Restoration 1 Franchise Holding LLC v. Coast 2 Coast Restoration LLC et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
RESTORATION 1 FRANCHISE 	§
HOLDING, LLC, 	§
§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
V. 	§ 	No. 3:23-cv-549-D
§
COAST 2 COAST RESTORATION 	§
LLC, ET AL., 	§
§
Defendants. 	§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Following a bench trial, the Court entered findings of fact and conclusions of
law [Dkt. No. 116] and a corresponding final judgment that ordered, adjudged, and
decreed that
Defendant Coast 2 Coast Restoration LLC, Robert A. Lee, Jr., and
Anthony Aceto, jointly and severally, shall pay to Plaintiff Restoration
1 Franchise Holding, LLC $274,751.67 in damages, plus prejudgment
interest at Texas’s statutory rate of 7.5% per annum on $274,751.67,
from 	March 	13, 	2023, 	to 	the 	date 	of 	Judgment, 	plus 	reasonable
attorney’s fees and costs to be determined, plus postjudgment interest
at the legal rate on all sums awarded pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a),
compounded annually, from the date of this Judgment until paid in full,
and for all of which execution may issue [and] that Coast 2 Coast
Restoration LLC, Robert A. Lee, Jr., and Anthony Aceto shall take
nothing on their claims.
Dkt. No. 117.
Restoration 1 then moved for attorneys’ fees and costs. See Dkt. No. 119.
And 	the 	Court 	referred 	the 	motion 	to 	the 	undersigned 	United 	States
magistrate judge for recommendation or determination. See Dkt. No. 120; 28 U.S.C.
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§ 636(b); FED . R. C IV. P 72(b); FED . R. C IV. P. 54(d)(2)(D) (“[T]he court may refer … a
motion for attorney’s fees to a magistrate judge under Rule 72(b) as if it were a
dispositive pretrial matter.”).
Defendants responded. See Dkt. No. 122. But Restoration 1 did not file a reply
brief.
And, after Senior United States District Judge Barbara M. G. Lynn retired,
this case was reassigned to Senior United States District Judge Sidney A. Fitzwater,
but the post-judgment motion remains referred to the undersigned.
For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Court grant
in part and deny in part the motion for fees and costs.
Legal Standards
Restoration 1 moves for fees “both under a Texas statute and, if applicable, the
terms of the contract.” Dkt. No. 119, ¶ 18. And, while Defendants do not agree that
the amount of fees requested is reasonable nor agree that all fees requested are
recoverable, they do not contest the legal basis for Restoration 1’s request. See
generally Dkt. No. 122 (concluding that the Court should “limit the award to
$300,000.00, including expenses”).
Texas law applies to a request for fees as a prevailing party on a claim made
under Texas law. See Ingalls Shipbuilding v. Fed. Ins. Co., 410 F.3d 214, 230 (5th
Cir. 2005) (“The award of attorneys’ fees is governed by the law of the state whose
substantive law is applied to the underlying claims.” (footnote omitted)); accord
Mathis v. Exxon Corp., 302 F.3d 448, 461 (5th Cir. 2002) (“State law controls both the
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award of and the reasonableness of fees awarded where state law supplies the rule of
decision.”).
“Texas law permits an award for attorney’s fees only if authorized by statute
or contract.” Bennigan’s Franchising Co., LLC v. Team Irish, No. 3:11-cv-364-D, 2011
WL 3903068, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 6, 2011) (citing Int’l Grp. P’ship v. KB Home Lone
Star L.P., 295 S.W.3d 650, 653 (Tex. 2009); Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212
S.W.3d 299, 310-11 (Tex. 2006)).
And, “[w]hen a prevailing party in a breach of contract suit seeks attorney’s
fees, an award of reasonable fees is mandatory under § 38.001 [of the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code] if there is proof that the fees are reasonable.” Id. at *3
(citations omitted).
“In addition to the statutory right to recover attorney’s fees under the
provisions of § 38.001, ‘[p]arties are free to contract for a fee-recovery standard either
looser or stricter than Chapter 38.’” Id. (quoting KB Home, 295 S.W.3d at 653; citation
omitted). In that case, “the terms of the contract, not statute, control the outcome of
the case.” Id. (cleaned up).
And, under Texas law, a prevailing party authorized “to obtain attorney’s fees
from the opposing party” still “must prove that the requested fees are both reasonable
and necessary.” Aircraft Holding Sols., LLC v. Learjet, Inc., No. 3:18-cv-823-D, 2023
WL 5311486, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2023) (quoting Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW
DVA Healthcare, LLP, 578 S.W.3d 469, 489 (Tex. 2019) (citing In re Nat’l Lloyds Ins.
Co., 532 S.W.3d 794, 809 (Tex. 2017))).
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The preferred method of federal courts calculating reasonable
attorneys’ fees under Texas law is the lodestar method. See Fairmont
Specialty Ins. Co. v. Apodaca, 234 F. Supp. 3d 843, 852 (S.D. Tex. 2017)
(citing Rappaport v. State Farm Lloyds, 275 F.3d 1079 (5th Cir. 2001)
(per curiam)). The lodestar method is a two-step process. Combs v. City
of Huntington, 829 F.3d 388, 391 (5th Cir. 2016). First, courts calculate
the lodestar by multiplying the “number of hours reasonably expended
... by the prevailing hourly rate in the community for similar work.” Id.
at 392 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Wease v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, No. 3:13-cv-4107-B, 2021 WL 4991079, at *2 (N.D.
Tex. Oct. 27, 2021).
There is a strong presumption of the reasonableness of the lodestar amount.
See Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542, 552 (2010); Saizan v. Delta Concrete Prods.,
Inc., 448 F.3d 795, 800 (5th Cir. 2006).
And, so, “[i]f a party does not object to particular billing entries as inadequately
documented, the court is not obligated sua sponte to sift through fee records searching
for vague entries or block billing,” so “[i]t is a common practice for courts to address
only those potentially inadequate entries brought to the court’s attention.” Hoffman
v. L & M Arts, No. 3:10-cv-953-D, 2015 WL 3999171, at *5 (N.D. Tex. July 1, 2015).
And the Court should not “eliminate wholesale the services of attorneys
without identifying the particular services which are regarded as duplicative.” Tasby
v. Estes, 651 F.2d 287, 289-90 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981) (cleaned up).
Instead, 	“[p]ercentage 	reductions 	are 	appropriate 	when 	attorneys
impermissibly engage in block billing or fail to exercise billing judgment” – including
by failing to write off time spent on work that was redundant and in hindsight may
have been unnecessary – or “when a court reduces excessive time spent on particular
legal services” or for particular services that are “duplicative.” Fralick v. Plumbers &
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Pipefitters Nat’l Pension Fund, No. 3:09-cv-752-D, 2011 WL 487754, at *13 (N.D. Tex.
Feb. 11, 2011); Shepherd v. Dallas Cnty., Tex., No. 3:05-cv-1442-D, 2009 WL 977294,
at *2 n.3 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 10, 2009); accord Saizan, 448 F.3d at 799 (“The proper
remedy for omitting evidence of billing judgment does not include a denial of fees but,
rather, a reduction of the award by a percentage intended to substitute for the
exercise of billing judgment.” (cleaned up)); Cookston v. Freeman, Inc., No. 3:98-cv-
2106-D, 1999 WL 714760, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 14, 1999).
After calculating the lodestar, “Texas courts then apply the eight Arthur
Andersen factors to determine whether the lodestar should be adjusted.” Wease, 2021
WL 4991079, at *2 (citing Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d
812, 818 (Tex. 1997); footnote omitted).
These factors are:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved, and the skill required to perform the legal service
properly;
(2) the likelihood ... that the acceptance of the particular employment
will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers
performing the services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained or
uncertainty of collection before the legal services have been rendered.
Id. at *2 n.7 (formatting modified; quoting Arthur Andersen, 945 S.W.2d at 818).
“[T]he base lodestar figure accounts for most of the relevant Arthur Andersen
considerations.” Rohrmoos, 578 S.W.3d at 500.
“The relevant factors are similar to those articulated in Johnson[ v. Georgia
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Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974), overruled on other
grounds by Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 90 (1989).]” El Campo Ventures LLC
v. Stratton Secs. Inc., No. 1:20-CV-00560-RP, 2022 WL 1518926, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Feb.
1, 2022) (footnote omitted), rec. adopted, 2022 WL 17735386 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 23,
2022).
And, in the end, the Court need only “provide a reasonably specific explanation
for all aspects of a fee determination.” Portillo v. Cunningham, 872 F.3d 728, 741 (5th
Cir. 2017) (cleaned up).
So “rulings on fee awards need not ‘be so excruciatingly explicit’ that those
decisions ‘consume more paper than did the cases from which they arose.’” Saldivar
v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 675 F. App’x 429, 432-33 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam)
(quoting In re High Sulfur Content Gasoline Prods. Liab. Litig., 517 F.3d 220, 228-29
(5th Cir. 2008)).
Instead, this Court’s “analysis [must be] ‘complete enough’ for [the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit] to review ‘whether the [C]ourt has used
proper factual criteria in exercising its discretion to fix just compensation.’” Id.
(quoting Brantley v. Surles, 804 F.2d 321, 325-26 (5th Cir. 1986)).
“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) permits a district court to provide
costs, other than attorney’s fees, to the ‘prevailing party.’” Mercer v. Patterson-UTI
Drilling Co., L.L.C., 717 F. App’x 400, 406 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). And, in this
circuit, the “rule is that: Unless a federal statute, the Federal Rules, or a court order
provides otherwise, costs – other than attorney’s fees – should be allowed to the
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prevailing party.” Vital v. Nat’l Oilwell Varco, L.P., 685 F. App’x 355, 360 (5th Cir.
2017) (per curiam) (cleaned up); see also Cheatham v. Allstate Ins. Co., 465 F.3d 578,
586 (5th Cir. 2006) (“There is a strong presumption under Rule 54(d)(1) that the
prevailing party will be awarded costs.”).
28 U.S.C. “§ 1920 defines the term ‘costs’ as used in Rule 54(d).” Crawford
Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 441 (1987). And the United States
“Supreme Court has indicated that federal courts may only award those costs
articulated in section 1920 absent explicit statutory or contractual authorization to
the 	contrary.” 	Cook 	Children’s 	Med. 	Ctr. 	v. 	The 	N. 	Engl. 	PPO 	Plan 	of 	Gen.
Consolidation Mgmt. Inc., 491 F.3d 266, 274 (5th Cir. 2007) (cleaned up).
“Taxable costs are limited to relatively minor, incidental expenses as is evident
from § 1920” and “are a fraction of the nontaxable expenses borne by litigants for
attorneys, experts, consultants, and investigators,” such that “costs almost always
amount to less than the successful litigant’s total expenses in connection with a
lawsuit.” Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560, 563 (2012) (cleaned up).
In short, “taxable costs are limited by statute and are modest in scope.” Id.
The party seeking recovery of costs bears the “burden of justifying the necessity
of obtaining the depositions and copies at issue.” Fogleman v. ARAMCO (Arabian Am.
Oil Co.), 920 F.2d 278, 286 (5th Cir. 1991). And the Court “may decline to award the
costs listed in the statute but may not award costs omitted from the list.” Coats v.
Penrod Drilling Corp., 5 F.3d 877, 891 (5th Cir. 1993) (cleaned up). That is,
a district court may, but is not required to, deny a prevailing party costs
where suit was brought in good faith and denial is based on at least one
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of 	the 	following 	factors: 	“(1) 	the 	losing 	party’s 	limited 	financial
resources; (2) misconduct by the prevailing party; (3) close and difficult
legal issues presented; (4) substantial benefit conferred to the public;
and (5) the prevailing party’s enormous financial resources.”
Smith v. Chrysler Grp., L.L.C., 909 F.3d 744, 753 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Pacheo v.
Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 794 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing 10 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR
R. M ILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2668 at 234 (1998))).
In Pacheo, the Fifth Circuit “withheld judgment on whether ‘any of the above
factors is a sufficient reason to deny costs.’” Smith, 909 F.3d at 753 (cleaned up;
quoting Pacheo, 448 F.3d at 794 n.18). But the Court of Appeals later held that a
district court may not deny a prevailing party “its costs because of its comparative
ability to more easily bear the costs” – a holding that “is especially applicable in the
light of the ‘strong presumption that the prevailing party will be awarded costs.’” Id.
(quoting Pacheco, 448 F.3d at 793). And the Fifth Circuit has “never held that the
‘limited resources’ of the losing party provide a basis for denying the prevailing party
its costs.” U.S. ex rel. Long v. GSDMIdea City, L.L.C., 807 F.3d 125, 130 (5th Cir.
2015) (citation omitted).
Analysis
Restoration 1 was represented by two firms in this matter, Cheng Cohen LLC
and Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP, and it now “seeks $583,367.68 in incurred
costs and fees” – “this total consists of $428,522.40 in Cheng Cohen costs and fees
($425,781.00 in fees $2,741.40 in costs) and $154,845.28 in Gordon Rees costs and
fees ($146,804.50 in fees and $8,040.78 in costs).” Dkt. No. 119 at 6. Its motion is
supported by declarations from Aaron-Michael Sapp, with Cheng Cohen, and Soña J.
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Garcia, with Gordon Rees, both attaching each firm’s billing records. See Dkt. Nos.
119-1 & 119-2.
In addition to contending generally that, in their view, “the case was not
managed efficiently” and, “on some tasks, the billing was simply excessive,” while
“some of the expenses are unreasonable, excessive, and unsupported,” Defendants’
response, supported by an affidavit from its counsel, Richard A. Illmer, advances
several specific objections to Restoration 1’s request including that their invoices (1)
contain block billing, (2) time billed for clerical tasks, (3) duplication of multiple
attorneys’ time, and (4) requests for costs that are not recoverable. Dkt. No. 122-1.
Starting with the block-billing objections, the undersigned cannot find that the
Court should reduce the requested attorneys’ fees for this reason.
“The term ‘block billing’ refers to the disfavored ‘time-keeping method by which
each lawyer and legal assistant enters the total daily time spent working on a case,
rather than itemizing the time expended on specific tasks.’” Wyndham Props. II, Ltd.
v. Buca Tex. Rests., LP, No. 4:22-cv-166-BP, 2023 WL 2392090, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar.
7, 2023) (quoting Hoffman, 2015 WL 3999171, at *4 n.5 (quoting Fralick, 2011 WL
487754, at *4)).
“Block billing prevents the court from accurately determining the time spent
on any particular task, thus impairing the court’s evaluation of whether the hours
were reasonably expended.” Id. (cleaned up).
But “most courts that have addressed block billing have concluded that
denying all block-billed attorney’s fees is not appropriate” and have instead reduced
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the block-billed hours by a percentage. Id. (quoting Bramlett v. Med. Prot. Co. of Fort
Wayne, Ind., No. 3:09-cv-1596-D, 2010 WL 3294248, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 2010));
see, e.g., Bramlett, 2010 WL 3294248, at *4 (“Little’s affidavit provides no more than
block-billed entries with general descriptions of activities relating to successive
phases of the litigation. The large block of time each entry describes materially
interferes with the court’s ability to assess the reasonableness of the time expended.
Moreover, the entries provide no dates for the work, hampering the court’s ability to
assess the time frame over which the time was expended. The court will therefore
reduce Med Pro’s request for Little’s time by 25% and will award compensation only
for 130.65 hours.”).
Here, the undersigned cannot agree with Defendants that “R1’s invoices are
heavily block billed,” such that “R1 has not met its burden to provide sufficient details
of the work performed so the court can make a meaningful review of the fee request.”
Dkt. No. 122 at 4; see Dkt. No. 122-2 (Defendants’ exhibit of their assessment of block-
billed entries).
For example, the entries that Defendants highlight in their exhibit include the
initials of the timekeeper and a narrative description of the work performed and,
except for four, those entries are for less than six hours – and many are much shorter.
See Dkt. No. 122-2. But even the lengthier entries do not amount to impermissible
block billing that “impair[s] the [C]ourt’s evaluation of whether the hours were
reasonably expended.” Wyndham, 2023 WL 2392090, at *3; see, e.g., id. at *4 (“After
reviewing the entire record, Wick Phillips’ entries include the attorney's initials, date,
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number of hours expended, and a brief description of the work performed. Further,
the block-billed entries are not for large amounts of time. Often, Buca’s entries are
for fewer than six hours. The longer time entries offer more substantive, detailed
descriptions of the different types of work performed during those periods by
particular lawyers. The Court finds that the block-billed time entries do not make it
‘impossible to conduct meaningful review and determine the precise number of hours
that should be reduced.’ Therefore, the Court does not reduce the fees claimed due to
block billing.” (cleaned up; quoting Barrow v. Greenville Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 3:00-
cv-913-D, 2005 WL 6789456 at *12 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 20, 2005)).
Defendants next object that
attorneys frequently billed for the following clerical and administrative
tasks that should have been delegated to a paralegal or junior attorney:
[d]rafting pro hac vice motions, initial disclosures, scheduling orders,
protective orders; and [p]reparing documents for production.
Likewise, seasoned attorneys at partner level rates frequently
billed for the following clerical and administrative tasks: [d]rafting
scheduling orders, initial disclosures, protective orders, simple motions
(motion 	to 	substitute 	counsel, 	motion 	for 	leave, 	motion 	regarding
witness unavailability, etc.), and simple discovery requests/responses.
Dkt. No. 122 at 7-8 (cleaned up).
Similarly, Defendants object to invoices reflecting time that paralegals spent
on clerical and administrative tasks. See id. at 10-11; see, e.g., id. at 10 (“Allen
frequently billed for tasks such as: (1) filing documents; (2) calendaring dates; (3)
retrieving documents; (3) uploading documents to the case file; (4) preparing binders;
and (5) scheduling court reporters.”).
It’s well-established that “clerical entries … such as filing court documents,
calendaring events, processing billing invoices, and requesting copies of documents”
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are “‘not recoverable in an award of attorneys’ fees.’” Wyndham, 2023 WL 2392090,
at *5 (quoting Black v. SettlePou, P.C., No. 3:10-cv-1418-K, 2014 WL 3534991, at *6
(N.D. Tex. July 17, 2014); citing Tovar v. Sw. Bell Tel., L.P., No. 3:20-cv-1455-B, 2022
WL 2306926 (N.D. Tex. June 27, 2022)); see also Vela v. City of Hous., 276 F.3d 659,
681 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Paralegal work can only be recovered as attorney’s fees if the
work is legal rather than clerical.” (citing Allen v. U.S. Steel Corp., 665 F.2d 689, 697
(5th Cir. 1982))); Tovar, 2022 WL 2306926, at *5 (“The court should consider whether
the work performed was legal work in the strict sense or was merely clerical work
that happened to be performed by a lawyer.” (cleaned up; quoting Abrams v. Baylor
Coll. of Med., 805 F.2d 528, 536 (5th Cir. 1986))).
And, 	while 	the 	undersigned 	recommends 	that 	the 	Court 	not 	sustain
Defendants’ objections to what they consider to be Restoration 1’s inefficient use of
attorneys’ time performing legal work, see, e.g., Dkt. No. 122 at 4-9 – particularly
considering the billing judgment detailed in Mr. Sapp’s declaration, see, e.g., Dkt. No.
119-1, ¶¶ 18-17 – Defendants’ points as to time billed for clerical work are well-taken,
see, e.g., Dkt. No. 122 at 9-10.
And, by not filing a reply, Restoration 1 has not objected to Defendants’
suggestion that the Court reduce the paralegal portion of its invoice to account for
time spent on clerical or administrative tasks:
The paralegal portion of the R1’s attorneys’ fee request should be
reduced 	by 	fifty 	percent 	(50%) 	($13,314.00) 	to 	account 	for 	non-
recoverable administrative and clerical tasks billed by paralegals.
Moreover, Allen, Johnson, and Grossman frequently billed for
duplicative tasks. Allen billed 16 hours to “compile,” “work on,” “review,”
and “revise” trial exhibits and exhibit list.
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Johnson billed 24.3 hours to “work on,” “review,” and “update”
trial exhibits and exhibit list. Grossman then billed 18.5 hours to
“review” and “prepare” trial exhibits.
Billing 	over 	58 	hours 	alone 	on 	trial 	exhibits 	is 	not 	only
duplicative, but unreasonable and excessive. This paralegal portion of
the R1’s attorneys’ fee request should be reduced by fifty percent (50%)
($7,250.00) to account for the duplicative tasks billed by paralegals.
Dkt. No. 122-1, ¶¶ 24-26.
Given the volume of time entries before the Court, this is not an unreasonable
approach. And the undersigned recommends that the Court reduce the lodestar
accordingly.
And, so, having carefully reviewed Mr. Sapp’s and Ms. Garcia’s declarations
and the attached billing records, the undersigned finds the number of hours to be
reasonable 	and 	necessary 	and 	not 	excessive, 	duplicative, 	or 	inadequately
documented, except as noted above.
And the undersigned finds (1) that the appropriate lodestar here to be
calculated 	(at 	least 	initially) 	as 	1,484.5 	hours 	at 	a 	blended 	hourly 	rate 	of
approximately (or just shy of) $385.71, for a total of $572,585.50 (867.3 hours at a
blended hourly rate of just shy of $490.93 for Cheng Cohen; 617.2 hours at a blended
hourly rate just shy of $237.86 for Gordon Rees) and (2) that this total should be
reduced by $20,564, to account for unrecoverable clerical tasks included the invoices.
And, so, the appropriate adjusted lodestar amounts to $552,021.50.
And, while the undersigned has considered the Arthur Andersen factors, the
lodestar (as adjusted) is presumed to be reasonable and should only be modified in
exceptional cases.
So the undersigned determines that no enhancement is warranted under the
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circumstances and that there are no other exceptional circumstances.
Turning to costs then, Restoration 1 seeks (1) $602 for filing fees, see Dkt. No.
119-1, ¶ 33; (2) $2,139.40 “for court reporter fees and deposition transcript cost,” id.;
see also id. at 50 (identified as “Court reporter fee (Bizzaro deposition)” and
“Transcripts (Amy Cheng Deposition)”); and (3) “$8,040.78 in litigation expenses for
defense of the claims brought by [Defendants, as] reflected in Exhibit C and are
recoverable pursuant to the Franchise Agreement,” Dkt. No. 119-2 at 4; see also id.
at 86, 136, & 141-42 (expenses listed in Gordon Rees’s bills, for deposition transcripts,
deposition fees, travel, delivery, reference materials, and experts, all of which, in
total, exceeds $8,040.78).
First, fees charged by the clerk are recoverable under Section 1920(1).
And Section 1920(2) authorizes recovery of the costs of a transcript so long as,
at the time that the transcript was made, it could reasonably be expected to be used
during trial or for trial preparation, rather than for the mere convenience of counsel
or merely for discovery. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Plambeck, 66 F. Supp.3d 782, 790
(N.D. Tex. 2014).
And some (or maybe all) of the deposition transcripts cited in Restoration 1’s
evidence may qualify as recoverable under Section 1920(2). But that has not been
shown to the Court through the conclusory record supporting the request for costs.
And the Court is not obligated to sift through the record (or hunt down a Franchise
Agreement) to verify Restoration 1’s counsel’s conclusions that these costs are
recoverable. And, so, the Court should award Restoration 1 $602 in costs.
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Recommendation
The Court should grant in part and deny in part Plaintiff Restoration 1
Franchise Holding, LLC’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs [Dkt. No. 119] to the
extent that it should award attorneys’ fees of $552,021.50 and costs of $602 against
Defendants Coast 2 Coast Restoration LLC, Robert A. Lee, Jr., and Anthony Aceto.
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these
findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections
within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED . R. CIV.
P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or
recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation
where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure
to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the
factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or
adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
DATED: February 13, 2026
_________________________________________
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case 3:23-cv-00549-D Document 123 Filed 02/13/26 Page 15 of 15 PageID <pageID>