Avila v. Director, TDCJ-CID

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
JUAN FRANCISCO AVILA, 	§
TDCJ No. 02404445, 	§
§
Petitioner, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	No. 3:24-cv-02956-E-BW
§
DIRECTOR, TDCJ-CID, 	§
§
Respondent. 	§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court is the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in
State Custody, received on November 25, 2024. (Dkt. No. 3.) Based on the relevant
filings and applicable law, the Court should DENY the petition.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner Juan Francisco Avila is in custody pursuant to a Texas state-court
indictment and conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child. (Dkt. No. 17-1 at
15 (Indictment).) Following a jury trial, he was found guilty and sentenced to a term
of 75 years of imprisonment. Avila’s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal in
Avila v. State, No. 05-22-00727-CR, 2024 WL 445949 at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb.
6, 2024, pet. ref’d), and his subsequent application for state habeas relief was denied.
(Dkt. No. 17-17.)
Avila now seeks federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, asserting six
grounds for relief. Specifically, he contends that (1) he is actually innocent because
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there was no evidence presented at trial that supported his conviction; (2) trial
counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and prepare his
defense; (3) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call and subpoena certain
character witnesses; (4) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present a defense
and adequately advise him regarding a plea offer; (5) his rights under the
Confrontation Clause were violated; and (6) trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to object to alleged shackling during trial. (Dkt. No. 3 at 5-15.)
Avila contends that these alleged errors violated his constitutional rights, and
he seeks relief from his conviction and sentence. As discussed below, Avila is not
entitled to habeas relief on any of his claims.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
“Federal habeas features an intricate procedural blend of statutory and
caselaw authority.” Adekeye v. Davis, 938 F.3d 678, 682 (5th Cir. 2019). In the
district court, this process begins with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (AEDPA), under which “state prisoners face strict procedural
requirements and a high standard of review.” Id. (citation omitted). Under the
AEDPA, a state prisoner may not obtain federal habeas relief
with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State
court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
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(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
This standard “restricts the power of federal courts to grant writs of habeas
corpus” and ensures that “state courts play the leading role in assessing challenges to
state sentences based on federal law.” Shinn v. Kayer, 592 U.S. 111, 124 (2020). A
state court decision is “contrary” to clearly established federal law only if “it relies on
legal rules that directly conflict with prior holdings of the Supreme Court or if it
reaches a different conclusion than the Supreme Court on materially
indistinguishable facts.” Busby v. Dretke, 359 F.3d 708, 713 (5th Cir. 2004); see also
Lopez v. Smith, 574 U.S. 1, 2 (2014) (“We have emphasized, time and time again, that
the [AEDPA] prohibits the federal courts of appeals from relying on their own
precedent to conclude that a particular constitutional principle is ‘clearly
established.’” (citation omitted)). A decision involves an “unreasonable application”
of federal law when the state court “identifies the correct governing principle” but
“unreasonably applies that principle to the facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,
412-13 (2000).
Critically, the question is not whether the state court was incorrect, but
whether its decision was “so lacking in justification that there was an error well
understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded
disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). “If this standard is
difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be.” Id. at 102. Federal courts must
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“determine what arguments or theories supported . . . or could have supported the
state court’s decision” and then ask whether fair-minded jurists could disagree that
those arguments are inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent. Id.
Under this highly deferential standard, a petitioner must do more than show
the state court’s factual or legal conclusions were incorrect, he must show that they
were “objectively unreasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 409-10. As the Supreme
Court has explained, “a state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely
because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the
first instance” and that federal habeas relief is precluded even where the state court’s
factual determination is debatable. Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301, 303 (2010).
State court factual findings are “presumed to be correct” unless the petitioner can
rebut this presumption by “clear and convincing evidence.” Id. at 293.
This presumption applies not only to explicit findings of fact but also “to those
unarticulated findings which are necessary to the state court’s conclusions of mixed
law and fact.” Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 948 n.11 (5th Cir. 2001); see also Ford
v. Davis, 910 F.3d 232, 235 (5th Cir. 2018) (“As long as there is ‘some indication of
the legal basis for the state court’s denial of relief,’ the district court may infer the
state court’s factual findings even if they were not expressly made.” (footnotes
omitted)).
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III. ANALYSIS
A. 	Avila’s claim of actual innocence is procedurally defaulted. (Ground One)
Avila labels his first ground as “actual innocence,” but the substance of his
claim—that the victim’s testimony failed to corroborate the allegations in the
indictment and that no physical evidence supported the conviction—is still a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, not a freestanding actual innocence
claim. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Ex parte Williams, 703
S.W.2d 674, 679-80 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (treating a “no evidence” claim as an
insufficiency claim where the record is not wholly devoid of evidentiary support).
Because Avila attacks the evidence presented at trial rather than supplying new
evidence demonstrating factual innocence, his claim is properly analyzed as a
sufficiency challenge. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995) (distinguishing
actual innocence gateway claims, which require new evidence, from sufficiency
challenges).
That claim is procedurally defaulted and may not be entertained by this Court.
It is long settled under Texas law that the sufficiency of the evidence may only be
raised on direct appeal and is not cognizable in a state habeas proceeding. Ex parte
Grigsby, 137 S.W.3d 673, 674 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Ex parte Easter, 615 S.W.2d
719, 721 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); Ex parte McLain, 869 S.W.2d 349, 350 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1994). Avila did not raise a sufficiency challenge on direct appeal and instead
raised it for the first time in his state habeas application, where the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals declined to consider it on the merits. (See Dkt. No. 17-18 (State
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Writ); see also Dkt. No. 17-17 (Action Taken).) Because Texas courts consistently
refuse to entertain such claims in post-conviction proceedings, Avila has failed to
exhaust his state court remedies in a procedurally proper manner, and the claim is
procedurally defaulted in this Court. Renz v. Scott, 28 F.3d 431, 432 (5th Cir. 1994);
West v. Johnson, 92 F.3d 1385, 1398 n.18 (5th Cir. 1996).
Even so, a federal court may review a procedurally defaulted claim if the
petitioner demonstrates cause for the default and actual prejudice or establishes that
failure to consider the claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.1 (1991); see also Smith v. Director, TDCJ-
CID, No. 3:20-CV-2947-G (BT), 2022 WL 18359120, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 28,
2022) (neither a petitioner’s “pro se status” nor his “lack of legal training and
knowledge” constitutes cause to excuse default), rec. adopted, 2023 WL 289721 (N.D.
Tex. Jan. 18, 2023). Here, however, Avila has not identified any cause for his failure
to raise this claim on direct appeal, nor has he presented new reliable evidence of
actual innocence that would permit the Court to excuse the default under the narrow
miscarriage-of-justice exception. See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. Relief based on
Ground One should therefore be denied.
B. 	Avila’s claims of ineffective assistance by trial counsel do not meet the
Strickland standard. (Grounds Two, Three, Four, and Six)
When, as here, a petitioner claims ineffective assistance of counsel, that claim
is subject to both AEDPA’s deferential standard and the substantive framework
established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The result is a
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review that is “doubly deferential,” applying first to the state court’s adjudication of
the claim and second to counsel’s professional judgment. Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556
U.S. 111, 123 (2009); see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 190, 202 (2011)
(stating that a court’s review requires a “highly deferential” look at counsel’s
performance) (citation omitted)).
That “double deference” requires more than showing that counsel’s
performance was imperfect or that the outcome might have been different. Richter,
562 U.S. at 112 (“The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just
conceivable.”). And “even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court’s
contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Id. at 102. The petitioner must also prove
that he was prejudiced by his attorney’s substandard performance. See Strickland, 466
U.S. at 687, 692. “This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. at 687. The
trial counsel’s error must be “so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
‘counsel’ guaranteed ... by the Sixth Amendment.” Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100, 119
(2017) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).
To demonstrate prejudice, a habeas petitioner “must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. This means a
petitioner must overcome both the strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell
within the “wide range of reasonable professional assistance,” and that “under the
circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.”
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Richter, 562 U.S. at 105. Simply making conclusory allegations of deficient
performance and prejudice is not sufficient to meet the Strickland test. See Miller v.
Johnson, 200 F.3d 274, 282 (5th Cir. 2000).
As explained below, Avila’s claims do not meet the Strickland standard.
1. 	Ground Two: failure to investigate
Avila contends that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing
to conduct an independent investigation, hire an investigator, recover surveillance
footage from his apartment, retrieve his work schedule, consult an expert witness,
and call on Avila for his own version of the events. (See Dkt. No. 3 at 7.) He further
alleges that counsel advised him not to testify during the guilt/innocence phase
because counsel had failed to prepare him. These allegations, however, do not
satisfy either prong of Strickland.
The record contradicts Avila’s factual premises. It reflects that counsel
undertook investigative efforts. Counsel retained an investigator, J. Joplin, and
advised the trial court that he experienced difficulty locating witnesses. (Dkt. No.
17-6 at 10-11.) Counsel also requested appointment of a second chair to assist with
evidence gathering and witness location, a request the trial court denied. (See id. at
11.) These actions defeat any suggestion of wholesale failure to investigate. See
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (“Counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or
to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.”).
At most, Avila disputes the scope of that investigation, which without more, does
not establish deficient performance.
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To the extent Avila identifies specific evidence that counsel allegedly failed to
obtain, his allegations remain insufficient. A petitioner must do more than speculate
that additional investigation would have been helpful. He must identify what the
investigation would have revealed and explain specifically how it would have altered
the outcome of the trial. United States v. Green, 882 F.2d 999, 1003 (5th Cir. 1989).
Avila does not make that showing.
For example, Avila contends that surveillance footage from his apartment
would have demonstrated his innocence. But Avila testified that he personally
installed the cameras and remained out on bond for nearly three years prior to trial.
(Dkt. No. 17-9 at 47, 70.) Yet he does not identify any specific footage, describe its
contents with particularity, or explain how it would have been exculpatory. Nor
does he show that such evidence existed and was unavailable to him or counsel.
Absent such a showing, his claim rests on speculation and is insufficient to establish
deficient performance or prejudice. Green, 882 F.2d at 1003.
Similarly, Avila asserts that his work schedule would have demonstrated his
innocence, but he does not provide the records, identify specific dates or times, or
explain how such evidence would have altered the outcome of the trial. Without
such detail, the claim remains conclusory and does not establish prejudice under
Strickland.
Avila’s claim regarding expert consultation fares no better. Counsel is not
constitutionally required to consult an expert in every case, and there are “countless
ways to provide effective assistance in any given case.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 788-89
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(quotations omitted). Avila does not identify any expert, describe the substance of
any proposed testimony, or demonstrate how such testimony would have affected
the verdict.
As to Avila’s right to testify, the Constitution does guarantee a defendant the
right to take the stand on his own behalf. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 49-52 (1987).
But where, as here, the petitioner alleges that counsel, not the court, prevented him
from testifying, the proper vehicle his contention is an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim analyzed under Strickland. Sayre v. Anderson, 238 F.3d 631, 634 (5th
Cir. 2001). Avila offers only his own conclusory assertion, with no indication in the
record that he sought to testify or that counsel prevented him from doing so. He also
fails to identify what his testimony would have been or how it would have changed
the outcome. Notably, Avila did testify during the punishment phase, where he
denied the abuse. (Dkt. No. 17-9 at 44-75.) On this record, he has not demonstrated
prejudice.
In sum, Avila’s allegations identify potential avenues of investigation but do
not demonstrate that any such investigation would have produced evidence creating
a reasonable probability of a different result. That is insufficient under Strickland.
Ground Two is without merit.
2. 	Ground Three: failure to call and subpoena character witnesses
Avila next alleges counsel was ineffective for failing to call and subpoena
pastor Erick Jose Mejia Enamorado and Avila’s niece, Claudia Osiris Avila Castillo,
as character witnesses. (See Dkt. No. 3 at 8-9; see also Dkt. No. 4 at 14 (Brief in
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Support).) Avila submitted two affidavits in support of this claim: one from a
Claudia Lainez attesting generally to Avila’s good character, and one from his niece
Claudia Castillo attesting to her role in advising the family and noting Avila had no
history of problems with others. (Dkt. No. 4 at 146-48.) No affidavit from Pastor
Mejia was submitted.
Complaints about uncalled witnesses are disfavored in habeas proceedings
because witness presentation is a matter of trial strategy. Boyd v. Estelle, 661 F.2d
388, 390 (5th Cir. 1981). Where the only evidence of a missing witness’s testimony
comes from the petitioner, such claims must be viewed with great caution. Lockhart
v. McCotter, 782 F.2d 1275, 1282 (5th Cir. 1986). To demonstrate prejudice, the
petitioner “‘must show not only that the testimony would have been favorable but
also that the witness would have testified at trial.’” Evans v. Cockrell, 285 F.3d 370,
377 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Alexander v. McCotter, 775 F.2d 595, 602 (5th Cir. 1985).
“[S]peculations as to what [uncalled] witnesses would have testified is too
uncertain.” Alexander, 775 F.2d at 602.
Avila provided no affidavit from Pastor Mejia. Without evidence of what
Mejia would have said or that he would have testified, Avila cannot establish either
deficiency or prejudice. As to his niece, however, the affidavit provided amounts to
general character testimony. Such generalized assertions do not demonstrate a
reasonable probability of a different outcome, particularly where they do not address
the specific allegations at issue. Nor has Avila shown that this testimony would have
materially altered the evidentiary picture presented at trial. Moreover, Avila has not
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demonstrated that counsel’s decision to forego character witnesses was anything
other than reasoned trial strategy. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
To the extent Avila argues that the absence of these witnesses affected his
sentence, he likewise fails to demonstrate prejudice. See Daniel v. Cockrell, 283 F.3d
697, 699 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that unsupported allegations regarding additional
evidence do not establish Strickland prejudice). Avila faced a punishment range of 5
to 99 years and received a sentence of 75 years. The jury was presented with
testimony from multiple witnesses, including the complainant, a school counselor,
forensic services representatives, and the examining physician. (See Dkt. No. 17-7 at
51-53, 82, 86, 113, 133, 137-38; 17-8 at 11-31, 86-100.) Avila has not shown a
reasonable probability that the addition of general character testimony from two lay
witnesses would have resulted in a significantly lesser sentence. Ground Three is
without merit.
3. 	Ground Four: failure to present a defense and advise on plea
Avila also claims counsel was ineffective for failing to present a defense and
for failing to ensure that he understood the ten-year plea offer from the State. (Dkt.
No. 3 at 10.) He asserts, as an aside, that counsel failed to request a lesser-included-
offense instruction or argue for his innocence, attributing all these failures to
counsel’s preoccupation with his own and his family’s illness from COVID-19. (See
id.; see also Dkt. No. 4 at 15-17.)
On the plea issue, the Supreme Court holds that trial counsel must
communicate formal plea offers that may be favorable to the defendant, and that
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counsel may be deficient for permitting such an offer to lapse. Missouri v. Frye, 566
U.S. 134, 145 (2012). But to establish prejudice, a petitioner must demonstrate a
reasonable probability that he would have accepted the offer, that the prosecution
would not have withdrawn it, that the court would have accepted it, and that the end
result would have been more favorable. Id. at 147. Avila has not made this showing.
The record contains no indication that Avila communicated any confusion
about the offer to counsel or the court during the pretrial hearing where the offer was
discussed. (Dkt. No. 17-6 at 21.) Moreover, Avila had the benefit of both an
interpreter and bilingual trial counsel, (Dkt. No. 17-9 at 50), eliminating any
suggestion of a language barrier as a source of prejudice. His allegations regarding
the plea are therefore conclusory and unsupported by any evidence in the record. See
Ross v. Estelle, 694 F.2d 1008, 1011 (5th Cir. 1983); Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63,
74 (1977) (emphasizing that solemn declarations made by a defendant in open court
during a plea hearing carry a “strong presumption of verity,” and any subsequent
allegations that lack specific factual support are subject to summary dismissal).
Avila’s assertion that counsel failed to present a defense, including his claim
that counsel’s performance was impaired by illness, is likewise unsupported. Avila
identifies no specific deficiency in counsel’s trial performance beyond conclusory
allegations. Such assertions do not establish deficient performance under Strickland.
See Schlang v. Heard, 691 F.2d 796, 799 (5th Cir. 1982) (“Mere conclusory statements
do not raise a constitutional issue in a habeas case.”).
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Finally, Avila argues that counsel failed to request a lesser-included-offense
instruction. Under Texas law, this instruction is required only if the evidence would
permit a rational jury to find that the defendant is guilty only of the lesser offense.
Guzman v. State, 188 S.W.3d 185, 188 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Avila has not shown
that the evidence supported such an instruction. Accordingly, he cannot
demonstrate that counsel performed deficiently in failing to request this instruction
or that the outcome would have been different. Kinnamon v. Scott, 33 F.3d 462, 464-
65 (5th Cir. 1994). Ground Four is without merit.
4. 	Ground Six: failure to object to shackling
Avila alleges that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to his restraint in
iron shackles throughout trial, including when he testified before the jury during the
punishment phase, despite having no prior criminal history and no court finding of
necessity for restraints. (Dkt. No. 3 at 15.) This claim fails.
The Constitution prohibits the routine use of visible restraints absent a case-
specific justification. See Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 626-29 (2005) (holding that
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the use of physical restraints visible
to the jury absent a trial court determination, in the exercise of its discretion, that
they are justified by a specific state interest). But Avila has not established that any
such constitutional violation occurred. Avila himself acknowledges that during the
guilt/innocence phase he sat at counsel’s table with his restraints concealed. (Dkt.
No. 4 at 19.)
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As to the punishment phase, Avila provides no evidence that he was visibly
shackled before the jury. He offers no witness account, no photograph, and no other
objective indication that restraints were used in a manner observable to jurors.
Unsupported allegations are insufficient to establish deficient performance. See
Ochoa v. Davis, 750 F. App’x 365, 371 (5th Cir. 2018) (“[U]nsupported allegations
and pleas for presumptive prejudice are not the stuff that Strickland is made of.”)
Because Avila has not shown that visible shackling occurred, he cannot
demonstrate that counsel performed deficiently in failing to object. Nor has he
shown prejudice. Even assuming some form of restraint was used, Avila does not
establish that the jury saw it or that it affected the outcome of the proceeding.
Absent such a showing, he fails to demonstrate a reasonable probability of a different
result. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
Here, the state court’s denial of this claim was reasonable, and Ground Six is
without merit.
C. 	Avila’s Confrontation Clause claim does not establish a violation of clearly
established federal law. (Ground Five)
Avila contends that admission of the expert testimony of Dr. Elena Doskey de
Lobon violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation because Dr. Doskey
based her opinions in part on the forensic interview conducted by Ms. Bernadette
Yupit-Martinez, whom Avila claims he had no adequate opportunity to cross-
examine. (Dkt. No. 3 at 15; Dkt. No. 4 at 18.) This claim is without merit.
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The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment bars admission of
testimonial hearsay statements by a witness who did not appear at trial unless the
declarant was unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-
examination. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004). But the right of
confrontation guarantees only “an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not
cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the
defense might wish.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986) (quoting
Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985)). The constitutional right is satisfied
when defense counsel receives wide latitude to question witnesses, and the extent of
cross-examination is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Id. at 679.
Here, the record shows that Ms. Yupit-Martinez testified at trial and was
subject to cross-examination by defense counsel. (Dkt. 17-7 at 128-29, 131, 144-59.)
Avila does not identify any restrictions imposed by the trial court that prevented
meaningful cross-examination. Avila therefore had the opportunity to physically
face Ms. Yupit-Martinez and to challenge her account before the jury. Pennsylvania
v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987). The fact that counsel objected to portions of her
testimony or that the examination did not proceed in the manner Avila now prefers
does not establish a violation of the Confrontation Clause. See United States v. Hitt,
473 F.3d 146, 150 (5th Cir. 2006).
To the extent Avila challenges Dr. Doskey’s reliance on information from the
forensic interview, he has not shown that any testimonial hearsay was admitted in
violation of Crawford or that he was denied the opportunity to confront the declarant.
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Nor does he identify specific statements that were improperly admitted for their
truth.
Even if some marginal Confrontation Clause error could be identified in the
admission of Dr. Doskey’s testimony (see Dkt. No. 17-8 at 133-159), alleged
violations of the right to confrontation are subject to harmless-error analysis. United
States v. Jimenez, 464 F.3d 555, 558 (5th Cir. 2006). Habeas relief is not available for
trial error unless it had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining
the jury’s verdict. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). Here, Avila
does not show that Dr. Doskey’s testimony had a substantial effect on the jury’s
verdict. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 823 (1989) (corroborating evidence may be
considered in harmless error analysis). Absent such a showing, habeas relief is not
warranted. Ground Five is without merit.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
The Court should deny the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person
in State Custody (Dkt. No. 3) with prejudice.
SO RECOMMENDED on March 20, 2026.
______________________________________
BRIAN McKAY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the manner
provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and recommendation
must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED . R. C IV. P. 72(b). 	An objection must identify the finding
or recommendation to which objection is made, the basis for the objection, and the
place in the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation the disputed determination
is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing
before the magistrate judge is not specific. 	Failure to file specific written objections
will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions
of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon
grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th
Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time
to object to 14 days).
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