Griffin v. Johnson County Jail et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
GENERIAL GRIFFIN, §
TDCJ No. 02423396, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
V. § No. 3:23-cv-2219-X-BN
§
JOHNSON COUNTY JAIL, §
ET AL., §
§
Defendants. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Generial Griffin, now a Texas prisoner, filed a pro se civil rights
complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 relating to his medical care while a pretrial
detainee in Johnson County. See Dkt. No. 4. And United States District Judge
Brantley Starr referred Griffin’s lawsuit to the undersigned United States magistrate
judge for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of
reference.
The Court granted Griffin leave to proceed in forma pauperis under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). See Dkt. No. 7. Griffin has also filed a motion for
summary judgment. See Dkt. No. 20.
And, after screening his claims, as detailed below, the undersigned now enters
these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation that the Court should
dismiss this lawsuit under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and deny Griffin’s motion for summary
judgment.
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Applicable Background
In his complaint, Griffin alleges claims relating to medical treatment for an
abscess in his mouth. See Dkt. No. 4 at 4-5. It is not clear from the complaint when
the issue first arose, but Griffin alleges he reported it on intake at White Settlement
City Jail on August 10, 2022, Tarrant County Jail on August 11, 2022, and Johnson
County Jail on August 22, 2022. See id. Griffin alleges that about two weeks after his
arrival at Johnson County Jail, he was prescribed antibiotics and Ibuprofen. See id.
at 5. And, on September 16, 2022, he alleges that he was taken to Johnson County
Hospital and then to J.P.S. Fort Worth with a high fever and blood poisoning from
the infected abscess. See id.
Under the PLRA, where prisoners (whether incarcerated or detained pending
trial) seek relief from a governmental entity or employee, a district court must, on
initial screening, identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion
of the complaint, that “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
Consistent with this obligation, the undersigned required the Johnson County
Sheriff to file a report under Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1978). See
Dkt. No. 9. The sheriff filed the Martinez report on December 11, 2023. See Dkt. No.
12. And the Court allowed Griffin to file a response, see Dkt. No. 13, which he did on
January 18, 2024, see Dkt. No. 16. Griffin’s response did not deny any of the records
and factual information provided in the Martinez report but only disagreed with the
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sheriff’s arguments as to the impact and relevance of those records. See id.
Before the Martinez report was filed, Griffin filed a notice of intention to file a
motion to amend indicating that he planned to amend to “giv[e] the full and proper
names of each and all defendants” after the Martinez report was filed. See Dkt. No.
10. And Griffin did file a motion for leave to amend with his response to the Martinez
report. See Dkt. No. 15.
In his motion, Griffin did not specifically identify any individual defendants
but stated “[p]aragraphs are amended to reflect the identity and the actions of
Johnson County Jail medical staff.” Id. at 1. The caption of the motion listed the
defendants as “Johnson County Jail, Medical Staff, et al.,” but no amended pleading
was filed with the motion identifying any individual defendants or the specific
allegations against them. See id. Instead, the motion merely appears to incorporate
the information from the records attached to the Martinez report as to the identity
and actions of medical staff and leave the Court to identify the specific defendants
and allegations. The Court granted the motion “to the extent that the undersigned
will review the entirety of … Griffin’s allegations in screening his claims considering
the report under Martinez ….” Dkt. No. 19.
Griffin’s motion for summary judgment also relies largely on the information
provided in the Martinez report. See Dkt. No. 20. And Griffin has now filed a notice
with a caption identifying the defendants as “Johnson County Jail, medical staff,
Ashley Lawrence, RN, Dayle Austin, LVN, [and] Amy Bankston, LVN.” See Dkt. No.
23. The undersigned construed this notice as a second motion for leave to amend and
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entered an order with this FCR granting the motion as to the identity of the
defendants and directing the Clerk of Court to update the docket accordingly.
Legal Standards
As set out above, the PLRA authorizes the Court to dismiss a complaint where
it “fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
Because this language tracks the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), the Court should apply the pleading standards as set out in Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
Under these standards, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) does not require
that a complaint contain detailed factual allegations, but it does require “enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks
for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678.
So, “[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief.” Id. (cleaned up; quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
On the other hand, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.; cf. Bryant v. Ditech Fin., L.L.C.,
No. 23-10416, 2024 WL 890122, at *3 (5th Cir. Mar. 1, 2024) (“[J]ust as plaintiffs
cannot state a claim using speculation, defendants cannot defeat plausible inferences
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using speculation.”).
“The burden is on the plaintiff to frame a ‘complaint with enough factual
matter (taken as true) to suggest’ that he or she is entitled to relief.” Robbins v.
Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
And, while a court must accept a plaintiff’s allegations as true, it is “not bound
to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
In fact, “the court does not ‘presume true a number of categories of statements,
including,’” in addition to legal conclusions, “‘mere labels; threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action; conclusory statements; and naked assertions devoid of
further factual enhancement.’” Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 269 (5th Cir. 2023)
(quoting Harmon v. City of Arlington, Tex., 16 F.4th 1159, 1162-63 (5th Cir. 2021)).
So, to avoid dismissal for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted under Section 1915A(b)(1), plaintiffs must “plead facts sufficient to show”
that the claims asserted have “substantive plausibility” by stating “simply, concisely,
and directly events” that they contend entitle them to relief. Johnson v. City of Shelby,
Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014) (per curiam) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)-(3), (d)(1), (e));
see also Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890, 899
(5th Cir. 2019) (“‘Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief’
is ‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.’” (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679)).
A Martinez report is one “tool” a district court may use to screen claims under
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Section 1915A. Hamer v. Jones, 364 F. App’x 119, 122 n.2 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)
(“This court has adopted the procedures used in Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d 317 (10th
Cir. 1978), as a tool by which an administrative record is constructed to assist in
assessing prisoner litigation under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.” (citing Norton v. Dimazana,
122 F.3d 286, 292-93 (5th Cir. 1997))).
And, as the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit more recently
explained,
[a] district court may obtain a Martinez report to frame its evaluation of
a prisoner’s in forma pauperis claim. “A Martinez report is produced as
a result of prison officials’ investigating the prisoner’s complaints and
compiling an administrative record that acts like an affidavit to aid the
district court in screening the complaint.” The report serves only to “sort
and clarify issues raised in a pro se complaint.”
Thompson v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 67 F.4th 275, 280 (5th Cir. 2023)
(footnotes omitted).
And, so, information provided through “[a] Martinez report may not be used to
resolve material disputed fact findings when they are in conflict with the pleadings
or affidavits.” Newby v. Quarterman, 325 F. App’x 345, 354 (5th Cir. 2009) (per
curiam) (citing Shabazz v. Askins, 980 F.2d 1333, 1334-35 (10th Cir. 1992)); accord
Cardona v. Taylor, 828 F. App’x 198, 201 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (collecting
cases).
Accordingly, “if the Martinez report conflicts with the pro se plaintiff’s
allegations, the district court must accept the plaintiff’s allegations as true, not the
records in the report.” Davis v. Lumpkin, 35 F.4th 958, 964 (5th Cir. 2022) (citation
omitted); see also Thompson, 67 F.4th at 280 (approving “[t]he district court[’s
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reliance] on the ‘more complete record’ in the Martinez report to elucidate details
about [a plaintiff’s alleged] medical evaluations” where “nothing in the district court’s
opinion [ ] contradict[ed] the claims in [the plaintiff’s] initial pleadings”). But “[i]f an
exhibit to a complaint contradicts an allegation in the complaint, the exhibit
controls.” Stevenson v. Tocé, 113 F.4th 494, 502-03 (5th Cir. 2024).
Analysis
First, Griffin’s claims against Johnson County Jail and “medical staff” must be
dismissed because neither the jail nor the general category of medical staff are jural
entities subject to suit. See Darby v. City of Pasadena, 939 F.2d 311, 313-14 (5th Cir.
1991) (servient agency or department cannot be sued unless it “enjoy[s] a separate
legal existence” because “true political entity has taken explicit steps to grant the
servient agency with jural authority”); Gomez v. Johnson County, No. 3:22-cv-1357-
E-BT, 2023 WL 8191916, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 27, 2023) (Johnson County jail is
nonjural entity), rec. accepted, 2023 WL 8190701 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 27, 2023); Wilson v.
Tangipahoa Parish Jail, No. 24-2704, 2025 WL 1539833, at *3 (E.D. La. Apr. 16,
2025) (medical staff as “broad group of people is not a properly named defendant” and
“action must be field against an actual identified person who violated a constitutional
right, not a department or general staff group at the jail”), rec. accepted, 2025 WL
1532756 (E.D. La. May 28, 2025).
Ordinarily, a pro se plaintiff who names a non-jural entity as defendant should
be alerted and given an opportunity to amend before dismissal of the complaint. See
Parker v. Fort Worth Police Dept., 980 F 2d 1023, 1026 (5th Cir.1993). But Griffin has
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already been granted leave to amend to name three individual defendants in addition
to the broad category of “medical staff” and any attempt to amend to name Johnson
County itself would be futile.
A county “cannot be held liable under § 1983 unless ‘execution of a
government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose
edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury.’”
Martinez v. Nueces Cnty., 71 F.4th 385, 389 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t
of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). A plaintiff may proceed on a
Monell claim only by
identify[ing] “(1) an official policy (or custom), of which (2) a policy maker
can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a
constitutional violation whose moving force is that policy (or custom).”
Pineda v. City of Hous., 291 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002) (cleaned up).
Municipalities are not liable “on the theory of respondeat superior” and
are “almost never liable for an isolated unconstitutional act on the part
of an employee.” Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 847 (5th
Cir. 2009).
Hutcheson v. Dall. Cnty., 994 F.3d 477, 482 (5th Cir. 2021); see also Brown v. Tarrant
Cnty., 985 F.3d 489, 497 & n.11 (5th Cir. 2021) (noting that where a plaintiff’s claim
fails as to one prong, a court “need not consider whether [his] claim also fails the other
two Monell prongs” (citing Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls, 614 F.3d 161, 168-69 (5th
Cir. 2010))).
Griffin does not allege any facts relating to an official policy or custom of
Johnson County. So allowing an opportunity to amend to name Johnson County
rather than the Johnson County Jail would be futile.
As to the specifically identified medical staff in Griffin’s recent notice, see Dkt.
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No. 23, Griffin has never set out specific allegations as to each individual but instead
has merely requested that the Court rely on the records provided with the Martinez
report to determine their actions, see Dkt. No. 15. So the undersigned will liberally
construe the records attached to the Martinez report as exhibits incorporated into the
amended complaint and construes the general allegations in the original complaint
with those records as Griffin’s amended complaint.
For a pretrial detainee, deliberate indifference claims are considered under the
due process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Ford v. Anderson Cnty.,
102 F.4th 292, 307 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting Est. of Henson v. Wichita County, 795 F.3d
456, 462 (5th Cir. 2015)). And finding a constitutional violation requires showing that
the defendant “(1) subjectively knew of a substantial risk of serious harm to the
detainee; and (2) responded to that risk with ‘deliberate indifference.’” Id. (citing Cope
v. Cogdill, 3 F.4th 198, 206-07 (5th Cir. 2021)).
“‘Deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard to meet’ but can be
satisfied by a ‘wanton disregard for [an inmate’s] serious medical needs.’” Cope, 3
F.4th at 207 (quoting Domino v. Tex. Dep't of Crim. Just., 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir.
2001)).
Put another way, “[d]eliberate indifference is a degree of culpability beyond
mere negligence or even gross negligence; it must amount to an intentional choice,
not merely an unintentionally negligent oversight.” Alvarez v. City of Brownsville,
904 F.3d 382, 391 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (quoting James v. Harris Cnty., 577 F.3d
612, 617-18 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting, in turn, Rhyne v. Henderson Cnty., 973 F.2d 386,
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392 (5th Cir. 1992))); see also Kelson v. Clark, 1 F.4th 411, 417 (5th Cir. 2021)
(“[D]eliberate indifference cannot be inferred merely from a negligent or even a
grossly negligent response to a substantial risk of serious harm. Rather, the plaintiff
must show that the officials refused to treat him, ignored his complaints,
intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would
clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.” (cleaned up)).
Alone, a disagreement with medical treatment or a failure to provide
additional medical treatment does not constitute deliberate indifference. See Domino,
239 F.3d at 756; Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 292 (5th Cir. 1997); see also Smith
v. Allen, 288 F. App’x 938, 939 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (determination that a
prisoner was not a candidate for further surgery after two prior surgeries were not
successful “is insufficient to establish a constitutional violation” (citations omitted)).
On intake at Johnson County Jail, the form indicates that Griffin was asked if
he had a “painful dental condition” and reported no. Dkt. No. 12 at 330. But he did
receive a dental referral for a broken tooth. Id. at 291, 323.
Two days, later Griffin was seen by Defendant Amy Bankston. LVN specifically
to address his dental complaints. See id. at 343. Bankston found that Griffin had two
broken teeth. His temperature was normal, and he reported mild but throbbing pain
as well as back pain from a previous injury. See id. Griffin was prescribed ibuprofen
twice a day as needed for the pain and told to return if his symptoms worsened. See
id.
Griffin was next seen by medical staff on September 8, 2022. See id. at 382.
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Griffin alleges that he filed sick call slips and grievances in the interim and “sought
officers attention.” Dkt. No. 4 at 5. The medical records show that he generally
received his medication other than three missed pills marked as “PRN not needed.”
Dkt. No. 12 at 126-27. But there are no specific allegations as to any of the named
defendants relating to Griffin’s allegations of a delay in care between August 24, 2022
and September 8, 2022.
On September 8, 2022, Griffin was seen by Defendant Dayle Austin, LVN. See
id. at 382. Griffin was complaining of severe pain in his jaw and asking to go to the
ER. See id. But Austin did not see swelling or redness and noted no issues with vital
signs or signs and symptoms of distress. See id. So Austin referred Griffin to dental,
and Robert Reeves, D.D.S. prescribed Amoxicillin. See id. at 382-83.
The next day Griffin refused a sick call with Defendant Amy Bankston, LVN.
See id. at 389, 462-63. Then, on September 12, 2022, Defendant Amy Bankston, LVN
requested a sick call for Griffin because his mother had called stating that Griffin had
not been receiving his medication and that he could not eat because his food was not
soft enough. See id. at 402. The medication records show that, after his September 8,
2022 appointment until he was taken to the hospital, Griffin received all prescribed
medication other than a one-day delay in administration of the Amoxicillin because
it was not available. See id. at 127-28.
On September 13, 2022, Griffin filed an emergency sick call request stating
that he had “not eaten in 3 or 4 days [because his] mouth wouldn’t open wide enough
to accept solid foods” and that he had “night … sweats, blurred vision, ear aches, and
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migra[ine]s with severe mouth pain.” Id. at 464.
On September 14, 2022, Griffin was seen by Defendant Ashley Lawrence,
RN/H.S.A. See id. at 414. Griffin reported constant but moderate pain and rated his
pain 3 out of 10. See id. He also reported that the swelling was getting worse, and
Lawrence also noted facial swelling on examination. See id. Griffin was prescribed a
second antibiotic (Clindamycin) and Acetaminophen for the pain, told to rinse with
warm water and salt often, and referred to a higher level of care. See id. In the
comments to the sick call request, Lawrence stated that “NO diet changes are needed”
and asked Griffin to give the new antibiotic time to work. Id. at 464.
On September 16, 2022, around 5:35 am, Griffin was sent to urgent care
because of an abscess, fever, and complaints of chest pains. See id. at 490. At the
hospital, Griffin reported pain onset 8 days before and fever onset that day up to
102.5. See id. at 235. He was transferred from Texas Health Cleburne to Texas Health
Harris Methodist Fort Worth because the necessary services were not available at
Texas Health Cleburne. See id. On September 20, 2022, Griffin had oral surgery to
extract a decayed molar. See id. at 163.
The complaint and incorporated records show that the named individual
defendants – Bankston, Austin, and Lawrence – provided medical treatment to
address Griffin’s complaints.
And, although that treatment did not sufficiently treat Griffin’s condition
leading to a medical emergency, he was immediately transported to the hospital when
his condition became emergent and then transferred to another hospital with the
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needed specialty care.
And the allegations do not sufficiently state a non-conclusory claim that the
named individual defendants subjectively knew of a substantial risk of serious harm
to the detainee and do not meet the high standard for alleging deliberate indifference
rather than negligence or gross negligence.
And, although no such claims are specifically alleged, to the extent that Griffin
also seeks to bring claims against Lawrence in a supervisory capacity as the Health
Services Administrator for the jail, “[u]nder section 1983, supervisory officials are not
liable for the actions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability.” Thompkins
v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir.1987).
So the Court should dismiss this lawsuit with prejudice under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b).
And, because Griffin’s allegations do not state a claim, he cannot prevail on a
motion for summary judgment in his favor, which requires that he “establish beyond
peradventure all of the essential elements of [each claim].” Hughes v. Dillard, Inc.,
No. 3:09-cv-218-D, 2009 WL 4279414, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2009) (cleaned up;
quoting Bank One, Tex., N.A. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 878 F. Supp. 943, 962
(N.D. Tex. 1995) (quoting, in turn, Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th
Cir. 1986))).
Leave to Amend
Griffin has already been granted leave to amend his complaint twice, but
rather than specifically alleging claims against particular individuals, Griffin’s
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amendment simply asks the Court to determine the relevant actions of the
defendants from the Martinez report. See Dkt. No. 15; see also Dkt. No. 23 (identifying
three specific individuals in caption but not alleging facts specific to each). And as
discussed above, granting leave to amend with respect to the nonjural entities would
be futile.
That said, if Griffin believes that he has not yet stated his best case – which
means, after considering the notice provided above, Griffin believes he knows of more
facts that he can assert to allege a plausible claim – the time to file objections (further
explained below) allows him an opportunity to explain how he would cure the
deficiencies identified above and thus show the Court that his case should not be
dismissed with prejudice at this time and that the Court should instead grant him
leave to amend his claims. See Scott v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 16 F.4th 1204, 1209
(5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (“A court should freely give leave to amend when justice
so requires, FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2)), but a movant must give the court at least some
notice of what his or her amendments would be and how those amendments would
cure the initial complaint’s defects.”).
Recommendation
The Court should deny Griffin’s motion for summary judgment and dismiss the
complaint with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these
findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections
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within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.
P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or
recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation
where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure
to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the
factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or
adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
DATED: February 10, 2026
_________________________________________
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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