Amazon Content Services LLC et al v. Freemon et al

Order – Page 1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
AMAZON CONTENT SERVICES LLC; 	§
COLUMBIA PICTURES INDUSTRIES, 	§
INC.; DISNEY ENTERPRISES, INC.; 	§
NETFLIX US, LLC; NETFLIX 	§
WORLDWIDE ENTERTAINMENT, 	§
LLC; PARAMOUNT PICTURES 	§
CORPORATION; SONY PICTURES 	§
ANIMATION INC.; UNIVERSAL 	§
CITY STUDIOS PRODUCTION 	§
LLLP; and WARNER BROS 	§
ENTERTAINMENT, INC., 	§
§
Plaintiffs, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	Civil Action No. 3:24-CV-733-L-BK
§
WILLIAM FREEMON, II; 	§
FREEMON TECHNOLOGY 	§
INDUSTRIES, LLC; INSTANTIPTV.NET; §
STREAMINGTVNOW.NET; 	§
TVNITRO.NET; CASHAPPIPTV.COM; 	§
LIVETVRESELLERS.COM; 	§
STNCLOUD.LTD; and 	§
STNLIVE.LTD, 	§
§
Defendants. 	§
ORDER
On February 24 and 25, 2026, the United States Magistrate Judge entered the following
Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations (collectively, “Reports”):
(1) Report No. 1 (Doc. 116), recommending that the court deny Defendant’s Motion to Set
Aside Clerk’s Entry of Default (Doc. 83), filed by William Freemon, II (“Mr. Freemon”);
(2) Report No. 2 (Doc. 117), recommending that the court deny Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Due to Lack of Standing (Doc. 87), filed
by Mr. Freemon; and
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(3) Report No. 3 (Doc. 118), recommending that the court grant Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default
Judgment against All Defendants (Doc. 75).
On March 9, 2026, Mr. Freemon, who is proceeding pro se, filed objections to all three Reports.
The court addresses Mr. Freemon’s objections to each Report below, and, for the reasons herein
explained, the court accepts the Reports and overrules his objections.
I. 	Report No. 1 (Doc. 116)
The magistrate judge recommends that the court deny Mr. Freemon’s Motion to Set Aside
Clerk’s Entry of Default (Doc. 83) in light of his repeated failure to file an amended complaint as
ordered despite being aware of the consequences of his noncompliance, which conduct the
magistrate judge concludes was willful because Mr. Freemon does not dispute that he had actual
notice of the court’s order (Doc. 24), he fails to offer any explanation for his failure to comply
with the court’s order, and the record does not support his assertion that he acted expeditiously in
attempting to cure his failure to comply with the court’s order or set aside the clerk’s entry of
default. The magistrate judge also agreed with Plaintiffs’ argument that Mr. Freemon’s prolonged
delay in moving to set aside the clerk’s entry of default stands in stark contrast to his extensive
activity in this action during the same time. The magistrate judge, therefore, determined that, even
resolving all doubts in Mr. Freemon’s favor, he “failed to demonstrate that his failure to file an
amended appearance in this action was the result of excusable neglect, rather than willful default,
which is alone sufficient to justify the denial of relief,” and “[a]lthough a finding of willfulness is
enough to end the inquiry, [Mr.] Freemon’s failure to proffer a meritorious defense also supports
a finding that no good cause exists to set aside the default.” Doc. 116 at 8 & n.3 (citation omitted).
In the title of Mr. Freemon’s objections, he indicates that he is objecting to all three Reports
(Docs. 116, 117, 118); however, the body of his objections contain no objections to Report No. 1
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(Doc. 116) or the recommended denial of his Motion to Set Aside Clerk’s Entry of Default (Doc.
83). Accordingly, he waived any objections he may have had to this Report. The court also notes
that it finds no error in this Report or recommendation. The court will, therefore, deny this motion
by Mr. Freemon as recommended by the magistrate judge.
II. 	Report No. 2 (Doc. 117)
The magistrate judge next recommends that the court deny the Motion to Dismiss for Lack
of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Due to Lack of Standing (Doc. 87) because, contrary to Mr.
Freemon, Plaintiffs have adequately connected him to the infringing activity at issue and
demonstrated the requisite concrete or particularized injury that is traceable to him. Doc. 117 at 5
(citations omitted). The magistrate judge further determined that, “even absent evidence linking
[Mr.] Freemon to the back-end domains, Plaintiffs would still have standing because they assert
both direct and secondary copyright claims.” Id. at 10.
As noted, the title of Mr. Freemon’s objections indicates that he is objecting to all three
Reports (Docs. 116, 117, 118). The body of his objections, however, does not contain any objection
to Report No. 2 (Doc. 117) or the recommended denial of his Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Subject Matter Jurisdiction Due to Lack of Standing (Doc. 87).* 	Accordingly, he waived any
objections he may have had to this Report. The court also notes that it finds no error in this Report
or recommendation. The court will, therefore, deny this motion by Mr. Freemon as recommended
by the magistrate judge.
* Although Mr. Freemon references Doc. 117 in the body of his objections, he does so merely for purposes of objecting
to the magistrate judge’s recommendation that the court grant Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment that is addressed
in Doc. 118. The court addresses his arguments with respect to this recommendation in the section of this order dealing
with Report No. 3 (Doc. 118).
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III. 	Report No. 3 (Doc. 118)
The magistrate judge finally recommends that the court grant Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default
Judgment against All Defendants (Doc. 75). The magistrate judge first notes with respect to the
Domain Defendants that, although Plaintiffs also named the websites and domains allegedly used
by Mr. Freemon to offer infringing services in this action, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment
seeks default judgment only against Mr. Freemon and Freemon Technology Industries, LLC (“FTI
LLC”). Doc. 118 at 3 & n.1. In this regard, the magistrate judge also notes that Plaintiffs contend
that “[Mr.] Freemon and FTI LLC retain control over the identified domains and services, and the
[magistrate judge] has found that [Mr.] Freemon has not effectively disputed that contention.” Id.
The magistrate judge, therefore, recommends that the court dismiss this action against the Domain
Defendants, as any relief against them would be duplicative of the relief awarded against Mr.
Freemon and FTI LLC.
The magistrate judge determined that Plaintiffs are entitled to default judgment against Mr.
Freemon and FTI LLC (“Defaulting Defendants”) because default judgment is procedurally
warranted; and Plaintiffs’ pleadings provide a sufficient basis for entry of default judgment. The
magistrate judge also determined that Plaintiffs are entitled to recover the maximum amount of
statutory damages under the Copyright Act because the Defaulting Defendants’ infringement was
willful and likely profited handsomely at Plaintiffs’ expense “[g]iven the extensive and ongoing
nature of [their] willful infringement.” Id. at 16. The magistrate judge, therefore, determined that
Plaintiffs are entitled to and “should be awarded $150,000 per copyrighted work under 17 U.S.C.
§ 504(c)(2), and [Defaulting] Defendants should be ordered to pay the total amount of $18,750,000
in statutory damages.” Doc. 118 at 17. 	In addition to monetary damages, the magistrate judge
concluded that Plaintiffs’ request for a permanent injunction should be granted because they
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Order – Page 5
satisfied all of the requirements for a permanent injunction and the terms of their requested
permanent injunction is narrowly tailored to remedy their specific harms and prevent future
infringement. Finally, the magistrate judge determined that Plaintiffs should be awarded
postjudgment interest at the applicable federal rate, and Plaintiffs are entitled to recover the
reasonable attorney’s fees that they incurred in this action in an amount to be determined by
postjudgment motion.
Mr. 	Freemon’s 	objections 	focus 	on 	the 	correctness 	of 	the 	magistrate 	judge’s
recommendation that Plaintiffs are entitled to default judgment. In this regard, he contends that
there is not a sufficient factual basis linking him to ownership or operation of the IPTV services,
including the services identified by Plaintiffs as Streaming TV Now and TV Nitro, which Plaintiffs
allege 	that 	he 	owned 	or 	operated. 	Mr. 	Freemon 	contends 	that 	the 	magistrate 	judge’s
recommendation relies on “inference rather than evidentiary proof.” Doc. 121 at 2. He, therefore,
argues that, “[b]ecause default judgment requires a sufficient factual basis linking the defendant
to the alleged conduct, the absence of documentary evidence connecting [him] to the operation of
the accused services or associated domains prevents entry of judgment under the standard
articulated in Nishimatsu.” Id. at 2 (cleaned up). Mr. Freemon similarly asserts that Plaintiffs were
required but failed to demonstrate traceability via evidence rather than their pleadings, and the
magistrate judge’s recommendation incorrectly relies on allegations rather than evidence.
The court overrules these objections, which appear to be based on a misapprehension of
the legal standard applicable to motions for default judgment. Mr. Freemon, by failing to answer
or otherwise respond to Plaintiffs’ Complaint, has admitted the well-pleaded allegations of the
Complaint and is precluded from contesting the established facts on appeal. Nishimatsu Constr.
Co. v. Houston Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975) (citations omitted). 	While a
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“defendant is not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of law,” he
may not contest the “sufficiency of the evidence” on appeal but “is entitled to contest the
sufficiency of the complaint and its allegations to support the judgment.” Wooten v. McDonald
Transit Assocs., Inc., 788 F.3d 490, 496 (5th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). Having admitted the
allegations in the Complaint, the only issue for the court to decide is the sufficiency of such
allegations, not whether Plaintiffs have come forward with evidence to support their copyright
infringement claim. 	As indicated, the magistrate judge determined that the pleadings present a
“sufficient basis” for relief warranting entry of default judgment on Plaintiffs’ copyright
infringement claim. In making this determination, the magistrate judge also correctly noted that,
“[u]nder this standard, [the] plaintiff’s factual allegations, taken as true, “need only be enough to
raise a right to relief above a speculative level.” Wooten, 788 F.3d at 498 (citation omitted). As the
court finds no error in the legal standard applied by the magistrate judge or the way in which the
magistrate judge applied that standard to pleadings in this case in recommending that Plaintiffs are
entitled to entry of default judgment against Mr. Freemon, it overrules these objections.
Mr. Freemon next objects, contending that the evidence in this case does not support an
award 	of 	statutory 	damages 	because 	the 	magistrate 	judge’s 	recommendation 	references
“‘representative works,’ but statutory damages under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) must be supported by
record evidence linking each work to the alleged infringement,” and the magistrate judge “does
not identify evidence showing that any specific copyrighted work was transmitted through a
domain attributable to [him].” Doc. 121 at 5. Mr. Freemon, therefore, asserts that, [b]ecause the
[magistrate judge’s recommendation] does not identify evidence linking the listed works to
specific infringing transmissions attributable to [him], the damages calculation lacks the factual
basis required under Nishimatsu.” Id. (cleaned up).
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This objection fails for the same reason his prior objections fail because, as explained,
whether Plaintiffs are entitled to default judgment turns on the sufficiency of their pleadings, not
whether they have come forward with evidence to support their claims. 	Accordingly, this
objection is overruled.
Finally, Mr. Freemon objects, arguing that the magistrate judge erred in recommending the
imposition of a permanent injunction against him. 	Specifically, he asserts: “Under eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006), a permanent injunction requires a showing of actual
success on the merits and proof of irreparable harm. Because the record fails to establish a
sufficient factual basis for liability, the required elements for injunctive relief have not been
demonstrated.” Doc. 121 at 5 (cleaned up).
The magistrate judge noted as follows regarding the legal standard applicable to Plaintiffs’
request for permanent injunction:
Under 17 U.S.C. § 502(a), a court has the power to grant “final injunctions
on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a
copyright.” Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 790 (5th Cir. 1999)
(quoting 17 U.S.C. § 502(a)). To obtain a permanent injunction in copyright cases,
the plaintiff must show: “(1) actual success on the merits; (2) no adequate remedy
at law; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs any damage to the defendant; and
(4) the injunction will not disserve the public interest.” Arista Records, Inc. v.
Kabani, No. 3:03-CV-1191, 2004 WL 884445, at *4. (N.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2004)
(Sanders, J.) (citing DSC Comm’ns Corp. v. DGI Tech. Inc., 81 F.3d 597, 600 (5th
Cir. 1996)).
Doc. 118 at 18. Having already determined that the pleadings in this case provide a sufficient basis
for liability with respect to Plaintiffs’ copyright claim, Mr. Freemon’s argument that Plaintiffs
have not demonstrated actual success on the merits necessarily fails. Additionally, contrary to Mr.
Freemon’s argument, Plaintiffs were not required to provide “proof of irreparable harm.” They
were only required to show that “the threatened injury outweighs any damage to the defendant.”
Doc. 118 at 18. The magistrate judge determined that there was no indication that Mr. Freemon or
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Order – Page 8
FTI LLC would suffer any harm from a permanent injunction that prevents their continued
unlawful infringement. Finding no error, the court overrules these objections by Mr. Freemon.
IV. 	Conclusion
Having considered the parties’ Motions, the briefs, the pleadings, record in this case, and
Report, and having conducted a de novo review of the portions of the Reports objected to by Mr.
Freemon, the court determines that the findings and conclusions of the magistrate judge are correct,
and accepts them as those of the court. The court, therefore, overrules Mr. Freemon’s objections
for the reasons explained and rules as follows:
(1) Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside Clerk’s Entry of Default (Doc. 83) is denied;
(2) Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Due to Lack of
Standing (Doc. 87) is denied;
(3) Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment against Mr. Freemon and FTI LLC (Doc. 75) is
granted; and
(4) any and all relief against remaining Domain Defendants is dismissed with prejudice as
duplicative of the relief awarded against Mr. Freemon and FTI LLC.
Plaintiffs are awarded $18,750,000 in statutory damages against Mr. Freemon and FTI LLC.
Postjudgment interest will apply to this amount and will be calculated from the date judgment is
entered at the applicable federal rate of 3.51% until paid in full. The court defers ruling on any
request by Plaintiffs to recover attorney’s fees and will decide this issue postjudgment upon the
filing of a motion and supporting documentation in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(d).
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The court further orders that:
1. 	Mr. Freemon and FTI LLC, and all individuals who serve as their officers, agents,
servants, employees and attorneys, and other persons who have notice of this injunction
and are in privity with Mr. Freemon and FTI LLC and/or acting in active concert or
participation with Mr. Freemon and FTI LLC, their officers, agents, servants employees
or attorneys, are hereby restrained and permanently enjoined from:
a. 	linking to, distributing, reproducing, copying, hosting, uploading, making available
for download, indexing, displaying, exhibiting, publicly performing (including
without limitation streaming, transmitting, or otherwise communicating to the
public), or otherwise exploiting or making any use of any rights under the
Copyright Act in any motion picture or other audiovisual work (or portion(s)
thereof in any form), the rights to which Plaintiffs or their affiliates own or control
(“Copyrighted Works”);
b. 	taking any action that directly or indirectly enables, facilitates, permits, assists,
solicits, encourages or induces any user or other third party (i) to link to, distribute,
reproduce, copy, host, upload, download, index, display, exhibit, publicly perform
(including without limitation streaming, transmitting, or otherwise communicating
to the public), or otherwise use or exploit in any manner any of Plaintiffs’
Copyrighted Works or portion(s) thereof; or (ii) to make available any of Plaintiffs’
Copyrighted Works or portion(s) thereof for linking to, distributing, reproducing,
copying, 	hosting, 	uploading, 	downloading, 	indexing, 	displaying, 	exhibiting,
publicly performing (including without limitation streaming, transmitting, or
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Order – Page 10
otherwise communicating to the public), or for any other use or means of
exploitation;
c. 	transferring or performing any function that results in the transfer of the registration
of the domain name of instantiptv.net, streamingtvnow.com, streamingtvnow.net,
tvnitro.net, cashappiptv.com, livetvresellers.com, stncloud.ltd, and stnlive.ltd (the
“Infringing Domains”) to any other registrant or registrar other than as identified
by Plaintiffs; and
d. 	assisting, aiding or abetting any other person or business entity in engaging in or
performing any of the activities referred to in the above subparagraphs (a)-(c); and
2. 	To give practical effect to this permanent injunction, Mr. Freemon and FTI LLC, their
assignees and/or successors-in-interest or title, and/or the domain name registrars are
hereby ordered to immediately transfer the Infringing Domains to Plaintiffs’ control.
If the current registrars do not facilitate the transfer of the Infringing Domains to
Plaintiffs’ control within five (5) days of receipt of this Order and corresponding
Default Judgment, upon Plaintiffs’ request, Mr. Freemon and FTI LLC as Defaulting
Defendants and the top level domain (TLD) registry for each of the Infringing
Domains, 	or 	their 	administrators, 	including 	backend 	registry 	operators 	or
administrators, shall, within thirty (30) days, (i) change the registrar of record for the
Infringing Domains to a registrar of Plaintiffs’ choosing, and that registrar shall transfer
the subject domain names to Plaintiffs, or (ii) place the Infringing Domains on registry
hold status for the life of the current registration, thus removing them from the TLD
zone files maintained by the registries which link the Infringing Domains to the IP
addresses where the associated websites are hosted.
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3. 	Plaintiffs may complete service of process by e-mail for Defaulting Defendants.
In accordance with Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a default judgment
will issue by separate document.
It is so ordered this 11th day of March, 2026.
_________________________________
Sam A. Lindsay
United States District Judge
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