McCoo v. City of Dallas et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
MITCHELL RAY MCCOO, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF DALLAS, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 3:24-CV-2774-X
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Mitchell Ray McCoo, Jr. filed suit against the City of Dallas and
Dallas police officers Robert Beck, Jr. and Jesus Martinez. McCoo argued the officers
used excessive force and unlawfully detained, searched, and arrested him. McCoo
dismissed his claims against the City of Dallas with prejudice. (Doc. 25). And the
Court dismissed without prejudice McCoo’s claims against Officer Martinez.
(Doc. 31). Officer Beck answered McCoo’s complaint and the Court ordered McCoo to
file a Rule 7(a) reply pursuant to Schultea v. Wood,1 requiring him to plead with
particularity that Beck had violated his clearly established Fourth Amendment
rights. (Doc. 33). Beck subsequently moved for judgment on the pleadings under
Rule 12(c). (Doc. 35).
After due consideration, the Court GRANTS Beck’s motion and DISMISSES
WITHOUT PREJUDICE McCoo’s claims against Beck.
1 Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
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I. Background
As stated McCoo’s amended complaint and McCoo’s Rule 7(a) reply, shortly
after 1:15 a.m. in January 2024, McCoo stopped his car on a one-way road, allegedly
to check his phone for directions. After remaining in the road for about five minutes,
Beck and Martinez initiated a traffic stop and asked him for his license and
registration.
Without being instructed to do so, McCoo exited his vehicle, allegedly to
retrieve his identification. While he did not make threatening movements or
gestures, McCoo repeatedly expressed his frustration with law enforcement. Beck
and Martinez instructed McCoo to move out of the street and attempted to guide him
to the side of the road. McCoo verbally indicated that he did not want to be touched.
Beck then instructed him to sit on the curb. McCoo refused to sit.
Beck subsequently unholstered his TASER and grabbed McCoo, attempting to
pull him to the curb. McCoo again stated he did not want to be touched, pulled away
from Beck and moved toward the curb. At that point, Beck discharged his TASER
into McCoo’s chest, causing him to collapse.
II. Legal Standard
Beck seeks dismissal of McCoo’s complaint under Rule 12(c). Rule 12(c)
motions are “subject to the same standards as a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6).”2
2 Truong v. Bank of Am., N.A., 717 F.3d 377, 381 (5th Cir. 2013).
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To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a complaint must “state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.”3 The complaint must allege sufficient facts “to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”4 And there must be enough facts for the
Court to be able to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.”5
In its evaluation, the Court construes the complaint liberally in favor of the
plaintiff, and accepts all facts pleaded in the complaint as true.6 But the Court cannot
credit conclusory statements or legal conclusions.7
III. Analysis
McCoo alleges that Beck violated the Fourth Amendment by using excessive
force and committed Texas common-law assault when he tased McCoo. Beck raises
the defense of qualified immunity.
Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability, unless
they violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.”8 “[G]overnment officials,” thus have
“breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments” unless they are
“plainly incompetent or . . . knowingly violate the law.”9
3 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
4 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 50 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
5 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
6 Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000).
7 See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678.
8 City of Tahlequah v. Bond, 595 U.S. 9, 12 (2021) (cleaned up).
9 Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 546 (2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S.
731, 743 (2011)) (cleaned up).
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So a plaintiff bears the burden of alleging (1) the violation of a constitutional
right, and (2) that the defendant’s conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of
clearly established law at the time of the incident.10
The Supreme Court has made clear that courts must not “define clearly
established law at a high level of generality.”11 Instead, the “inquiry must be
undertaken in light of specific context of the case.”12 “Therefore, unless existing
precedent squarely governs the conduct at issue, an official will be entitled to
qualified immunity.”13
Ordinarily, at the 12(b)(6) stage, a plaintiff does not have to meet the
heightened standard of identifying legal caselaw to survive dismissal.14 But McCoo
has provided a Rule 7(a) Reply to plead with particularity that Beck has violated
clearly established Fourth Amendment rights and provided responsive briefing to
Beck’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.15 So the Court finds it appropriate to
apply more of a summary-judgment standard to defeat a qualified immunity defense.
Accordingly, McCoo must “identify a case in which an officer acting under
similar circumstances was held to have violated the Constitution.”16 “The burden
here is heavy” as a “right is clearly established only if preexisting precedent has
10 See Connelly v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 484 F.3d 343, 346 (5th Cir. 2007).
11 Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (per curiam).
12 Id. (cleaned up).
13 Cope v. Cogdill, 3 F.4th 198, 204 (5th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up) (citing Brosseau v. Haugen, 543
U.S. 194, 201 (2004) (per curiam)).
14 Santander v. Salazar, 133 F.4th 471, 478 (5th Cir. 2025).
15 Docs. 34, 38.
16 Cope, 3 F.4th at 205 (cleaned up).
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placed the constitutional question beyond debate.”17 But even if the plaintiff
demonstrates the violation of a clearly established right, “the official is entitled to
qualified immunity if his conduct was objectively reasonable.”18
McCoo raises a single claim of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment.19
But he fails to identify a case where an officer acting under similar circumstances
was held to violate the Constitution. The cases McCoo provides involved suspects
complying with law enforcement commands at the time law enforcement began using
force against them.20 In contrast, McCoo concedes that he was noncompliant.21 So
these cases cannot meet McCoo’s burden of showing legal authority finding “an officer
acting under similar circumstances was held to have violated the Constitution.”22
Moreover, the Court is unable to identify a case that “squarely governs” the
“specific context” of this case.23 Nor is it “beyond debate” that Beck’s conduct is
unlawful such that it falls under the obvious case exception.24
17 Harmon v. City of Arlington, 16 F.4th 1159, 1165 (5th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up) (quoting
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741).
18 Davis v. McKinney, 518 F.3d 304, 317 (5th Cir. 2008).
19 McCoo declined to advance his unlawful search and seizure claim against Beck.
20 Newman v. Guedry, 703 F.3d 757, 762–63 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding officers used excessive
force when they tased a suspect who made an off-color joke but that “was never given any commands
that he disobeyed”); Darden v. City of Fort Worth, 880 F.3d 722, 730–31 (5th Cir. 2018) (holding officers
used excessive force when witness and video testimony showed the suspect had complied with officer
commands before officers used force); Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 502 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding an
officer’s slamming an arrestee’s face into a vehicle after she was “restrained and subdued” and “not
resisting arrest or attempting to flee” was excessive).
21 See Doc. 38 at 2, 4, 6.
22 Cope, 3 F.4th at 205.
23 Id. at 204.
24 Joseph ex rel. Estate of Joseph, 981 F.3d at 330.
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So Beck is entitled to qualified immunity. And because McCoo’s constitutional
claim is foreclosed by qualified immunity, his state law claims likewise fail as a
matter of law.25
Accordingly, the Court must dismiss McCoo’s claims against Beck.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Officer Beck’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE McCoo’s
claims against Officer Beck.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 24th day of February, 2026.
BRANTLEY STARR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
25 Shaboon v. Duncan, 252 F.3d 722, 735–36 (5th Cir. 2001) (“We look to whether a reasonable
official could have believed his or her conduct to be lawful in light of clearly established law and the
information possessed by the official at the time the conduct occurred.” (quoting City of Lancaster v.
Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Tex. 1994) (emphasis added))).
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