Robert J O'Neill LLC et al v. Frisco Silver Star Hotel Corporation et al

U n i t e d 	S t a t e s 	D i s t r i c t 	C o u r t
N O R T H E R N D I S T R I C T O F T E X A S
D A L L A S D I V I S I O N
ROBERT J. O’NEILL and ROBERT J.
O ’ N E I L L E E C
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C I V I E A C T I O N N O . 3 : 2 4 - C V - 2 0 7 4 - S	F R I S C O S I E V E R S T A R H O T E E
C O R P O R A T I O N d / b / a O M N I F R I S C O
SIEVER 	HOTEL, 	OMNI 	HOTELS
MANAGEMENT 	CORPORATION, 	and
J O H N N Y L E E L O O M I S
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M E M O R A N D U M 	O P I N I O N 	A N D 	O R D E R
This Memorandum Opinion and Order addresses Defendant Johnny Lee Loomis’s Partial
Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (“Loomis Motion”)
[ECF No. 50] and Defendants Frisco Silver Star Hotel Corporation d/b/a Omni Frisco Silver Hotel
and Omni Hotels Management Corporation’s Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First
Amended Complaint (“Hotel Motion”) [ECF No. 54] (collectively, “Motions”). The Court has
reviewed the Motions, the Brief in Support of the Loomis Motion (“Loomis Brief’) [ECF No. 51],
the Brief in Support of the Hotel Motion (“Hotel Brief’) [ECF No. 55], Plaintiffs Robert J. O’Neill
and Robert J. O’Neill LLC’s Omnibus Response and Brief in Opposition to the Motions
(“Response”) [ECF No. 56], the Reply in Support of the Hotel Motion [ECF No. 57], and the
applicable law. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART the Motions to the extent
that the Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ negligent hiring, supervision, and retention claims, dismisses
Plaintiff Robert J. O’Neill LLC’s assault and false imprisonment claims and the vicarious liability
claims predicated on them, and strikes all references to Defendant Johnny Lee Loomis’s alleged
past misconduct.
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I . 	B A C K G R O U N D
This case arises out of an alleged physical altercation between Plaintiff Robert J. O’Neill
and Defendant Johnny Lee Loomis, asecurity guard at the Omni Frisco Hotel at The Star, ahotel
owned and operated by Defendants Frisco Silver Star Hotel Corporation d/b/a Omni Frisco Silver
Hotel and Omni Hotels Management Corporation (“Hotel Defendants”). In August 2023, O’Neill
stayed as aguest at the Omni Frisco Hotel at The Star. First Am. Compl. (“Complaint”) [ECF
No. 49] ITf 2, 36-37. During his stay, O’Neill visited the hotel bar at night, where he “ordered one
drink, and, tired from his day, fell asleep alone at the bar.” Id. 37-38. Loomis, asecurity guard
at the hotel, approached O’Neill and accompanied O’Neill to his room. Id. 39-40. At the door
of his room, O’Neill “searched for his keycard to unloek the door.” Id. 40.
As O’Neill tried to get into his room, Loomis allegedly “intentionally made contact with
O’Neill’s person by reaching for and grabbing O’Neill’s hotel key and/or wallet.” Id. ^123. The
sequence of events that immediately followed this alleged contact is unclear based on the pleadings
filed to date. However, Plaintiffs allege that “Loomis contacted another hotel employee ...and
requested that [he] call the police. Loomis alleged that O’Neill had assaulted him and used aracial
slur.” Id. 142. When the police arrived. Plaintiffs allege that Loomis “g[a]ve adescription of the
events ... that differed from the actual incident.” Id. 43. Police arrested O’Neill and took him to
the Frisco County jail for alleged public intoxication. Id. 45. Police also obtained awarrant for
O’Neill’s arrest on an assault charge. Id. O’Neill was not prosecuted for either public intoxication
or assault. Id. 146.
Plaintiffs allege that, prior to this incident, O’Neill had a“robust schedule of speaking
engagements” booked through his company. Plaintiff Robert J. O’Neill LLC (“RJO”). Id.
71-72. As aresult of Defendants’ actions. Plaintiffs claim that they “have incurred substantial
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losses in income, opportunities, and revenue,” id. ^72, and that “[O’Neill’s] business, RJO, was
ruined,” id. ]| 35.
Plaintiffs sued, asserting claims for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention and
vicarious 	liability 	against 	the 	Hotel 	Defendants, 	id. 	76-106, 	and 	for 	defamation, 	false
imprisonment, 	and 	assault 	against 	Loomis, 	id. 	m107-125. 	Under 	Federal 	Rule 	of 	Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), Loomis moves to dismiss RJO’s claims against him, Loomis Mot. 1, and the
Hotel Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against them, Hotel Mot. 6-8. Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), all Defendants move to strike references of Loomis’s
alleged past misconduct. Loomis Mot. 2; Hotel Mot. 110.
I I . 	L E G A L 	S T A N D A R D
To defeat amotion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a
plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state aclaim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl.
Corp. V. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). To meet this “facial plausibility” standard, aplaintiff
must “plead [] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(citation omitted). The court must accept well-pleaded facts as true and view them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Sonnier v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 509 F.3d 673, 675 (5th Cir.
2007) (citation omitted). However, the court does not accept as true “conclusory allegations.
unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.” Ferrer v. Chevron Corp., 484 F.3d 776, 780
(5th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Aplaintiff must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and
aformulaic recitation of the elements of acause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
(citation omitted). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise aright to relief above the
speculative level... on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if
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doubtful in fact).” Id. (citations omitted). At the motion to dismiss stage, the court does not evaluate
the plaintiffs likelihood of success. See Mann v. Adams Realty Co., 556 F.2d 288, 293 (5th Cir.
1977). It only determines whether the plaintiff has stated aclaim upon which relief can be granted.
See id.
I I I . 	A N A L Y S I S
The Hotel Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ direct negligence and vicarious liability
claims against them because Plaintiffs’ injuries were not foreseeable. Hotel Br. 5-6, and because
Loomis was not acting in the eourse and scope of his employment at the time, id. at 14 n.lO.
Loomis moves to dismiss RJO’s defamation, false imprisonment, and assault claims against him
because it “cannot legally maintain aclaim for false imprisonment or assault” and because it was
not involved in the incident at issue. Loomis Br. 3. Loomis also moves to strike allegations of his
alleged prior misconduct and descriptions of him as “sordid” and “deviant” from the Complaint
” 1
because they are immaterial, irrelevant, and “scandalous. 	I d a t 5 - 6 .
The Court first addresses Plaintiffs’ direct negligence claims against the Hotel Defendants.
Second, the Court considers RJO’s tort claims against Loomis. The Court then turns to Plaintiffs’
vicarious liability claim against the Hotel Defendants. Finally, the Court addresses Defendants’
request to strike certain references from the Complaint.
A. 	Direct 	Negligence
The Hotel Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ negligent hiring, retention, and
supervision claims against them.
The Hotel Defendants incorporated this argument by reference. Hotel Br. 3n.4.
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i. Negligent Hiring
The Texas Supreme Court has not determined the existence or precise elements of a
negligent hiring claim. Endeavor Energy Res., L.P. v. Cuevas, 593 S.W.3d 307, 311 (Tex. 2019)
(citation omitted). But to the extent that Texas law recognizes such aclaim, it requires negligence
by the employer and “some harmful or negligent conduct” by the employee. Wansey v. Hole, 379
S.W.3d 246, 247 (Tex. 2012). Both acts must proximately cause the plaintiffs injury. Werner
Enters., Inc. v. Blake, 719 S.W.3d 525, 540 (Tex. 2025) (citation omitted). Proximate cause
includes two components, cause-in-fact and foreseeability.” Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645,
658 (Tex. 2018) (citation omitted). “Whether an injury is foreseeable in aparticular instance
requires ‘more than someone, viewing the facts in retrospect, theorizing an extraordinary sequence
of events whereby the defendant’s conduct brings about the injury.’” McDorman ex rel. Connelly
V. Texas-Cola Leasing Co., 288 F. Supp. 2d 796, 804 (N.D. Tex. 2003) (quoting Doe v. Boys Clubs
of Greater Dali, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 478 (Tex. 1995)).
Plaintiffs argue that the Hotel Defendants negligently hired Loomis because they failed to
conduct an adequate investigation as part of Loomis’s employment screening. Compl. 80-82;
Resp. 9. Plaintiffs contend that the Hotel Defendants did not perform an internet search, which
would have uncovered information about Loomis’s past that purportedly would have made the
alleged assault, defamation, and false imprisonment foreseeable. Resp. 9, 17. Plaintiffs point to a
report authored by ahuman resources professional stating that “social media and internet checks'
are an industry best practice. Compl., Ex. 1[ECF No. 49-1] 2. But importantly. Plaintiffs cite no
Texas case that establishes aduty for employers to conduct internet searches of prospective
employees. Nor is the Court aware of any. See Doe v. YUM! Brands, Inc., 639 S.W.3d 214, 228
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.) (“[Plaintiff] cites no authority, nor are we aware
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of any, suggesting an employer has aduty to go beyond performing abackground check to examine
aprospective employee’s social media accounts to determine whether hiring the individual would
create an unreasonable risk of harm to others.”). The sole case that Plaintiffs reference, Doe v. Coe,
135 N.E.3d 1, 13-14 (111. 2019), had adirect nexus between the misconduct that would have been
uncovered by an internet search and the misconduct committed by the defendant, and is an Illinois
state court case that is neither binding on nor persuasive to this Court.
Texas courts routinely hold that present conduct without asufficient connection to past
behavior is not foreseeable. See, e.g., YUM! Brands, 639 S. W.3d at 228 (finding that an employee’s
imquestionably tasteless” social media activity did not make the employee’s criminal activity
foreseeable (citation omitted)); Fifth Club, Inc. v. Ramirez, 196 S.W.3d 788, 796-97 (Tex. 2006)
(holding that an employee’s violation of peace officer manual and use of profanity did not make
the employee’s alleged assault foreseeable); McDorman, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 805 (concluding that
an employee’s marijuana and domestic violence convictions, among other conduct, did not make
the employee’s negligent operation of avehicle foreseeable); Barton v. Whataburger, Inc., 276
S.W.3d 456, 463 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (finding that an employee’s
drug conviction and failure to pay child support did not make the employee’s aggravated assault
foreseeable (citation omitted)); Boys Club of Greater Dali, 907 S.W.2d at 478 (determining that
an employee’s driving while intoxicated convictions did not make the employee’s criminal
conduct, including sexual assault of young boys, foreseeable).
Here, the required nexus is not present. Plaintiffs allege that Loomis’s “problematic pasf
includes allegations of “serious misconduct against vulnerable individuals, maintenance of at least
four fake identities, misuse of employer property, and ... fictionalized stories of violence against
vulnerable individuals.” Compl. ^29. Even if the Hotel Defendants had performed an internet
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search of Loomis, and even if they had found this information on Loomis’s “problematic past,'
the Court finds that it would not have made the alleged assault, defamation, and false imprisonment
foreseeable. O’Neill, amilitary veteran who is “fully aware of his capabilities in any physical
confrontation,” id. T| 47, is not avulnerable individual. And alleged use of fake identities and
misuse of employer property do not indicate apropensity for assault, defamation, or false
imprisonment. Thus, Loomis’s alleged past lacks asufficient nexus to the torts alleged in the
Complaint to make those torts foreseeable.
Plaintiffs also contend that Loomis “did not hold the necessary certifications, licenses, or
registrations” to work in the Hotel Defendants’ security department, and that this issue should have
immediately disqualified Loomis from employment.” Id. 82. According to Plaintiffs, Loomis
was a“Security Officer” under Texas Occupations Code §1702.222 and therefore must have been
certified with the State. Id. 53-55 &n.2. However, Texas Occupations Code §1702.323 clarifies
that, subject to certain exceptions, “this chapter does not apply to an individual employed in an
employee-employer relationship exclusively and regularly by one employer in connection with the
affairs of the employer.” Plaintiffs argue that Loomis “worked for the [Hotel Defendants’] security
department,” Compl. ^55, and do not allege that Loomis fell into any of the exceptions contained
in Section 1702.323.^ Therefore, nothing in the Complaint indicates that Loomis was required to
be certified by the State. Regardless, even if Loomis was required to be certified, Plaintiffs allege
no facts indicating that Loomis’s lack of certification made his alleged torts foreseeable. See Fifth
Club, 196 S.W.3d at 796-97 (holding that an employee’s violation of apeace officer manual did
not make his assault against apatron foreseeable). Because nothing in Loomis’s background made
^Plaintiffs allege new facts in their Response in an attempt to allege that Loomis fell into one of the
exceptions in Section 1702.323. See Resp. 21. The Court will not consider allegations that are included in
aresponse brief but not in the Complaint. Obinyan v. Prime Therapeutics LLC, No. 3:18-CV-0933-D, 2019
WL 5647955, at *3 (N-D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2019) (citation omitted).
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his alleged assault, defamation, and false imprisonment foreseeable to the Hotel Defendants, the
Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ negligent hiring claim.
a. Negligent Retention
The Texas Supreme Court has not definitively recognized negligent retention as an
independent theory of liability. Pagayon v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 536 S.W.3d 499, 505 (Tex. 2017)
(citation omitted). However, like negligent hiring, the plaintiff must show that he ‘“suffer[ed] some
damages from the foreseeable misconduct of an employee’ who was ...retained pursuant to the
defendant’s negligent practices.” Clark v. PFPP Ltd. P’ship, 455 S.W.3d 283, 287 (Tex. App.
Dallas 2015, no pet.) (quoting Wansey, 378 S.W.3d at 247).
Plaintiffs allege that the Hotel Defendants negligently retained Loomis for two reasons.
First, Loomis, “[o]n at least two occasions ... was involved in violent altercations with [the Hotel
Defendants’] guests,” and, in “at least one of those instances, he fabricated awholly false narrative
to cast himself as the victim rather than the aggressor.” Compl. T| 85. Second, Loomis’s past
employer allegedly called the Hotel Defendants ayear prior to the events at issue here and told the
Hotel Defendants about Loomis’s alleged “previous misconduct,” including “incidents involving
vulnerable individuals.” Id. 56-57. Neither the previous altercations nor the phone call made
Loomis’s alleged torts here foreseeable.
Plaintiffs allege that Loomis had violent altercations with at least two guests prior to the
events in this case. Id. 49-52. According to Plaintiffs, the first altercation, which occurred in
2017, resulted in Loomis “claim[ing] to be the victim” of an assault. Id. ^49. Plaintiffs claim that
in the second altercation, which occurred in 2021, Loomis attacked aguest. Id. 50-52. The Hotel
Defendants “failed to take any remedial action” after either of the altercations. Id. 85. Therefore,
aecording to Plaintiffs, the Hotel Defendants negligently retained Loomis. Id. 85, 88.
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However, the Hotel Defendants point out that per public court records, it was the guest who
was charged with assault after each altercation, not Loomis, and it was the guest, not Loomis, who
pleaded guilty to assault. Hotel Br. 6-8; Hotel Defs.’ App. in Supp. of Hotel Mot. [ECF No. 23].
The Court takes judicial notice of the public court records showing the guests’ guilty pleas.^ Two
altercations in six years, both of which resulted in guilty pleas naming Loomis as the victim of an
assault, not the perpetrator, are insufficient to make Loomis’s alleged conduct foreseeable.
Plaintiffs also claim that Loomis’s previous employer “reached out to arepresentative of
the Hotel Defendants” in 2022 and told that person about Loomis’s previous alleged misconduct.
Compl. I56 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs claim that Loomis’s previous employer provided the
Hotel Defendants with “an investigative report packef’ and that “[djespite receiving this
information, the Hotel Defendants did not take reasonable steps to address Loomis’[s] past
misconduct.” 	Id. 	57-58. 	The 	Hotel 	Defendants’ 	failure 	allegedly 	“demonstrat[ed] 	awillful
disregard for guest safety and welfare.” Id. |59.
In cases of direct corporate liability, knowledge may be imputed to acorporate employer
from information obtained by its supervisory employees and agents." Verizon Emp. Benefits
Comm. V. Frawley, 655 F. Supp. 2d 644, 649 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (emphasis added) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). “To impute an employee’s knowledge to acompany, the
employee must be ‘acting within the scope of his authority’ and the knowledge must relate ‘to
matters within the scope of that authority.’” United States v. Harlingen Med. Ctr., 701 F. Supp. 3d
636, 651 (S.D. Tex. 2023) (quoting In re Hellenic Inc., 252 F.3d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 2001)).
^The filings are available through searches on the Collin County Courts Records Inquiry webpage
(https://cijspub.co.collin.tx.us/PublicAccess/Search.aspx?ID=100#MainContent). Adistrict 	court 	may
properly take judicial notice of public records in state court proceedings. See Stiel v. Heritage Numismatic
Auctions, Inc., 816 F. App’x 888, 892 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted); see also Lowe v. Hearst Commc ’ns,
Inc., 487 F.3d 246, 249 n.3 (5th Cir. 2007) (“All court records are presumptively available to the
public .. ..”).
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Plaintiffs allege no facts to indicate that Loomis’s previous employer provided information to a
supervisory employee or agent of the Hotel Defendants. Therefore, Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently
allege that the Hotel Defendants had knowledge of Loomis’s alleged past conduct. Moreover, as
explained above, even if the Hotel Defendants had received information from Loomis’s previous
employer, it would not have made the conduct described in the Complaint foreseeable. Because
Loomis’s two past altercations with guests, where he was adjudicated to be the victim of such
assaults, and information on his past employment did not make his conduct foreseeable, the Court
dismisses Plaintiffs’ negligent retention claim.
in. Negligent Supervision
The 	Court 	dismisses 	Plaintiffs’ negligent 	supervision 	claim 	for 	the 	same 	lack 	of
foreseeability discussed above. See McDorman, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 804 (“Foreseeability is apivotal
i s s u e 	i n 	a s s e s s i n g 	w h e t h e r 	a n 	e m p l o y e r 	h a s 	a d u t y 	i n 	t h e 	c o n t e x t 	o f 	a
negligent... supervising ... of an employee.” (citation omitted)).
* 	* 	*
Because Loomis’s prior conduct did not make his alleged conduct foreseeable, the Court
dismisses Plaintiffs’ negligent hiring, supervision, and retention claims against the Hotel
D e f e n d a n t s .
B . To r t C l a i m s
Loomis moves to dismiss RJO’s claims against him for defamation, false imprisonment.
and assault. To the extent that RJO brought afalse imprisonment or assault claim, RJO has since
expressly abandoned such claims. See Resp. 21 (stating that the “[Complaint] does not assert a
claim by RJO against Loomis for false imprisonment or for assault”).
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RJO does, however, maintain its defamation claim. Id. at 21-22. Loomis argues that
'Plaintiffs plead no facts that show Loomis published any statements, much less any false
statements, concerning RJO.” Loomis Br. 4. When adefamatory statement “specifically injures
the reputation of [a business owner],” the resulting damages are those “suffered as the owner of
the business,” not those suffered by the business itself Waste Mgmt. of Tex., Inc. v. Tex. Disposal
Sys. Landfill, Inc., 434 S.W.3d 142,150 n.35 (Tex. 2014) (citation omitted). “O’Neill conducts his
speaking engagements through his company, RJO[.]” Compl. ^72. And Plaintiffs allege that,
because of Loomis’s defamation of O’Neill, O’Neill’s “speaking opportunities declined, book
sales dropped, [and] revenue fell, and ... RJO was ruined.” Id. 135. As the owner of the business.
then, it is possible that RJO’s reputation may have been injured by Loomis’s alleged defamation.
Accepting all well-pleaded facts as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs,
as the Court must, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs pleaded sufficient facts to state aclaim for
relief that is plausible on its face. Therefore, the Court dismisses RJO’s false imprisonment and
assault claims but declines to dismiss RJO’s defamation claim.
C. Vicarious Liability
The Hotel Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ vicarious liability claims against them.
Generally, an employer is vicariously liable for the torts of its employees “committed in the course
and scope of their employment. ..even though the employee’s tort is intentional when the act.
although not specifically authorized by the employer, is closely connected with the [employee’s]
authorized duties.” GTE Sw., Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 617-18 (Tex. 1999) (citations
omitted). While “[i]t is not ordinarily within the scope of a[n] [employee’s] authority to commit
an assault on athird person,... exceptions may exist where the assault... is closely connected
with the [employee’s] authorized duties, such as where asecurity guard uses more force than is
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necessary.” Medina v. Herrera, 927 S.W.2d 597, 601 (Tex. 1996) (first alteration in original)
(citation omitted).
/. Plaintiff Robert J. O’Neill
With respect to O’Neill’s claims against the Hotel Defendants, Plaintiffs allege that Loomis
was acting in the course and scope of his employment as asecurity guard for the Hotel Defendants
when he published false statements about O’Neill to another employee and to law enforcement
officers, Compl. 109, 101-02, instigated O’Neill’s arrest, id. THf 120,101-02, and “intentionally
made contact with O’Neill’s person by reaching for him and grabbing O’Neill’s hotel key and/or
wallet,” id. 123, 101-02. Accepting Plaintiffs’ well-pleaded allegations as true. Plaintiffs have
pleaded sufficient facts to make O’Neill’s vicarious liability claim plausible on its face.'* The Court
denies the Hotel Defendants’ request to dismiss O’Neill’s vicarious liability claim.
a. Plaintiff RJO
For the reasons stated above, any claims by RJO for false imprisonment and assault have
been abandoned. As such, the Hotel Defendants cannot be vicariously liable for such violations.
and the Court dismisses RJO’s vicarious liability cause of action predicated on those claims.
However, RJO’s vicarious liability claim survives at this stage of this lawsuit to the extent it is
b a s e d o n d e f a m a t i o n .
*The Hotel Defendants argue that because Plaintiffs allege that “Loomis recognized O’Neill and wanted to
cause him great harm and embairassment out of ill will and spite,” Compl. H113, there is no basis for
vicarious liability, Hotel Br. 14 n.lO. While the Hotel Defendants are correct that an employer is generally
not liable for an intentional tort committed by an employee out of personal animus, Bodin v. Vagshenian,
462 F.3d 481, 484 (5th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted), the Court need not accept Plaintiffs’ conclusory
allegation as true, see Pamon v. U.S. Postal5'erv., No. 3:25-CV-539-G-BK, 2025 WL 3785554, at *4 (N.D.
Tex. Nov. 3, 2025) (citation omitted), report and recommendation adopted by 2026 WL 19417 (N.D. Tex.
Jan. 2, 2026).
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D . M o t i o n t o S t r i k e
Loomis moves to strike the references to his background and past employment in the
Complaint because they are irrelevant and “scandalous.” Loomis Br. 5-6. “Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(f) provides that adistrict court ‘may strike from apleading ... any redundant,
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.9 9 9
United States v. Coney, 689 F.3d 365, 379 (5th
Cir. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f)). Scandalous “generally refers to
any allegation that unnecessarily reflects on the moral character of an individual.” Florance v.
Buchmeyer, 500 F. Supp. 2d 618, 645 (N.D. Tex. 2007) (citation omitted). Plaintiffs argue that
Loomis’s past conduct “is highly probative in the negligent hiring case.” Resp. 24. But the Court
dismissed those claims above and has already struck similar allegations of Loomis’s past alleged
misconduct. See Tr. of Aug. 19, 2025, Hr’g, ECF No. 48, at 53:18-54:22. Because the Court has
dismissed Plaintiffs’ negligent hiring, supervision, and retention claims, in addition to the reasons
for which the Court previously granted Defendants’ first motion to strike, the Court strikes all
references to such purported “misconduct” in the Complaint, including any material attached to
the Complaint, as requested in the Loomis Motion.
I V . 	C O N C L U S I O N
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART
Defendant Johnny Lee Loomis’s Partial Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ First
Amended Complaint [ECF No. 50]. The Court GRANTS the Loomis Motion to the extent that the
C o u r t D I S M I S S E S W I T H P R E J U D I C E P l a i n t i ff R o b e r t J . O ’ N e i l l L L C ’s a s s a u l t a n d f a l s e
imprisonment claims and STRIKES all references to Defendant Johnny Lee Loomis’s alleged
past misconduct. The Court DENIES the Loomis Motion as to Plaintiff Robert J. O’Neill LLC’s
d e f a m a t i o n c l a i m .
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Further, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants Frisco Silver
Star 	Hotel 	Corporation 	d/b/a 	Omni 	Frisco 	Silver 	Hotel 	and 	Omni 	Hotels 	Management
Corporation’s Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint [ECF
No. 54]. The Court GRANTS the Hotel Motion to the extent that the Court DISMISSES WITH
PREJUDICE Plaintiffs’ negligent hiring, supervision, and retention claims against Defendants
Frisco Silver Star Hotel Corporation d/b/a Omni Frisco Silver Hotel and Omni Hotel Management
Corporation, and Plaintiff Robert J. O’Neill LLC’s vicarious liability claims predicated upon its
assault and false imprisonment claims. The Court DENIES the Hotel Motion as to Plaintiff Robert
J. O’Neill’s vicarious liability claim and Plaintiff Robert J. O’Neill, LLC’s vicarious liability claim
predicated on its defamation claim.
S O 	O R D E R E D .
SIGNED March 6, 2026.
K A R E N 	G R E N 	S C H O L E R
U N I T E D 	S T A T E S 	D I S T R I C T 	J U D G E
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