Allen v. Amazon

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
SAMUEL LOMBEH ALLEN, 	§
§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
VS. 	§ 	Civil Action No. 3:24-CV-2846-D
§
AMAZON, 	§
§
Defendant. 	§
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
In response to defendant Amazon’s subpoenas served on three non-parties, pro se
plaintiff Samuel Lombeh Allen (“Allen”) has filed a “Motion to Compel Discovery
Responses and to Require Defendant to Withdraw Boilerplate Objections” and a “Motion to
Modify Subpoenas and for Protective Order (Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3) and 26(c)).” For
the reasons that follow, the court denies the motion to compel, and grants in part and denies
it part the motion to modify subpoenas and for a protective order.
I
The relevant background facts of this case are largely set out in a prior memorandum
opinion and order and need not be repeated at length for purposes of deciding these motions.
See Allen v. Amazon, 2025 WL 3059629, at *1-2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 3, 2025) (Fitzwater, J.).
Allen served discovery requests on Amazon. According to Allen, Amazon responded
to the requests with improper and unsupported objections. 	Allen then filed a motion to
compel discovery responses and to require Amazon to withdraw its boilerplate objections.
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In October 2025 Amazon notified Allen of its intention to serve three identically
worded subpoenas on non-parties Medical City Dallas (“Medical City”), Parkland Health &
Hospital System (“Parkland”), and Concentra Urgent Care (“Concentra”). The subpoenas
required these three medical facilities to produce “any and all medical records” related to
Allen from January 1, 2015 to the present. D. App. (ECF No. 65-3) 34, 38, 42. In response,
Allen filed a motion to modify subpoenas and for protective order.
Amazon opposes the motions, which the court is deciding on the briefs, without oral
argument.
II
The court begins by addressing Amazon’s contention that Allen’s motions should be
stricken because of their failure to comply with the court’s local civil rules.
A
Amazon maintains that, before Allen filed his motion to modify the subpoenas and
for a protective order, he failed to satisfy the conference requirements of N.D. Tex. Civ. R.
7.1. 	In his motion, Allen represented that he “attempted in good faith to confer with
Defendant’s counsel . . . on 25, OF October, 2025 but no agreement was reached.” P. Br.
(ECF No. 58) 2. Amazon disputes Allen’s representation of what occurred. It contends that,
on October 27, 2025, Allen sent a letter to Amazon’s counsel after business hours to “initiate
a good-faith meet-and-confer regarding [Amazon]’s recently served subpoenas” and then
requested a response within two days. 	D. Resp. (ECF No. 64) 3 (alteration in original).
Before the two-day deadline expired, Allen filed the motion to modify the subpoenas and for
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a protective order.
Allen failed to comply both with a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure and with one of
this court’s local civil rules: he did not confer in “good faith,” see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1),
and did not fully explain why it was not possible to confer, see N.D. Tex. Civ. R. 7.1(b)(3)
(“If a conference was not held, the certificate must explain why it was not possible to
confer[.]”). 	Nevertheless, “[a] failure to satisfy conference requirements does not . . .
mandate summary denial of [a motion,] because the Court retains discretion to waive strict
compliance with the conference requirements and to consider the motion[] on [its] merits.”
Brown v. Bridges, 2015 WL 11121361, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2015) (Solis, C.J.) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted), modified in part, 2015 WL 12532137 (N.D. Tex. June
22, 2015). The court in its discretion can excuse a failure to confer when “it is clear that the
motion is opposed and that a conference would neither have eliminated nor narrowed the
parties’ dispute.” Obregon v. Melton, 2002 WL 1792086, at *1 n.3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2002)
(Fitzwater, J.).
Here, although Allen’s certificate of conference violates both a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure and one of this court’s local civil rules, it is clear that the motion is opposed. The
issue in dispute—whether the information sought in three identically worded subpoenas is
relevant—is also already sufficiently narrow despite the absence of the required conference.
Accordingly, the court will not deny Allen’s motion based solely on his failure to comply
with Rule 26(c)(1) and local civil rule 7.1. See State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Freehold Mgmt.,
Inc., 2018 WL 10391736, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2018) (Rutherford, J.) (declining to deny
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motion to quash and for protective order based on failure to comply with Rule 26(c)(1) and
local civil rule 7.1).
Although the court has decided not to deny Allen’s motion to modify the subpoenas
and for a protective order based on his failure to abide by these national and local rules, the
court emphasizes that the “[f]ailure to comply with a local civil rule of this court is to be
carefully avoided and should not be repeated.” 	Obregon, 2002 WL 1792086, at *1 n.3.
Indeed, a magistrate judge of this court has cautioned that “future noncompliance with the
certificate of conference requirement may result in the Court striking the offending motion
from the docket.” Monitronics Int’l, Inc. v. Skyline Sec. Mgmt., Inc., 2017 WL 7520612, at
*1 n.1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2017) (Toliver, J.). The same is true for a failure to comply with
a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.
B
Amazon also maintains that the court should strike Allen’s motion to compel because
of his failure to disclose his use of artificial intelligence (“AI”). N.D. Tex. Civ. R. 7.2(f)(1)
requires that “[a] brief prepared using generative [AI] must disclose this fact on the first
page[.]” 	Allen does not dispute that he used AI or that he failed to make the required
disclosure. According to Amazon, Allen’s use of AI has resulted in his citing non-existent
cases and procedures and providing hallucinated quotations.
The court declines at this time to sanction Allen for his undisclosed use of AI. Allen
is proceeding pro se, and the court has not previously warned him of the consequences of
failing to comply with the court’s local civil rules. While such a warning is not necessarily
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required in this or any other case involving a pro se party, the court deems it best to
admonish Allen before imposing sanctions that could be quite severe. Accordingly, the court
warns Allen that, going forward, his failure to comply with N.D. Tex. Civ. R. 7.2(f) “may
result in the imposition of sanctions, including the striking of filings, the imposition of filing
restrictions, monetary penalties, or dismissal of this action.” Jayroe v. Progressive Cas. Ins.,
2025 WL 3144976, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 27, 2025) (Toliver, J.), rec. adopted, 2025 WL
3143269 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2025) (Fish, J.).
III
The court now turns to Allen’s motion to modify the subpoenas that Amazon served
on Medical City, Parkland, and Concentra.
A
The court must initially decide whether Allen has standing to challenge the subpoenas.
“A party’s standing to quash subpoenas served on non-parties pursuant to Rule 45 is limited.”
MC Trilogy Tex., LLC v. City of Heath, Tex., 2023 WL 5918925, at *9 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 11,
2023) (Fitzwater, J.). To have standing, “[t]he movant must ‘be in possession or control of
the requested material; be the person to whom the subpoena is issued; or have a personal
right or privilege in the subject matter of the subpoena.’” Id. (quoting Brown v. Braddick,
595 F.2d 961, 967 (5th Cir. 1979)). 	The movant may establish a “personal right” to
subpoenaed materials requested from a non-party in limited circumstances, such as when “the
subpoena seeks confidential or protected information sensitive to the movant.” 	Keybank
Nat’l Ass’n v. Perkins Rowe Assocs., LLC, 2011 WL 90108, at *2 (M.D. La. Jan. 11, 2011)
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(collecting cases). “A party challenging a subpoena issued to a non-party may not object on
the grounds that it ‘violates another person’s privacy rights . . . that the subpoena is overly
broad, or that the subpoena seeks information that is irrelevant[,] because only the responding
third party can object and seek to quash a Rule 45 subpoena on those grounds.’” Deitz v.
Performance Food Grp., Inc., 2021 WL 2715974, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 21, 2021) (quoting
River House Partners, LLC v. Grandbridge Real Est. Cap. LLC, 2016 WL 3747613, at *3
(M.D. La. July 11, 2016)).
The court holds that Allen has standing to challenge the subpoenas served on Medical
City, Parkland, and Concentra. 	Allen’s contention that the subpoenas are overbroad and
disproportionate is, alone, insufficient to provide him standing. 	See, e.g., Donaldson v.
Crisp, 2023 WL 6201372, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2023) (collecting cases) (“[A] party
cannot challenge a subpoena issued to a non-party on the basis that it is overbroad, irrelevant,
or unduly burdensome.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). But the subpoenas
seek Allen’s medical records. The sensitive information contained in his medical records
confers Allen with standing. See Ruiz v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 2024 WL 2982042, at *4
(N.D. Tex. June 13, 2024) (Fitzwater, J.) (holding that plaintiff had standing to challenge
non-party subpoena targeting her medical records); Giarratano v. Huntington Ingalls Inc.,
2022 WL 16552816, at *4 (E.D. La. Oct. 31, 2022) (“Plaintiff has standing to seek the relief
requested in this case under Rule 45 because she has a personal interest in her medical
records.”).
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B
Having concluded that Allen has standing to challenge the subpoenas, the court now
addresses the merits of his request to modify the subpoenas.1
1
Rule 26(b)(1) provides that a party may obtain discovery of “any nonprivileged matter
that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.”
Rule 26(b)(1). 	“Relevancy is broadly construed, and a request for discovery should be
considered relevant if there is ‘any possibility’ that the information sought may be relevant
to the claim or defense of any party.” Merrill v. Waffle House, Inc., 227 F.R.D. 467, 470
(N.D. Tex. 2005) (Ramirez, J.) (quoting Sheldon v. Vermonty, 204 F.R.D. 679, 689 (D. Kan.
2001)).
Rule 45 governs subpoenas to obtain discovery from non-parties. The party issuing
the subpoena “must take reasonable steps to avoid imposing undue burden or expense on a
person subject to the subpoena.” Rule 45(d)(1). Rule 45(d)(3)(A)(iv) requires that, on timely
motion, the court must quash or modify a subpoena if it “subjects a person to undue burden.”
1Allen’s motion is in part styled as a “Motion to Modify Subpoenas,” and the relevant
section of his brief is entitled “The Subpoenas Should Be Modified Under Rule 45(d)(3)(A).”
P. Br. (ECF No. 58) 1. At times, however, he requests that the court modify or quash the
subpoenas. 	As discussed below, the court agrees with Allen that the wording of the
subpoenas is overbroad. But at least some of the subpoenaed information is likely relevant,
and Allen, as the movant, has not demonstrated that production of that information will
unduly burden him or the three medical facilities. The court therefore declines to quash the
subpoenas in toto. See Ruiz, 2024 WL 2982042, at *5 (applying similar reasoning to deny
motion to quash); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 392 F.3d 812, 818 (5th Cir. 2004)
(“Generally, modification of a subpoena is preferable to quashing it outright.”)
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Rule 45(d)(3)(A)(iv). The movant has the burden of proof, see Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petrol.
Co., 392 F.3d 812, 818 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Williams v. City of Dallas, 178 F.R.D. 103,
109 (N.D. Tex. 1998) (Fitzwater, J.)), and must meet “the heavy burden of establishing that
compliance with the subpoena would be ‘unreasonable and oppressive.’” 	Williams, 178
F.R.D. at 109 (citation omitted).
“Whether a burdensome subpoena is reasonable must be determined according to the
facts of the case[.]” Linder v. Dep’t of Def., 133 F.3d 17, 24 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). 	Among the factors that the court may consider in
determining whether there is an undue burden are “(1) relevance of the information
requested; (2) the need of the party for the documents; (3) the breadth of the document
request; (4) the time period covered by the request; (5) the particularity with which the party
describes the requested documents; and (6) the burden imposed.” Wiwa, 392 F.3d at 818
(citing Williams, 178 F.R.D. at 109). 	The status of a witness as a non-party entitles the
witness to consideration regarding expense and inconvenience. 	See Rule 45(d)(2)(B)(ii).
Undue burden can be found when a subpoena duces tecum is facially overbroad. See, e.g.,
Wiwa, 392 F.3d at 818.
2
The subpoenas request
ANY 	AND 	ALL 	MEDICAL 	RECORDS 	(EXCLUDING
BILLING 	RECORDS), 	FROM 	1/1/2015 	TO 	PRESENT,
INCLUDING 	BUT 	NOT 	LIMITED 	TO 	RECORDS
REGARDING 	THE 	PATIENT’S 	CONDITIONS 	AND
TREATMENTS, 	DOCTOR’S 	NOTES, 	EVALUATIONS,
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OFFICE NOTES, PROGRESS NOTES, CORRESPONDENCE
WITH OTHER PHYSICIANS, THERAPISTS, HOSPITALS
AND/OR 	HEALTHCARE 	PROVIDERS, 	PHYSICAL
THERAPY 	RECORDS, 	LAB 	REPORTS, 	PATHOLOGY
REPORTS, 	RADIOLOGY 	REPORTS, 	ALL 	OTHER
DIAGNOSTIC REPORTS, PRESCRIPTIONS, REFERRALS
TO 	OTHER 	HEALTH 	CARE 	PROVIDERS, 	CLAIMS,
WORKER'S 	COMPENSATION 	RECORDS, 	HOSPITAL
RECORDS, 	THERAPISTS’ 	RECORDS, 	PATIENT
INFORMATION FORMS, PATIENT INSURANCE FORMS,
INTAKE FORMS, HANDWRITTEN NOTES, LETTERS OF
PROTECTION, 	TELEPHONE 	MESSAGES, 	NURSES’
NOTES, EVERY SUCH RECORD . . . PERTAINING TO;
SAMUEL LOMBEH[.]
D. App. (ECF No. 65-3) 34, 38, 42. Allen contends that the subpoenas are deficient in two
ways. He maintains, first, that the subpoenas cover irrelevant subject matter.2 Allen posits,
for example, that the subpoenas elicit information about his reproductive health and HIV
testing. 	He asserts, second, that the subpoenas’ ten-year scope is too broad because it
extends beyond the period he was employed with Amazon.
Amazon responds that, because Allen’s claims involve his visual disability, right leg
injury, physical pain and suffering, and mental anguish and emotional distress, it is entitled
to discover information about his history of physical impairments, mental or emotional
issues, disabilities, alternative stressors, and medical reasons restricting him from work
besides those alleged. 	And, Amazon explains, the subpoenas as phrased are reasonably
2He also maintains that the subpoenas reach information protected by the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 and his privacy rights. 	But “the
privilege protecting medical records from discovery is waived when the party places [his]
medical condition at issue.” Hardy v. Scandinavian Airlines Sys., 2025 WL 416106, at *5
(E.D. La. Feb. 6, 2025) (collecting cases).
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tailored to discover that information.
3
Amazon’s subpoenas are not limited in the information they seek about Allen’s
medical history. Subpoenas that require production of documents that are not actually related
to a claim or defense are looked upon with disfavor and, where feasible, are narrowed to
exclude information that exceeds Rule 26(b)(1)’s scope. See, e.g., MC Trilogy Tex., 2023
WL 5918925, at *8 (declining to enforce third-party subpoena requiring production of “all”
communications during time-bound period); Williams, 178 F.R.D. at 110 (narrowing
third-party subpoena requiring production of “any and all” documents); Ruiz, 2024 WL
2982042, at *1, 5 (narrowing third-party subpoena requiring production of “all medical
records” related to plaintiff). Given the nature of Allen’s claims, Amazon may subpoena
information 	related 	to 	his 	visual 	disability, 	his 	right 	leg 	injury 	and 	any 	resulting
complications and similar previous injuries, and his mental or emotional condition. 	See
Barnett v. Stafford Transp. of La., 2020 WL 10314640, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2020)
(“When a plaintiff places his medical condition at issue, a defendant may discover medical
information related to that condition”); Merrill, 227 F.R.D. at 473 (“[S]everal courts have
found that medical records are relevant to claims of mental anguish in discrimination
cases.”); Parker v. Bill Melton Trucking, Inc., 2017 WL 6520779, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 2,
2017) (Toliver, J.) (permitting subpoena to cover medical records concerning past, similar
injuries). But Amazon’s subpoenas require that the three medical facilities produce “any and
all medical records.” D. App. (ECF No. 65-3) 34, 38, 42. Similar to the phrase “including
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but not limited to,” id., this requirement, in the context of this case, is overbroad in its
expansion of the scope of the subpoenas. See Moncevais v. Herrick, 2023 WL 4666612, at
*2 (S.D. Tex. July 20, 2023) (subpoenas were facially overbroad where “including, but not
limited to” preceded list of particular documents). Consequently, these subpoenas—which
require the production of “any and all medical records”—“likely encompass many
[documents] having absolutely nothing to do with” the issues in this case. See Crescent City
Remodeling, LLC v. CMR Constr. & Roofing, LLC, 643 F.Supp.3d 613, 620 (E.D. La. 2022).
The ten-year scope of the subpoenas, however, is permissible. Allen requests that the
court modify the subpoenas to cover only the period of his employment with Amazon
through one-year after his termination. The court concludes, however, that medical records
from before this period may be relevant to his disability and whether he suffered from any
pre-existing physical or emotional conditions that may have been the cause of his alleged
injuries. See, e.g., Cummins v. Lollar, 2015 WL 12731746, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2015)
(Cureton, J.) (explaining that access to plaintiff’s past medical records allows defendant to
“sufficiently evaluate[] . . . [t]he issue of any preexisting causes to Plaintiff’s health issues”);
EEOC v. Eastbox LLC, 2025 WL 41915, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 7, 2025) (similar). Moreover,
courts in the Fifth Circuit have permitted subpoenas with similar ten-year scopes. See, e.g.,
Barnett, 2020 WL 10314640, at *3 (allowing discovery of ten years of medical records
where plaintiff sought damages for “mental anguish, physical pain and suffering, disability,
loss of enjoyment of life, and physical impairment”); Hardy v. Scandinavian Airlines Sys.,
2025 WL 416106, at *10 (E.D. La. Feb. 6, 2025) (modifying scope of subpoena to
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encompass ten years of medical records). Accordingly, the court denies Allen’s request to
modify the temporal scope of the subpoenas.3
4
Accordingly, the court modifies the subpoenas to limit their subject matter scope.
Medical City, Parkland, and Concentra may be subpoenaed to produce medical records
related to Allen’s visual disability, his right leg injury and any resulting complications and
similar previous injuries, and his mental or emotional condition. So modified, the subpoenas
will neither be overly broad nor intrusive.
Amazon is ordered to serve new subpoenas on Medical City, Parkland, and Concentra
that are narrowed in compliance with this memorandum opinion and order, or to serve
notices on Medical City, Parkland, and Concentra that, by court order, the subpoenas have
been narrowed in accordance with this memorandum opinion and order.
IV
The court next considers Allen’s request for a protective order.
A
This court “has broad discretion in determining whether to grant a motion for a
protective order.” McKinney/Pearl Rest. Partners, L.P. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 322 F.R.D.
235, 242 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (Horan, J.) (citing Harris v. Amoco Prod. Co., 768 F.2d 669, 684
3In reply, Allen suggests that changing the start date of the subpoenas to 2019 would
be an appropriate modification. But Allen, as the movant, has not adequately “explained the
significance of [this] cutoff date” that he proposes for the first time in his reply brief. See
Stogner v. Sturdivant, 2011 WL 4435254, at *6 (M.D. La. Sept. 22, 2011).
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(5th Cir. 1985)). 	Under Rule 26(c)(1), the court “may, for good cause, issue an order to
protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or
expense[.]” Rule 26(c)(1). The burden is on the moving party “to show the necessity of its
issuance, which contemplates a particular and specific demonstration of fact as distinguished
from stereotyped and conclusory statements.” In re Terra Int’l, Inc., 134 F.3d 302, 306 (5th
Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Garrett, 571 F.2d 1323, 1326 n.3 (5th Cir.
1978)). “If a party maintains that a protective order is necessary to protect it from undue
burden or expense, it ‘must show how the requested discovery is overly broad, unduly
burdensome, or oppressive by submitting affidavits or offering evidence revealing the nature
of the burden.’” Samurai Glob., LLC v. Landmark Am. Ins. Co., 2023 WL 2190190, at *3
(N.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2023) (Fitzwater, J.) (quoting Samsung Elecs. Am. Inc. v. Yang Kun
“Michael” Chung, 325 F.R.D. 578, 590 (N.D. Tex. 2017) (Horan, J.)).
B
Allen maintains that, because the records contain highly sensitive health information,
the court should (1) limit the scope of the medical records that the three medical facilities are
permitted to produce to records related only to the medical conditions alleged in Allen’s
complaint, and (2) enter a protective order that requires that the produced records be kept
confidential and used solely for this litigation.
C
The court need not address Allen’s motion for a protective order that limits the subject
matter scope of the records that the medical facilities are permitted to produce to the extent
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it is mooted by the court’s decision above to modify the scope of subpoenas. See, e.g., In re
Venequip, S.A., 2022 WL 834780, at *1 n.1 (E.D. La. Mar. 21, 2022) (denying motion for
protective order as moot where court granted motion to quash subpoena); Alston v. Prarie
Farms Dairy, Inc., 2017 WL 4274858, at *1 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 26, 2017) (same); EEOC v.
New Hanover Reg’l Med. Ctr., 2010 WL 4668957, at *1 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 9, 2010) (“Because
the same issue is presented in both the motion to quash and the motion for protective order,
the Court will address the merits through the motion for protective order and deny the motion
to quash as moot.”).
The court also denies Allen’s request for a protective order designating his medical
records as confidential. As an initial matter, it is not evident that Allen’s concerns that the
records contain highly sensitive health information (e.g., HIV testing) remain given the
court’s decision to narrow the subject matter scope of the subpoenas. 	And regardless,
Allen’s thinly-supported assertion that, because the records contain highly sensitive health
information he is entitled to a protective order, is insufficient. See McCallum v. Camping
World, Inc., 2020 WL 4558310, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 12, 2020) (“Although the Court
recognizes that Plaintiff’s medical records may contain ‘private’ information, that alone does
not necessarily mean the proposed protective order is appropriate[.]” (footnote omitted)).
This assertion does not involve a “particular and specific demonstration of fact” necessary
to satisfy Allen’s burden under Rule 26(c). 	In re Terra Int’l, Inc., 134 F.3d at 306; see
Rummans v. HSBC Bank USA, Nat’l Ass’n, 2024 WL 3635522, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 28,
2024) (Rutherford, J.) (“[C]onclusory statements fall far short of the specific demonstration
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of fact required to obtain a protective order.”).
Accordingly, the court denies Allen’s request for a protective order, in part on the
merits and in part as moot.
V
The court now considers Allen’s motion to compel discovery responses and require
Amazon to withdraw its boilerplate objections.
A party’s motion to compel must meet certain threshold requirements under Rule
37(a) in that it must
attach a copy of the discovery requests at issue . . . and of the
resisting party’s responses and objections to those requests;
must specifically and individually identify each discovery
request in dispute and specifically, as to each request, identify
the nature and basis of the dispute, including, for example,
explaining . . . 	how a response or answer is deficient or
incomplete, and ask the Court for specific relief as to each
request; and must include a concise discussion of the facts and
authority that support the motion as to each discovery request in
dispute.
See Woolery v. Doty, 2023 WL 416556, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 2023) (Fitzwater, J.)
(quoting Yang Kun “Michael” Chung, 325 F.R.D. at 594).
Allen maintains that Amazon has responded with improper and boilerplate objections
to his discovery requests. 	By and large, however, he does not adequately identify the
discovery requests in dispute. See id. at *1 (denying motion to compel where plaintiff did
not identify discovery requests that were at issue).
There are only two sets of discovery requests that Allen identifies with specificity.
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He maintains that, in response to interrogatories 1, 3, and 5, Amazon referred him to a
Disability and Leave Services (“DLS”) file.4 Allen maintains that Rule 33 requires that
Amazon “identify by Bates range or file name the documents containing each interrogatory’s
responsive information.” P. Br. (ECF No. 51) 6. Yet to support this assertion, Allen cites
a case that does not discuss Rule 33. Moreover, he does not indicate that he is unable to
locate or identify the information he seeks in the DLS file that Amazon produced during
discovery. See Rule 33(d). Next, Allen identifies requests for production 7 through 17, in
response to which Amazon allegedly produced an Owner’s Manual.5 He maintains that an
Owner’s Manual that does not indicate “which sections correspond to which request fails
[Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(i)].” 	Id. at 7. 	This contention is also unavailing. 	Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(i)
requires that “[a] party must produce documents as they are kept in the usual course of
business or must organize and label them to correspond to the categories in the request.”
Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(i) (emphasis added). 	Allen does not explain how the Owner’s Manual
qualifies as a document that must be organized and labeled. 	Because Allen has not
demonstrated how Amazon has responded insufficiently to his discovery requests, his motion
to compel is denied. See Obinyan v. Prime Therapeutics LLC, 2021 WL 135983, at *2 (N.D.
Tex. Jan. 14, 2021) (Fitzwater, J.) (denying motion to compel where plaintiff failed to
contend that responding party did not respond or insufficiently responded to discovery
4It appears that Amazon only referred Allen to the DLS file in response to
interrogatory number 1.
5 Amazon maintains that only its responses to requests for production 7, 14, 15, and
16 involve an Owner’s Manual.
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requests). 6
* 	* 	*
For the reasons explained, the court denies Allen’s motion to compel, and grants in
part and denies in part Allen’s motion to modify subpoenas and for a protective order.
SO ORDERED.
December 23, 2025.
_________________________________
SIDNEY A. FITZWATER
SENIOR JUDGE
6Allen’s remaining arguments are without merit. 	For example, he requests that
Amazon produce a privilege log, yet Amazon is not withholding documents on the basis of
privilege. He also references a non-existent standing order about electronic discovery.
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