. Doc. 4-1, Charge Discrimination,
1. Moreover, it stated, “I believe I have been discriminated against in violation of Texas Labor Code,
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Chapter 21 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as Amended based on my color/national
origin/race/ and retaliation for exercising my protected rights,” and “I believe I have been
discriminated against in violation of Texas Labor Code, Chapter 21 and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 because of my age (46) and retaliation for exercising my protected rights.”
Id. Lastly, it noted that the discrimination took place from May 15, 2024, to June 21, 2024. Id.
In November 2024, Jones filed suit against Defendants and asserted claims for (1)
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”); (2) retaliation under
Title VII; (3) sexual harassment under Title VII; (4) discrimination under Texas Labor Code Chapter
21 (the “TCHRA”); (5) retaliation under the TCHRA; (6) sexual harassment under the TCHRA; (7)
negligent supervision and retention; (8) wrongful termination; (9) negligent infliction of emotional
distress (“NIED”); and (10) intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). Doc. 1-1, Pet. ¶¶
26-73. Defendants moved to dismiss all claims. Doc. 4, Mot. Dismiss, 14.
After reviewing the relevant pleadings and motions, the Court found Jones had failed to
state claims upon which relief could be granted and resultingly dismissed all of Jones’s claims against
Defendants with prejudice. Doc. 7, Mem. Op. & Order, 10. Accordingly, the Court issued a Final
Judgment decreeing Jones takes nothing. Doc. 8, Final J., 1. Within twenty-eight days of the issuance
of the Final Judgment, Jones filed a Motion for Reconsideration. See generally Doc. 11, Mot. Recons.
Defendants did not file a response. The Court evaluates the Motion below.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not recognize a general motion for reconsideration.
St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Fair Grounds Corp., 123 F.3d 336, 339 (5th Cir. 1997). “Rather, courts
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treat such motions as motions pursuant to either Rule 54(b), 59(e), or 60 depending on when the
motion is brought and the type of order that the party requests the Court to reconsider.” Mehar
Holdings, LLC v. Evanston Ins. Co., No. 5:16-CV-491-DAE, 2016 WL 5957681, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Oct.
14, 2016) (citations omitted). “If the motion was filed within twenty-eight days after the entry of the
judgment, the motion is treated as though it was filed under Rule 59, and if it was filed outside of
that time, it is analyzed under Rule 60.” Demahy v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc., 702 F.3d 177, 182 n.2 (5th
Cir. 2012) (citing Texas A & M Research Found. v. Magna Transp., Inc., 338 F.3d 394, 400 (5th
Cir.2003)). “Here, the relevant motion was filed within the applicable twenty-eight day time frame,
and [the Court] thus consider[s] it as a motion to amend the judgment under Rule 59(e).” Id.
“Rule 59(e) motions serve the narrow purpose of permitting ‘a court to alter or amend a
judgment to (1) accommodate an intervening change in controlling law, (2) account for newly
discovered evidence, or (3) correct a manifest error of law or fact.’” Anderson v. Octapharma Plasma,
Inc., No. 3:19-CV-2311-D, 2021 WL 4219700, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2021) (Fitzwater, S.J.)
(quoting Trevino v. City of Ft. Wor., 944 F.3d 567, 570 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam)) (other citation
omitted). The Fifth Circuit has consistently held a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Rule
59(e) “is not the proper vehicle for rehashing evidence, legal theories, or arguments that could have
been offered or raised before the entry of judgment.” Budri v. FirstFleet, Inc., 860 F. App’x 306, 308
(5th Cir. 2021) (citing Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 2004) (citation
omitted). “Reconsideration of a judgment after its entry is an extraordinary remedy that should be
used sparingly.” Templet, 367 F.3d at 479.
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III.
ANALYSIS
The Court DENIES Jones’s Motion for Reconsideration. In his Motion, Jones fails to
identify a change in the law, new evidence, or a “manifest error of law or fact.” See Anderson, 2021
WL 4219700, at *1. Instead, he merely “rehash[es] the arguments and legal theories” that the Court
has already rejected and presents new arguments that could have been offered in his Response to
the Motion to Dismiss. Budri, 860 F. App’x at 309. Jones therefore fails to present a sufficient basis
for reconsideration.
Even if the Court was inclined to consider Jones’s new arguments, such consideration does
not change its decision to deny the Motion for Reconsideration. Jones argues the Court erred in
dismissing his claims against Defendants with prejudice because (1) the doctrine of equitable tolling
permits Jones to proceed with an untimely Charge, and (2) the Complaint could be amended to
plead state law claims that are not preempted by Title VII and the TCHRA. The Court briefly
examines each argument below.
The Court did not err in dismissing Jones’s Title VII and TCHRA claims with prejudice
because Jones’s facts do not permit the application of equitable tolling. The Fifth Circuit has
cautioned that the doctrine of equitable tolling is to be applied “sparingly.” DeBlanc v. St. Tammany
Par. Sch. Bd., 640 F. App’x 308, 310 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (citation omitted). Equitable tolling
is appropriate in three situations: “(1) the pendency of a suit between the same parties in the wrong
forum; (2) [the] plaintiff’s unawareness of the facts giving rise to the claim because of the defendant’s
intentional concealment of them; and (3) the EEOC’s misleading the plaintiff about the nature of
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her rights.” Weathers v. Houston Methodist Hosp., 116 F.4th 324, 330 (5th Cir. 2024) (per curiam)
(quoting Melgar v. T.B. Butler Publ'g Co., 931 F.3d 375, 380 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam)).
In Jones’s Motion, he asserts he “reasonably relied on the EEOC’s determination that the
charge was procedurally adequate,” and “[i]t would be inequitable to penalize [Jones] for any
perceived ambiguity or lack of detail in the charge, when the [EEOC] itself accepted the charge.”
Doc. 11, Mot. Recons., 6. The Court construes this assertion as an argument that the third
situation—that the EEOC misled him—applies to his case. But the Fifth Circuit has found the third
situation is limited to instances where the EEOC gave an employee the wrong information. Manning
v. Chevron Chem. Co., 332 F.3d 874, 881 (5th Cir. 2003). In Manning, the Fifth Circuit confirmed
that the EEOC’s reissuance of a right to sue letter does not by itself constitute giving an individual
incorrect information. Id. Because Jones includes no allegations other than the receipt of his Right
to Sue Letter, he has not alleged facts showing he received wrong information from the EEOC that
would permit the third situation to apply to his facts. Moreover, the Court notes that Jones did not
file the Charge pro se, see id. at 6, and the Fifth Circuit has held it is “reluctant to apply equitable
tolling to situations of attorney error or neglect, because both parties are bound by the acts of their
lawyer.” Granger v. Aaron’s, Inc., 636 F.3d 708, 712 (5th Cir. 2011).
Turning to Jones’s negligent supervision and retention, wrongful termination in violation of
public policy, and IIED claims,1 the Court did not err in dismissing those claims with prejudice.
Jones did not request leave to amend in his response to the motion to dismiss. Instead, he requests
the Court grant him leave to file an amended complaint in his Motion for Reconsideration. Doc.
1 In his Motion for Reconsideration, Jones concedes an NIED claim does not exist under Texas law. Doc. 11,
Mot. Recons., 12.
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11, Mot. Recons., 7-12. Accordingly, the Court did not err in not granting unrequested relief. See
Estes v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 613 F. App’x 277, 280 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam)
(“Nevertheless, a party must ‘expressly request’ leave to amend.”) (quoting United States ex rel. Willard
v. Humana Health Plan of Tex. Inc., 336 F.3d 375, 387 (5th Cir. 2003)).
Moreover, Jones’s reconsideration motion further demonstrates that he pleaded his best
case. See Coleman v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 969 F. Supp. 2d 736, 755 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (Lynn, J.)
(“Dismissal with prejudice is also appropriate if a court finds that the plaintiff has alleged his or her
best case.” (citing Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 1999))). Jones asserts no new facts
that suggest he could plausibly allege claims upon which relief could be granted. Instead, he merely
references vague principles and adds conclusory statements. See id. at 8 (“Plaintiff asserts that
Defendant’s inadequate supervision enabled conduct that went beyond discrimination based on
protected characteristics and included other harmful behaviors that may constitute independent
tortious acts under Texas law.”); id. at 10 (“Plaintiff could amend to allege facts, if supported by
discovery, showing that certain abusive or malicious conduct directed at him was not related to . . .
any protected category but rather arose from personal animosity or other reasons falling outside the
reach of Title VII and the TCHRA.”); id. at 11-12 (“Plaintiff requests leave to amend and clarify that
he . . . actively refus[ed] to be complicit in practices that he believed to be unlawful . . . . This includes,
for example, refusing to remain silent about workplace harassment, refusing to ignore dangerous
safety issues, and rejecting instructions or expectations that he engage in or permit unlawful
behavior.”). Resultingly, he has not shown that dismissing the claims with prejudice was
inappropriate.
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IV.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, 	for 	the 	reasons 	explained, 	the 	Court 	DENIES 	Jones’s 	Motion 	for
Reconsideration (Doc. 11).
SO ORDERED.
SIGNED: March 4, 2026.
_________________________________
JANE J. BOYLE
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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