Dill v. Experian Information Solutions Inc

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
DOUGLAS WAYNE DILL, SR., 	§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	No. 3:23-CV-1399-G-BW
§
EXPERIAN INFORMATION 	§
SOLUTIONS INC., et al., 	§
Defendants. 	§ 	Referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge1
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court is Intervenor Defendant Douglas Wayne Dill, Sr.’s Motion
to Dismiss Complaint in Intervention of R. Kent Piacenti and the Law Office of R.
Kent Piacenti PLLC (“Piacenti”), filed on October 20, 2025. (Dkt. No. 100
(“Mot.”).) 	Intervenor Plaintiff Piacenti filed a response on November 10, 2025.
(Dkt. No. 103 (“Resp.”).) Dill did not file a reply, and the time to do so has passed.
See N.D. Tex. L. Civ. R. 7.1(f) (“[A] party who has filed an opposed motion may file
a reply brief within 14 days from the date a response is filed.”). Accordingly, the
Motion (Dkt. No. 100) is ripe for consideration.
For the reasons below, the undersigned magistrate judge recommends that
Dill’s motion to dismiss Piacenti’s intervenor complaint (Dkt. No. 100) be denied.
1 Senior United States District Judge A. Joe Fish has referred this case to the
undersigned magistrate judge for full case management pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b).
(Dkt. No. 87.)
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I. BACKGROUND
This consolidated case began as two separate actions. On March 4, 2023,
Plaintiff Douglas Dill, Sr., represented by attorney R. Kent Piacenti, filed a petition
in the 68th Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas, against Experian
Information Solutions, Inc. asserting claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(“FCRA”) relating to Experian’s failure to remedy false information in Plaintiff’s
credit report. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 15-23 (“Compl. Exp.”).) Experian removed the
action on June 22, 2023, and it was assigned Case No. 3:23-CV-1399-G. (See Dkt.
No. 1.) On July 26, 2023, Dill filed suit in this Court asserting similar claims under
the FCRA against Trans Union, LLC, in Case No. 3:23-CV-1660-G. (See Dkt. No.
1, Case No. 3:23-CV-1660-G.) Because the Court perceived that the two actions
arose out of a common nucleus of facts, it consolidated the two actions in the interest
of judicial economy and efficiency. (Dkt. No. 13.)
The parties attempted to settle the cases in September 2024. (See Dkt. No. 51.)
They subsequently disputed whether a settlement agreement had been reached,
prompting a motion to enforce by the defendants. (See Dkt. 56.) Litigation of that
motion exposed disagreement between Dill and his attorney, prompting Piacenti,
with Dill’s full consent, to move to withdraw from further representing Dill. (See
Dkt. Nos. 56-60, 62-64, 69, 70.) The Court allowed Piacenti to withdraw on January
28, 2025 (Dkt. No. 66), and Dill has proceeded pro se in this action since.
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On April 9, 2025, Piacenti, filed a Motion to Intervene claiming an interest in
any monetary award to Dill pursuant to the fee agreement between them (Dkt. No.
77), to which Dill filed a response in opposition to intervention on April 22, 2025
(Dkt. No. 80). On October 14, 2025, the Court granted Piacenti’s Motion to
Intervene (Dkt. No. 98), and Piacenti’s Complaint in Intervention and supporting
exhibits (Dkt. 99) were filed on the same day. The exhibits include Exhibit A:
Experian Engagement Letter and Fee Agreement (Dkt. 99 at ECF p. 10-14), and
Exhibit B: Trans Union Engagement Letter and Fee Agreement (id. at ECF p. 16-
20.)
In granting Piacenti’s motion to intervene, the Court found that Piacenti had
shown that Dill retained him on a contingent-fee agreement, and “[t]he Fifth Circuit
has held that a discharged attorney (or law firm) may intervene in the principal
lawsuit when initially retained on a contingent-fee basis.” (Dkt. 98 at 2 (citing
Aragon v. Westrock Servs., LLC, No. 3:19-CV-01674-X, 2020 WL 10786537, at *2
(N.D. Tex. Nov. 16, 2020), in turn citing Gaines v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 434 F.2d 52
(5th Cir. 1970), and Keith v. St. George Packing Co., 806 F.2d 525 (5th Cir. 1986)).)
The Court also found that Piacenti was permitted to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2)
because he met the necessary requirements—he (1) timely filed his application,
(2) had an interest in the subject matter of the action, (3) demonstrated an
impediment to protection of this interest arising from the pending action, and
(4) showed inadequate protection of that interest by the existing parties to the action.
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(Id. at 3 (citing Williams v. Remington Arms Co., No. 3:05-CV-1383-D, 2006 WL
2993253, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 18, 2006), in turn citing Heaton v. Monogram Credit
Card Bank of Georgia, 297 F.3d 416, 422 (5th Cir. 2002).)
II. LEGAL STANDARDS AND ANALYSIS
Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes certain defenses
to be presented via pretrial motions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). These defenses are:
(1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction; (2) lack of personal jurisdiction; (3) improper
venue; (4) insufficient process; (5) insufficient service of process; (6) failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted; and (7) failure to join a required party. Fed.
R. Civ. P/ 12(b)(1)-(7). Although Dill does not specifically cite any of the above
Rule 12(b) defenses as grounds for his motion (see generally Mot.), the undersigned
construes the motion as an attempt to assert a defense under Rule 12(b)(6), because
that is the only available defense to challenge the substance of Piacenti’s complaint in
intervention.
“To survive a motion to dismiss [pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). To assess
the sufficiency of a complaint, the court first identifies conclusory allegations and
disregards them, for they are “not entitled to the assumption of truth,” and then
considers whether the remaining allegations “plausibly suggest an entitlement to
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relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603
(5th Cir. 2009) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
A court generally may not “go outside the complaint” in considering a Rule
12(b)(6) motion but may consider “the complaint, any documents attached to the
complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to
the claim and referenced by the complaint.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays
Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted); Scanlan v. Tex. A&M
Univ., 343 F.3d 533, 536 (5th Cir. 2003).
After reviewing Piacenti’s complaint, Dill’s motion to dismiss, and Piacenti’s
response, the undersigned finds that Piacenti has stated plausible claims for purposes
of defeating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. The complaint and the exhibits attached thereto
establish that Dill and Piacenti agreed to a contingent-fee agreement, under which
Piacenti agreed to represent Dill in exchange for a contingency fee of the greater of
40 percent of all value received or any award of attorney’s fees and advancing all
litigation expenses. (See Dkt. No. 99 at ECF p. 3, ¶ 9.) The fee agreements provide
that if Dill terminated the representation without good cause, Piacenti is entitled to
the greater of 40 percent of all value received or any fee award, and if terminated for
good cause, Piacenti is entitled to recover in quantum meruit. (See id. at ECF p. 3-4,
¶¶ 9-10; id. at ECF p. 12, Exhibit A ¶ 11; id. at ECF p. 19, Exhibit B ¶ 11.)
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In his motion, Dill asserts that Piacenti twice voluntarily resigned, abandoned
multiple active matters, and left Dill to litigate alone. (See Dkt. No. 100 at 1.) He
also argues that by withdrawing from the representation, Piacenti “forfeit[ed] his
rights to compensation.” (Id. at 3 (citing Mandell & Wright v. Thomas, 441 S.W.2d
841(Tex. 1969)). Dill further argues that Piacenti’s “misconduct and disloyalty,” as
well as “public policy and Rule 11 considerations,” bar quantum meruit recovery.
(See id. at 4 (citing Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. 1999) and Rule 11(b)(1) &
(3)).) 	As such, Dill makes no arguments that credibly challenge Piacenti’s claims,
but rather, raises fact issues on the merits that are not appropriate for resolution at
the motion-to-dismiss stage. The Court will fully examine these factual issues at the
appropriate time to determine whether Dill is liable to Piacenti for his claimed
interest in any settlement or recovery.
III. RECOMMENDATION
The undersigned magistrate judge recommends that Dill’s motion to dismiss
Piacenti’s Intervenor Complaint (Dkt. No. 100) be DENIED.
SO RECOMMENDED on January 16, 2026.
BRIAN McKAY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the manner
provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and recommendation
must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). To be specific, an objection must identify
the finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the
objection, and indicate the place in the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation
where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to
file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual
findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by
the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. 	See Douglass v. United Services
Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds,
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time to file objections to 14 days).
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