LaNore v. Corporation of the Episcopal Diocese of Dallas et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
KIM LANORE, 	§
§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:24-CV-2251-B
§
CORPORATION OF THE EPISCOPAL
DIOCESE OF DALLAS,
CORPORATION OF THE EPISCOPAL
DIOCESE OF DALLAS d/b/a THE
EPISCOPAL DIOCESE OF DALLAS,
and THE EPISCOPAL DIOCESE OF
DALLAS,
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
Defendants. 	§
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 24) filed by Defendants
Corporation of the Episcopal Diocese of Dallas, Corporation of the Episcopal Diocese of Dallas
d/b/a The Episcopal Diocese of Dallas, and the Episcopal Diocese of Dallas (collectively,
“Defendants”). For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion.
I.
BACKGROUND
This is a religious discrimination and retaliation case, arising after the Episcopal Diocese of
Dallas (the “EDOD”) denied Plaintiff Kim LaNore’s religious accommodation request to be exempt
from an employment position’s COVID-19 (“COVID”) vaccine requirement. The undisputed facts
are as follows.
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LaNore, a devout Baptist, began working for the EDOD in 2011 as a receptionist. Doc. 29,
Pl.’s App., Ex. 1, at 2. After the EDOD changed office buildings in 2022, EDOD’s Bishop George
Sumner informed LaNore that her receptionist position was being eliminated because the building
administrative tasks she performed were no longer needed at the new building. Doc. 26-2, Defs.’
App., Ex. J, 270. At that time, Bishop Sumner invited LaNore to apply for a new position. Id.
According to the new “Hospitality and Resource” position’s description, it involved performing
front desk duties, bookkeeping, and some faith-based programming. Doc. 26-1, Defs.’ App., Ex. E,
258. Moreover, the position required the applicant to be Christian and COVID vaccinated. Id.
LaNore was interested in the position, but she believed that obtaining the COVID vaccine
would violate her religious beliefs. Doc. 29, Pl.’s App., Ex. 1, at 2, 5. Accordingly, LaNore requested
a religious accommodation to be exempt from the COVID vaccine requirement. Id. at 5. LaNore’s
religious accommodation request was denied soon thereafter, and LaNore did not apply for the
Hospitality and Resource position. Id. at 6-8. Defendants instead hired an outside candidate for the
position. Id.
In September 2024, LaNore filed suit against Defendants for religious discrimination and
retaliation in violation of Title VII and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (“TCHRA”).
See generally Doc. 1, Compl. LaNore asserts that Defendants discriminated against her on the basis
of her religious beliefs when they denied her religious accommodation to be exempt from the
COVID vaccine requirement. Id. at 7-8. In November 2025, Defendants moved for summary
judgment against LaNore’s claims. See generally Doc. 24, Mot. Summ. J. LaNore filed a Response
(Doc. 27), and Defendants filed a reply (Doc. 32). The Motion is now ripe for the Court’s review.
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II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is appropriate “if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). On a motion for summary judgment, the burden is on the
movant to prove that no genuine dispute exists as to any issue of material fact. Provident Life &
Accident Ins. Co. v. Goel, 274 F.3d 984, 991 (5th Cir. 2001). To determine whether a genuine dispute
exists for trial, the court must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant. See
Chaplin v. Nations Credit Corp., 307 F.3d 368, 371-72 (5th Cir. 2002).
Once the movant has met its burden, the burden shifts to the non-movant, who must show
that summary judgment is not appropriate. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.
1994) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325). “This burden is not satisfied with ‘some metaphysical doubt
as to material facts,’ . . . by ‘conclusory allegations,’ . . . by ‘unsubstantiated assertions,’ . . . or by only
a ‘scintilla’ of evidence.” Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586 (1986)) (other citations omitted). Finally, the evidence that any party proffers “must be
competent and admissible at trial.” Bellard v. Gautreaux, 675 F.3d 454, 460 (5th Cir. 2012).
III.
ANALYSIS
The Court concludes that LaNore’s claims fail as a matter of law because Defendants are
exempt from religious discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII and the TCHRA.
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Having so concluded, the Court does not address Defendants’ alternative argument that LaNore
cannot meet her burden of proof at trial.
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to “discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual’s . . . religion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(1). Title VII also contains an anti-retaliation provision that prohibits an employer from
discriminating against an employee because the employee opposed a discriminatory practice. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a). But, relevant here, Congress created an exemption for religious organizations,
which states:
[t]his subchapter [of Title VII] shall not apply to . . . a religious corporation,
association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of
individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on
by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1. In short, the Title VII statutory exemption “exempts religious organizations
from Title VII’s prohibition of religious discrimination regarding the employment of an individual.”
Scaffidi v. New Orleans Mission, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 3d 630, 635-36 (E.D. La. 2020). The Supreme
Court has understood the statutory exemption to apply to both the secular and religious activities
of a religious organization. See Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987).
Similarly, the TCHRA makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an
employee based on their religion or to retaliate against an employee that opposes an unlawful
discriminatory practice. See Tex. Lab. Code §§ 21.051, 21.055. Also, like Title VII, the TCHRA
exempts religious organizations from the general prohibition against religious discrimination. See
Tex. Lab. Code § 21.109. Relevant here, the TCHRA exemption states:
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(a) A religious corporation, association, society, or educational institution or an
educational organization 	operated, 	supervised, 	or 	controlled 	in 	whole 	or 	in
substantial part by a religious corporation, association, or society does not commit
an unlawful employment practice by limiting employment or giving a preference to
members of the same religion.
(b) Subchapter B [ Tex. Lab. Code § 21.051 et seq.] does not apply to the employment
of an individual of a particular religion by a religious corporation, association, or
society to perform work connected with the performance of religious activities by the
corporation, association, or society.
Tex. Lab. Code § 21.109.
According to the Texas Supreme Court, “[t]he [TCHRA] is modeled after” Title VII. NME
Hosps., Inc. v. Rennels, 994 S.W.2d 142, 144 (Tex. 1999). Additionally, one of the TCHRA’s stated
purposes is to “provide for the execution of the policies of Title VII[.]” Tex. Lab. Code § 21.001(1);
see Horvath v. City of Leander, 946 F.3d 787, 791 n.3 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Rennels, 994 S.W.2d at
144); Lacy v. Dall. Cowboys Football Club, No. 3:11-CV-0300-B, 2012 WL 2795979, at *9 (N.D. Tex.
July 10, 2012) (Boyle, J.) (“Like discrimination claims, retaliation claims under Title VII and TCHRA
are analyzed under the same standard.”). The Court therefore analyzes LaNore’s Title VII and
TCHRA claims together and refers to the religious organization exemptions collectively as the
“statutory exemptions.”
A. Defendants Are Religious Organizations
Assessing whether the statutory exemptions apply requires (1) determining if Defendants are
religious organizations, and (2) determining if their employment decision falls within the exempted
categories. The Court addresses both issues below.
The statutory exemptions are limited to religious organizations. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a); Tex.
Lab. Code § 21.109. Because Title VII does not provide a definition for religious organizations,
courts look to the nine factors identified by the Third Circuit in the LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish
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Community Center, 503 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2007) case for guidance. See Garza v. Hou. Methodist Hosp.,
795 F. Supp. 3d 966, 971 (S.D. Tex. 2025) (citing Scaffidi, 612 F. Supp. 3d at 635); see also Speer v.
Presbyterian Child.’s Home & Serv. Agency, 847 S.W.2d 227, 234 (Tex. 1993) (Gonzalez, J., concurring)
(looking to federal law to determine if an entity is a religious organization). The nine factors set out
in LeBoon are:
(1) whether the entity operates for a profit, (2) whether it produces a secular product,
(3) whether the entity’s articles of incorporation or other pertinent documents state
a religious purpose, (4) whether it is owned, affiliated with or financially supported
by a formally religious entity such as a church or synagogue, (5) whether a formally
religious 	entity 	participates 	in 	the 	management, 	for 	instance 	by 	having
representatives on the board of trustees, (6) whether the entity holds itself out to the
public as secular or sectarian, (7) whether the entity regularly includes prayer or other
forms of worship in its activities, (8) whether it includes religious instruction in its
curriculum, to the extent it is an educational institution, and (9) whether its
membership is made up by coreligionists.
Braidwood Mgmt., Inc. v. EEOC, 70 F.4th 914, 936 n.48 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting LeBoon, 503 F.3d
at 226).
Here, LaNore does not contest Defendants’ status as religious organizations. See Doc. 28,
Pl.’s Br., 10. After weighing the relevant factors, the Court finds that Defendants are religious
organizations. Defendants are non-profit, religious entities affiliated with the Episcopal Church—a
formal Christian church. See Doc. 25, Defs.’ Br., 12-13 (walking through the LeBoon factors).
Defendant Corporation of the Episcopal Diocese of Dallas administers the affairs of the EDOD,
which consists of “more than 60 churches” and regularly includes religious prayer and worship
within these churches. Doc. 26-1, Defs.’ App., Ex. C, 3-4.
B. 	LaNore’s Claims are Precluded by the Statutory Exemptions
LaNore argues that, even as religious organizations, Defendants cannot rely on the statutory
exemptions to avoid liability because (1) Defendants’ employment decision—the denial of her
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religious accommodation request—was not based on religious reasons but instead based on fear of
COVID transmissions, and (2) Executive Order No. GA-40 (“EO No. 40”) suspended the TCHRA
religious exception insofar as it permitted Defendants to issue a COVID vaccine mandate. Id. at 10,
13-14.
On LaNore’s first argument, the reason for a religious employer’s action is immaterial when
the cause for complaint under Title VII or the TCHRA is religious discrimination. A court in the
Southern District of Texas recently addressed and rejected LaNore’s first argument. Garza, 795 F.
Supp. 3d at 976. There, nurses sued their employer-hospital for religious discrimination after it
terminated their employment for failing to comply with a COVID vaccine mandate. Id. at 969. The
nurses asserted that their religious belief against the COVID-vaccine prevented them from
complying, and thus the hospital should have granted them a religious accommodation. Id. Like
LaNore, the nurses argued the statutory exemption did not apply to their claims because the
hospital’s employment decision was not based upon its religion. Id. at 975. The Court rejected that
argument because “nowhere in the statute is the limitation that the reason for the employment
decision must stem from the employer’s religion, not the employee’s.” Id. at 976. The Court further
noted that Congress previously broadened the statutory exemption “to encompass not just those
employment decisions motivated by a religious organization’s religious activities, but those
connected with its activities generally—religious or not.” Id.
Courts in other circuits have similarly found that Title VII’s statutory exemption shields
religious organizations from liability against claims of religious discrimination, including claims
deriving from vaccine requirements. See Conway v. Mercy Hosp. St. Louis, 146 F.4th 704, 710 (8th Cir.
2025) (affirming district court’s grant of summary judgment for hospital because Title VII exempted
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hospital from religious discrimination claim based on a COVID vaccine mandate); Burlison v. Mercy
Hosp. S., No. 4:22-CV-01017-SEP, 2023 WL 4560796, at *1-3 (E.D. Mo. July 17, 2023) (finding
therapist’s religious discrimination and retaliation claims, stemming from the hospital’s rejection of
her request to be exempt from the COVID vaccine requirement due to her religious belief, were
precluded by the statutory exemption); Jacobs v. Mercy Health, 719 F. Supp. 3d 894, 906-907 (E.D.
Mo. 2024) (holding “the applicability of Title VII’s exemption is not contingent upon . . . 	a
statement by the religious organization that expressly identifies the religious beliefs in contention”);
Wertz v. Mercy Health, No. 4:23-CV-00579-NCC, 2024 WL 3427218, at *9 (E.D. Mo. July 16, 2024)
(holding that hospital was “entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law as exempt from Title
VII religious discrimination claims” because it was a “religious entit[y] within the meaning of Title
VII’s exemption, and the exemption shields [it] from religious discrimination claims, including
claims arising from disputes over vaccination requirements”); Reilly v. Ascension Wis., No. 22-CV-
1168-BHL, 2024 WL 4527290, at *3-5 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 18, 2024) (granting summary judgment for
healthcare organization because it was a religious organization and the workers’ claims—stemming
from their termination for failing to obtain the COVID vaccine due to their religious beliefs—were
covered by the statutory exemption); Hamil v. Acts Ret.-Life Communities Inc., No. CV 22-00366-KD-
B, 2025 WL 627227, at *9-10 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 26, 2025) (granting summary judgment for religious
organization because“[t]he law declares that such an organization is exempt from religious
discrimination claims under Title VII”).
The Court agrees with this consistent body of law , which accords with the Supreme Court’s
suggestion that the Title VII religious exemption protects both secular and religious decisions made
by a religious organization from religious discrimination claims. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 339
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(“Congress acted with a legitimate purpose in expanding the [Title VII statutory] exemption to cover
all activities of religious employers.”). The statutory exemptions do not require Defendants to proffer
a religious reason for their employment decision because, as religious entities, Defendants are
categorically exempt from claims alleging a failure to accommodate an employee’s religious practice.
LaNore’s second argument also fails because EO No. 40 had no impact on the TCHRA. In
early 2020, the Governor of Texas began issuing COVID related executive orders using the power
granted under the Texas Disaster Act. “The Disaster Act provides: ‘The Governor may suspend the
provisions of any regulatory statute prescribing the procedures for conduct of state business or the
orders or rules of a state agency if strict compliance with the provisions, orders, or rules would in
any way prevent, hinder, or delay necessary action in coping with a disaster.’” Abbott v. Harris Cnty.,
672 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Tex. 2023) (quoting Tex. Gov’t Code § 418.016(a)). According to the Texas
Supreme Court, “[t]his language places textual limitations on the power it grants to suspend statutes
. . . [because] the statutes suspended must be ‘regulatory[]’ [and] . . . ‘prescrib[e] the procedures for
conduct of state business.’” Id. at 12-13.
Relevant here, on October 11, 2021, Governor Abott issued EO No. 40 that stated in part:
No entity in Texas can compel receipt of a COVID-19 vaccine by any individual,
including an employee or a consumer, who objects to such vaccination for any reason
of personal conscience, based on a religious belief, or for medical reasons, including
prior recovery from COVID-19. I hereby suspend all relevant statutes to the extent
necessary to enforce this prohibition.
The Governor of the State of Texas, Exec. Order GA-40 (issued Oct. 11, 2021). Because the TCHRA
is not a regulatory statute, nor does it “prescribe the procedures for conduct of state business,” EO
No. 40 did not suspend the religious organization exemption within the TCHRA. Thus, the issuance
of EO No. 40 does not preclude Defendants from relying on the statutory exemptions.
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To conclude, because Defendants are religious organizations, they are immune from liability
for religious discrimination claims under Title VII and the TCHRA. LaNore’s discrimination and
retaliation claims are based on her contention that Defendants discriminated against her based on
her religious belief. See Doc. 1, Compl., 1. Therefore, the statutory exemptions apply to LaNore’s
claims, and they fail as a matter of law.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants Corporation of the Episcopal
Diocese of Dallas, Corporation of the Episcopal Diocese of Dallas d/b/a The Episcopal Diocese of
Dallas, and the Episcopal Diocese of Dallas’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 24). A final
judgment will follow.
SO ORDERED.
SIGNED: January 30, 2026.
_________________________________
JANE J. BOYLE
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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