Taplin et al v. Wagner et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
MICHAEL JERMAINE TAPLIN and
NOVA-LEE MARIE GRABER,
Plaintiffs,
v.
HOLLY WAGNER, JEFFEREY YOUNG,
GARY LEWIS, and PANTHER
PREMIUM LOGISTICS
Defendants.
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Case No. 3:24-cv-03208-E-BT
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiffs Michael Jermain Taplin and Nova-Lee Marie Graber drove for
Defendant Panther Premium Logistics (Panther), a trucking company, until their
contract was terminated in December 2022, after Panther concluded that Taplin
failed to report on time for a scheduled drug test. See generally Compl. (ECF No.
3); Mot. (ECF No. 10). Plaintiffs filed EEOC discrimination charges against
Panther, and the EEOC issued Plaintiffs right-to-sue letters on July 19 and 26,
2024. Mot. App’x C, D (ECF No. 1o-1). Plaintiffs then filed this lawsuit on
December 20, 2024, asserting claims against Panther, as well as Panther
employees Holly Wagner, Jefferey Young, and Gary Lewis (the “individual
Defendants”). Liberally construed, Plaintiffs sue Defendants for unlawful
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termination, defamation, and for violating the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Regulations (FMCSRs). See Compl. at 1–10 (ECF No. 3).
In response, Defendants move to dismiss arguing, among other things, that
(1) this Court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over the individual Defendants,
(2) Plaintiffs’ employment discrimination and defamation claims are barred by
limitations, and (3) the FMCSRs do not provide Plaintiffs a private right of action.
See Mot. at 2 (ECF No. 10).
As explained below, the District Judge should GRANT Defendants’ Motion.
I. Plaintiffs have not established that this Court can exercise personal
jurisdiction over the individual Defendants.
In a federal question case,1 the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause fixes
the limits of the Court’s personal jurisdiction. Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie
des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982). Due process is satisfied when a
court finds that a defendant has “minimum contacts” with the forum state such
that exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant would not offend
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” See Latshaw v. Johnston,
167 F.3d 208, 211 (5th Cir. 1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
A defendant gains the requisite minimum contacts by conduct that gives rise to
either general or specific jurisdiction. Panda Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Elec.
Power Co., 253 F.3d 865, 867–68 (5th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
1 Liberally construed, Plaintiffs’ complaint appears to assert claims arising under
federal law.
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General jurisdiction exists over a person in the state where she is domiciled.
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011).
Specific jurisdiction exists when (1) the defendant has minimum contacts with the
forum state; (2) the plaintiff’s cause of action arises out of or results from the
defendant’s forum-related contacts; and (3) the exercise of personal jurisdiction is
fair and reasonable.” See Libersat v. Sundance Energy, Inc., 978 F.3d 315, 318–19
(5th Cir. 2020) (citing Seiferth v. Helicopteros Atuneros, Inc., 472 F.3d 266, 271
(5th Cir. 2006)).
These minimum contacts must be substantial enough that the defendant
“should have reasonably anticipated being haled into a [court in the forum state].”
Mullins v. TestAmerica, Inc., 564 F.3d 386, 402 (5th Cir. 2009). Put another way,
a defendant only has the requisite minimum contacts if she “purposefully avail[ed]
[herself] of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Sayers Constr., L.L.C. v.
Timberline Constr., Inc., 976 F.3d 570, 573 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, (1958)). This “purposeful availment” requirement
protects a defendant from being summoned to a forum where she has only
“random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Ultimately,
the defendant must have a “substantial connection” for a court to exercise specific
personal jurisdiction. Jones v. Petty-Ray Geophysical Geosource, Inc., 954 F.2d
1061, 1068 n.9 (5th Cir. 1992).
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“When a nonresident defendant presents a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that in
personam jurisdiction exists.” Dynamo v. Warehouse of Vending & Games, 168 F.
Supp. 2d 616, (N.D. Tex. 2001) (McBryde, J.) (citing Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644,
648 (5th Cir. 1994), Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1192 (5th Cir. 1985); D.J.
Invs., Inc. v. Metzeler Motorcycle Tire Agent Gregg Inc., 754 F.2d 542, 545–46
(5th Cir. 1985)). Where, as here, the Court resolves questions of personal
jurisdiction without holding an evidentiary hearing, Plaintiffs need only establish
a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Clemens v. McNamee, 615
F.3d 374, 378 (5th Cir. 2010). The court may resolve a jurisdictional issue by
reviewing pleadings, affidavits, interrogatories, depositions, oral testimony,
exhibits, any part of the record, and any combination thereof. Stuart, 772 F.2d at
1192. Allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint are taken as true unless they are
contradicted by the defendant’s affidavits. Wyatt v. Kaplan, 686 F.2d 276, 282
n.13 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing Black v. Acme Markets, Inc., 564 F.2d 681, 683 n.3 (5th
Cir. 1977)). Any genuine, material conflicts between the facts established by the
parties’ affidavits and other evidence are resolved in favor of the plaintiff in
determining whether a prima facie case exists. Bullion v. Gillespie, 895 F.2d 213,
217 (5th Cir. 1990).
Here, Plaintiffs’ initial pleading wholly fails to establish this Court’s personal
jurisdiction over any of the individual Defendants. Plaintiffs have not shown that
any individual Defendant is domiciled in Texas. Indeed, the returns of service
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Plaintiffs filed reveal that the individual Defendants were personally served in
Ohio. See ECF Nos. 6, 7, 8. Nor have Plaintiffs alleged any facts showing that any
of the individual Defendants have “purposefully availed themselves” of this forum.
See Sayers Constr., L.L.C., 976 F.3d at 573.
In their Response to the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs argue that the Court
has personal jurisdiction over Wagner and Young based on email communications
to and about Plaintiffs. See Resp. at 2 (ECF No. 12). But these communications,
standing alone, do not permit the Court to exercise personal jurisdiction. See
Manchester Tex. Fin. Grp., LLC v. Badame, No. A-19-CV-00009-LY, 2019 WL
4228370, at *11 (W.D. Tex. 2019) (“Sending a Texas resident a few emails related
to a contract is not sufficient to establish the requisite minimum contacts to confer
personal jurisdiction over [plaintiff] in this case.”) (citing Marathon Oil Co. v. A.G.
Ruhrgas, 182 F.3d 291, 295 (5th Cir. 1999)); see also Lea v. McGue, No. 4:20-CV-
00483, 2020 WL 5642320, at *4 (E.D. Tex. 2020) (“[T]he Court is not willing to
find a single communication to be sufficient to subject a nonresident to personal
jurisdiction in Texas.”); Fogarty v. USA Truck, Inc., No. 3:05-CV-1783-M, 2005
WL 3982061, at *5 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (“Even if [Defendant] directed multiple pieces
of correspondence to Plaintiff in Texas, correspondence alone is an insufficient
basis for specific jurisdiction.”).
Plaintiffs also argue that Lewis contacted them via phone and email about
scheduling drug tests and created the “termination letter.” See Resp. at 4 (ECF No.
12). But as discussed, communicating with a forum resident is, by itself, an
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insufficient basis to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs also
acknowledge that the “termination letter” was not sent to them but was instead
“posted . . . onto the Clearinghouse website . . . which was how Plaintiff Taplin had
obtained it.” See id.
On this record, the District Judge should find that Plaintiffs have failed to
establish the Court can exercise personal jurisdiction over the individual
Defendants and dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against those Defendants without
prejudice.2 See, e.g., Am. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Hamilton Lane Advisors, Inc., 115
F.App’x 662, 666 (5th Cir. 2004) (dismissal for want of personal jurisdiction
should be without prejudice).
II. Plaintiffs have failed to state a plausible claim against Panther.
To survive dismissal, Plaintiffs’ complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter to state a plausible claim for relief on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “To be plausible, the complaint’s ‘[f]actual allegations
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” In re Great
2 Almost two months after Plaintiffs responded to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,
and over a month after Defendants Replied, Plaintiffs filed an “Objection to
Defendants Personal Jurisdiction Challenge.” See ECF No. 16. The Court liberally
construes this filing as a surreply to the Motion to Dismiss. But neither the local
rules of this court nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow a party to file a
surreply as a matter of right. And the Fifth Circuit has stated that “surreplies are
‘heavily disfavored.’” Butler v. S. Porter, 999 F.3d 287, 297 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting
RedHawk Holdings Corp. v. Schreiber Tr. ex rel. Schreiber Living Tr., 836 F.
App’x 232, 235 (5th Cir. 2020)). Even so, given Plaintiffs’ pro se status, the Court
has considered Plaintiffs’ surreply, ECF No. 16, in making this recommendation.
But Plaintiffs’ surreply fails to argue or identify any additional basis for this Court
to exercise personal jurisdiction over the individual defendants. See id.
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Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. LLC, 624 F.3d 201, 210 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
This pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations,” but it
does demand more than an unadorned accusation devoid of factual support.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). “While legal conclusions
can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual
allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. When the facts do not permit the Court to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has stopped short of
showing that the plaintiff is plausibly entitled to relief. Id. at 679.
When applying the plausibility standard, the Court “accepts all well-pleaded
facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” In re
Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). But a court may not look beyond the
pleadings “to determine whether relief should be granted based on the alleged
facts.” Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999). Review is “limited to
the complaint, any documents attached to the complaint, and any documents
attached to the [motion to dismiss] that are central to the claim and referenced by
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the complaint.” Smith v. Buffalo Wild Wings, No. 3:20-CV-2875-D, 2021 WL
4265849, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 20, 2021) (Fitzwater, J.) (quoting Lone Star Fund
V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010)).
Courts generally hold pro se complaints to “less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d
376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Miller v.
Stanmore, 636 F.2d 986, 988 (5th Cir. 1981)). But “despite [the] general
willingness to construe pro se filings liberally,” courts “still require pro se parties
to fundamentally abide by the rules that govern the federal courts.” See, e.g.,
E.E.O.C. v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 484 (5th Cir. 2014), as revised (Sept. 18,
2014) (cleaned up). Thus, a pro se plaintiff is not excused from the requirements
to “properly plead sufficient facts that, when liberally construed, state a plausible
claim to relief[.]” Id. (citations omitted).
A. Plaintiff’s employment discrimination and defamation claims are time-
barred.
Liberally construed, Plaintiffs’ complaint appears to assert claims for
employment discrimination and retaliation under Title VII. See Compl. at 1
(“[Petitioners’] filed a charge of discrimination with the . . . EEOC.”); see also Mot.
App’x 001–018, EEOC Charges and Determination Letters (ECF No. 10-1). Panther
moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ purported Title VII claims under Rule 12(b)(6). Mot. at
2 (ECF No. 10). In response, Plaintiffs abandon their Title VII claims, asserting
that they “did not file [a] lawsuit over discrimination on the basis of race and sex[.]”
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See Obj. at 1 (ECF No. 12); see also, e.g., Hernandez v. City of Grand Prairie, Tex.,
2017 WL 4098596, at *13 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 15, 2017) (Lindsay, J.) (a plaintiff who
fails to defend or pursue a claim in response to a motion to dismiss has abandoned
that claim).
Even if Plaintiffs have not abandoned their claims under Title VII, such
claims should be dismissed. First, to plead a discrimination claim under Title VII
a plaintiff must allege facts plausibly showing: “(1) an adverse employment action,
(2) taken against a plaintiff because of her protected status.” Harrison v.
Brookhaven Sch. Dist., 82 F.4th 427, 430 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Hamilton v.
Dallas Cnty., 79 F.4th 494, 502 (5th Cir. 2023)). And to state a retaliation claim
under Title VII, a plaintiff must plead facts to show: (1) she engaged in a protected
activity, (2) a materially adverse employment action occurred, and (3) there is a
causal link connecting the protected activity to the adverse employment action.
Cuellar v. Sw. Gen. Emergency Physicians, P.L.L.C., 656 F. App’x 707, 709 (5th
Cir. 2016) (quoting Roberson v. Alltel Info. Servs., 373 F.3d 647, 655 (5th Cir.
2004)). But Plaintiffs allege no facts showing that their termination was because
of any protected status. Nor do they allege that they engaged in a protected activity,
or that they were fired because they engaged in that protected activity. Thus,
Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for relief.
Furthermore, limitations is generally an affirmative defense on which a
defendant bears the burden of proof. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1) (“In responding to a
pleading, a party must affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense,
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including ... statute of limitations[.]”). Nonetheless, a statute of limitations defense
may support dismissal when it is evident from a plaintiff’s pleadings that the action
is time-barred and the pleadings fail to set forth or raise some basis for tolling the
statute. Jones v. Alcoa, Inc., 339 F.3d 359, 366 (5th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
In this case, the EEOC issued right-to-sue letters to Taplin and Graber on
July 19, 2024, and July 26, 2024, respectively. See Mot. App’x C, D (ECF No. 10-
1). Those notices expressly stated that any lawsuit based on their EEOC charge
“must be filed within 90 days of the receipt of [the] notice.” Id. Plaintiffs do not
allege when they received the EEOC letters or that they received these letters and
filed suit within the 90-day window. But “[w]hen the date on which a right-to-sue
letter was actually received is either unknown or disputed . . . the maximum
number of days that court[s] have allowed under the presumption of receipt
doctrine” is seven days. Taylor, 296 F.3d at 379–80. Presuming that Plaintiffs
received their EEOC letters seven days after they were issued, Taplin needed to file
suit by October 17, 2024, and Graber needed to file suit by October 24, 2024.
Plaintiffs did not file their lawsuit until December 20, 2024— about two months
too late. Thus, any claims related to their EEOC charges are untimely, and the
District Judge should dismiss with prejudice any Title VII claim against Panther.
Plaintiffs’ Complaint also appears to assert a defamation claim against
Panther. But, except for the title, the Complaint contains no discussion of
defamation. See generally Compl. (ECF No. 3). Liberally construed, it appears
Plaintiffs may be asserting that Panther’s communication to the Federal Motor
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Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) regarding Plaintiff Taplin’s failure to
report for drug testing was defamatory. Defamation is a tort claim under Texas
law.3 See WFAA-TV, Inc. v. McLemore, 978 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Tex. 1998). Relevant
here, Texas has a one-year statute of limitations for defamation claims. See Tex.
Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.002(a) (providing a one-year limitations period for
“libel” and “slander,” the two forms of defamation). According to the documents
attached to the Complaint, any “statement” Defendants made to the FMCSA
regarding Plaintiffs’ failure to appear occurred in December 2022. See ECF No. 3
Page ID 32, Taplin’s Resp. to EEOC Position Statement (providing a “screenshot”
from “DOT Clearinghouse” showing that Panther reported Taplin’s failure to
appear to the FMCSA on “12/29/2022 8:01:02 AM”). Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit
on December 20, 2024, almost a year after limitations ran, and Plaintiffs plead no
basis for tolling limitations. Accordingly, the District Judge should dismiss with
prejudice any claim for defamation against Panther.
B. The FMCSRs do not provide a private right of action.
Plaintiffs allege that Panther violated the “Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Regulations parts 40 & 382,” and the Complaint references various FMCSRs
throughout. See Compl. 2–4 (ECF No.3). The Court liberally construes these
3 “To maintain a defamation cause of action, the plaintiff must prove that the
defendant: (1) published a statement; (2) that was defamatory concerning the
plaintiff; (3) while acting with either actual malice, if the plaintiff was a public
official or public figure, or negligence, if the plaintiff was a private individual,
regarding the truth of the statement.” WFAA-TV, Inc. v. McLemore, 978 S.W.2d
568, 571 (Tex. 1998).
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allegations as an attempt to assert causes of action against Panther under the
FMCSRs.
The Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999 created the Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), codified at 49 U.S.C.A. § 113, which
then promulgated the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSRs). The
Fifth Circuit has never held that the FMCSRs provide a private right of action.
And most courts—including this one—have held that a private right of action does
not exist under the FMCSRs. See Thompson v. Intermodal Cartage Co., LLC, No.
2:24-CV-34-KS-MTP, 2025 WL 699355, at *3 n.3 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 4, 2025);
Brown v. Powers, No. 2:24-CV-00004-HEA, 2024 WL 4370845, at *3 (E.D. Mo.
Oct. 2, 2024); Khnanisho v. S. Mail Serv., Inc., No. 3:22-CV-02791-N-BT, 2024
WL 3207032, at *4 (N.D. Tex. June 20, 2024) (Rutherford, J.), rec. adopted, 2024
WL 3585600 (N.D. Tex. July 30, 2024) (Godbey, C.J.); Fuller v. Werner Ent., Inc.,
No. 3:16-CV-2958-BK, 2018 WL 3548886, at *4 (N.D. Tex. July 24, 2018);
Lipscomb v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. 11-2555, 2012 WL 1902595, at *1–2 (E.D. La.
May 25, 2012); Hall v. Chang Soo Kang, No. CIV-16-1101-HE, 2017 WL 2414916,
at *3 (W.D. Okla. June 1, 2017) (“Those [enforcement] mechanisms [in the
FMCSRs] do not appear to include a private right of action . . . and the weight of
authority suggests that Congress did not intend to authorize a private right of
action based on claimed violations of the FMCSRs.”). Thus, the District Judge
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should dismiss with prejudice Plaintiffs’ claims based on an alleged violation of the
FMCSRs.4
Leave to Amend
The Fifth Circuit is inclined to give pro se plaintiffs several opportunities to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Scott v. Byrnes, No. 3:07-CV-
1975-D, 2008 WL 398314, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2008) (Fitzwater, C.J.); Sims
v. Tester, No. 3:00-CV-0863-D, 2001 WL 627600, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2001)
(Fitzwater, J.). Courts therefore typically allow pro se plaintiffs to amend their
complaints when the action is to be dismissed by a court order. See Robinette v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 3:96-CV-2923-D, 2004 WL
789870, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 12, 2004) (Fitzwater, J.); Sims, 2001 WL 627600, at
*2. A pro se plaintiff may also obtain leave to amend his complaint in response to
a recommended dismissal. See Swanson v. Aegis Commc’ns Grp., Inc., 2010 WL
26459, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2010); Scott, 2008 WL 398314, at *1.
But leave to amend is not automatic and may be refused where it would be
“futile.” See Morgan v. Chapman, 969 F.3d 238, 248 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Smith
4 After the Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 10, was fully briefed, Plaintiffs filed an
“Objection to Defendants’ Second Motion to Dismiss.” See ECF No. 15. Defendants
did not file a second motion to dismiss; instead, it appears that Plaintiffs’ filing is
another surreply to Defendants’ Motion, ECF No. 10. As explained in note 2, supra,
surreplies are not permitted by this District’s local rules or by the Federal Rules of
Procedure. And surreplies are “heavily disfavored” in this Circuit. See Note 2,
supra (citing Butler, 999 F.3d at 297). But, again, in light of Plaintiffs’ pro se status,
the Court has considered the surreply, ECF No. 15, in making this
recommendation. And, again, nothing in that surreply indicates that Plaintiffs can
state a claim against Panther or changes the recommended result. See id.
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v. EMC Corp., 393 F.3d 590, 595 (5th Cir. 2004)). “The court may deny leave to
amend . . . if the defects are incurable or the plaintiff[ ] ha[s] already alleged [his]
best case.” Pierce v. Hearne Indep. Sch. Dist., 600 F. App’x 194, 200 (5th Cir. 2015)
(per curiam) (citing Great Plains Tr. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co.,
313 F.3d 305, 329 (5th Cir. 2002); Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir.
1998) (per curiam)).
Here, the Court should not allow Plaintiffs to amend. Although Plaintiffs
have sought leave to amend, see Mot. (ECF No. 22), nothing in that motion
suggests that Plaintiffs can establish this Court can exercise personal jurisdiction
over any individual Defendant or that Plaintiffs can state a plausible claim against
Panther. And to the extent that Plaintiffs request leave to name an additional party
as a defendant, see Mot. (ECF No. 22), they fail to identify any plausible claim
against the proposed defendant. Thus, the Court should DENY Plaintiffs leave to
amend.
RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons stated, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the District
Judge GRANT Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 13) and DISMISS the
claims against Defendants Wagner, Young, and Lee without prejudice for lack of
personal jurisdiction and DISMISS the claims against Defendant Panther with
prejudice.
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SO RECOMMENDED.
February 24, 2026.
____________________________
REBECCA RUTHERFORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the
manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and
recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being
served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). To be specific,
an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which
objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination
is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the
briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written
objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal
conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district
court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Auto.
Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time to file objections to 14 days).
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