USA v. Aguilar et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
V.
CIPRIANO PEREZ CORRAL a/k/a
David,
Defendant.
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No. 3:25-cr-455-E (3)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING
THE GOVERNMENT’S MOTION FOR DETENTION
Defendant Cipriano Perez Corral is charged with one count of Conspiracy to
Possess with Intent to Distribute a Controlled Substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§
846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A)(ii), and one count of Possession with Intent to
Distribute a Controlled Substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and
841(b)(1)(B)(ii), in a superseding indictment filed in this district. See Dkt. No. 27.
The superseding indictment alleges that Corral and his three named co-
defendants, beginning on or about December 1, 2024 and continuing through on or
about September 12, 2025, conspired to possess with intent to distribute and to
distribute 5 kilograms or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable
amount of cocaine and that Corral, on or about July 28, 2025, knowingly and
intentionally possessed with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture and
substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine.
The government moved for Corral’s pretrial detention under 18 U.S.C. § 3142.
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And, on March 6, 2026, the Court held a hearing on the government’s motion for
detention. Corral appeared in person and through counsel. The government appeared
through an Assistant United States Attorney for the Northern District of Texas.
On the record at the end of the hearing on March 6, 2026, the Court
determined, for the reasons explained on the record and further explained below, that
Corral should be released on conditions under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1) pending trial.
The government asked the Court to stay the release order to allow the
government to file, for the presiding district judge’s determination, a motion under
18 U.S.C. § 3145(a)(1) for revocation of the order of release. See generally 18 U.S.C. §
3145(a)(1) (providing that, “[i]f a person is ordered released by a magistrate judge, …
(1) the attorney for the Government may file, with the court having original
jurisdiction over the offense, a motion for revocation of the order or amendment of the
conditions of release”); United States v. Fortna, 769 F.2d 243, 249-50 (5th Cir. 1985).
The Court granted that request, consistent with what the Court takes to be
governing Fifth Circuit authority, see United States v. Brigham, 569 F.3d 220, 229-
30 (5th Cir. 2009), and ordered that the Order Setting Conditions of Release “is stayed
until 5 pm on 3/11/2026 but the stay will continue if a 18 USC 3145(a) motion is filed
by that time (pending the motion’s resolution) or if the presiding judge otherwise
extends the stay.”
The Court enters this memorandum opinion and order to further explain the
bases for its decision to deny the government’s motion for detention and order that
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Corral be released conditions under Section 3142(c)(1) pending trial.
I. Eligibility for a detention hearing
“The provisions of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142 and 3144 govern pretrial release.” FED. R.
CRIM. P. 46(a).
“[18 U.S.C.] § 3142(f) does not authorize a detention hearing whenever the
government thinks detention would be desirable, but rather limits such hearings to
the [seven circumstances listed in (f)(1)(A), (f)(1)(B), (f)(1)(C), (f)(1)(D), (f)(1)(E),
(f)(2)(A), and (f)(2)(b)].” United States v. Byrd, 969 F.2d 106, 109 (5th Cir. 1992).
“A hearing can be held only if one of the [seven] circumstances listed in (f)(1)
and (2) is present; detention can be ordered only after a hearing is held pursuant to
§ 3142(f).” Id.
“Section 3142(f) specifies the circumstances under which a detention hearing
must be held, including: a case involving a crime of violence; an offense with a
maximum sentence of life imprisonment or death; certain drug offenses with a
maximum term of imprisonment for ten years or more; a felony offense if the
defendant has two or more previous conviction that would quality under the
preceding subsections; a serious risk that the person will flee; or a serious risk that
the person will obstruct or attempt to obstruct justice, or threaten, injure, or
intimidate, or attempt to threaten, injure or intimidate, a prospective witness or
juror.” United States v. Okhumale, 813 F. App’x 936, 938 (5th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up).
18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(E) also provides for a hearing, “on motion of the attorney for
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the Government, in a case that involves … any felony that is not otherwise a crime of
violence that involves a minor victim or that involves the possession or use of a
firearm or destructive device (as those terms are defined in [18 U.S.C. §] 921), or any
other dangerous weapon, or involves a failure to register under section 2250 of title
18, United States Code.”
“Detention can be ordered, therefore, only in a case that involves one of the
[seven] circumstances listed in (f), and in which the judicial officer finds, after a
hearing, that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the
appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the
community.” Byrd, 969 F.2d at 109.
That is, ordering pretrial detention under Section 3142 “requires both the
presence of one of the circumstances outlined in § 3142(f) and a determination under
§ 3142(e) that the no conditions imposed could either assure the appearance of the
defendant or the safety of the defendant and community.” Okhumale, 813 F. App’x at
939 (cleaned up).
And, so, as the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has
confirmed, “[t]here can be no doubt that [the Bail Reform Act of 1984] clearly favors
nondetention,” and a defendant’s “threat to the safety of any other person or the
community, in the absence of one of the [seven] specified circumstances, [cannot]
justify detention under the Act.” Byrd, 969 F.2d at 109-10; accord Okhumale, 813 F.
App’x at 939.
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In this case, Corral is eligible for pretrial detention under 18 U.S.C. §
3142(f)(1)(C) because he is charged by a superseding indictment with “an offense for
which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed in the
Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.).”
II. Burden on government’s motion for pretrial detention
Under the Bail Reform Act, “[i]f, after a hearing pursuant to the provisions of
[18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)], the judicial officer finds that no condition or combination of
conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the
safety of any other person and the community, such judicial officer shall order the
detention of the person before trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1).
On a motion for detention under 18 U.S.C. § 3142, the government always must
prove either
• by, a preponderance of the evidence, that there is no condition or combination
of conditions that could be set to reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance
as required or,
• by clear and convincing evidence, that there is no condition or combination of
conditions that will reasonably assure the safety of the community or another
person if the defendant were released.
18 U.S.C. § 3142(f); United States v. Westbrook, 780 F.2d 1185, 1189 & n.6 (5th Cir.
1986); Fortna, 769 F.2d at 250.
“For pretrial detention to be imposed on a defendant, the lack of reasonable
assurance of either the defendant’s appearance, or the safety of others or the
community, is sufficient; both are not required.” United States v. Rueben, 974 F.2d
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580, 586 (5th Cir. 1992); accord Westbrook, 780 F.2d at 1188-89 & n.5.
But, under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b), the Court must “order the pretrial release of
the person unless the person is a flight risk or danger to the community.” United
States v. Baltazar-Sebastian, 990 F.3d 939, 944 (5th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up); accord
Byrd, 969 F.2d at 109.
And, so, “[i]n making a pretrial detention determination, a judicial officer must
bear in mind that passage of the pretrial detention provision of the 1984 [Bail Reform]
Act did not ... signal a congressional intent to incarcerate wholesale the category of
accused persons awaiting trial” and that, “[r]ather, Congress was demonstrating its
concern about a small but identifiable group of individuals as to whom pretrial release
is inappropriate.” Westbrook, 780 F.2d at 1189 (cleaned up).
Under Section 3142, “pretrial release is not inappropriate – that is, pretrial
detention is not required – in every case in which the government charges a defendant
with a crime that is considered particularly serious (which are generally the only
offenses for which detention is authorized at all under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)), or for
which the government has strong evidence, or for which the defendant is exposed to
a lengthy sentence.” United States v. Roberson, 547 F. Supp. 3d 560, 565 (N.D. Tex.
2021).
“There is a difference under the Bail Reform Act between (1) the universe of
people whom prosecutors and law enforcement agents consider to be ‘bad men’ – or
have probable cause to believe are involved with or connected to criminal activity that
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may be particularly repugnant or traumatizing or scary – and (2) the universe of
people whom the governing legal standards consider to be, even with restrictive
conditions, too dangerous going forward after arrest to be released while their cases
are pending.” Id. at 566.
III. Rebuttable presumption
The Bail Reform Act adds one more variable into the analysis in some cases:
18 U.S.C. §§ “3142(e)(2) and (3) create rebuttable presumptions for certain arrestees
that ‘no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the safety of
any other person and the community.’” Miranda v. Garland, 34 F.4th 338, 363 (4th
Cir. 2022) (quoting 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(e)(2), 3142(e)(3)).
“For example, [under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(2),] a person convicted of a prior
federal offense, if it is an offense listed under § 3142(f)(1), such as an offense for which
the maximum sentence is life imprisonment or death, would face this rebuttable
presumption. Moreover, arrestees face this presumption if the judicial officer finds
there is probable cause to believe they committed certain drug offenses, see [18
U.S.C.] § 3142(e)(3)(A); committed firearms offenses, serious crimes in a foreign
country, or terrorism, see id. § 3142(e)(3)(B); engaged in peonage, slavery, or
trafficking in persons, see id. § 3142(e)(3)(D); or committed certain offenses involving
a minor victim, see id. § 3142(e)(3)(E).” Miranda, 34 F.4th at 363; accord Kaley v.
United States, 571 U.S. 320, 329 n.6 (2014) (the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §
3141 et seq., “creates a rebuttable presumption that a defendant is ineligible for bail
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if ‘there is probable cause to believe’ she committed certain serious crimes.” (citing18
U.S.C. §§ 3142(e)(2)-(3), (f)).
And an indictment conclusively establishes probable cause to believe that the
defendant committed a triggering offense. See Kaley, 571 U.S. at 329 n.6; United
States v. Trosper, 809 F.2d 1107, 1110 (5th Cir. 1987).
In this case, the government has invoked the 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3) rebuttable
presumption, which applies in this case because the Court finds that there is probable
cause to believe – based on the superseding indictment – that Corral has committed
“an offense for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is
prescribed in the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.).” 18 U.S.C. §
3142(e)(3)(A).
Section 3142(e)(3) mandates that, in such a case as this, “it shall be presumed
that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance
of the person as required and the safety of the community.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3).
Where, as here, the presumption applies, Corral must produce sufficient
evidence to rebut the presumption – that is, “some credible evidence” to suggest that
Corral would be unlikely to flee or pose a danger. See United States v. Hare, 873 F.2d
796, 798-99 (5th Cir. 1989); accord Trosper, 809 F.2d at 1110.
The Fifth Circuit has, for example, “previously held that when the defendant
has presented considerable evidence of his longstanding ties to the locality in which
he faces trial, the presumption of flight has been rebutted.” Rueben, 974 F.2d at 586.
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And “the serious nature of the charged offenses” – while alone “sufficient to
create a presumption” – is “not sufficient to create an irrebuttable presumption.”
United States v. Morales, No. 97 CR. 829 (JSR), 1997 WL 555614, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 4, 1997). While a defendant must come forward with sufficient evidence to rebut
the presumption that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure
his appearance as required and the safety of the community, where he has met that
burden of production, the Fifth Circuit has held that the Section “3142(e)
presumption, coupled with the allegations of the indictment against [a defendant],
are [not] alone sufficient to satisfy § 3142(g).” United States v. Jackson, 845 F.2d 1262,
1266 (5th Cir. 1988).
“In applying this burden-shifting framework, the district court should consider
the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).” United States v. Flores, 53 F.4th 313, 315
(5th Cir. 2022); see also Jackson, 845 F.2d at 1266; accord United States v. Sims, 801
F. App’x 324, 324-25 (5th Cir. 2020); Rueben, 974 F.2d at 586-87; Trosper, 809 F.2d
at 1110-11; Fortna, 769 F.2d at 253.
And, at least where a defendant has satisfied his burden to produce rebuttal
evidence, the government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there
is no condition or combination of conditions that could be set to reasonably assure the
defendant’s appearance as required or by clear and convincing evidence that there is
no condition or combination of conditions that will reasonably assure the safety of the
community or another person if the defendant were to be released. See Jackson, 845
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F.2d at 1265-66; Fortna, 769 F.2d at 250-51.
But, on the other hand, “the mere production of evidence does not completely
rebut the [Section 3142(e)(3)] presumption.” Rueben, 974 F.2d at 586. Rather, “[i]n
making its ultimate determination” on whether to order release or detention, the
Court may consider the existence of and underlying reasons for the presumption –
such as “the finding by Congress that drug offenders pose a special risk of flight and
dangerousness to society” – in assessing whether there are conditions that the Court
might set that would reasonably assure Corral’s appearance as required and the
safety of the community. Id.; accord Jackson, 845 F.2d at 1266 (noting that, although
the presumption had been rebutted, “the presumption necessarily remains in the case
because of Congressional determination that drug offenders pose special risks of
flight”).
IV. Standards for pretrial detention versus release
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3142, the Court is presented with essentially three
questions:
1. Does the defendant pose a risk, danger, or threat going forward not to appear
as required or to endanger the safety of the community or any other person?
2. If so, are there conditions of release that will reasonably assure the defendant’s
appearance as required and the safety of any other person and the community
if the defendant is released?
3. And, if so, is there evidence that the defendant is unlikely to comply with those
conditions – that is, that the Court cannot be reasonably assured that the
defendant will comply with the least restrictive combination of conditions that
will reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance as required and the safety
of any other person and the community while Corral is on release?
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At bottom, the issue is whether, pursuant to Section 3142(e)(1), any condition
or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance as
required and the safety of any other person and the community.
Or, put another way, can the defendant be subjected to conditions of release
that will reasonably assure (not guarantee) that he will not engage in harmful or
illegal conduct in general or toward a specific person – and that he will show up to
court and for other court-obligations as required – if he is released? See Roberson, 547
F. Supp. 3d at 566.
To prove that the defendant cannot based on danger to the community or
another person, the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the defendant presents an identified and articulable – and future or ongoing – threat
to a person or the community and that this demonstrable danger is one that no
condition or combination of conditions of release can reasonably be expected to dispel.
See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987); accord Foucha v. La., 504 U.S.
71, 81 (1992); United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273, 1282-83 (D.C. Cir. 2021);
Roberson, 547 F. Supp. 3d at 566-67.
That is a high burden. See United States v. Singh, 860 F. App’x 283, 284 (4th
Cir. 2021); United States v. Rodriguez, 950 F.2d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 1991). “Clear and
convincing evidence is that weight of proof which produces in the mind of the trier of
fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be
established, evidence so clear, direct and weighty and convincing as to enable the fact
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finder to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts
of the case.” United States v. Jackson, 19 F.3d 1003, 1007 (5th Cir. 1994) (cleaned up).
And a “defendant’s detention based on dangerousness accords with due process
only insofar as the district court determines that the defendant's history,
characteristics, and alleged criminal conduct make clear that he or she poses a
concrete, prospective threat to public safety.” Munchel, 991 F.3d at 1280.
Whether a defendant poses a particular threat depends on the nature of the
threat identified and a defendant’s resources and capabilities. And, so, for example,
whether a defendant poses a threat of dealing drugs may depend on her past
experience and whether she has the means to continue to do so in the future. See id.
at 1283.
To prove that there is no condition or combination of conditions that could be
set to reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance as required, the government
must make a showing that allows the Court to determine, from the information before
it, that it is more likely than not that no condition or combination of conditions will
reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance as required. See Fortna, 769 F.3d at
250.
And the defendant’s potential for compliance with release conditions is
relevant to the detention inquiry, and the Court can consider whether it believes the
defendant will abide by its conditions when making the release determination in the
first instance under 18 U.S.C. § 3142. See Munchel, 991 F.3d at 1280-81. But
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detention under 18 U.S.C. § 3142 cannot be based only on a finding that the defendant
is unlikely to comply with conditions of release absent the requisite finding of
dangerousness or risk of flight. See id. at 1283.
If the Court determines that the government has not met its burden to show
that detention is required based on the lack of reasonable assurance of either the
defendant’s appearance as required or the safety of others or the community, the
Court is required to order the defendant’s pretrial release on personal recognizance,
or on an unsecured appearance bond, subject to the condition that the defendant must
not commit a Federal, State, or local crime during the period of release and subject to
the condition that the defendant must cooperate in collecting a DNA sample if
required by federal statute – unless the Court determines that release on personal
recognizance or an unsecured appearance bond will not reasonably assure the
defendant’s appearance as required or will endanger the safety of any other person
or the community. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b); Byrd, 969 F.2d at 109.
If release under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) on personal recognizance or an unsecured
appearance bond will not reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance as required
or will endanger the safety of any other person or the community, the Court is
directed under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B) to release the defendant subject to the least
restrictive further condition or combination of conditions that the Court determines
will reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance as required and the safety of any
other person and the community. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B); accord Byrd, 969 F.2d
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at 108.
That is, “[i]f conditions of pretrial release are reasonably necessary to assure
the appearance of the defendant in court or to prevent endangering the safety of
others [or the community], then the court shall order the defendant released ‘subject
to the least restrictive further condition, or combination of conditions,’ to achieve
those goals.” United States v. Davis, No. 23-50917, 2024 WL 3372682, at *2 (5th Cir.
July 11, 2024) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)).
In setting conditions under Section 3142(c)(1), the Court’s task, then, is to
identify and impose the least restrictive combination of conditions that will
reasonably assure – not guarantee – the defendant’s appearance as required and the
safety of any other person and the community while the defendant is on release. See
Fortna, 769 F.2d at 250; United States v. Barker, No. 3:16-cr-516-D, 2017 WL 345643,
at *13 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 24, 2017). And, so, under Section 3142(c), conditions are not
“presumptively appropriate” just because “they would not cause a defendant harm or
injury” – rather, any condition of release must be “part of the least restrictive
combination of conditions that will reasonably assure [] defendants’ appearances as
required and the safety of any other person and the community while they are on
release pending trial.” Barker, 2017 WL 345643, at *15.
“The Bail Reform Act includes a non-exhaustive list” under 18 U.S.C. §
3142(c)(1)(B) “of additional conditions” that “may be imposed to assure appearance”
or the safety of other persons or the community and includes, as a catch-all, “any
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other condition that is reasonably necessary to assure the appearance of the person
as required and to assure the safety of any other person and the community.” 18
U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(i)-(xiv); United States v. Aziz, No. 21-40878, 2022 WL 1056102,
at *3 (5th Cir. Apr. 8, 2022).
And, under Section 3142(c)(1)(B)(xiv), courts do sometimes impose conditions
of pretrial release that attempt to prevent or reduce the risk that a defendant will
engage in similar or related criminal activities to those charged in the complaint or
indictment. See Barker, 2017 WL 345643, at *14. “This Court has imposed special
conditions precluding certain defendants indicted for preparing fraudulent tax
returns from preparing tax returns for others while on release and precluding certain
defendants charged with submitting fraudulent billing to federal health care
programs from billing to those programs while on release.” Id.
V. Standards for and application of Section 3142(g) factors
To make all these determinations under 18 U.S.C. § 3142 regarding possible
detention or release with or without conditions, the Court must consider the available
information concerning the 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) factors. See United States v. Flores,
53 F.4th 313, 315 (5th Cir. 2022); United States v. Green, 793 F. App’x 223, 225 (5th
Cir. 2019); Rueben, 974 F.2d at 586; Fassler v. United States, 858 F.2d 1016, 1018 n.4
(5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Parker, 848 F.2d 61, 62 (5th Cir. 1988); United States
v. Jackson, 845 F.2d 1262, 1264-66 (5th Cir. 1988); Westbrook, 780 F.2d at 1189.
But the Court is not required to expressly “address any specific conditions of
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release and why they would be inadequate.” Aziz, 2022 WL 1056102, at *3.
In this case, the Court has considered the testimony of the case agent, the
superseding indictment, Corral’s counsel’s proffers of character letters and of the
testimony of Corral’s sister and of Corral’s common-law wife, and the report of the
pretrial services officer, in light of the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) – including
the nature and circumstances of the charged offense; the apparent weight of the
evidence against Corral; Corral’s history and characteristics; whether Corral was, at
the time of the current offense or arrest, on probation, on parole, or on other release
pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of sentence for an offense under
federal, state, or local law; and the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person
or the community that would be posed by Corral’s release.
As to the Section 3142(g)(1) factor – “the nature and circumstances of the
offense charged” – the Fifth Circuit has credited district courts’ emphasizing “the
amount of drugs involved in [a] case and the fact that [a defendant] faced a lengthy
punishment.” Flores, 53 F.4th at 315.
As to the Section 3142(g)(2) factor – “the weight of the evidence against the
person” – the Fifth Circuit has held that “[t]he government’s introduction of extrinsic
incriminatory evidence … is a required feature of the government’s proof,” and all the
more so where the government invokes the Section 3142(e)(3) rebuttable
presumption. See Jackson, 845 F.2d at 1264-66.
And the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has offered
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reasoning that explains how this factor plays into a decision on whether to release or
detain a defendant.
The Court of Appeals recently explained that a district court properly
considered this factor “in determining that there was significant evidence that [a
defendant] had in fact committed the charged murder” and that the proffered witness
testimony and other evidence all “formed a strong case against him”; that, “[i]n
making a predictive assessment of the defendant’s future dangerousness if released
into the community, common sense and § 3142(g)(2) aligned with the district court’s
consideration of the strength of this evidence, especially coupled with the nature of
the charged offense”; and that “[i]t stands to reason that the more strongly the
evidence indicated that the defendant committed the murder, the more likely he
poses a danger to the community if released on bail.” United States v. Zhang, 55 F.4th
141, 150 (2d Cir. 2022) (cleaned up).
And, as to risk of flight, the Second Circuit observed that, just as (relevant to
the Section 3142(g)(1) factor) “[t]he prospect of a severe sentence can create a strong
incentive for a defendant to flee and thereby avoid that sentence,” where “the
evidence against a defendant is strong, it follows that the defendant faces an elevated
risk of conviction (and of the attendant punishment), and therefore may present an
elevated risk of flight.” Id. at 151.
As to the Section 3142(g)(3)(A) factor – “the history and characteristics of the
person, including [] the person’s character, physical and mental condition, family ties,
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employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community, community
ties, past conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal history, and
record concerning appearance at court proceedings” – the Fifth Circuit has recently
affirmed a detention order where, even where a defendant “presented evidence of his
family connections, work history, lack of prior felonies, past compliance with bond
conditions, and insufficient resources to flee,” “the record also shows that [the
defendant] previously used and distributed drugs under his parents’ roof” and “used
drugs on a weekly basis and committed the instant charged offenses while on state
probation.” Flores, 53 F.4th at 315-16.
And, as to danger to the community, the Fifth Circuit has held that the
government met its burden as to detention where it “presented substantial evidence
to show that [the defendants] have continuously engaged in the trafficking of drugs
for several years, including while being on parole or shortly after being released from
parole” and where the defendants “presented absolutely no evidence whatsoever to
indicate that they will not continue to engage in drug trafficking if released on bail
pending trial.” Rueben, 974 F.2d at 587.
As to the Section 3142(g)(3)(B) factor – “the history and characteristics of the
person, including … whether, at the time of the current offense or arrest, the person
was on probation, on parole, or on other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or
completion of sentence for an offense under Federal, State, or local law” – the Fifth
Circuit has affirmed that a district court is “allowed to consider the fact that [a
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defendant] was arrested while on parole from the state law conviction.” United States
v. Barker, 876 F.2d 475, 476 (5th Cir. 1989).
And the Section 3142(g)(4) factor – “the nature and seriousness of the danger
to any person or the community that would be posed by the person’s release” –
“applies when detention is premised on risk to the community.” Aziz, 2022 WL
1056102, at *3 n.1.
But the Section 3142(g) factors do not direct the Court to weigh whether a
defendant is subject to a so-called ICE detainer and whether Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) officials intend to initiate removal proceedings if the
defendant is released on conditions in his criminal case.
As the Court explained at the hearing, the Court believes it is not proper to
rely on what a federal agency may do pending trial to remove a defendant –
involuntarily from the defendant’s perspective – if the defendant is released under
Section 3142 as a basis for finding that no combination of conditions could be set to
reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance as required.
Under the Bail Reform Act, on the government’s attorney’s motion or on the
Court’s own motion, detention may be requested “in a case, that involves – (A) a
serious risk that [the defendant] will flee.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2). “If, after a hearing
pursuant to the provisions of [18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)], the judicial officer finds that no
condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the
person as required and the safety of any other person and the community, such
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judicial officer shall order the detention of the person before trial.” 18 U.S.C. §
3142(e)(1).
Section 3142(f)(2)’s preliminary requirement for holding a detention hearing
suggests that a defendant must himself present a serious risk of, through his own
volition, failing to appear or – in the words of the statute – “fleeing,” and, in context,
the better reading of Section 3142(e)(1)’s phrase “no condition or combination of
conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required” appears
to be that the statute directs the Court to decide whether conditions can be set to
address any risk that a defendant will, through his own volition or of his own accord,
fail to appear, not whether a government agency will make it impossible for him to
appear. The Bail Reform Act, after all, does not suggest that Section 3142 conditions
of release should or could be addressed to or imposed on independent federal agencies.
And the Fifth Circuit has pointed only to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(d) as “a limitation
on the district court’s authority to release an alien-defendant pursuant to the” Bail
Reform Act. Baltazar-Sebastian, 990 F.3d at 945. While holding that “the United
States Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Agency (ICE) may, under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101
et seq., civilly detain a criminal defendant after she has been granted pretrial release
pursuant to the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3141 et seq.,” the Court of Appeals made
clear that “[n]othing in the text of the BRA or INA evinces any order of precedence
between the statutes.” Id. at 941-45.
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And the Fifth Circuit’s entire analysis would make little sense if an ICE
detainer – which was lodged in that case before the defendant was released under the
Bail Reform Act – precluded a court from determining, after the usual Section 3142
analysis that applies to any criminal defendant, that the defendant should be
released under Section 3142(b) or 3142(c). See id.; accord United States v.
Somkongmany, No. 3:23-CR-00029-29, 2024 WL 1531414, at *3-*4 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 8,
2024).
In this case, the evidence as presented or proffered at the detention hearing
shows that, among other things,
• Corral is facing a statutory maximum sentence of life on the conspiracy charge;
• the government originally turned its investigation to Corral while it was
investigating his son (who is not indicted here) for drug trafficking;
• the government has compiled substantial evidence of Corral’s engaging in
cocaine trafficking at kilogram quantities, including with co-conspirators in
other districts, as well as possibly trafficking firearms to Mexico, and that
evidence includes conversations (including using coded language) intercepted
on wiretaps of multiple phones that Corral used and dropped when a contact
was either arrested or Corral became suspicious of a contact;
• Corral has been a legal permanent resident for decades and has family in
North Texas and also in Weslaco, Texas and in Mexico;
• Corral has caused moneys to be transferred to contacts in Mexico in amounts
that the government contends cannot be easily tied to any legitimate sources
of income;
• Corral was arrested on July 28, 2025 and charged with a state drug offense
involving 1 kilogram of cocaine seized from his car during a traffic stop and has
been on release on a state bond since that time;
• during the execution, after that arrest, of a search warrant on the home that
Corral shares with his common-law wife, 18 firearms were seized, which were
mostly long-barrel hunting rifles or shotguns and 2 of which were discovered
to have been reported as stolen;
• no cocaine or drug proceeds were discovered in Corral’s house;
• the house and the mortgage on it are not in Corral’s name;
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• in a recorded jail call, Corral asked his sister to move the firearms, but she
reported to him that they had already been seized;
• Corral has relatively minimal criminal history, including a drug charge in 1993
that was dismissed in 2011 after deferred adjudication and a 2009 failure to
identify charge for which he served 8 days in jail;
• Corral is facing 5 to 99 years imprisonment on the related pending state drug
charge for which he has been on bond since July 2025;
• Corral has no employment history reported to the Texas Workforce
Commission but reportedly works in horse training and may own a horse;
• Corral traveled to and back from Mexico more than 10 times in each of 2023
and 2024 and then again in early 2026, and has a passport that can be
surrendered; and
• the government has no evidence of Corral’s engaging in any drug trafficking or
illegal firearm activity after his arrest on July 28, 2025.
The Court finds that Corral has presented evidence to rebut the Section
3145(e)(3) presumption based on his family in the area in which he is a long-time
resident, including in the house to which he can return to live with his common-law
wife; Corral’s returning from travel to South Texas and to Mexico even while on bond
for a serious, related state drug charge; and his compliance with his bond conditions
for over 6 months on that charge.
The identified and articulable – and future or ongoing – threat to the
community to which the government points is the danger that Corral will, while on
release, engage in drug trafficking or possess stolen firearms or engage in firearm
trafficking.
The risk of nonappearance to which the government points is that Corral will
flee to Mexico because he is facing significant prison time and the prospect, if
convicted, of being stripped of his legal permanent resident status and being deported
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and barred from ever legally returning to the United States.
As outlined above, the weight of the evidence against Corral appears to be
strong as to his alleged drug trafficking involving kilogram quantities of cocaine and
the use of multiple phones and coded language used with multiple co-conspirators in
or with contacts in South Texas and Mexico – up to July 28, 2025.
As to the Section 3142(g)(4) factor – “the nature and seriousness of the danger
to any person or the community that would be posed by the person’s release” – the
Fifth Circuit has recently explained that a “district court correctly recognized our
precedent holding ‘that the risk of continued narcotics trafficking on bail does
constitute a risk to the community,” where the defendant “was involved in trafficking
a significant quantity of drugs and previously committed other drug offenses.” Flores,
53 F.4th at 315 (quoting Rueben, 974 F.2d at 586).
But there is no evidence that Corral has engaged in drug or firearms trafficking
since his arrest on July 28, 2025. There is no evidence of any bond violations, and the
government’s counsel explained that the government does not know if Corral has
continued to engage in criminal activity but has no evidence that he has.
Corral’s criminal history includes no evidence of failing to appear or report as
required, either previously or on the related state charge for which he was arrested
in late July 2025.
Corral can return to live with his common-law wife in a house in which there
are no longer any firearms, after law enforcement seized all the (primarily, at least)
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hunting rifles and shotguns, and in which law enforcement found no cocaine or drug
proceeds. And the Court can, and often does, impose a special condition of pretrial
release that prohibits a defendant from possessing any firearm. See 18 U.S.C. §
3142(c)(1)(B)(viii).
Corral has been facing the exposure to significant prison time on the July 2025
related state charge, with the same risk of stripping his legal permanent resident
status and deportation. And yet he has been, according to the evidence before the
Court, compliant with his bond conditions on release and has returned from Mexico
each time he has crossed the border in the last few months.
For the reasons explained above, the possibility that, as the government’s
counsel briefly argued at the hearing, ICE could impose a detainer based on one of
those crossings into or from Mexico is not a proper consideration, and the Court in
any event would, at this point, prohibit Corral from leaving the district, much less
traveling to Mexico, while on release.
On these facts, the Court does not find that it is more likely than not that no
condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the defendant’s
appearance as required. And the particular facts in this case do not support a firm
belief or conviction that the Court cannot be reasonably assured that Corral will not
possess (or traffic) any firearm or engaging in drug trafficking while on release going
forward – particularly where the only evidence before the Court regarding Corral’s
conduct after his July 28, 2025 arrest is that he has complied with his bond
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conditions.
Corral’s asking his sister to remove firearms from his home after his arrest
might weigh against the Court’s being convinced that Corral will comply with
conditions of release. But the Court’s task is to consider if it can set a combination of
conditions that will reasonably assure – not guarantee – the safety of the community
and Corral’s appearance on required if he is released. And Corral’s ill-advised request
to his sister does not convince the Court that he is unlikely to abide by the Court’s
condition that not possess any firearm or, for that matter, any other condition that
the Court should impose as part of the least restrictive combination of conditions that
will reasonably assure Corral’s appearance as required and the safety of any other
person and the community while Corral is on release.
Under these circumstances and considering all of the available information in
light of the Section 3142(g) factors, the Court finds that Corral has rebutted the
Section 3143(e)(3) presumption and that the government has not established by clear
and convincing evidence that there is no condition or combination of conditions that
will reasonably assure the safety of the community if Corral is released or by a
preponderance of the evidence that there is no combination of conditions that could
be set to reasonably assure Corral’s appearance as required.
The Court determines, under Section 3142(c)(1), that a combination of
conditions requiring Corral to report to and be supervised by Pretrial Services,
surrender his passport, not obtain other international travel document, and restrict
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his travel to this district; prohibiting Corral from possessing any firearm and using
or unlawful possessing any narcotic drug or other controlled substances (as defined
by federal law) or having contact with any witnesses or co-defendants; requiring
Corral to submit to testing for prohibited substance use; requiring Corral to report
any further contact with law enforcement; and requiring Corral to submit to home
detention enforced by electronic location monitoring amount to the least restrictive
combination of conditions that will reasonably assure Corral’s appearance as required
and the safety of any other person and the community while Corral is on release. See
18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(iv), (v), (vi), (viii), (ix), (xiv).
For these reasons, and as the Court explained on the record at the end of the
detention hearing, the Court denied the government’s motion for detention and
ordered that Defendant Cipriano Perez Corral be released under 18 U.S.C. §
3142(c)(1) pending trial subject to the conditions in the Court’s Order Setting
Conditions of Release that was separately entered in this case but that was, by its
own terms, stayed as explained above.
SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 9, 2026
_________________________________________
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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